It must however be borne in mind that the term covered by the reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, since it is added as a predicate, which is taken formally, for it is the same to say "Christ as Man" and to say "Christ as He is a Man." Hence this is to be granted rather than denied: "Christ as Man is a creature." But if something further be added whereby [the term covered by the reduplication] is attracted to the suppositum, this proposition is to be denied rather than granted, for instance were one to say: "Christ as "this" Man is a creature."
Reply Obj. 1: Although Christ is not the human nature, He has human nature. Now the word "creature" is naturally predicated not only of abstract, but also of concrete things; since we say that "manhood is a creature" and that "man is a creature."
Reply Obj. 2: Man as placed in the subject refers to the suppositum--and as placed in the reduplication refers to the nature, as was stated above. And because the nature is created and the suppositum uncreated, therefore, although it is not granted that "this man is a creature," yet it is granted that "Christ as Man is a creature."
Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to every man who is a suppositum of human nature alone to have his being only in human nature. Hence of every such suppositum it follows that if it is a creature as man, it is a creature simply. But Christ is a suppositum not merely of human nature, but also of the Divine Nature, in which He has an uncreated being. Hence it does not follow that, if He is a creature as Man, He is a creature simply.
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ELEVENTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 11]
Whether This Is True: "Christ As Man Is G.o.d"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ, as Man, is G.o.d. For Christ is G.o.d by the grace of union. But Christ, as Man, has the grace of union. Therefore Christ as Man is G.o.d.
Obj. 2: Further, to forgive sins is proper to G.o.d, according to Isa.
43:25: "I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake." But Christ as Man forgives sin, according to Matt. 9:6: "But that you may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins," etc.
Therefore Christ as Man is G.o.d.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ is not Man in common, but is this particular Man. Now Christ, as this Man, is G.o.d, since by "this Man" we signify the eternal suppositum which is G.o.d naturally. Therefore Christ as Man is G.o.d.
_On the contrary,_ Whatever belongs to Christ as Man belongs to every man. Now, if Christ as Man is G.o.d, it follows that every man is G.o.d--which is clearly false.
_I answer that,_ This term "man" when placed in the reduplication may be taken in two ways. First as referring to the nature; and in this way it is not true that Christ as Man is G.o.d, because the human nature is distinct from the Divine by a difference of nature.
Secondly it may be taken as referring to the suppositum; and in this way, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the Person of the Son of G.o.d, to Whom it essentially belongs to be G.o.d, it is true that Christ, as Man, is G.o.d. Nevertheless because the term placed in the reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, as stated above (A. 10), hence this is to be denied rather than granted: "Christ as Man is G.o.d."
Reply Obj. 1: It is not with regard to the same, that a thing moves towards, and that it is, something; for to move belongs to a thing because of its matter or subject--and to be in act belongs to it because of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same, that it belongs to Christ to be ordained to be G.o.d by the grace of union, and to be G.o.d. For the first belongs to Him in His human nature, and the second, in His Divine Nature. Hence this is true: "Christ as Man has the grace of union"; yet not this: "Christ as Man is G.o.d."
Reply Obj. 2: The Son of Man has on earth the power of forgiving sins, not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the Divine Nature, in which Divine Nature resides the power of forgiving sins authoritatively; whereas in the human nature it resides instrumentally and ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this pa.s.sage says [*Implicitly. Hom. x.x.x in Matth; cf. St. Thomas, Catena Aurea on Mk. 2:10]: "He said pointedly "on earth to forgive sins," in order to show that by an indivisible union He united human nature to the power of the G.o.dhead, since although He was made Man, yet He remained the Word of G.o.d."
Reply Obj. 3: When we say "this man," the demonstrative p.r.o.noun "this" attracts "man" to the suppositum; and hence "Christ as this Man, is G.o.d, is a truer proposition than Christ as Man is G.o.d."
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TWELFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 16, Art. 12]
Whether This Is True: "Christ As Man Is a Hypostasis or Person"?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as Man is a hypostasis or person. For what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as Man, since He is like other men according to Phil. 2:7: "Being made in the likeness of men." But every man is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is a person.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ as Man is a substance of rational nature. But He is not a universal substance: therefore He is an individual substance. Now a person is nothing else than an individual substance of rational nature; as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). Therefore Christ as Man is a person.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ as Man is a being of human nature, and a suppositum and a hypostasis of the same nature. But every hypostasis and suppositum and being of human nature is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is a person.
_On the contrary,_ Christ as Man is not an eternal person. Therefore if Christ as Man is a person it would follow that in Christ there are two persons--one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous, as was said above (Q. 2, A. 6; Q. 4, A. 2).
_I answer that,_ As was said (AA. 10, 11), the term "Man" placed in the reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the nature. Hence when it is said: "Christ as Man is a person," if it is taken as referring to the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as Man is a person, since the suppositum of human nature is nothing else than the Person of the Son of G.o.d. But if it be taken as referring to the nature, it may be understood in two ways. First, we may so understand it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person, and in this way it is true, for whatever subsists in human nature is a person. Secondly it may be taken that in Christ a proper personality, caused by the principles of the human nature, is due to the human nature; and in this way Christ as Man is not a person, since the human nature does not exist of itself apart from the Divine Nature, and yet the notion of person requires this.
Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to every man to be a person, inasmuch as everything subsisting in human nature is a person. Now this is proper to the Man Christ that the Person subsisting in His human nature is not caused by the principles of the human nature, but is eternal.
Hence in one way He is a person, as Man; and in another way He is not, as stated above.
Reply Obj. 2: The "individual substance," which is included in the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else; otherwise, a man"s hand might be called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless, because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, can the human nature in Christ, although it may be called something individual and singular.
Reply Obj. 3: As a person signifies something complete and self-subsisting in rational nature, so a hypostasis, suppositum, and being of nature in the genus of substance, signify something that subsists of itself. Hence, as human nature is not of itself a person apart from the Person of the Son of G.o.d, so likewise it is not of itself a hypostasis or suppositum or a being of nature. Hence in the sense in which we deny that "Christ as Man is a person" we must deny all the other propositions.
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QUESTION 17
OF CHRIST"S UNITY OF BEING (In Two Articles)
We must now consider what pertains to Christ"s unity in common. For, in their proper place, we must consider what pertains to unity and plurality in detail: thus we concluded (Q. 9) that there is not only one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter (Q. 35, A. 2) that there is not only one nativity in Christ.
Hence we must consider Christ"s unity (1) of being; (2) of will; (3) of operation.
Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ is one or two?
(2) Whether there is only one being in Christ?
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FIRST ARTICLE [III, Q. 17, Art. 1]
Whether Christ Is One or Two?
Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not one, but two. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "Because the form of G.o.d took the form of a servant, both are G.o.d by reason of G.o.d Who a.s.sumed, yet both are Man by reason of the man a.s.sumed." Now "both" may only be said when there are two. Therefore Christ is two.
Obj. 2: Further, where there is one thing and another there are two.
Now Christ is one thing and another; for Augustine says (Enchiridion x.x.xv): "Being in the form of G.o.d ... He took the form of a servant ... being both in one; but He was one of these as Word, and the other as man." Therefore Christ is two.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ is not only man; for, if He were a mere man, He would not be G.o.d. Therefore He is something else than man, and thus in Christ there is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.
Obj. 4: Further, Christ is something that the Father is, and something that the Father is not. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.
Obj. 5: Further, as in the mystery of the Trinity there are three Persons in one Nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there are two natures in one Person. But on account of the unity of the Nature, notwithstanding the distinction of Person, the Father and Son are one, according to John 10:30: "I and the Father are one." Therefore, notwithstanding the unity of Person, Christ is two on account of the duality of nature.
Obj. 6: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text. 18) that "one" and "two" are predicated denominatively. Now Christ has a duality of nature. Therefore Christ is two.
Obj. 7: Further, as accidental form makes a thing otherwise (_alterum_) so does substantial form make another thing (_aliud_) as Porphyry says (Praedic.). Now in Christ there are two substantial natures, the human and the Divine. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "Whatever is, inasmuch as it is, is one." But we confess that Christ is. Therefore Christ is one.
_I answer that,_ Nature, considered in itself, as it is used in the abstract, cannot truly be predicated of the suppositum or person, except in G.o.d, in Whom "what it is" and "whereby it is" do not differ, as stated in the First Part (Q. 29, A. 4, ad 1). But in Christ, since there are two natures, viz. the Divine and the human, one of them, viz. the Divine, may be predicated of Him both in the abstract and in the concrete, for we say that the Son of G.o.d, Who is signified by the word Christ, is the Divine Nature and is G.o.d. But the human nature cannot be predicated of Christ in the abstract, but only in the concrete, i.e. as it is signified by the suppositum. For we cannot truly say that "Christ is human nature," because human nature is not naturally predicated of its suppositum. But we say that Christ is a man, even as Christ is G.o.d. Now G.o.d signifies one having the G.o.dhead, and man signifies one having manhood. Yet one having manhood is differently signified by the word "man" and by the word "Jesus" or "Peter." For this word "man" implies one having manhood indistinctly, even as the word "G.o.d" implies indistinctly one having the G.o.dhead; but the word "Peter" or "Jesus" implies one having manhood distinctly, i.e. with its determinate individual properties, as "Son of G.o.d" implies one having the G.o.dhead under a determinate personal property. Now the dual number is placed in Christ with regard to the natures. Hence, if both the natures were predicated in the abstract of Christ, it would follow that Christ is two. But because the two natures are not predicated of Christ, except as they are signified in the suppositum, it must be by reason of the suppositum that "one" or "two" be predicated of Christ.
Now some placed two supposita in Christ, and one Person, which, in their opinion, would seem to be the suppositum completed with its final completion. Hence, since they placed two supposita in Christ, they said that G.o.d is two, in the neuter. But because they a.s.serted one Person, they said that Christ is one, in the masculine, for the neuter gender signifies something unformed and imperfect, whereas the masculine signifies something formed and perfect. On the other hand, the Nestorians, who a.s.serted two Persons in Christ, said that Christ is two not only in the neuter, but also in the masculine. But since we maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ, as is clear from Q. 2, AA. 2, 3, it follows that we say that Christ is one not merely in the masculine, but also in the neuter.
Reply Obj. 1: This saying of Augustine is not to be taken as if "both" referred to the predicate, so as to mean that Christ is both; but it refers to the subject. And thus "both" does not stand for two supposita, but for two words signifying two natures in the concrete.
For I can say that "both, viz. G.o.d and Man, are G.o.d" on account of G.o.d Who a.s.sumes; and "both, viz. G.o.d and Man," are Man on account of the man a.s.sumed.
Reply Obj. 2: When it is said that "Christ is one thing and another,"