Whether the Human Nature Was United to the Word of G.o.d Accidentally?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human nature was united to the Word of G.o.d accidentally. For the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) of the Son of G.o.d, that He was "in habit found as a man." But habit is accidentally a.s.sociated with that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for one of the ten predicaments or as a species of quality.
Therefore human nature is accidentally united to the Son of G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in being comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can come or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came to Christ in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it came to Him accidentally.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or the essence of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the Divine Essence or Nature of the Son of G.o.d, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said above (A. 1). Hence the human nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of G.o.d.
Obj. 4: Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the human nature was the instrument of the G.o.dhead in Christ, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), that "the flesh of Christ is the instrument of the G.o.dhead." Therefore it seems that the human nature was united to the Son of G.o.d accidentally.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates, not substance, but quant.i.ty, or quality, or some other mode of being.
If therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we say Christ is man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or quant.i.ty, or some other mode of being, which is contrary to the Decretal of Pope Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): "Since Christ is perfect G.o.d and perfect man, what foolhardiness have some to dare to affirm that Christ as man is not a substance?"
_I answer that,_ In evidence of this question we must know that two heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches and Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature resulted, so that they confessed Christ to be "from" two natures (which were distinct before the union), but not "in" two natures (the distinction of nature coming to an end after the union). The second was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the persons. For they held the Person of the Son of G.o.d to be distinct from the Person of the Son of man, and said these were mutually united: first, "by indwelling," inasmuch as the Word of G.o.d dwelt in the man, as in a temple; secondly, "by unity of intention,"
inasmuch as the will of the man was always in agreement with the will of the Word of G.o.d; thirdly, "by operation," inasmuch as they said the man was the instrument of the Word of G.o.d; fourthly, "by greatness of honor," inasmuch as all honor shown to the Son of G.o.d was equally shown to the Son of man, on account of His union with the Son of G.o.d; fifthly, "by equivocation," i.e. communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this man is G.o.d and the Son of G.o.d. Now it is plain that these modes imply an accidental union.
But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies, through ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in Christ, but maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that a man, composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his conception a.s.sumed by the Word of G.o.d. And this is the first opinion set down by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But others desirous of keeping the unity of person, held that the soul of Christ was not united to the body, but that these two were mutually separate, and were united to the Word accidentally, so that the number of persons might not be increased. And this is the third opinion which the Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6).
But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the first, indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above (A.
3). And if stress is laid on the word "person," we must have in mind that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the unity of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council (Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anathema against such a one as holds "one person in dignity, honor and adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius foolishly wrote." But the other opinion falls into the error of Nestorius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is no difference in saying that the Word of G.o.d is united to the Man Christ by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nestorius said), or by putting on man, as a garment, which is the third opinion; rather it says something worse than Nestorius--to wit, that the soul and body are not united.
Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid positions, does not affirm that the union of G.o.d and man took place in the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway, in a subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council (Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) we read: "Since the unity may be understood in many ways, those who follow the impiety of Apollinaris and Eutyches, professing the destruction of what came together" (i.e. destroying both natures), "confess a union by mingling; but the followers of Theodore and Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of purpose. But the Holy Church of G.o.d, rejecting the impiety of both these treasons, confesses a union of the Word of G.o.d with flesh, by composition, which is in subsistence."
Therefore it is plain that the second of the three opinions, mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which holds one hypostasis of G.o.d and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an article of Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which holds two hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union, are not to be styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in Councils.
Reply Obj. 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26): "Examples need not be wholly and at all points similar, for what is wholly similar is the same, and not an example, and especially in Divine things, for it is impossible to find a wholly similar example in the Theology," i.e. in the G.o.dhead of Persons, "and in the Dispensation,"
i.e. the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the human nature in Christ is likened to a habit, i.e. a garment, not indeed in regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as the Word is seen by the human nature, as a man by his garment, and also inasmuch as the garment is changed, for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account of the garment. So likewise the human nature a.s.sumed by the Word of G.o.d is enn.o.bled, but the Word of G.o.d is not changed, as Augustine says (Qq.
83, qu. 73).
Reply Obj. 2: Whatever accrues after the completion of the being comes accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the complete being, just as in the resurrection the body comes to the soul which pre-exists, yet not accidentally, because it is a.s.sumed unto the same being, so that the body has vital being through the soul; but it is not so with whiteness, for the being of whiteness is other than the being of man to which whiteness comes. But the Word of G.o.d from all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the human nature accrued to it, not as if it were a.s.sumed unto one being inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the body is a.s.sumed to the being of the soul), but to one being inasmuch as this is of the hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not accidentally united to the Son of G.o.d.
Reply Obj. 3: Accident is divided against substance. Now substance, as is plain from _Metaph._ v, 25, is taken in two ways: first, for essence or nature; secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis--hence the union having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show that it is not an accidental union, although the union did not take place in the nature.
Reply Obj. 4: Not everything that is a.s.sumed as an instrument pertains to the hypostasis of the one who a.s.sumes, as is plain in the case of a saw or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is a.s.sumed into the unity of the hypostasis from being as an instrument, even as the body of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the human nature was a.s.sumed by the Word merely as an instrument, and not into the unity of the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede that the man was really the Son of G.o.d, but His instrument. Hence Cyril says (Epist. ad Monach. Aegyptii): "The Scripture does not affirm that this Emmanuel," i.e. Christ, "was a.s.sumed for the office of an instrument, but as G.o.d truly humanized," i.e. made man. But Damascene held that the human nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to the unity of the hypostasis.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 7]
Whether the Union of the Divine Nature and the Human Is Anything Created?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Divine and human natures is not anything created. For there can be nothing created in G.o.d, because whatever is in G.o.d is G.o.d. But the union is in G.o.d, for G.o.d Himself is united to human nature. Therefore it seems that the union is not anything created.
Obj. 2: Further, the end holds first place in everything. But the end of the union is the Divine hypostasis or Person in which the union is terminated. Therefore it seems that this union ought chiefly to be judged with reference to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which is not anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created.
Obj. 3: Further, "That which is the cause of a thing being such is still more so" (Poster. i). But man is said to be the Creator on account of the union. Therefore much more is the union itself nothing created, but the Creator.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever has a beginning in time is created. Now this union was not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore the union is something created.
_I answer that,_ The union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they come together in one Person of the Son of G.o.d. Now, as was said above (I, Q. 13, A. 7), every relation which we consider between G.o.d and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in G.o.d, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in G.o.d. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in G.o.d, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is something created.
Reply Obj. 1: This union is not really in G.o.d, but only in our way of thinking, for G.o.d is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really united to G.o.d without any change in Him.
Reply Obj. 2: The specific nature of a relation, as of motion, depends on the subject. And since this union has its being nowhere save in a created nature, as was said above, it follows that it has a created being.
Reply Obj. 3: A man is called Creator and is G.o.d because of the union, inasmuch as it is terminated in the Divine hypostasis; yet it does not follow that the union itself is the Creator or G.o.d, because that a thing is said to be created regards its being rather than its relation.
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EIGHTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 8]
Whether Union Is the Same As a.s.sumption?
Objection 1: It would seem that union is the same as a.s.sumption. For relations, as motions, are specified by their termini. Now the term of a.s.sumption and union is one and the same, viz. the Divine hypostasis. Therefore it seems that union and a.s.sumption are not different.
Obj. 2: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the same thing seems to be what unites and what a.s.sumes, and what is united and what is a.s.sumed. But union and a.s.sumption seem to follow the action and pa.s.sion of the thing uniting and the united, of the thing a.s.suming and the a.s.sumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as a.s.sumption.
Obj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "Union is one thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation, and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and humanation determine the end of copulation." But likewise a.s.sumption does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it seems that union is the same as a.s.sumption.
_On the contrary,_ The Divine Nature is said to be united, not a.s.sumed.
_I answer that,_ As was stated above (A. 7), union implies a certain relation of the Divine Nature and the human, according as they come together in one Person. Now all relations which begin in time are brought about by some change; and change consists in action and pa.s.sion. Hence the _first_ and princ.i.p.al difference between a.s.sumption and union must be said to be that union implies the relation: whereas a.s.sumption implies the action, whereby someone is said to a.s.sume, or the pa.s.sion, whereby something is said to be a.s.sumed. Now from this difference another _second_ difference arises, for a.s.sumption implies _becoming,_ whereas union implies _having become,_ and therefore the thing uniting is said to be united, but the thing a.s.suming is not said to be a.s.sumed. For the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of a.s.sumption unto the Divine hypostasis when man is spoken of; and hence we can truly say that the Son of G.o.d, Who a.s.sumes human nature unto Himself, is man. But human nature, considered in itself, i.e. in the abstract, is viewed as a.s.sumed; and we do not say the Son of G.o.d is human nature. From this same follows a _third_ difference, which is that a relation, especially one of equiparance, is no more to one extreme than to the other, whereas action and pa.s.sion bear themselves differently to the agent and the patient, and to different termini. And hence a.s.sumption determines the term whence and the term whither; for a.s.sumption means a taking to oneself from another. But union determines none of these things.
Hence it may be said indifferently that the human nature is united with the Divine, or conversely. But the Divine Nature is not said to be a.s.sumed by the human, but conversely, because the human nature is joined to the Divine personality, so that the Divine Person subsists in human nature.
Reply Obj. 1: Union and a.s.sumption have not the same relation to the term, but a different relation, as was said above.
Reply Obj. 2: What unites and what a.s.sumes are not the same. For whatsoever Person a.s.sumes unites, and not conversely. For the Person of the Father united the human nature to the Son, but not to Himself; and hence He is said to unite and not to a.s.sume. So likewise the united and the a.s.sumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature is said to be united, but not a.s.sumed.
Reply Obj. 3: a.s.sumption determines with whom the union is made on the part of the one a.s.suming, inasmuch as a.s.sumption means taking unto oneself (_ad se sumere_), whereas incarnation and humanation (determine with whom the union is made) on the part of the thing a.s.sumed, which is flesh or human nature. And thus a.s.sumption differs logically both from union and from incarnation or humanation.
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NINTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 2, Art. 9]
Whether the Union of the Two Natures in Christ Is the Greatest of All Unions?
Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the two natures in Christ is not the greatest of all unions. For what is united falls short of the unity of what is one, since what is united is by partic.i.p.ation, but one is by essence. Now in created things there are some that are simply one, as is shown especially in unity itself, which is the principle of number. Therefore the union of which we are speaking does not imply the greatest of all unions.
Obj. 2: Further, the greater the distance between things united, the less the union. Now, the things united by this union are most distant--namely, the Divine and human natures; for they are infinitely apart. Therefore their union is the least of all.
Obj. 3: Further, from union there results one. But from the union of soul and body in us there arises what is one in person and nature; whereas from the union of the Divine and human nature there results what is one in person only. Therefore the union of soul and body is greater than that of the Divine and human natures; and hence the union of which we speak does not imply the greatest unity.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 10) that "man is in the Son of G.o.d, more than the Son in the Father." But the Son is in the Father by unity of essence, and man is in the Son by the union of the Incarnation. Therefore the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the Divine Essence, which nevertheless is the greatest union; and thus the union of the Incarnation implies the greatest unity.
_I answer that,_ Union implies the joining of several in some one thing. Therefore the union of the Incarnation may be taken in two ways: first, in regard to the things united; secondly, in regard to that in which they are united. And in this regard this union has a pre-eminence over other unions; for the unity of the Divine Person, in which the two natures are united, is the greatest. But it has no pre-eminence in regard to the things united.
Reply Obj. 1: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than numerical unity, which is the principle of number. For the unity of a Divine Person is an uncreated and self-subsisting unity, not received into another by partic.i.p.ation. Also, it is complete in itself, having in itself whatever pertains to the nature of unity; and therefore it is not compatible with the nature of a part, as in numerical unity, which is a part of number, and which is shared in by the things numbered. And hence in this respect the union of the Incarnation is higher than numerical unity by reason of the unity of the Divine Person, and not by reason of the human nature, which is not the unity of the Divine Person, but is united to it.
Reply Obj. 2: This reason regards the things united, and not the Person in Whom the union takes place.
Reply Obj. 3: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than the unity of person and nature in us; and hence the union of the Incarnation is greater than the union of soul and body in us.
And because what is urged in the argument "on the contrary" rests upon what is untrue--namely, that the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the Divine Persons in Essence--we must say to the authority of Augustine that the human nature is not more in the Son of G.o.d than the Son of G.o.d in the Father, but much less. But the man in some respects is more in the Son than the Son in the Father--namely, inasmuch as the same suppositum is signified when I say "man," meaning Christ, and when I say "Son of G.o.d"; whereas it is not the same suppositum of Father and Son.