[Footnote 900: This is given upon the authority of Maxey [_Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 857]. It seems slightly at variance with Smith"s own official statements. Smith would appear to have entertained a deep distrust of Cooper, whose promotion he did not regard as either "wise or necessary" [Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1102].]
[Footnote 901: Cooper to T.M. Scott, January, 1864 [Ibid., vol.
x.x.xiv, part ii, 859-862].]
[Ill.u.s.tration: FACSIMILE OF MONTHLY INSPECTION REPORT OF THE FIRST CREEK REGIMENT OF MOUNTED VOLUNTEERS.]
It seems a little strange that the Indians should so emphasize their national individualism at this particular time, inasmuch as six of them, the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek, Seminole, and Caddo, professing to be still in strict alliance with the Southern States, had formed an Indian confederacy, had collectively re-a.s.serted their allegiance, pledged their continued support, and made reciprocal demands. All these things they had done in a joint, or general, council, which had been held at Armstrong Academy the previous November. Resolutions of the council, embodying the collective pledges and demands, were even at this very moment under consideration by President Davis and were having not a little to do with his att.i.tude toward the whole Maxey programme.
In the matter of army reorganization, Smith was prepared to concede to Maxey a large discretion.[902] The brigading that would most comfortably fit in with the nationalistic feelings of the Indians and, at the same time, accord, in spirit, with treaty obligations and also make it possible for Cooper to have a supreme command of the Indian forces in the field was that which Cooper himself advocated, the same that Boudinot took occasion, at this juncture, to urge upon President Davis.[903] It was a plan for three distinct Indian brigades, a Cherokee, a Creek-Seminole, and a Choctaw-Chickasaw. Maxey thought "it would be a fine recruiting order,"[904] yet, notwithstanding, he gave his
[Footnote 902: _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 917.]
[Footnote 903: Boudinot to Davis, January 4, 1864 [Ibid., vol.
liii, supplement, 920-921]. Boudinot also suggested other things, some good, some bad. He suggested, for instance, that Indian Territory be attached to Missouri and Price put in command. Seddon doubted if Price would care for the place [Ibid., 921].]
[Footnote 904:--Ibid., vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 858.]
preference for the two brigade plan.[905] The promotion of Cooper, implicit in the three brigade plan, was not at all pleasing to General Smith; for he thought of it as reflecting upon Steele, whom he loyally described as having "labored conscientiously and faithfully in the discharge of his duties."[906] With Steele removed from the scene[907]--and he was soon removed for he had been retained in the Indian country only that Maxey might have for a brief season the benefit of his experience[908]--the case was altered and Boudinot again pressed his point,[909] obtaining, finally, the a.s.surance of the War Department that so soon as the number of Indian regiments justified the organization of three brigades they should be formed.[910]
The formation of brigades was only one of the Indian demands that had emanated from the general council. Another was, the establishment of Indian Territory as a military department, an arrangement altogether inadvisable and for better reasons than the one reason that Davis offered when he addressed the united nations through their princ.i.p.al chiefs on the twenty-second of February.[911] Davis"s reason was that
[Footnote 905: Maxey to Smith, January 15, 1864, _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 875.]
[Footnote 906:--Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1101-1102.]
[Footnote 907:--Ibid., vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 845, 848.]
[Footnote 908: So Smith explained [Ibid., 845], when Steele objected to staying in the Indian Territory in a subordinate capacity [Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1108]. Steele was transferred to the District of Texas [Ibid., vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 961]. The withdrawal of Steele left Cooper the ranking officer and the person on whom such a command, if created, would fall [Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 968-969].]
[Footnote 909: Boudinot to Davis, February 11, 1864, Ibid., 968.]
[Footnote 910: Seddon to Davis, February 22, 1864, Ibid., 968-969.]
[Footnote 911: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, vol. i, 477-479; _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part iii, 824-825. Davis addressed the chiefs and not the delegation that had brought the resolutions [Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 1030-1031]. John Jumper, Seminole princ.i.p.al chief, was a member of the delegation.]
as a separate department Indian Territory could not count upon the protection of the forces belonging to the Trans-Mississippi Department that was a.s.sured to her while she remained one of its integral parts.
A distinct military district she should certainly be.
When Davis wrote, the ambition of Cooper had, in a measure, been satisfied; for he had been put in command of all "the Indian troops in the Trans-Mississippi Department on the borders of Arkansas."[912] It was by no means all he wanted or all that he felt himself ent.i.tled to and he soon let it be known that such was the state of affairs. He tried to presume upon the fact that his commission as superintendent of Indian affairs had issued from the government, although never actually delivered to him, and, in virtue of it, he was in military command.[913] The quietus came from General Smith, who informed Cooper that his new command and he himself were under Maxey.[914]
It was hoped that prospective Indian brigades would be a powerful incentive to Indian enlistment and so they proved. Moreover, much was expected in that direction from the rea.s.sembling of the general council at Armstrong Academy, and much had to be; for the times were critical. Maxey"s position was not likely to be a sinecure. As a friend wrote him,
Northern Texas and the Indian Department have been neglected so long that they have become the most difficult and the most responsible commands in the Trans-Mississippi Department. I tremble for you. A great name is in store for you or you fall into the rank of failures; the latter may be your
[Footnote 912: _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 848; Special Orders of the Adjutant and Inspector General"s Office, 1864, _Confederate Records_, no. 7, p. 15.]
[Footnote 913: Cooper to Davis, February 29, 1864, _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 1007.]
[Footnote 914:--Ibid., 1008.]
fate, and might be the fate of any man, even after an entire and perfect devotion of all one"s time and talent, for want of the proper means. In military matters these things are never considered. Success is the only criterion--a good rule, upon the whole, though in many instances it works great injustice. Good and deserving men fall, and accidental heroes rise in the scale, kicking their less fortunate brothers from the platform.[915]
With a view to strengthening the Indian alliance and accomplishing all that was necessary to make it effective, Commissioner Scott was ordered by Seddon to attend the meeting of the general council.[916]
Unfortunately, he did not arrive at Armstrong Academy in time, most unfortunately, in fact, since he was expected to bring funds with him and funds were sadly needed. Maxey attended and delivered an address[917] that rallied the Indians in spite of themselves. In council meeting they had many things to consider, whether or no they should insist upon confining their operations henceforth to their own country. Some were for making a raid into Kansas, some for forming an alliance with the Indians of the Plains,[918] who, during this year of 1864, were to prove a veritable thorn in the flesh to Kansas and Colorado.[919] As regarded some of the work of the general council, Samuel Garland, the princ.i.p.al chief of the Choctaws, proved a huge stumbling block,
[Footnote 915: S.A. Roberts to Maxey, February 1, 1864, _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 936-937.]
[Footnote 916: Seddon to Scott, January 6, 1864, Ibid., 828-829.]
[Footnote 917: Moty Kanard, late princ.i.p.al chief of the Creek Nation, spoke of it as a _n.o.ble_ address and begged for a copy [Ibid., 960].]
[Footnote 918: Vore to Maxey, January 29, 1864, Ibid., 928; Maxey to Anderson, February 9, 1864, Ibid., 958; same to same, February 7, 1864, Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 963-966.]
[Footnote 919: Inasmuch as the alliance with the Indians of the Plains was never fully consummated and inasmuch as these Indians hara.s.sed and devastated the frontier states for reasons quite foreign to the causes of the Civil War, the subject of their depredations and outrages is not considered as within the scope of the present volume.]
and Cooper was forced, so he said, to "put the members of the grand council to work on" him.[920] It was Cooper"s wish, evidently, that the council would "insist under the Indian compact that all Choctaw troops shall be put at once in the field as regular Confederate troops for the redemption and defense of the whole Indian Territory." The obstinacy of the Choctaw princ.i.p.al chief had to be overcome in order "to bring out the Third Choctaw Regiment speedily and on the proper basis." In general, the council reiterated its recommendations of November previous and so Boudinot informed President Davis,[921] it being with him the opportunity he coveted of urging, as already noted, the promotion of Cooper to a major-generalship.
In January and so anterior to most of the foregoing incidents, the shaking of the political dice in Washington, D.C., had brought again into existence the old Department of Kansas, Curtis in command.[922]
Its limits were peculiar for they included Indian Territory[923] and the military post of Fort Smith as well as Kansas and the territories of Nebraska and Colorado. The status of Fort Smith was a question for the future to decide; but, in the meantime, it was to be a bone of contention between Curtis and his colleague, Frederick Steele, in command of the sister Department of
[Footnote 920: Cooper to Maxey, February, 1864, _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 959. The report reached Phillips that the Choctaws wanted a confederacy quite independent of the southern [Ibid., part i, 107].]
[Footnote 921: Although Davis"s address of February 22 could well, in point of chronology, have been an answer to the applications and recommendations of the second session of the general council, it has been dealt with in connection with those of the first session, notwithstanding that Boudinot made his appeal less than a fortnight before Davis wrote. In his address, Davis specifically mentioned the work of the first session and made no reference whatsoever to that of the second.]
[Footnote 922: _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 10.]
[Footnote 923: Ewing wanted the command of Indian Territory, Ibid., 89.]
Arkansas; for Steele had control over all Federal forces within the political and geographical boundaries of the state that gave the name to his department except the Fort Smith garrison.[924] The termination of Schofield"s career in Missouri[925] was another result of political dice-throwing, so also was the call for Blunt to repair to the national capital for a conference.[926]
But politics had nothing whatever to do with an event more notable still. With the first of February began one of the most remarkable expeditions that had yet been undertaken in the Indian country. It was an expedition conducted by Colonel William A. Phillips and it was remarkable because, while it professed to have for its object the cleaning out of Indian Territory,[927] its incidents were as much diplomatic and pacific as military. Its course was only feebly obstructed and might have been extended into northern Texas had Moonlight of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry chosen to cooperate.[928]
As it was, the course was southward almost to Fort Was.h.i.ta.
Phillips carried with him copies of President Lincoln"s Amnesty Proclamation[929] and he distributed them freely. His interpretation of the proclamation was his own and perhaps not strictly warranted by the phraseology but justice and generosity debarred his seeing why magnanimity and forgiveness should not be extended betimes to the poor deluded red man as much as to the deliberately rebellious white. To various prominent chiefs
[Footnote 924: _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 167, 187.]
[Footnote 925:--Ibid., 188.]
[Footnote 926: Lane, Wilder, and Dole, requested that Blunt be summoned to Washington [Ibid., 52].]
[Footnote 927: See Phillips"s address to his soldiers, January 30, 1864, Ibid., 190.]
[Footnote 928: Phillips to Curtis, February 16, 1864, Ibid., part i, 106-108.]
[Footnote 929: Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Presidents_, vol. vi, 213-215.]
of secessionist persuasion he sent messages of encouragement and good-will.[930] More sanguine than circ.u.mstances really justified, he returned to report that, for some of the tribes at least, the war was virtually over.[931] What his peace mission may have accomplished, the future would reveal; but there was no doubting what his raid had done.
It had produced consternation among the weaker elements. The Creeks, the Seminoles, and the Chickasaws had widely dispersed, some into the fastnesses of the mountains. Only the Choctaws continued obdurate and defiant. It was strange that Phillips should have arrived at conclusions so sweeping; for his course[932] had led him within hearing range of the general council in session at Armstrong Academy and there the division of sentiment was not so much along tribal lines as along individual. Strong personalities triumphed; for, as Maxey so truly divined, the Indian nations were after all aristocracies. The minority really ruled. At Armstrong Academy, in spite of tendencies toward an isolation that, in effect, would have been neutrality and, on the part of a few, toward a definite retracing of steps, the southern Indians renewed their pledges of loyalty to the Confederacy.
Phillips"s olive branch was in their hands and they threw it aside.