Price was again moving
[Footnote 119: _Daily Conservative_, November 22, 1861.]
[Footnote 120: Woodburn, _Life of Thaddeus Stevens_, 183.]
[Footnote 121: Lane"s speech at Springfield, November 7, 1861 [_Daily Conservative_, November 17, 1861].]
[Footnote 122: For a full discussion of the progress of the movement, see Abel, _American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist_, 227 ff.]
suspiciously near to Kansas. On the third he was known to have left Warrensburg, ostensibly to join McCulloch in Bates County[123] and, on the eighth, he was reported as still proceeding in a southwestwardly direction, possibly to attack Fort Scott.[124] His movements gave opportunity for a popular expression of opinion among Lane"s adherents. On the evening of the eighth, a large meeting was held in Stockton"s Hall to consider the whole situation and, amidst great enthusiasm, Lane was importuned to go to Washington,[125] there to lay the case of the piteous need of Kansas, in actuality more imaginary than real, before the president. Nothing loath to a.s.sume such responsibility but not finding it convenient to leave his military task just then, Lane resorted to letter-writing. On the ninth, he complained[126] to Lincoln that Robinson was attempting to break up his brigade and had secured the cooperation of Prince to that end.[127] The anti-Robinson press[128] went farther and accused Robinson and Prince of not being big enough, in the face of grave danger to the commonwealth, to forget old scores.[129] As a solution of the problem before them, Lane suggested to Lincoln the establishment of a new military district that should include Kansas, Indian Territory, and Arkansas, and be under his command.[130] So anxious was Lane to be
[Footnote 123: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 525, 526, 527.]
[Footnote 124:--Ibid, 527.]
[Footnote 125: _Daily Conservative_, October 9, 10, 1861.]
[Footnote 126: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 529.]
[Footnote 127: _Daily Conservative_, October 9, 15, 1861.]
[Footnote 128: Chief among the papers against Robinson, in the matter of his longstanding feud with Lane, was the _Daily Conservative_ with D.W. Wilder as its editor. Another anti-Robinson paper was the Lawrence _Republican_. The Cincinnati _Gazette_ was decidedly friendly to Lane.]
[Footnote 129: _Daily Conservative_, October 15, 1861.]
[Footnote 130: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 529-530. Lane outlined his plan for a separate department in his speech in Stockton"s Hall [_Daily Conservative_, October 9, 1861]. (cont.)]
identified with what he thought was the rescue of Kansas that he proposed resigning his seat in the senate that he might be entirely untrammelled.[131] Perchance, also, he had some inkling that with Frederick P. Stanton[132] contesting the seat, a bitter partisan fight was in prospect, a not altogether welcome diversion.[133] Stanton, prominent in and out of office in territorial days, was an old political antagonist of the Lane faction and one of the four candidates whose names had been before the legislature in March. In the second half of October, Lane"s brigade notably contributed to Fremont"s show of activity and then, antic.i.p.atory perhaps to greater changes, it was detached from the main column and given the liberty of moving independently down the Missouri line to the Cherokee country.[134]
Lane"s efforts towards securing Indian enlistment did not stop with soliciting the Kansas tribes. Thoroughly aware, since the time of his sojourn at Fort Scott, if not before, of the delicate situation in Indian Territory, of the divided allegiance there, and of the despairing cry for help that had gone forth from the Union element to Washington, he conceived it eminently fitting and practicable that that same Union element should have its loyalty put to good uses and be itself induced to take up arms in behalf of the cause it affected so ardently to endorse. To an ex-teacher among the Seminoles, E.H.
Carruth, was entrusted the task of recruiting.
The situation in Indian Territory was more than
[Footnote 130: (cont.) Robinson was opposed to the idea [Ibid., November 2, 6, 1861].]
[Footnote 131: _Official Records_, vol. iii, 530.]
[Footnote 132: Martin, _First Two Years of Kansas_, 24; _Biographical Congressional Directory_, 1771-1903.]
[Footnote 133: _Daily Conservative_, November 1, 1861, gives Robinson the credit of inciting Stanton to contest the seat.]
[Footnote 134: _Daily Conservative_, October 30, 1861.]
delicate. It was precarious and had been so almost from the beginning.
The withdrawal of troops from the frontier posts had left the Territory absolutely dest.i.tute of the protection solemnly guaranteed its inhabitants by treaty with the United States government.
Appeal[135] to the War Department for a restoration of what was a sacred obligation had been without effect all the summer. Southern emissaries had had, therefore, an entirely free hand to accomplish whatever purpose they might have in mind with the tribes. In September,[136] the Indian Office through Charles E. Mix, acting commissioner of Indian affairs in the absence of William P. Dole, who was then away on a mission to the Kansas tribes, again begged the War Department[137] to look into matters so extremely urgent. National honor would of itself have dictated a policy of intervention before
[Footnote 135: Secretary Cameron"s reply to Secretary Smith"s first request was uncompromising in the extreme and prophetic of his persistent refusal to recognize the obligation resting upon the United States to protect its defenceless "wards." This is Cameron"s letter of May 10, 1861:
"In answer to your letter of the 4th instant, I have the honor to state that on the 17th April instructions were issued by this Department to remove the troops stationed at Forts Cobb, Arbuckle, Was.h.i.ta, and Smith, to Fort Leavenworth, leaving it to the discretion of the Commanding Officer to replace them, or not, by Arkansas Volunteers.
"The exigencies of the service will not admit any change in these orders." [Interior Department Files, _Bundle no. 1 (1849-1864) War_.]
Secretary Smith wrote to Cameron again on the thirtieth [Interior Department _Letter Press Book_, vol. iii, 125], enclosing Dole"s letter of the same date [Interior Department, _File Box, January 1 to December 1, 1861_; Indian Office _Report Book_, no. 12, 176], but to no purpose.]
[Footnote 136: Indian Office _Report Book_, no. 12, 218-219.]
[Footnote 137: Although his refusal to keep faith with the Indians is not usually cited among the things making for Cameron"s unfitness for the office of Secretary of War, it might well and justifiably be. No student of history questions to-day that the appointment of Simon Cameron to the portfolio of war, to which Thaddeus Stevens had aspirations [Woodburn, _Life of Thaddeus Stevens_, 239], was one of the worst administrative mistakes Lincoln ever made. It was certainly one of the four cabinet appointment errors noted by Weed [_Autobiography_, 607].]
the poor neglected Indians had been driven to the last desperate straits. The next month, October, nothing at all having been done in the interval, Dole submitted[138] to Secretary Smith new evidence of a most alarmingly serious state of affairs and asked that the president"s attention be at once elicited. The apparent result was that about the middle of November, Dole was able to write with confidence--and he was writing at the request of the president--that the United States was prepared to maintain itself in its authority over the Indians at all hazards.[139]
Boastful words those were and not to be made good until many precious months had elapsed and many sad regrettable scenes enacted. In early November occurred the reorganization of the Department of the West which meant the formation of a Department of Kansas separate and distinct from a Department of Missouri, an arrangement that afforded ample opportunity for a closer attention to local exigencies in both states than had heretofore been possible or than, upon trial, was subsequently to be deemed altogether desirable. It necessarily increased the chances for local patronage and exposed military matters to the grave danger of becoming hopelessly entangled with political.
The need for change of some sort was, however, very evident and the demand for it, insistent. If the southern Indians were not soon secured, they were bound to menace, not only Kansas, but Colorado[140]
and to help materially in blocking the way to Texas, New Mexico,
[Footnote 138: Indian Office _Report Book_ no. 12, 225.]
[Footnote 139: Dole to Hunter, November 16, 1861, ibid., _Letter Book_, no. 67, pp. 80-82.]
[Footnote 140: On conditions in Colorado Territory, the following are enlightening: ibid., _Consolidated Files_, C 195 of 1861; C 1213 of 1861; C 1270 of 1861; C 1369 of 1861; V 43 of 1861; _Official Records_, vol. iv, 73.]
and Arizona. Their own domestic affairs had now reached a supremely critical stage.[141] It was high time
[Footnote 141: In addition to what may be obtained on the subject from the first volume of this work, two letters of slightly later date furnish particulars, as do also the records of a council held by Agent Cuther with certain chiefs at Leroy.
(a). LAWRENCE, KANSAS, Dec. 14th, 1861.
HON.W.P. DOLE, Commissioner of Ind. Affairs
Dear Sir, It is with reluctance that I again intrude on your valuable time. But I am induced to do so by the conviction that the subject of our Indian relations is really a matter of serious concern: as involving the justice and honor of our own Government, and the deepest interests--the very existence, indeed--of a helpless and dependent people. And knowing that it is your wish to be furnished with every item of information which may, in any way, throw light on the subject, I venture to trouble you with another letter.
Mico Hat-ki, the Creek man referred to in my letter of Oct. 31st has been back to the Creek Nation, and returned about the middle of last month. He was accompanied, to this place, by one of his former companions, but had left some of their present company at LeRoy. They were expecting to have a meeting with some of the Indians, at LeRoy, to consult about the proper course to be pursued, in order to protect the loyal and peaceable Indians, from the hostility of the disaffected, who have become troublesome and menacing in their bearing.
With this man and his companion, I had considerable conversation, and find that the Secessionists and disaffected Half-breeds are carrying things with a high hand. While the loyal Indians are not in a condition to resist them, by reason of the proximity of an overwhelming rebel force.
From them (repeating their former statements, regarding the defection of certain parties, and the loyalty of others, with the addition of some further particulars) I learn the following facts: Viz. That M Kennard, the Princ.i.p.al Chief of the Lower Creeks, most of the McIntoshes, George Stidham, and others have joined the rebels, and organized a military force in their interest; for the purpose of intimidating and harra.s.sing the loyal Indians. They name some of the officers, but are not sufficiently conversant with military terms to distinguish the different grades, with much exactness. Unee McIntosh, however, is the highest in rank, (a Colonel I presume) and Sam Cho-co-ti, George Stidham, Chilly McIntosh, are all officers in the Lower Creek rebel force.
Among the Upper Creeks, John Smith, Timiny Barnet and Wm. Robinson, are leaders.
Among the Seminoles, John Jumper, the Princ.i.p.al Chief, is on the side of the rebels. Pas-co-fa, the second chief, stands neutral. Fraser McClish, though himself a Chickasaw, has raised a company (cont.)]
for the Federal government to do something to attest its own competency. There was need for it to do that,
[Footnote 141: (cont.) among the Seminoles in favor of the rebellion.
They say the full Indians will kill him.
The Choctaws are divided in much the same way as the other Tribes, the disaffected being princ.i.p.ally among the Half-breeds.