[133] Governor of Dalmatia (cp. ii. 86).
[134] Fano.
[135] Apparently soldiers" slang. Probably at some period an officer had bribed his men under the pretence of making special grants for the purchase of nails for their shoes.
[136] 87 B.C.
[137] L. Cornelius Sisenna, who died 67 B.C. in Pompey"s war against the pirates, wrote a history of his own time, dealing in particular with Sulla"s wars.
[138] This or some similar incident seems to have become a respected commonplace of history and poetry (cp. chap. 25).
[139] i.e. the main body of the legions.
[140] See chap. 50.
[141] See ii. 86.
[142] i.e. Aponius, Vipsta.n.u.s Messala, Dillius, and Numisius (see ii. 85, iii. 9, 10).
[143] Cp. chap. 8.
[144] i.e. Mucia.n.u.s and his officers (see chap. 46).
VITELLIUS" MEASURES OF DEFENCE
After the crushing defeat at Cremona Vitellius stupidly suppressed 54 the news of the disaster, thus postponing not the danger itself but only his precautions against it. Had he admitted the facts and sought advice, hope and strength were still left to him: his pretension that all went well only made matters worse. He was himself extraordinarily silent about the war, and in Rome all discussion of the subject was forbidden. This only increased the number of people who, if permitted, would have told the truth, but in the face of this prohibition spread grossly exaggerated rumours. Nor were the Flavian leaders slow to foster these rumours. Whenever they captured Vitellian spies they escorted them round the camp to show them the strength of the winning army, and sent them back again. Vitellius cross-examined each of them in private and then had them murdered. A centurion named Julius Agrestis, after many interviews, in which he endeavoured in vain to fire Vitellius" courage, at last with heroic persistence induced the emperor to send him to inspect the enemy"s forces and discover what had really happened at Cremona. He made no attempt to deceive Antonius by concealing the object of his mission, but openly avowed the emperor"s instructions, stated his intentions and demanded to be shown everything. He was given guides, who showed him the field of battle, the ruins of Cremona and the captured legions. Back went Agrestis to Vitellius. Finding that the emperor disbelieved his report and even suggested that he had been bribed, he said, "You want some certain evidence and, since you have no further use for me either alive or dead, I will give you evidence that you can believe." And he was as good as his word. He went straight from the emperor"s presence and committed suicide. Some say he was killed by order of Vitellius, but they give the same account of his heroic devotion.[145]
Vitellius was like a man roused from sleep. He dispatched Julius 55 Priscus and Alfenus Varus[146] with fourteen cohorts of Guards and all his available cavalry to hold the Apennines. A legion levied from the marines[147] was sent after them. This large army of picked men and horses, if there had been any general to lead it, was strong enough to have even taken the offensive. His other cohorts[148] were given to his brother, Lucius Vitellius, for the protection of the city. The emperor himself gave up none of his habitual luxuries, but, feeling nervous and depressed, he hurried on the elections and nominated consuls for several years in advance. He lavished special charters[149] on allied communities and extended Latin rights[150] to foreign towns: he remitted taxation here, granted immunities there. In fact, he took no thought for the future, and did his best to cripple the empire. However, the mob accepted these munificent grants with open mouths. Fools paid money for them, but wise men held them invalid, since they could be neither given nor received without a revolution. At last he yielded to the demands of the army and joined the camp at Mevania,[151] where they had taken up their position. A long train of senators followed him, many moved by their ambition, but most by their fears. Here he was still undecided and at the mercy of treacherous advice.
During one of his speeches a portent occurred. A cloud of 56 ill-omened birds[152] flew over his head and its density obscured the daylight. To this was added another omen of disaster. A bull broke from the altar, scattered the utensils for the ceremony, and escaped so far away that it had to be killed instead of being sacrificed according to the proper ritual. But the chief portent was Vitellius himself. He was ignorant of soldiering, incapable of forethought: knew nothing of drill or scouting, or how far operations should be pressed forward or protracted. He always had to ask some one else. At every fresh piece of news his expression and gait betrayed his alarm. And then he would get drunk. At last he found camp life too tedious, and on learning of a mutiny in the fleet at Misenum[153] he returned to Rome. Every fresh blow terrified him, but of the real crisis he seemed insensible. For it was open to him to cross the Apennines and with his full strength unimpaired to attack the enemy while they were worn out with cold and hunger. But by breaking up his forces he sent his keenest soldiers, stubbornly loyal to the last, to be killed or taken prisoner. The more experienced of his centurions disapproved of this policy and would have told him the truth, if they had been consulted.
But the emperor"s intimates refused them admittance. He had, indeed, formed a habit of regarding wholesome advice as unpleasant, and refusing to listen to any that was not agreeable, and in the long run fatal.
In civil war individual enterprise counts for much. The mutiny of 57 the fleet at Misenum had been engineered by Claudius Faventinus, a centurion whom Galba had dismissed in disgrace. To obtain his object he had forged a letter from Vespasian promising rewards for treachery.
The admiral, Claudius Apollinaris,[154] was neither a staunch loyalist nor an enthusiastic traitor. Accordingly Apinius Tiro, an ex-praetor, who happened to be at Minturnae,[155] offered to take the lead of the rebels. They proceeded to win over the colonies and country towns.
Puteoli in particular was strong for Vespasian, while Capua remained loyal to Vitellius, for they dragged their local jealousies into the civil war. To pacify the excited troops Vitellius chose Claudius Julia.n.u.s, who had lately been in command of the fleet at Misenum and had allowed lax discipline. To support him he was given one cohort of the city garrison and the force of gladiators already serving under him. The two parties encamped close to one another, and it was not long before Julia.n.u.s came over to Vespasian"s side. They then joined forces and occupied Tarracina,[156] which owed its strength more to its walls and situation than to the character of its new garrison.
When news of this reached Vitellius, he left part of his force at 58 Narnia[157] with the prefects of the Guard,[158] and sent his brother Lucius with six regiments of Guards and five hundred horse to cope with the threatened outbreak in Campania. His own nervous depression was somewhat relieved by the enthusiasm of the troops and of the populace, who clamoured loudly for arms. For he dignified this poor-spirited mob, which would never dare to do anything but shout, by the specious t.i.tles of "the army" or "his legions". His friends were all untrustworthy in proportion to their eminence; but on the advice of his freedmen he held a levy for conscription and swore in all who gave their names. As their numbers were too great, he gave the task of selection to the two consuls. From each of the senators he levied a fixed number of slaves and a weight of silver. The knights offered money and personal service, while even freedmen volunteered similar a.s.sistance. Indeed, protestations of loyalty prompted by fear, had gradually changed into real sympathy. People began to feel pity, not perhaps so much for Vitellius as for the throne and its misfortunes.
He himself by his looks, his voice, his tears made ceaseless demands upon their compa.s.sion, promising rewards lavishly and, as men do when they are frightened, beyond all limits. He had hitherto refused the t.i.tle of Caesar,[159] but he now expressed a wish for it. He had a superst.i.tious respect for the name, and in moments of terror one listens as much to gossip as to sound advice. However, while a rash and ill-conceived undertaking may prosper at the outset, in time it always begins to flag. Gradually the senators and knights deserted him. At first they hesitated and waited till his back was turned, but soon they ceased to care and openly showed their disrespect. At last Vitellius grew ashamed of the failure of his efforts and excused them from the services which they refused to render.
FOOTNOTES:
[145] This incident was probably another historical commonplace. See the story from Plutarch (ii. 46, note 316), which is also told by Suetonius and Dio.
[146] The prefects of the Guards (cp. ii. 92).
[147] At Misenum. (Leg. II Adjutrix.) The Ravenna marines were on the Flavian side (see chap. 50).
[148] i.e. the rest of the Guards (2), with the city garrison (4), and police (7) (cp. ii. 93).
[149] i.e. granting them special privileges denied to other communities in the same province.
[150] A sort of "half-way house to Roman citizenship". Full commercial rights were included but not those of intermarriage. It was possible for individual citizens in a Latin town to obtain the full rights of a Roman.
[151] Bevagna.
[152] Dio makes them vultures and the scene a sacrifice: they scattered the victims and nearly knocked Vitellius off his pulpit.
[153] Described in the following chapter.
[154] He had succeeded Ba.s.sus (iii. 12).
[155] Near the mouth of the Liris.
[156] Horace"s "Anxur perched on gleaming rocks". It lay near the Pontine marshes on the Appian way.
[157] Narni.
[158] Priscus and Varus (see chap. 55).
[159] i. 62, ii. 62.
THE Pa.s.sAGE OF THE APENNINES
The occupation of Mevania[160] had terrified Italy with the 59 prospect of a revival of the war, but Vitellius" cowardly retreat[161]
sensibly strengthened the popularity of the Flavian party. The Samnites, Pelignians, and Marsians were now induced to rise. They were jealous of Campania for stealing a march on them, and the change of masters, as so often happens, made them perform all their military duties with the utmost alacrity. But in crossing the Apennines Antonius" army suffered severely from the rough December weather.
Though they met with no opposition, they found it hard enough to struggle through the snow, and realized what danger they would have had to face if Vitellius had not happened to turn back. Certainly chance helped the Flavian generals quite as often as their own strategy. Here they came across Petilius Cerialis,[162] who had been enabled by his knowledge of the country to elude Vitellius" outposts, disguised as a peasant. As he was a near relative of Vespasian and a distinguished soldier he was given a place on the staff. Several authorities say that Flavius Sabinus and Domitian[163] were also afforded facilities for escape, and that Antonius sent messengers who contrived by various devices to get through to them, and made arrangements for an interview and safe conduct. Sabinus, however, pleaded that his health was unequal to the fatigue of such a bold step. Domitian was quite ready to venture, but although the guards to whom Vitellius had entrusted him, promised that they would share his flight, he was afraid they might be laying a trap for him. As a matter of fact, Vitellius was too anxious for the safety of his own relatives to plot any harm against Domitian.
Arrived at Carsulae[164] the Flavian generals took a few days" 60 rest and awaited the arrival of the main legionary force.[165] The place suited them admirably for an encampment. It commanded a wide view, and with so many prosperous towns in the rear their supplies were safe. The Vitellians too, were only ten miles away, and they had hopes of negotiating treason with them. The soldiers chafed at this delay, preferring victory to peace. They did not even want to wait for their own legions, for there would be more plunder than danger to share with them. Antonius accordingly summoned a meeting of the men and explained to them that Vitellius still had troops at his command.
Reflection might make them waver, despair would steel their hearts. In civil war, he told them, the first steps may be left to chance, nothing but careful strategy can win the final victory. The fleet at Misenum and the richest districts of Campania had already deserted Vitellius, and in the whole world nothing was left to him now except the country between Narnia and Tarracina. The battle of Cremona had brought them credit enough, and the destruction of the town more than enough discredit. Their desire must be not to take Rome but to save it. They would gain richer rewards and far more glory if they could show that they had saved the senate and people of Rome without shedding a drop of blood. Such considerations as these calmed their excitement, and it was not long before the legions arrived.
Alarmed at the repute of this augmented army, Vitellius" Guards 61 began to waver. There was no one to encourage them to fight, while many urged them to desert, being eager to hand over their companies or squadrons to the enemy and by such a gift to secure the victor"s grat.i.tude for the future. These also let the Flavians know that the next camp at Interamna[166] had a garrison of four hundred cavalry.
Varus was promptly sent off with a light marching force, and the few who offered resistance were killed. The majority threw away their arms and begged for quarter. Some escaped to the main camp[167] and spread universal panic by exaggerating the strength and prowess of the enemy, in order to mitigate the disgrace of losing the fort. In the Vitellian camp all offences went unpunished: desertion met with sure reward.
Their loyalty soon gave way and a compet.i.tion in treachery began.
Tribunes and centurions deserted daily, but not the common soldiers, who had grown stubbornly faithful to Vitellius. At last, however, Priscus and Alfenus[168] abandoned the camp and returned to Vitellius, thus finally releasing all the others from any obligation to blush for their treachery.
About the same time Fabius Valens[169] was executed in his prison 62 at Urbinum, and his head was exhibited to Vitellius" Guards to show them that further hope was vain. For they cherished a belief that Valens had made his way into Germany, and was there mustering his old force and fresh troops as well. This evidence of his death threw them into despair. The Flavian army was vastly inspirited by it and regarded Valens" death as the end of the war.
Valens had been born at Anagnia of an equestrian family. He was a man of loose morality, not without intellectual gifts, who by indulging in frivolity posed as a wit. In Nero"s time he had acted in a harlequinade at the Juvenalian Games.[170] At first he pleaded compulsion, but afterwards he acted voluntarily, and his performances were rather clever than respectable. Rising to the command of a legion, he supported Verginius[171] and then defamed his character. He murdered Fonteius Capito,[171] whose loyalty he had undermined--or perhaps because he had failed to do so. He betrayed Galba and remained faithful to Vitellius, a merit to which the treachery of others served as a foil.
Now that their hopes were crushed on all sides, the Vitellians 63 prepared to go over to the enemy. But even at this crisis they saved their honour by marching down with their standards and colours to the plains below Narnia, where the Flavian army was drawn up in full armour ready for battle in two deep lines on either side of the road.
The Vitellians marched in between and were surrounded. Antonius then spoke to them kindly and told them to remain, some at Narnia and some at Interamna. He also left behind some of the victorious legions, which were strong enough to quell any outbreak but would not molest them so long as they remained quiet.
FOOTNOTES:
[160] See chap. 55.