by white troops, the need of which, for moral as well as for physical strength, he had always insisted upon.
It is quite believable that Van Dorn was the person most responsible for Hindman"s interference with Pike, although, of course, the very seriousness and desperateness of Hindman"s situation would have impelled him to turn to the only place where ready help was to be had.
Three days prior to the time that Hindman had been a.s.signed to the Trans-Mississippi Department, Roane, an old antagonist of Pike[396]
and the commander to whose immediate care Van Dorn had confided Arkansas,[397] had asked of Pike at Van Dorn"s suggestion[398] all the white forces he could spare, Roane having practically none of his own.
Pike had refused the request, if request it was, and in refusing it, had represented how insufficient his forces actually were for purposes of his own department and how exceedingly difficult had been the task, which was his and his alone, of getting them together. At the time of writing he had not a single dollar of public money for his army and only a very limited amount of ammunition and other supplies.[399]
Pike received Hindman"s communication of May 31 late in the afternoon of June 8 and he replied to it that same evening immediately after he had made arrangements[400] for complying in part with its requirements.
The reply[401] as it stands in the records today is a strong indictment of the Confederate management of Indian
[Footnote 396: Pike had fought a duel with Roane, Roane having challenged him because he had dared to criticize his conduct in the Mexican War [Hallura, _Biographical and Pictorial History of Arkansas_, vol. i, 229; _Confederate Military History_, vol.
x, 99].]
[Footnote 397: Maury to Roane, May 11, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 827.]
[Footnote 398: Maury to Pike, May 19, 1862, Ibid.]
[Footnote 399: Pike to Roane, June 1, 1862, Ibid., 935-936.]
[Footnote 400: General Orders, June 8, 1862, Ibid., 943.]
[Footnote 401: Pike to Hindman, June 8, 1862, Ibid., 936-943.]
affairs in the West and should be dealt with a.n.a.lytically, yet also as a whole; since no paraphrase, no mere synopsis of contents could ever do the subject justice. From the facts presented, it is only too evident that very little had been attempted or done by the Richmond authorities for the Indian regiments. Neither officers nor men had been regularly or fully paid. And not all the good intentions, few as they were, of the central government had been allowed realization.
They had been checkmated by the men in control west of the Mississippi. In fact, the army men in Arkansas had virtually exploited Pike"s command, had appropriated for their own use his money, his supplies, and had never permitted anything to pa.s.s on to Indian Territory, notwithstanding that it had been bought with Indian funds, "that was fit to be sent anywhere else." The Indian"s portion was the "refuse," as Pike so truly, bitterly, and emphatically put it, or, in other words of his, the "crumbs" that fell from the white man"s table.
Pike"s compliance with Hindman"s orders was only partial and he offered not the vestige of an apology that it was so. What he did send was Dawson"s[402] infantry regiment and Woodruff"s battery which went duly on to Little Rock with the requisite thirty days" subsistence and the caution that not a single cartridge was to be fired along the way.
The caution Pike must have repeated in almost ironical vein; for the way to Little Rock lay through Indian Territory and cartridges like everything else under Pike"s control had been collected solely for its defense.
Respecting the forward movement of the Indian troops, Pike made not the slightest observation in his
[Footnote 402: C.L. Dawson of the Nineteenth Regiment of Arkansas Volunteers had joined Pike at Fort McCulloch in April [_Fort Smith Papers_].]
reply. His silence was ominous. Perhaps it was intended as a warning to Hindman not to encroach too far upon his department; but that is mere conjecture; inasmuch as Pike had not yet seen fit to question outright Hindman"s authority over himself. As if antic.i.p.ating an echo from Little Rock of criticisms that were rife elsewhere, he ventured an explanation of his conduct in establishing himself in the extreme southern part of Indian Territory and towards the west and in fortifying on an open prairie, far from any recognized base.[403] He had gone down into the Red River country, he a.s.serted, in order to be near Texas where supplies might be had in abundance and where, since he had no means of defence, he would be safe from attack. He deplored the seeming necessity of merging his department in another and larger one. His reasons were probably many but the one reason he stressed was, for present purposes, the best he could have offered. It was, that the Indians could not be expected to render to him as a subordinate the same obedience they had rendered to him as the chief officer in command. Were his authority to be superseded in any degree, the Indians would naturally infer that his influence at Richmond had declined, likewise his power to protect them and their interests.
During the night Pike must have pondered deeply
[Footnote 403: His enemies were particularly scornful of his work in this regard. They poked fun at him on every possible occasion.
Edwards, in _Shelby and His Men_, 63, but echoed the general criticism,
"Pike, also a Brigadier, had retreated with his Indian contingent out of North West Arkansas, unpursued, through the Cherokee country, the Chickasaw country, and the country of the Choctaws, two hundred and fifty miles to the southward, only halting on the "Little Blue", an unknown thread of a stream, twenty miles from Red river, where he constructed fortifications on the open prairie, erected a saw-mill remote from any timber, and devoted himself to gastronomy and poetic meditation, with elegant accompaniments..."]
over things omitted from his reply to Hindman and over all that was wanting to make his compliance with Hindman"s instructions full and satisfactory. On the ninth, his a.s.sistant-adjutant, O.F. Russell, prepared a fairly comprehensive report[404] of the conditions in and surrounding his command. Pike"s force,[405] so the report stated, was anything but complete. With Dawson gone, there would be in camp, of Arkansas troops, one company of cavalry and one of artillery and, of Texas, two companies of cavalry. When men, furloughed for the wheat harvest, should return, there would be "in addition two regiments and one company of cavalry, and one company of artillery, about 80 strong."[406] The withdrawal of white troops from the Territory would be interpreted by the Indians to mean its abandonment.
Of the Indian contingent, Russell had this to say:
The two Cherokee regiments are near the Kansas line, operating on that frontier. Col. Stand Watie has recently had a skirmish there, in which, as always, he and his men fought gallantly, and were successful. Col. D.N. McIntosh"s Creek Regiment is under orders to advance up the Verdigris, toward the Santa Fe road. Lieut. Col.
Chilly McIntosh"s Creek Battalion, Lieut. Col. John Jumper"s Seminole Battalion, and Lieut. Col. J.D. Harris" Chickasaw Battalion are under orders, and part of them now in motion toward the Salt Plains, to take Fort Larned, the post at Walnut Creek, and perhaps Fort Wise, and intercept trains going to New Mexico.
The First Choctaw (new)[407] Regiment, of Col. Sampson Folsom, and the Choctaw Battalion (three companies), of Maj. Simpson (N.) Folsom, are at Middle Boggy, 23 miles northeast of this point.
They were under orders to march northward to
[Footnote 404: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 943-945.]
[Footnote 405: For tabulated showing of Pike"s brigade, see Ibid., 831.]
[Footnote 406: Compare Russell"s statement with Hindman"s [Ibid., 30]. See also Maury to Price, March 22, 1862 [Ibid., vol. viii, 798].]
[Footnote 407: The parentheses appear here as in the original.]
the Salt Plains and Santa Fe road; but the withdrawal of Colonel Dawson"s regiment prevents that, and the regiment is now ordered to take position here, and the battalion to march to and take position at Camp McIntosh, 17 miles this side of Fort Cobb, where, with Hart"s Spies, 40 in number, it will send out parties to the Wichita Mountains and up the False Wichita, and prevent, if possible, depredations on the frontier of Texas.
The First Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment, of Col. Douglas H.
Cooper, goes out of service on the 25th and 26th of July. It is now encamped 11 miles east of here.... The country to the westward is quiet, all the Comanches this side of the Staked Plains being friendly, and the Kiowas[408] having made peace, and selected a home to live at on Elk Creek, not far from the site of Camp Radziwintski, south of the Wichita Mountains.
The Indian troops have been instructed, if the enemy[409] invades the country, to hara.s.s him, and impede his progress by every possible means, and, falling back here as he advances, to a.s.sist in holding this position against him.
Included in Russell"s report there might well have been much interesting data respecting the condition of the troops that Pike was parting with; for it can scarcely be said that he manifested any generosity in sending them forth. He obeyed the letter of his order and ignored its spirit. He permitted no guns to be taken out of the Territory that had been paid for with money that he had furnished.
Dawson"s regiment had not its full quota of men, but that was scarcely Pike"s fault. Neither was it his fault that its equipment was so sadly below par that it could make but very slow progress on the nine hundred mile march between Fort McCulloch and Little Rock. Moreover, the health of the
[Footnote 408: Pike had just received a.s.surances of the friendly disposition of the Kiowas [Bickel to Pike, June 1, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 936].]
[Footnote 409: The enemy in mind was the Indian Expedition. Pike had heard that Sturgis had been removed "on account of his tardiness in not invading the Indian country...." [Ibid., 944].]
men was impaired, their duties, especially the "fort duties, throwing up intrenchments, etc.,"[410] had been very fatiguing. Pike had no wagons to spare them for the trip eastward. So many of his men had obtained furloughs for the harvest season and every company, in departing, had taken with it a wagon,[411] no one having any thought that there would come a call decreasing Pike"s command.
So slowly and laboriously did Dawson"s regiment progress that Hindman, not hearing either of it or of Woodruff"s battery, which was slightly in advance, began to have misgivings as to the fate of his orders of May 31. He, therefore, repeated them in substance, on June 17, with the additional specific direction that Pike should "move at once to Fort Gibson." That order Pike received June 24, the day following his issuance of instructions to his next in command, Colonel D.H. Cooper, that he should hasten to the country north of the Canadian and there take command of all forces except Chief Jumper"s.
The receipt of Hindman"s order of June 17 was the signal for Pike to pen another lengthy letter[412] of description and protest.
Interspersed through it were his grievances, the same that were recited in the letter of June 8, but now more elaborately dwelt upon.
Pike was getting irritable. He declared that he had done all he could to expedite the movement of his troops. The odds were unquestionably against him. His Indians were doing duty in different places. Most of the men of his white cavalry force were off on furlough. Their furloughs would not expire until the
[Footnote 410: Dawson to Hindman, June 20, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 945-946.]
[Footnote 411: Dawson had allowed his wagons to go "of his own motion"
[Pike to Hindman, June 24, 1862, Ibid., 947].]
[Footnote 412:--Ibid., 947-950.]
twenty-fifth and not until the twenty-seventh could they be proceeded against as deserters. Not until that date, too, would the reorganization, preliminary to marching, be possible. He was short of transportation and half of what he had was unserviceable.
Of his available Indian force, he had made what disposition to him seemed best. He had ordered the newly-organized First Choctaw Regiment, under Colonel Sampson Folsom, to Fort Gibson and had a.s.signed Cooper to the command north of the Canadian, which meant, of course, the Cherokee country. Cooper"s own regiment was the First Choctaw and Chickasaw, of which, two companies, proceeding from Scullyville, had already posted themselves in the upper part of the Indian Territory, where also were the two Cherokee regiments, Watie"s and Drew"s. The remaining eight companies of the First Choctaw and Chickasaw were encamped near Fort McCulloch and would have, before moving elsewhere, to await the reorganization of their regiment, now near at hand. However, Cooper was not without hope that he could effect reorganization promptly and take at least four companies to join those that had just come from Scullyville. There were six companies in the Chickasaw Battalion, two at Fort Cobb and four on the march to Fort McCulloch; but they would all have to be left within their own country for they were averse to moving out of it and were in no condition to move. The three companies of the Choctaw Battalion would also have to be left behind in the south for they had no transportation with which to effect a removal. The Creek commands, D.N. McIntosh"s Creek Regiment, Chilly McIntosh"s Creek Battalion, and John Jumper"s Seminole Battalion, were operating in the west, along
the Santa Fe Trail and towards Forts Larned and Wise.
June 17 might be said to mark the beginning of the real controversy between Pike and Hindman; for, on that day, not only did Hindman reiterate the order to hurry that aroused Pike"s ire but he encroached upon Pike"s prerogative in a financial particular that was bound, considering Pike"s experiences in the past, to make for trouble.
Interference with his commissary Pike was determined not to brook, yet, on June 17, Hindman put N. Bart Pearce in supreme control at Fort Smith as commissary, acting quartermaster, and acting ordnance officer.[413] His jurisdiction was to extend over northwestern Arkansas and over the Indian Territory. Now Pike had had dealings already with Pearce and thought that he knew too well the limits of his probity. Exactly when Pike heard of Pearce"s promotion is not quite clear; but, on the twenty-third, Hindman sent him a conciliatory note explaining that his intention was "to stop the operations of the commissaries of wandering companies in the Cherokee Nation, who"
were "destroying the credit of the Confederacy by the floods of certificates they" issued and not "to restrict officers acting under"
Pike"s orders.[414] All very well, but Pearce had other ideas as to the functions of his office and lost no time in apprising various people of them. His notes[415] to Pike"s officers were most impertinently prompt. They were sent out on the twenty-fourth of June and on the twenty-sixth Pike reported[416] the whole history of his economic embarra.s.sments to the Secretary of War.[417]