Reply Obj. 1: In the present life one man"s thought is not known by another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of the grossness of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets.
The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not exist at all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in the angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body will show forth the quality of the soul; as to its amount of grace and of glory. In this way one will be able to see the mind of another.
Reply Obj. 2: Although one angel sees the intelligible species of another, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of these substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by actual consideration.
Reply Obj. 3: The appet.i.te of the brute does not control its act, but follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause.
Since, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, they can thereby know what is pa.s.sing in the appet.i.te or in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of man, in so far as the sensitive appet.i.te sometimes, through following some bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens in brutes. Yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the sensitive appet.i.te and the imaginative apprehension of man in so far as these are moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower part of the soul has some share of reason, as obeying its ruler, as is said in _Ethics_ iii, 12. But it does not follow that, if the angel knows what is pa.s.sing through man"s sensitive appet.i.te or imagination, he knows what is in the thought or will: because the intellect or will is not subject to the sensitive appet.i.te or the imagination, but can make various uses of them.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 5]
Whether the Angels Know the Mysteries of Grace?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace.
For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19): "This mystery was hidden in G.o.d through the ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly places." And the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:16): "That great mystery of G.o.dliness appeared unto angels*." [*Vulg.: "Great is the mystery of G.o.dliness, which ... appeared unto angels."] Therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace.
Obj. 2: Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained in the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold G.o.d"s wisdom, which is His essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace.
Obj. 3: Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew mysteries of grace; for it is said (Amos 3:7): "For the Lord G.o.d doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets."
Therefore angels know the mysteries of grace.
_On the contrary,_ No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated (Coel. Hier. vii) that "Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly essences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly": as is evident in Isa. 63:1, where, on the angels asking, "Who is he who cometh up from Edom?" Jesus answered, "It is I, Who speak justice."
Therefore the angels do not know mysteries of grace.
_I answer that,_ There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first is his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by his essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels cannot know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the pure will of G.o.d: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel, which depend upon the will of such angel, much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon G.o.d"s will. The Apostle reasons in this fashion (1 Cor. 2:11): "No one knoweth the things of a man [*Vulg.: "What man knoweth the things of a man, but ... ?"], but the spirit of a man that is in him." So, "the things also that are of G.o.d no man knoweth but the Spirit of G.o.d."
There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things in the Word. By such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor do they all know them equally; but just as G.o.d wills them to learn by revelation; as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10): "But to us G.o.d hath revealed them through His Spirit"; yet so that the higher angels beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, learn more and deeper mysteries in the vision of G.o.d, which mysteries they communicate to the lower angels by enlightening them. Some of these mysteries they knew from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught afterwards, as befits their ministrations.
Reply Obj. 1: One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the Incarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was revealed to all from the commencement of their beat.i.tude. The reason of this is, that this is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are ordered. For "all are [*Vulg.: "Are they not all."]
ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (Heb. 1:14); and this is brought about by the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in this mystery from the very beginning.
We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to its special conditions. Thus not all the angels were instructed on all points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these afterwards, as appears from the pa.s.sage of Dionysius already quoted.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom, yet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them to know everything hidden in it.
Reply Obj. 3: Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the mysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels. And although G.o.d revealed in general to the prophets what He was one day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still the apostles knew some particulars of the same, which the prophets did not know. Thus we read (Eph. 3:4, 5): "As you reading, may understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which in other generations was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles." Among the prophets also, the later ones knew what the former did not know; according to Ps. 118:100: "I have had understanding above ancients," and Gregory says: "The knowledge of Divine things increased as time went on" (Hom. xvi in Ezech.).
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QUESTION 58
OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (In Seven Articles)
After the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angel"s intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and sometimes in act?
(2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time?
(3) Whether the angel"s knowledge is discursive?
(4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing?
(5) Whether there can be error in the angel"s intellect?
(6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening?
(7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do they differ?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 1]
Whether the Angel"s Intellect Is Sometimes in Potentiality, Sometimes in Act?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel"s intellect is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what is in potentiality, as stated in _Phys._ iii, 6. But the angels" minds are moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Therefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality.
Obj. 2: Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but possible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality thereto. But it is said (1 Pet. 1:12): "On Whom the angels desire to look." Therefore the angel"s intellect is sometimes in potentiality.
Obj. 3: Further, in the book _De Causis_ it is stated that "an intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance."
But the angel"s intelligence has some admixture of potentiality.
Therefore it sometimes understands potentially.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): "Since the angels were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy and devout contemplation." Now a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality, but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality.
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8; Phys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first, "as before learning or discovering," that is, before it has the habit of knowledge; secondly, as "when it possesses the habit of knowledge, but does not actually consider." In the first way an angel"s intellect is never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the heavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which is not fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intellects, the angels, have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible species. But with regard to things divinely revealed to them, there is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: because even the heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by the sun.
In the second way an angel"s intellect can be in potentiality with regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is not always actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge.
But as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things he beholds in the Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and beat.i.tude does not consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8).
Reply Obj. 1: Movement is taken there not as the act of something imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. In this way understanding and feeling are termed movements, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, text. 28.
Reply Obj. 2: Such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude the object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to desire the vision of G.o.d with regard to fresh revelations, which they receive from G.o.d to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform.
Reply Obj. 3: In the angel"s substance there is no potentiality divested of act. In the same way, the angel"s intellect is never so in potentiality as to be without act.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 2]
Whether an Angel Can Understand Many Things at the Same Time?
Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that "it may happen that we know many things, but understand only one."
Obj. 2: Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be informed by an intelligible species; just at the body is formed by shape. But one body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various intelligible things.
Obj. 3: Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no movement terminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be understood altogether.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32): "The spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time all things that it wills."
_I answer that,_ As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement, so is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens that several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts of a continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered severally they are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so they are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one operation; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as is stated in _De Anima_ iii, text. 23. In this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition; and also two things compared together, according as they agree in one point of comparison. From this it is evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be understood at once; but in so far as they are comprised under one intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect.