[244] Antibes.
[245] Albenga.
[246] Sardinia and Corsica were an imperial province A.D.
6-67. Then Nero gave it back to the senate to compensate for his declaration of the independence of Achaia. Vespasian once more transferred it to imperial government. If _procurator_ is correct here, Pacarius must have been a subordinate imperial functionary in a senatorial province. As the province changed hands so often and was so soon after this placed under imperial control, it is possible that Tacitus made a mistake and that Pacarius was an ex-praetor. Those who feel that Tacitus is unlikely to have made this error, and that Pacarius can hardly have been anything but governor, adopt the suggestion that Corsica did not share the fate of Sardinia in A.D. 67, but remained under the control of an imperial procurator. There is no clear evidence of this, but under Diocletian Corsica was certainly separate.
[247] These cruisers were of a peculiarly light build, called after the Liburni, an Illyrian tribe, who fought for Octavian in the battle of Actium. He introduced similar craft into the Roman navy. They were very fast, and worked with a triangular, instead of the usual square sail.
[248] i.e. his Corsican and Roman clients.
[249] i. 70.
[250] Piacenza and Pavia.
[251] i.e. one of the two detachments sent forward by the armies of Dalmatia and Pannonia (cp. chap. 11).
[252] Otho"s Praetorian Guards were the weakest point in his army.
[253] Cp. i. 36 note 61.
[254] i.e. that Spurinna was in league with Caecina, and meant to hand them over to him.
[255] He was making "a reconnaissance in force westwards along the river bank to discover, if he could, the strength and intentions of the enemy" (B.W. Henderson, _Civil War_, &c.).
But Mr. E.G. Hardy points out that, as he had only 4,000 men and Caecina"s 30,000 were in the immediate neighbourhood, this would have been foolish. It seems better to believe Tacitus"
suggestion that his insubordinate troops forced Spurinna to march out.
[256] Considered Gallic and effeminate.
[257] Mr. Henderson (_Civil War_, &c.) argues that it was imperative for Caecina to take the fortress at Placentia, since it threatened his sole line of communication with Valens" column. Tacitus, as usual, gives a practical rather than a strategic motive. His interests are purely human.
[258] Familiar devices for sheltering troops against missiles from a town wall. They were generally made of hurdles covered with raw hides. The _vinea_ was a shelter on poles, so named from its resemblance to a pergola of vines.
[259] In i. 61 only legion XXI is mentioned. But Caecina may have formed the detachments into another legion.
[260] Civilis" nephew and bitter enemy. See iv. 70, v. 21.
[261] Spurinna"s colleague in the command of the advanced guard from Rome. He was now probably at Mantua.
[262] At the meeting of two high roads leading to Cremona, the one from Hostilia and the other from Mantua. It was near here that Vitellius defeated Otho, and here that his power fell before Vespasian (cp. iii. 15 f.).
[263] See note 231.
[264] This was stated in i. 87. The reminder is inserted because they were not mentioned with Gallus in ii. 11--unless, indeed, Mr. Onions is right in suggesting that _quoque_ is an error for _duces_.
[265] He had left him in charge of Rome. See i. 90.
[266] We learn in chap. 33 that Gallus was disabled and took no part in this engagement: hence the omission of his name.
[267] About 10 English miles.
[268] Locus Castorum.
[269] See chap. 11.
[270] The Via Postumia, built up on a causeway high above the fields on either side.
[271] Son of Antiochus, king of Commagene (see note 216). He was in Rome probably as a hostage, and accompanied Otho.
[272] An eminent critic has called Tacitus" account of this battle an "historical nightmare", but those who do not suffer from a surfeit of military knowledge may find that it lies easy upon them. It is written for the plain man with an eye for situations and an ear for phrases.
THE DECISIVE STRUGGLE
This reverse reduced the Vitellians not to despair but to 27 discipline. Not only was this the case in Caecina"s camp, who blamed his men as being readier for mutiny than for battle, but the troops under Fabius Valens, who had now reached Ticinum,[273] lost their contempt for the enemy, conceived a desire to retrieve their glory, and offered their general a more respectful and steady obedience.
There had, indeed, been a serious outbreak of mutiny, the account of which I may now resume from an earlier chapter,[274] where it seemed wrong to break the narrative of Caecina"s operations. The Batavian auxiliaries, who had left the Fourteenth legion during the war against Vindex, heard of Vitellius" rising while on their way to Britain, and, as I have already described,[275] joined Fabius Valens in the country of the Lingones. There they grew insolent. Whenever they pa.s.sed the tents of the Roman soldiers, they boasted loudly that they had coerced the Fourteenth, had deprived Nero of Italy, and held the whole issue of the war in the hollow of their hand. This insulted the soldiers and annoyed the general; brawls and quarrels ruined good discipline.
Ultimately Valens began to suspect that their insubordination meant treachery. Accordingly, on receiving the news that Otho"s fleet 28 had defeated the Treviran cavalry[276] and the Tungri, and was now blockading Narbonese Gaul, he determined at the same time to a.s.sist his allies, and by a stroke of generalship to separate contingents that were so insubordinate and, if united, so strong. He therefore ordered the Batavians to march to the support of Narbo. Immediately this order became generally known, the auxiliaries began to complain and the legionaries to chafe. "They were being deprived of their strongest support: here were these invincible veterans promptly withdrawn directly the enemy came in sight: if the province was more important than the safety of Rome and the empire, why not all go there? but if Italy was the corner-stone of their success, he ought not as it were to amputate their strongest limb."[277] In answer 29 to this presumptuous criticism, Valens loosed his lictors upon them and set to work to check the mutiny. They attacked their general, stoned him, and chased him out of the camp, shouting that he was concealing the spoils of Gaul and the gold from Vienne,[278] the due reward of their labours. They looted the baggage, ransacked the general"s quarters, and even rummaged in the ground with javelins and lances. Valens, in slave"s dress, took refuge with a cavalry officer.
Gradually the disorder began to die down. Alfenus Varus, the camp-prefect, then hit upon the plan of forbidding the centurions to go the rounds or to have the bugle sounded to summon the men to their duties. No one had anything to do: they eyed each other in astonishment, dismayed above all at having no one to command them. At first by silent submission, at last with tearful prayers, they sought pardon. Valens appeared, haggard and in tears, but above all expectation safe and sound,--joy, sympathy, cheers! With a wild revulsion of feeling--mobs are always extravagant--they made a ring round him with the eagles and standards, and carried him to the Tribunal with loud praises and congratulations. With wise moderation he demanded no punishment, but, to disarm suspicion of his good faith, he criticized one or two of them severely.[279] He was well aware that in civil war the men are allowed more licence than their officers.
While they were entrenching themselves at Ticinum they heard the 30 news of Caecina"s defeat, and the mutiny nearly broke out afresh: Valens, they thought, had treacherously delayed in order to keep them out of the battle. They refused rest, would not wait for the general, marched on in front of the standards, hurrying on the bearers, and by a forced march joined Caecina. Valens had a bad name with Caecina"s army. They complained that despite their greatly inferior numbers he had exposed them to the full force of the enemy. At the same time, for fear of being despised as defeated cowards, they excused themselves by exaggerating the strength of the new arrivals. In fact, though Valens"
numbers were larger, and he had almost twice as many legionaries and auxiliaries as Caecina,[280] yet it was Caecina who enjoyed the confidence of the men. Apart from his kindness, in which he seemed much readier than Valens, they admired him for his youthful vigour and commanding stature,[281] and liked him too without exactly knowing why. So there was rivalry between the generals. Caecina mocked at Valens for his dirty and dishonest ways:[282] Valens at Caecina"s pompous vanity. But they smothered their dislike and worked together for a common end, writing frequent letters in which they sacrificed all hope of pardon and heaped abuse on Otho. Otho"s generals refrained from retaliating upon Vitellius, though his character offered richer scope. In death Otho earned a n.o.ble name and Vitellius infamy, yet 31 at this time people were more afraid of Otho"s burning pa.s.sions than of Vitellius" listless luxury. The murder of Galba had made Otho feared and hated, while no one attributed to Vitellius the outbreak of the war. It was felt that Vitellius" gluttony was a personal disgrace: Otho"s excesses, his cruelty and his daring, spelt more danger to the country.
Now that Caecina and Valens had joined forces, the Vitellians had no longer any reason to avoid a decisive battle. Otho accordingly held a council to decide whether they should prolong the war or put their fortune to the test. Suetonius Paulinus, who was considered the 32 most experienced general of his day,[283] now felt it was due to his reputation to deliver his views on the general conduct of the war. His contention was that the enemy"s interests were best served by haste, Otho"s by delay. He argued thus: "The whole of Vitellius" force has now arrived and he has few reinforcements in his rear, for the Gallic provinces are in a ferment, and it would be fatal to abandon the Rhine with all those hostile tribes ready to swarm across it. The troops in Britain are busy with their own foes and cut off by the sea: the Spanish provinces can scarcely spare any troops: the Narbonese are seriously alarmed by their recent reverse and the inroads of our fleet. The country across the Po is shut in by the Alps and denied all supplies by sea,[284] and, besides, its resources have been already exhausted by the pa.s.sage of their army. Nowhere can they get supplies, and without commissariat no army can be kept together. The German troops are their strongest fighting arm, but their const.i.tutions will not be strong enough to stand the change of weather, if we protract the war into the summer. It has often happened that a force, which seemed irresistible at first, has dwindled to nothing through the tedium of forced inaction.
"On the other hand, our resources are rich and reliable. We have on our side Pannonia, Moesia, Dalmatia, and the East; the armies there are fresh and strong; we have Italy and Rome, the Queen of the World, and the Roman Senate and People: those t.i.tles always mean something, though their glory may sometimes be obscured. We have large public and private resources, and in civil war a vast quant.i.ty of money is stronger than the sword. Our soldiers are inured to the Italian climate or, at any rate, to heat. We are entrenched behind the Po:[285] its cities are protected by strong walls and willing hands, and the defence of Placentia has shown that none of them will yield to the enemy." Therefore Otho must remain on the defensive. In a few days the Fourteenth legion would arrive: its fame alone was great, and the Moesian forces[286] would be with it. He should, at any rate, postpone his deliberations until then, and fight, if fight he must, with augmented strength.
Marius Celsus supported Paulinus. Annius Gallus had been hurt a 33 few days before by a fall from his horse, but messengers were sent to inquire his views, and they reported that he too agreed. Otho inclined to a decisive engagement. His brother t.i.tia.n.u.s and Proculus, the prefect of the Guard, with all the impatience of inexperience, stoutly maintained that fortune and Providence, and Otho"s own good genius inspired his policy, and would inspire its performance. They had descended to flattery by way of checking opposition. When it was decided to take the offensive, the question arose whether Otho in person should take part in the battle or hold himself in reserve. His evil counsellors again carried their point. Otho was to retire to Brixellum,[287] and, by withdrawing from the hazards of the field, reserve himself for the supreme control of the campaign and of the empire. To this Paulinus and Celsus offered no further opposition, for fear of seeming to endanger the person of their prince. From this day dates the decline of Otho"s party. Not only did he take with him a considerable force of the Guards, Body Guard, and cavalry, but the spirit of the troops who remained behind was broken. The men trusted no one but Otho, and Otho no one but the men. His generals were under suspicion and their authority left in doubt.[288]
None of these arrangements failed to reach the ears of the 34 Vitellians. Desertions were frequent, as they always are in civil war, and the scouts in their eagerness to discover the enemy"s plans always failed to conceal their own. Caecina and Valens, counting on the fatal impatience of the enemy, remained quietly on their guard to see what they would do: for it is always wisdom to profit by another"s folly.
Feigning an intention of crossing the Po, they began to construct a bridge, partly as a demonstration against the gladiators[289] on the opposite bank, partly to find something for their idle troops to do.
Boats were placed at equal intervals with their heads up stream and fastened together by strong wooden planks. They also cast anchors from them to ensure the solidity of the bridge, but they allowed the hawsers to drift slack, so that when the river rose the boats might all rise with it without the line being broken. To guard the bridge a high tower was built out on the end boat, from which they could repulse the enemy with various artillery. Meanwhile the Othonians had built a tower on the bank and kept up a steady shower of stones and torches.
In midstream there was an island, to which the gladiators tried to 35 make their way in boats, but the Germans swam over and got there first. When a good number of them had swam across, Macer manned some Liburnian cruisers[290] and attacked them with the bravest of his gladiators. But they fought with less courage than soldiers, and from their unsteady boats they could not shoot so well as the others, who had a firm footing on the bank. Swaying this way and that in their alarm, the sailors and the marines were beginning to get in each other"s way, when the Germans actually leapt into the shallows, caught hold of the boats by the stern, and either clambered up by the gangways or sunk them bodily with their own hands. All this took place before the eyes of both armies[291], and the higher rose the spirits of the Vitellians, the greater became the indignation of the Othonians against Macer, the author and cause of their disaster. The 36 remainder of the boats were eventually dragged off,[292] and the battle ended in flight. The army demanded Macer"s execution. He had been actually wounded by a lance that had been flung at him, and the soldiers were rushing on him with drawn swords when some tribunes and centurions intervened and rescued him.
Soon after this, Vestricius Spurinna, on Otho"s orders, brought up a reinforcement of the Guards, leaving behind a small garrison at Placentia, and before long, Otho sent the consul-elect, Flavius Sabinus,[293] to take command of Macer"s force. This change pleased the soldiers, but the frequent mutinies made the generals unwilling to a.s.sume such a perilous command.
In some of my authorities[294] I find a statement that either a 37 growing fear of war or dislike of the two emperors, whose discreditable misconduct grew daily more notorious, led the armies to hesitate whether they should not give up the struggle and either themselves combine to choose an emperor or refer the choice to the senate. This, it is suggested, was the motive of Otho"s generals in advising delay, and Paulinus in particular had high hopes, since he was the senior ex-consul, and a distinguished general who had earned a brilliant reputation by his operations in Britain. For my own part, while I am ready to admit that a few people may have tacitly wished for peace instead of civil war, or for a good and virtuous emperor instead of two who were the worst of criminals, yet I imagine that Paulinus was much too wise to hope that in a time of universal corruption the people would show such moderation. Those who had sacrificed peace in a pa.s.sion for war were not likely to stop the war from any affection for peace. Nor was it possible that armies whose language and characteristics differed so widely should ever come to such an agreement. As for the officers; nearly all of them were extravagant, bankrupt, and guilty of some crime: they had not a good enough conscience to put up with any emperor who was not as vicious as themselves and under an obligation for their services.
The old ingrained human pa.s.sion for power matured and burst into 38 prominence with the growth of the empire. With straiter resources equality was easily preserved. But when once we had brought the world to our feet and exterminated every rival state or king, we were left free to covet power without fear of interruption. It was then that strife first broke out between patricians and plebeians: at one time arose seditious tribunes,[295] at another tyrannous consuls:[296] in the Forum at Rome were sown the first seeds of civil war. Before long, Marius, rising from the lowest ranks of the people, and Sulla, the most cruel of all the n.o.bles, crushed our liberty by force of arms and subst.i.tuted a despotism. Then came Pompey, whose aims, though less patent, were no better than theirs. From that time onwards the one end sought was supreme power in the state. Even at Pharsalia and Philippi the citizen armies did not lay down their arms. How then can we suppose that the troops of Otho and Vitellius would have willingly stopped the war? The same anger of heaven, the same human pa.s.sions, the same criminal motives drove them into discord. True these wars were each settled by a single battle, but that was due to the generals" cowardice. However, my reflections on the ancient and the modern character have carried me too far: I must now resume the thread of our narrative.
When Otho started for Brixellum, he left his brother t.i.tia.n.u.s in 39 nominal command, though the real power lay with the prefect Proculus.
As for Celsus and Paulinus, no use was made of their experience, and their empty t.i.tles were used as a screen for other people"s blunders.
The tribunes and centurions felt themselves in an ambiguous position, seeing the better generals sacrificed and the worst in command. The men were full of spirit, but preferred criticizing to carrying out their officers" orders. It was decided to advance and encamp four miles west of Bedriac.u.m. Though it was spring, and rivers abounded, the men were very foolishly allowed to suffer from want of water. Here a council of war was held, for Otho kept sending dispatches urging haste, and the soldiers kept clamouring for their emperor to lead them. Many demanded that the troops stationed across the Po[297]
should be brought up. It is not so easy to decide what was the best thing they could have done as to be sure that what they did do was the worst. They were in marching order, not fighting trim, and their 40 objective was the confluence of the Po and the Arda,[298] sixteen miles away. Celsus and Paulinus refused to expose their troops, fatigued by the march and under heavy kit, to the a.s.sault of an enemy who, while still fresh after covering barely four miles, would certainly attack them, either while they were in the disorder of a marching column, or when they had broken up to dig trenches. However, t.i.tia.n.u.s and Proculus, worsted in argument, appealed to their authority: and there arrived post-haste a Numidian orderly with a peremptory dispatch from Otho, criticizing his generals" inaction, and ordering them to bring matters to a head. He was sick of delay and too impatient to live on hope.
On that same day, while Caecina was busy with the bridge-building 41 operations,[299] two officers of the Guards came and demanded an interview. He was preparing to hear and answer their proposals, when some scouts burst in with the news that the enemy were close at hand.
The officers" conversation was thus interrupted, and it was left uncertain whether they were broaching a hostile plot or a piece of treachery, or some honest plan. Caecina, dismissing the officers, rode back to the camp, where he found that Valens had given orders to sound for battle, and the troops were already under arms. While the legions were balloting for the order in which they were to take the field, the cavalry rode out and charged. Strange to say, they would have been hurtled back upon the trenches by a smaller force of Othonians, had not the Italian legion bravely stopped them by drawing their swords and forcing them to go back and resume the fight. The Vitellian legions formed without any disorder, for though the enemy were close at hand, thick plantations hid the approaching force. In the Othonian army the generals were nervous and the men ill-disposed towards them: their march was hindered by carts and camp-followers, and the high road,[300] with its deep ditches on either side, was too narrow even for a peaceful march. Some of the men formed round their standards, others went searching for their place: on every side there was an uproar as men ran about shouting to each other: the boldest kept pressing on to the front, while the tide of the timid ebbed to the rear.
Amid the confusion of this sudden panic somebody invented a story 42 that Vitellius" army had abandoned his cause, whereupon an unwarrantable glee relaxed their efforts. It was never fully known whether this report was spread by Vitellian scouts or whether it was started on Otho"s side, either by treachery or chance. Losing all their thirst for battle the Othonians actually broke into a cheer. The enemy answered with angry shouts, and most of Otho"s soldiers, having no idea what caused the cheering, feared treachery. At this point the Vitellian line charged. They were fresh, and in good order, stronger and more numerous. However, the Othonians, despite their disorder, fewer numbers, and fatigue, offered a stubborn resistance. The ground was enc.u.mbered with orchards and vineyards, and the character of the battle varied accordingly. They fought now from a distance, now at close quarters, and charged sometimes in detachment, sometimes in column.[301] On the raised high-road they fought hand to hand, using the weight of their bodies and their shields. They gave up throwing their javelins and cut through helmet and breastplate with sword and axe. Each man knew his foe; they were in view of the other troops;[302] and they fought as if the whole issue of the war depended on them.