Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no will of sensuality besides the will of reason. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that "the will is in the reason, and in the sensitive appet.i.te are the irascible and concupiscible parts." Now sensuality signifies the sensitive appet.i.te. Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12, 13) the sensuality is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing serpent-like in Christ; for He had the likeness of a venomous animal without the venom, as Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 32). Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.
Obj. 3: Further, will is consequent upon nature, as was said (A. 1).
But in Christ there was only one nature besides the Divine. Hence in Christ there was only one human will.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 7): "Mine is the will which He calls His own; because as Man He a.s.sumed my sorrow." From this we are given to understand that sorrow pertains to the human will of Christ. Now sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said in the Second Part (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1; Q. 25, A. 1). Therefore, seemingly, in Christ there is a will of sensuality besides the will of reason.
_I answer that,_ As was said (Q. 9, A. 1), the Son of G.o.d a.s.sumed human nature together with everything pertaining to the perfection of human nature. Now in human nature is included animal nature, as the genus in its species. Hence the Son of G.o.d must have a.s.sumed together with the human nature whatever belongs to animal nature; one of which things is the sensitive appet.i.te, which is called the sensuality.
Consequently it must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual appet.i.te, or sensuality. But it must be borne in mind that sensuality or the sensual appet.i.te, inasmuch as it naturally obeys reason, is said to be "rational by partic.i.p.ation," as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). And because "the will is in the reason,"
as stated above, it may equally be said that the sensuality is "a will by partic.i.p.ation."
Reply Obj. 1: This argument is based on the will, essentially so called, which is only in the intellectual part; but the will by partic.i.p.ation can be in the sensitive part, inasmuch as it obeys reason.
Reply Obj. 2: The sensuality is signified by the serpent--not as regards the nature of the sensuality, which Christ a.s.sumed, but as regards the corruption of the _fomes,_ which was not in Christ.
Reply Obj. 3: "Where there is one thing on account of another, there seems to be only one" (Aristotle, _Topic._ iii); thus a surface which is visible by color is one visible thing with the color. So, too, because the sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes of the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ, even as there is but one human nature.
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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 18, Art. 3]
Whether in Christ There Were Two Wills As Regards the Reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that there is a double will in man, viz. the natural will which is called _thelesis_, and the rational will which is called _boulesis_. Now Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of human nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, the appet.i.tive power is diversified in man by the difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and intellective appet.i.te in man. But in the same way as regards man"s apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one intellectual and the other rational.
Obj. 3: Further, some [*Hugh of St. Victor, De Quat. Volunt. Christ.]
ascribe to Christ "a will of piety," which can only be on the part of reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of reason there are several wills.
_On the contrary,_ In every order there is one first mover. But the will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one man there is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of reason. But Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one human will.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), the will is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if the will is taken for the act, it is necessary to place two wills, i.e. two species of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the reason. For the will, as was said in the I-II, Q. 8, AA. 2, 3, regards both the end and the means; and is affected differently towards both. For towards the end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards what is good in itself; but towards the means it is borne under a certain relation, as the goodness of the means depends on something else.
Hence the act of the will, inasmuch as it is drawn to anything desired of itself, as health, which act is called by Damascene _thelesis_--i.e. simple will, and by the masters "will as nature," is different from the act of the will as it is drawn to anything that is desired only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and this act of the will Damascene calls _boulesis_--i.e. counseling will, and the masters, "will as reason." But this diversity of acts does not diversify the power, since both acts regard the one common ratio of the object, which is goodness. Hence we must say that if we are speaking of the power of the will, in Christ there is but one human will, essentially so called and not by partic.i.p.ation; but if we are speaking of the will as an act, we thus distinguish in Christ a will as nature, which is called _thelesis_, and a will as reason, which is called _boulesis_.
Reply Obj. 1: These two wills do not diversify the power but only the act, as we have said.
Reply Obj. 2: The intellect and the reason are not distinct powers, as was said in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 8).
Reply Obj. 3: The "will of piety" would not seem to be distinct from the will considered as nature, inasmuch as it shrinks from another"s evil, absolutely considered.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 18, Art. 4]
Whether There Was Free-will in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no free-will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that _gnome_, i.e. opinion, thinking or cogitation, and _proairesis_, i.e. choice, "cannot possibly be attributed to our Lord, if we wish to speak with propriety." But in the things of faith especially we must speak with propriety. Therefore there was no choice in Christ and consequently no free-will, of which choice is the act.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is "a desire of something after taking counsel." Now counsel does not appear to be in Christ, because we do not take counsel concerning such things as we are certain of. But Christ was certain of everything. Hence there was no counsel and consequently no free-will in Christ.
Obj. 3: Further, free-will is indifferent. But Christ"s will was determined to good, since He could not sin; as stated above (Q. 15, AA. 1, 2). Hence there was no free-will in Christ.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 7:15): "He shall eat b.u.t.ter and honey, that He may know to refuse the evil and to choose the good," which is an act of the free-will. Therefore there was free-will in Christ.
_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 3), there was a twofold act of the will in Christ; one whereby He was drawn to anything willed in itself, which implies the nature of an end; the other whereby His will was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordained to another--which pertains to the nature of means. Now, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) choice differs from will in this, that will of itself regards the end, while choice regards the means.
And thus simple will is the same as the "will as nature"; but choice is the same as the "will as reason," and is the proper act of free-will, as was said in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 3). Hence, since "will as reason" is placed in Christ, we must also place choice, and consequently free-will, whose act is choice, as was said in the First Part (Q. 83, A. 3; I-II, Q. 13, A. 1).
Reply Obj. 1: Damascene excludes choice from Christ, in so far as he considers that doubt is implied in the word choice. Nevertheless doubt is not necessary to choice, since it belongs even to G.o.d Himself to choose, according to Eph. 1:4: "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world," although in G.o.d there is no doubt. Yet doubt is accidental to choice when it is in an ignorant nature. We may also say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the pa.s.sage quoted.
Reply Obj. 2: Choice presupposes counsel; yet it follows counsel only as determined by judgment. For what we judge to be done, we choose, after the inquiry of counsel, as is stated (Ethic. iii, 2, 3). Hence if anything is judged necessary to be done, without any preceding doubt or inquiry, this suffices for choice. Therefore it is plain that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not essentially, but only when it is in an ignorant nature.
Reply Obj. 3: The will of Christ, though determined to good, is not determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as to the blessed, to choose with a free-will confirmed in good.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 18, Art. 5]
Whether the Human Will of Christ Was Altogether Conformed to the Divine Will in the Thing Willed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the human will in Christ did not will anything except what G.o.d willed. For it is written (Ps. 39:9) in the person of Christ: "That I should do Thy will: O my G.o.d, I have desired it." Now he who desires to do another"s will, wills what the other wills. Hence it seems that Christ"s human will willed nothing but what was willed by His Divine will.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ"s soul had most perfect charity, which, indeed, surpa.s.ses the comprehension of all our knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19, "the charity of Christ, which surpa.s.seth all knowledge." Now charity makes men will what G.o.d wills; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that one mark of friendship is "to will and choose the same." Therefore the human will in Christ willed nothing else than was willed by His Divine will.
Obj. 3: Further, Christ was a true comprehensor. But the Saints who are comprehensors in heaven will only what G.o.d wills, otherwise they would not be happy, because they would not obtain whatever they will, for "blessed is he who has what he wills, and wills nothing amiss,"
as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5). Hence in His human will Christ wills nothing else than does the Divine will.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "When Christ says "Not what I will, but what Thou wilt" He shows Himself to have willed something else than did His Father; and this could only have been by His human heart, since He did not transfigure our weakness into His Divine but into His human will."
_I answer that,_ As was said (AA. 2, 3), in Christ according to His human nature there is a twofold will, viz. the will of sensuality, which is called will by partic.i.p.ation, and the rational will, whether considered after the manner of nature, or after the manner of reason.
Now it was said above (Q. 13, A. 3, ad 1; Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2) that by a certain dispensation the Son of G.o.d before His Pa.s.sion "allowed His flesh to do and suffer what belonged to it." And in like manner He allowed all the powers of His soul to do what belonged to them. Now it is clear that the will of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible pains and bodily hurt. In like manner, the will as nature turns from what is against nature and what is evil in itself, as death and the like; yet the will as reason may at time choose these things in relation to an end, as in a mere man the sensuality and the will absolutely considered shrink from burning, which, nevertheless, the will as reason may choose for the sake of health. Now it was the will of G.o.d that Christ should undergo pain, suffering, and death, not that these of themselves were willed by G.o.d, but for the sake of man"s salvation. Hence it is plain that in His will of sensuality and in His rational will considered as nature, Christ could will what G.o.d did not; but in His will as reason He always willed the same as G.o.d, which appears from what He says (Matt. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt." For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should be fulfilled although He said that He willed something else by another will.
Reply Obj. 1: By His rational will Christ willed the Divine will to be fulfilled; but not by His will of sensuality, the movement of which does not extend to the will of G.o.d--nor by His will considered as nature which regards things absolutely considered and not in relation to the Divine will.
Reply Obj. 2: The conformity of the human will to the Divine regards the will of reason: according to which the wills even of friends agree, inasmuch as reason considers something willed in its relation to the will of a friend.
Reply Obj. 3: Christ was at once comprehensor and wayfarer, inasmuch as He was enjoying G.o.d in His mind and had a pa.s.sible body. Hence things repugnant to His natural will and to His sensitive appet.i.te could happen to Him in His pa.s.sible flesh.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 18, Art. 6]
Whether There Was Contrariety of Wills in Christ?
Objection 1: It would seem that there was contrariety of wills in Christ. For contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects, as contrariety of movements springs from contrariety of termini, as is plain from the Philosopher (Phys. v, text. 49, seq.). Now Christ in His different wills wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He wished for death, from which He shrank in His human will, hence Athanasius says [*De Incarnat. et Cont. Arianos, written against Apollinarius]: "When Christ says "Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pa.s.s from Me; yet not My will, but Thine be done," and again, "The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh weak," He denotes two wills--the human, which through the weakness of the flesh shrank from the pa.s.sion--and His Divine will eager for the pa.s.sion." Hence there was contrariety of wills in Christ.
Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh l.u.s.teth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." Now when the spirit desires one thing, and the flesh another, there is contrariety of wills. But this was in Christ; for by the will of charity which the Holy Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed the pa.s.sion, according to Isa. 53:7: "He was offered because it was His own will,"
yet in His flesh He shrank from the pa.s.sion. Therefore there was contrariety of wills in Him.
Obj. 3: Further, it is written (Luke 22:43) that "being in an agony, He prayed the longer." Now agony seems to imply a certain struggle [*Greek, _agonia_] in a soul drawn to contrary things. Hence it seems that there was contrariety of will in Christ.