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suggested by the story just quoted. How did Ananias know that Paul had authority from the chief priests to arrest any one? How could he argue in such a way with the Lord? Did he not then know that Jesus had appeared to Paul on the way? How did he get that information? Is it not an extraordinary thing that Paul never mentions Ananias in any of his letters, nor in any way refers to these miracles? We have already referred to the symbolic nature of the blindness, and recovery of sight on receiving the Holy Spirit and being baptized, and this is rendered still more apparent by the statement: v. 9. "And he was three days without sight, and neither did eat nor drink." We may further point out that in immediate connection with this episode Paul is represented, in the second account, as stating that, on going to Jerusalem, he has another vision of Jesus:xxii. 17. "And it came to pa.s.s that, when I returned to Jerusalem and was praying in the Temple, I was in a trance, 18. and saw him saying unto me: Make haste, and get thee quickly out of Jerusalem; for they will not receive thy witness concerning me. 19. And I said: Lord, they themselves know that I was wont to imprison and beat in every synagogue them that believe on thee. 20. And when the blood of Stephen, thy witness, was shed, I also was standing by and consenting, and keeping the garments of them that slew him. 21. And he said unto me: Go, for I will send thee far hence unto the Gentiles." It seems impossible, considering the utter silence of Paul, that the apparition to which he refers can have spoken to him at length as described upon these occasions.(1) We have elsewhere remarked
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that there is not the slightest evidence in his own or other writings connecting Stephen with Paul, and it may be appropriate to add here that, supposing him to have been present when the martyr exclaimed: "Lo, I behold the heavens opened, and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of G.o.d,"(1) it is singular that he does not name him as one of those by whom Jesus "was seen."
To resume this discussion, however: we have already shown that the statements of the Acts regarding Paul"s conduct after this alleged vision are distinctly in contradiction with the statements of Paul.
The explanation here given of the cause of Paul"s leaving Jerusalem, moreover, is not in agreement with Acts ix. 29 f., and much less with Gal. i. 20 ff. The three narratives themselves are full of irreconcilable differences and incongruities, which destroy all reasonable confidence in any substantial basis for the story. It is evident that the three narratives are from the same pen, and betray the composition of the author of Acts.(2) They cannot be regarded as true history.(3) The hand of the composer is very apparent in the lavish use of the miraculous, so characteristic of the whole work.
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It is worth while to catalogue the supernatural incidents of this episode. 1 The vision; 2 Companions hearing the voice but seeing no man, or not hearing the voice but seeing the light; 3 Paul"s blindness; 4 Vision of Ananias; 5 Restoration of sight to Paul; 6 Trance of Paul in Jerusalem. Such a narrative cannot be received in evidence.
The whole of the testimony before us, then, simply amounts to this: Paul believed that he had seen Jesus some years after his death: there is no evidence that he ever saw him during his life.(1) He states that he had "received" that he was seen by various other persons, but he does not give the slightest information as to who told him, or what reasons he had for believing the statements to be correct. And still less does he narrate the particulars of the alleged appearances or even of his own vision. Although we have no detailed statements of these extraordinary phenomena, we may a.s.sume that, as Paul himself believed that he had seen Jesus, certain other people of the circle of his disciples likewise believed that they had seen the risen Master. The whole of the evidence for the Resurrection reduces itself to an undefined belief on the part of a few persons, in a notoriously superst.i.tious age, that after Jesus had died and been buried they had seen him alive. These visions, it is admitted, occurred at a time of the most intense religious excitement, and under circ.u.mstances of wholly exceptional mental agitation and distress. The wildest alternations of fear, doubt, hope and
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indefinite expectation added their effects to oriental imaginations already excited by indignation at the fate of their Master, and sorrow or despair at such a dissipation of their Messianic dreams. There was present every element of intellectual and moral disturbance. Now must we seriously ask again whether this bare and wholly unjustified belief can be accepted as satisfactory evidence for so astounding a miracle as the Resurrection? Can the belief of such men, in such an age, establish the reality of a phenomenon which contradicts universal experience? It comes to us in the form of bare belief from the Age of Miracles, unsupported by facts, uncorroborated by evidence, unaccompanied by proof of investigation, and unprovided with material for examination. What is such belief worth? We have no.hesitation in saying that it is absolutely worth nothing.
We might here well bring our inquiry to a close, for we have no further evidence to deal with. The problem, however, is so full of interest that we cannot yet lay it down, and although we must restrain our argument within certain rigid limits, and wholly refrain from entering into regions of mere speculation, we may further discuss the origin and nature of the belief in the Resurrection. Recognizing the fact that, although its nature and extent are very indefinite, there existed an undoubted belief that, after his death, Jesus was seen alive; the argument is advanced that there must have been a real basis for this belief.
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"The existence of a Christian society," says an apologetic writer, "is the first and (if rightly viewed) the final proof of the historic truth of the miracle on which it was founded. It may indeed be said that the Church was founded upon the belief in the Resurrection, and not upon the Resurrection itself: and that the testimony must therefore be limited to the attestation of the belief, and cannot reach to the attestation of the fact. But belief expressed in action is for the most part the strongest evidence which we can have of any historic event. Unless, therefore, it can be shown that the origin of the apostolic belief in the Resurrection, with due regard to the fulness of its characteristic form, and the breadth and rapidity of its propagation can be satisfactorily explained on other grounds, the belief itself is a sufficient proof of the fact."(1) This is obviously Paley"s argument of the Twelve men(2) in a condensed form. Belief in action may be the strongest evidence which we can have of any historic event; but when the historic event happens to be an event in religious history, and an astounding miracle like the Resurrection, such bare evidence, emanating from such an age, is not very strong evidence, after all. The breadth and rapidity of its propagation absolutely prove nothing but belief in the report of those who believed; although it is very far from evident that people embraced Christianity from a rational belief in the Resurrection. No one pretends that the Gentiles who believed made a preliminary examination of the truth of the Resurrection. If breadth
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and rapidity of propagation be taken as sufficient proof of the truth of facts, we might consider Buddhism and Mahomedanism as satisfactorily attested creeds. There could not be a greater fallacy than the supposition that the origin of a belief must be explained upon other grounds, or that belief itself accepted as a sufficient proof of the fact a.s.serted. The truth or falsehood of any allegation is determined by a balance of evidence, and the critic is no more bound to account for the formation of erroneous belief than he is bound to believe because he may not, after a great lapse of time, be able so clearly to demonstrate the particular manner in which that erroneous belief originated, that any other mode is definitely excluded. The belief that a dead man rose from the dead and appeared to several persons alive is at once disposed of upon abstract grounds. The alleged occurrence is contrary to universal experience; but on the other hand the prevalence of defective observation, mistaken inference, self-deception and credulity, any of which might lead to such belief, are only too well known to it. Is it necessary to define which peculiar form of error is present in every false belief, before, with this immense preponderance of evidence against it, we finally reject it? We think not. Any explanation consistent with universal experience must be adopted, rather than a belief which is contradictory to it.
There are two theories which have been advanced to explain the origin of the apostolic belief in the Resurrection, to which we may now briefly refer; but it must be clearly understood that the suggestion of an explanation is quite apart from our examination of the actual evidence for the Resurrection. Fifty
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explanations might be offered and be considered unsatisfactory without in the least degree altering the fact, that the testimony for the final miracle of Christianity is totally insufficient, and that the allegation that it actually occurred cannot be maintained. The first explanation, adopted by some able critics, is that Jesus did not really die on the cross, but being taken down alive, and his body being delivered to friends, he subsequently revived. In support of this theory, it is argued that Jesus is represented by the Gospels as expiring after having been but three to six hours upon the cross, which would have been an un-precedentedly rapid death. It is affirmed that only the hands and not the feet were nailed to the cross. The crurifragium, not usually accompanying crucifixion, is dismissed as unknown to the three Synoptists, and only inserted by the fourth Evangelist for dogmatic reasons, and of course the lance-thrust disappears with the leg-breaking. Thus the apparent death was that profound faintness which might well fall upon such an organization after some hours of physical and mental agony on the cross, following the continued strain and fatigue of the previous night. As soon as he had sufficiently recovered, it is supposed that Jesus visited his disciples a few times to re-a.s.sure them, but with precaution on account of the Jews, and was by them believed to have risen from the dead, as indeed he himself may likewise have supposed, reviving as he had done from the faintness of death.(1)
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Seeing, however, that his death had set the crown upon his work, the Master withdrew into impenetrable obscurity and was heard of no more.
We have given but the baldest outline of this theory; for it would occupy too much s.p.a.ce to represent it adequately and show the ingenuity with which it is worked out, and the very considerable support which it receives from statements in the Gospels, and from inferences deducible from them. We do not ourselves adopt this explanation, although it must be clearly repeated that, were the only alternative to do so, or to fall back upon the hypothesis of a miracle, we should consider it preferable.
A serious objection brought against the theory seems to be, that it is not natural to suppose that, after such intense and protracted fatigue and anxiety followed by the most cruel agony on the cross, agony both of soul and body,(1) ending in unconsciousness only short of death, Jesus could within a short period have presented himself to his disciples with such an aspect as could have conveyed to them the impression of
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victory over death by the Prince of Life. He must still, it is urged, have presented the fresh traces of suffering and weakness little calculated to inspire them with the idea of divine power and glory. This is partly, but not altogether, true. There is no evidence, as we shall presently show, that the appearances of Jesus occurred so soon as is generally represented; and, in their astonishment at again seeing the Master whom they supposed to be dead, the disciples could not have been in a state minutely to remark the signs of suffering,(1) then probably, with the power of a mind like that of Jesus over physical weakness, little apparent. Time and imagination would doubtless soon have effaced from their minds any such impressions, and left only the belief that he had risen from the dead to develop and form the Christian doctrine.
A more powerful objection seems to us the disappearance of Jesus.
We cannot easily persuade ourselves that such a teacher could have renounced his work and left no subsequent trace of his existence. Still, it must be admitted that many explanations might be offered on this head, the most obvious being that death, whether as the result of the terrible crisis through which he had pa.s.sed, or from some other cause, may soon after have ensued. We repeat, however, that we neither advance this explanation nor think it worth while to discuss it seriously, not because we think it untenable, although we do not adopt it, but because we consider that there is another explanation of the origin of belief in the Resurrection which
1 The repeated statement in the Gospels that the women and his disciples did not at first recognize the risen Jesus, are quoted in connection with this point.
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is better, and which is in our opinion the true one. We mean that which is usually called the "vision-hypothesis."
The phenomenon which has to be accounted for is the apostolic belief that, after he had been dead and buried, Jesus "was seen" [------] by certain persons. The explanation which we offer, and which has long been adopted in various forms by able critics,1 is, that doubtless Jesus was seen, but the vision was not real ^and objective, but illusory and subjective; that is to say: Jesus was not himself seen, but only a representation of Jesus within the minds of the beholders. This explanation not only does not impeach the veracity of those who affirmed that they had seen Jesus, but, accepting to a certain extent a subjective truth as the basis of the belief, explains upon well-known and natural principles the erroneous inference deduced from the subjective vision. It seems to us that the points to be determined are simple and obvious: Is it possible for a man to mistake subjective impressions for objective occurrences? Is it possible that any considerable number of persons can at the same time receive similar subjective impressions and mistake them for objective facts? If these questions can be answered affirmatively,
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and it can be shown that the circ.u.mstances, the characters, the const.i.tution of those who believed in the first instance, favoured the reception of such subjective impressions, and the deduction of erroneous inferences, it must be admitted that a satisfactory explanation can thus be given of the apostolic belief, on other grounds than the reality of a miracle opposed to universal experience.
No sooner is the first question formulated than it becomes obvious to every one who is acquainted with psychological and physiological researches, or who has even the most elementary knowledge of the influence of the mind upon the body, that it must at once be answered in the affirmative. Indeed the affirmation that subjective impressions, in connection with every sense, can be mistaken for, and believed to be, actual objective effects, is so trite that it seems almost superfluous to make it. Every reader must be well acquainted with ill.u.s.trations of the fact. The only difficulty is to deal authoritatively with such a point within moderate compa.s.s. We must limit ourselves to the sense of sight "There are abundant proofs," says Sir Benjamin Brodie, "that impressions may be made in the brain by other causes simulating those which are made on it by external objects through the medium of the organs of sense, thus producing false perceptions, which may, in the first instance, and before we have had time to reflect on the subject, be mistaken for realities."(1) The limitation here introduced: "before we have had time to reflect on the subject," is of course valid in the case of those whose reason is capable of rejecting the false perceptions, whether on the ground of natural
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law or of probability; but, in anyone ignorant of natural law, familiar with the idea of supernatural agency and the occurrence of miraculous events, it is obvious, reflection, if reflection of a sceptical kind can even be a.s.sumed, would have little chance of arriving at any true discrimination of phenomena. Speaking of the nervous system and its functions, and more immediately of the relation of the Cerebrum to the Sensorium and the production of spectral illusions, Dr. Carpenter says, in his work on the "Principles of Mental Physiology," which is well worth the study of those interested in the question we are discussing: "Still stronger evidence of the same a.s.sociated action of the Cerebrum and Sensorium, is furnished by the study of the phenomena designated as Spectral Illusions. These are clearly sensorial states not excited by external objects; and it is also clear that they frequently originate in cerebral changes, since they represent creations of the mind, and are not mere reproductions of past sensations." Dr. Carpenter refers in ill.u.s.tration to a curious illusion to which Sir John Herschel was subject, "in the shape of the involuntary occurrence of Visual impressions, into which Geometrical regularity of form enters as the leading character. These were not of the nature of those ocular Spectra which may be attributed with probability to retinal changes."(1) Dr.
Carpenter then continues: "We have here not a reproduction of sensorial impressions formerly received; but a construction of new forms, by a process which, if it had been carried on consciously, we should have called imagination. And it is difficult to see
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how it is to be accounted for in any other way, than by an unconscious action of the cerebrum; the products of which impress themselves on the sensorial consciousness, just as, in other cases, they express themselves through the motor apparatus."(1) The illusions described by Sir John Herschel who, as he himself says, was "as little visionary as most people" should be referred to.
Of the production of sensations by ideas there can be no possible doubt(2) and, consequently, as little of the realisation by the person in whom they are produced of subjective impressions exactly as though they were objective. With regard to false perceptions, Dr. Carpenter says: "It has been shown that the action of ideational states upon the Sensorium can modify or even produce sensations. But the action of pre-existing states of Mind is still more frequently shown in modifying the interpretation which we put upon our sense-impressions. For since almost every such interpretation is an act of judgment based upon experience, that judgment will vary according to our mental condition at the time it is delivered; and will be greatly affected by any dominant idea or feeling, so as even to occasion a complete mis-interpretation of the objective source of the sense-impression, as often occurs in what is termed "absence of mind." The following case, mentioned by Dr. Tuke(3) as occurring within his own knowledge, affords a good example of this fallacy:--"A lady was walking one day from Penryn to Falmouth, and her mind being at that time, or recently, occupied by the subject of drinking-fountains, thought she saw
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in the road a newly-erected fountain, and even distinguished an inscription upon it, namely--"_If any man thirst let him come unto me and drink_." Some time afterwards, she mentioned the fact with pleasure to the daughters of a gentleman who was supposed to have erected it.
They expressed their surprise at her statement, and a.s.sured her that she must be quite mistaken. Perplexed with the contradiction between the testimony of her senses and of those who would have been aware of the fact had it been true, and feeling that she could not have been deceived (" for seeing is believing "), she repaired to the spot, and found to her astonishment that no drinking-fountain was in existence--only a few scattered stones, which had formed the foundation upon which the suggestion of an expectant imagination had built the superstructure.
The subject having previously occupied her attention, these sufficed to form, not only a definite erection, but one inscribed by an appropriate motto corresponding to the leading idea.""(1)
We may give as another ill.u.s.tration an illusion which presented itself to Sir Walter Scott(2) He had been reading, shortly after the death of Lord Byron, an account in a publication professing to detail the habits and opinions of the poet. As Scott had been intimate with Lord Byron he was deeply interested in the publication, which contained some particulars relative to himself and other friends. "Their sitting-room opened into an entrance hall, rather fantastically fitted up with articles of armour, skins of wild animals, and the like. It was when laying down his book,
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and pa.s.sing into this hall, through which the moon was beginning to shine, that the individual of whom I speak saw, right before him, and in a standing posture, the exact representation of his departed friend whose recollection had been so strongly brought to his imagination. He stopped for a single moment, so as to notice the wonderful accuracy with which fancy had impressed upon the bodily eye the peculiarities of dress and posture of the ill.u.s.trious poet. Sensible, however, of the delusion, he felt no sentiment save that of wonder at the extraordinary accuracy of the resemblance, and stepped onward towards the figure, which resolved itself, as he approached, into the various materials of which it was composed. These were merely a screen, occupied by great-coats, shawls, plaids and such other articles as usually are found in a country entrance-hall. The spectator returned to the spot from which he had seen the illusion, and endeavoured, with all his power, to recall the image which had been so singularly vivid. But this was beyond his capacity,"
&C.1 Although Sir Walter Scott might be sensible of the delusion, it may be more than doubted whether, in the first century of our era, such an apparition proceeding from or connected with religious agitation of mind would have been considered so.
Dr. Abercrombie(2) mentions many instances of spectral illusions, "some of the most authentic facts" relating to which he cla.s.ses under the head of "intense mental conceptions so strongly impressed upon the mind as, for the moment, to be believed to have a real existence."
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We cannot, however, venture to quote ill.u.s.trations.(1) Dr. Hibbert, in whose work on Apparitions many interesting instances are to be found, thus concludes his consideration of the conditions which lead to such illusions: "I have at length concluded my observations on what may be considered as the leading mental laws which are connected with the origin of spectral impressions. The general inference to be drawn from them is,--that _Apparitions are nothing more than morbid symptoms, which are indicative of an intense excitement of the renovated feelings of the mind_."(2) Subjective visions, believed to have had objective reality, abound in the history of the world. They are familiar to all who have read the lives of the Saints, and they have accompanied the progress of Christianity in various forms from the trances of Montanism to the vision of the "Immaculate Conception" in the Grotto of Lourdes.
If we turn to the inquiry whether a similar subjective impression can be received by many persons at one time and be mistaken by them for an objective reality, an equally certain reply in the affirmative must unhesitatingly be given. The contagiousness of emotion is well known,(3) and the rapidity with which panic, for instance, spreads from a single individual to the ma.s.s is remarked every day. The most trifling incident, unseen by more than a few and, therefore, more pliant in the imagination
1 Every one remembers the case of Luther and his visions of the Devil.
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