"All of them are true to the Government of the United States, but some are at war with each other. I proposed to them to make peace with all the tribes friendly to our Government, so that their "Great Father"
might view all of them alike.
"To this they agreed, and a Council was called to which the Osages, Potawatomies, Shians, Sac and Foxes, in fact all the tribes at variance, are (cont.)]
tale had been told many times of late and every time with a new emphasis upon that part of it that recounted delusion and betrayal.
For quite a while now the Indians had been feeling themselves neglected. Steele was aware of the fact but helpless. When told of treaty rights he had to plead ignorance; for he had never seen the treaties and had no official knowledge of their contents. He was exercising the functions of superintendent _ex officio_, not because the post had ever been specifically conferred upon him or instructions sent, but because he had come to his command to find it, in nearly every aspect, Indian and no agent or superintendent at hand to take charge [785] of affairs that were
[Footnote 784: (cont.) to be invited, to hold a grand peace Council near the mouth of the Little Arkansas River within six weeks.
Meanwhile they are to send runners to notify these tribes to gather on the Arkansas, sixty miles above, that they may be within reach of our call when we get to the Council ground. Subsistence will have to be provided for at least 10000 Indians at that time. They will expect something from the Government to convince them of its power to carry through its promises. Some of the Cadoes and Comanches connected with this Agency, after coming to the Arkansas, returned to Fort Cobb.
These will all come back to this Council. Their desire is to be subsisted on the Little Arkansas, some 70 miles from Emporia until the war closes.
"They argue like this, "The Government once sent us our provisions to Fort Cobb over 300 miles from Fort Smith. We do not want to live near the whites, because of troubles between them and us in regard to ponies, timber, fields, green corn, etc. Our subsistence can be hauled to the mouth of the Little Arkansas, easier by far, than it was formerly from Fort Smith, and by being at this point we shall be removed from the abodes of the whites, so they cannot steal our ponies, nor can our people trouble them."
"I believe they are right. I have had more trouble the past winter in settling difficulties between the Indians and whites on account of trades, stolen horses, broken fences, etc. than from all other causes combined.
"I cannot get all the Indians of this Agency together this side of the Little Arkansas. That point will be near enough the Texan frontier for the Indians to go home easily when the war closes. It is on the direct route to Fort Cobb. They are opposed to going via Fort Gibson ..."]
[Footnote 785: Without legislating on the subject, and without intending it, the Confederacy had virtually put into effect, a recommendation of Hindman"s that "The superintendencies, agencies, etc., should be abolished, and a purely military establishment subst.i.tuted ..." [_Official Records_, vol. xiii, p. 51.].]
ordinarily not strictly within the range of military cognizance.
General Steele, like many another, was inclined to think that the red men greatly over-estimated their own importance; for they failed to "see and understand how small a portion of the field"[786] they really occupied. To Steele, it was not Indian Territory that was valuable but Texas. For him the Indian country, barren by reason of the drouth, denuded of its live stock, a prey to jayhawker, famine, and pestilence, did nothing more than measure the distance between the Federals and the rich Texan grain-fields, from whence he fondly hoped an inexhaustible supply of flour[787] for the Confederates was to come. In short, the great and wonderful expanse that had been given to the Indian for a perpetual home was a mere buffer.
But it was a buffer, throbbing with life, and that was something Steele dared not ignore and could not if he would. With such a consciousness, when the secessionist Cherokees were making arrangements for their council at Webber"s Falls in April, he hastened to propitiate them ahead of time by addressing them "through the medium of their wants" for he feared what might be their action[788]
should they a.s.semble with a
[Footnote 786: Steele to Wigfall, April 15, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 820.]
[Footnote 787: Steele"s letter books furnish much evidence on this score. A large portion has been published in the _Official Records_. During the period covered by this chapter, he was drawing his supply of flour from Riddle"s Station, "on the Fort Smith and Boggy Road" [_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 252]
in charge of which was Captain Hardin of Ba.s.s"s Texas Cavalry. He expected to draw from Arkansas likewise [Steele to Major S.J. Lee, June 9, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, pp. 70-71; Duval to Hardin, June 16, 1863, Ibid., p. 81; Steele to Lee, June 17, 1863, Ibid., pp. 87-88].]
[Footnote 788: "Enclosed please find a letter to Col. Adair, and a note from him forwarding it. I send it for the consideration of General Holmes. The (cont.)]
grievance[789] against the Confederacy in their hearts. Protection against the oncoming enemy and relief from want were the things the Indians craved, so, short though his own supplies were, Steele had to make provision for the helpless and indigent natives, the feeding of whom became a fruitful and constantly increasing source of embarra.s.sment.[790]
Just and generous as General Steele endeavored to
[Footnote 788: (cont.) subject is one of grave importance. If a regiment of infantry could be spared to take post at this place and General Cabell could be permitted to include it in his command, I would go more into the nation and would be able soon to give the required protection. The troops from Red River have been ordered up and should be some distance on the way before this. I fear the meeting of the Cherokee Council which takes place on the 20th ... unless more troops arrive before they act."--STEELE to Anderson, April 15, 1863, _Confederate Records_, no. 270, p. 194.
This was not the first time Steele had expressed a wish to go into the Nation. March 20th, when writing to Anderson [Ibid., p. 150], he had thought it of "paramount importance" that he visit all parts of his command. Concerning his apprehension about the prospective work of the Cherokee Council, he wrote quite candidly to Wigfall [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 821].]
[Footnote 789: The letter to Colonel W.P. Adair, written by one of his adjutants, J.A. Scales, April 12, 1863 [Ibid., 821-822], is a creditable presentation of the Cherokee grievance.]
[Footnote 790: Steele here presents certain phases of the embarra.s.sment,
"... The matter of feeding dest.i.tute Indians has been all through a vexatious one, the greatest trouble being to find in each neighborhood a reliable person to receive the quota for that neighborhood. These people seem more indifferent to the wants of others than any I have seen; they are not willing to do the least thing to a.s.sist in helping their own people who are dest.i.tute. I have, in many instances, been unable to get wagons to haul the flour given them. I have incurred a great responsibility in using army rations in this way and to the extent that I have. I have endeavored to give to all dest.i.tute and to sell at cost to those who are able to purchase. In this matter the Nation has been more favored than the adjacent States. I am told by Mr. Boudinot that a bill was pa.s.sed by the Cherokee Council, taking the matter into their own hands. I hope it is so. In which case I shall cease issuing to others who have not, like them, been driven from their homes. Dr. Walker was appointed to superintend this matter, some system being necessary to prevent the same persons from drawing from different commissaries ..."--STEELE to D.H. Cooper, June 15, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, pp. 80-81.]
be in the matter of attention to Indian necessities, his efforts were unappreciated largely because of evil influences at work to undermine him and to advance Douglas H. Cooper. Steele had his points of vulnerability, his inability to check the Federal advance and his remoteness from the scene of action, his headquarters being at Fort Smith. Connected with the second point and charged against him were all the bad practices of those men who, in their political or military control of Indian Territory, had allowed Arkansas to be their chief concern. Such practices became the foundation stone of a general Indian dissatisfaction and, concomitantry, Douglas H. Cooper, of insatiable ambition, posed as the exponent of the idea that the safety of Indian Territory was an end in itself.
The kind of separate military organization that const.i.tuted Steele"s command was not enough for the Indians. Seemingly, they desired the restoration of the old Pike department, but not such as it had been in the days of the controversy with Hindman but such as it always was in Pike"s imagination. The Creeks were among the first to declare that this was their desire. They addressed[791] themselves to President Davis[792] and
[Footnote 791: Mory Kanard and Echo Harjo to President Davis, May 18, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1118-1119.]
[Footnote 792: Davis, in his message of January 12, 1863 [Richardson, _Messages and Papers of the Confederacy_, vol. i, 295] had revealed an acquaintance with some Indian dissatisfaction but intimated that it had been dispelled, it having arisen "from a misapprehension of the intentions of the Government ..." It was undoubtedly to allay apprehension on the part of the Indians that Miles, in the house of Representatives, offered the following resolution, February 17, 1863:
"_Resolved_, That the Government of the Confederate States has witnessed with feelings of no ordinary gratification the loyalty and good faith of the larger portion of its Indian allies west of the State of Arkansas.
"_Resolved further_, That no effort of the Confederate Government shall be spared to protect them fully in all their rights and to a.s.sist them in defending their country against the encroachments of all enemies." [_Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States_, vol. vi, 113].]
boldly said that their country had "been treated as a mere appendage of Arkansas, where needy politicians and _proteges_ of Arkansas members of Congress must be quartered." The Seminoles followed suit,[793] although in a congratulatory way, after a rumor had reached them that the Creek request for a separate department of Indian Territory was about to be granted. The rumor was false and in June Tandy Walker, on behalf of the Choctaws, reopened the whole subject.[794] A few days earlier, the Cherokees had filed their complaint but it was of a different character, more fundamental, more gravely portentous.
The Cherokee complaint took the form of a deliberate charge of contemplated bad faith on the part of the Confederate government. E.C.
Boudinot, the Cherokee delegate in the Southern Congress, had recently returned from Richmond, empowered to submit a certain proposal to his const.i.tuents. The text of the proposal does not appear in the records but its nature,[795] after account be taken of some exaggeration attributable to the extreme of indignation, can be inferred from the formal protest[796] against it, which was drawn up at Prairie Springs in the Cherokee Nation about fifteen miles from Fort Gibson on the twenty-first of June and signed by Samuel M. Taylor, acting a.s.sistant chief, John Spears of the Executive Council, and Alexander Foreman, president of the convention. To all intents and purposes the Cherokees were asked, in return for some paltry offices chiefly military, to inst.i.tute a sort of system of military land grants. White people were to be induced to enlist in their behalf and were then to
[Footnote 793: June 6, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1120.]
[Footnote 794: June 24, 1863, Ibid., 1122-1123.]
[Footnote 795: Steele"s letter to Kirby Smith, June 24, 1863 [Ibid., 883-884], gives some hint of its nature also.]
[Footnote 796:--Ibid., 1120-1122.]
be allowed to settle, on equal terms with the Cherokees, within the Cherokee country. The proposal, as construed by Taylor and his party, was nothing more or less than a suggestion that the Cherokees surrender their nationality, their political integrity, the one thing above everything else that they had sought to preserve when they entered into an active alliance with the Confederate States. So sordid was the bargain proposed, so unequal, that the thought obtrudes itself that a base advantage was about to be taken of the Cherokee necessities and that the objectors were justified in insinuating that Boudinot and his political friends were to be the chief beneficiaries.
The Cherokee country was already practically lost to the Confederacy.
Might it not be advisable to distribute the tribal lands, secure individual holdings, while vested rights might still accrue; for, should bad come to worse, private parties could with more chance of success prosecute a claim than could a commonalty, which in its national or corporate capacity had committed treason and thereby forfeited its rights. One part of the Cherokee protest merits quotation here. Its n.o.ble indignation ought to have been proof enough for anybody.
... We were present when the treaty was made, were a party to it, and rejoiced when it was done. In that treaty our rights to our country as a Nation were guaranteed to us forever, and the Confederate States promised to protect us in them. We enlisted under the banner of those States, and have fought in defense of our country under that treaty and for the rights of the South for nearly two years. We have been driven from our homes, and suffered severe hardships, privations, and losses, and now we are informed, when brighter prospects are before us, that you think it best for us to give part of our lands to our white friends; that, to defend our country and keep troops for our protection, we must raise and enlist them from
our own territory, and that it is actually necessary that they are citizens of our country to enable us to keep them with us. To do this would be the end of our national existence and the ruin of our people. Two things above all others we hold most dear, our nationality and the welfare of our people. Had the war been our own, there would have been justice in the proposition, but it is that of another nation. We are allies, a.s.sisting in establishing the rights and independence of another nation. We, therefore, in justice to ourselves and our people, cannot agree to give a part of our domain as an inducement to citizens of another Government to fight their own battles and for their own country; besides, it would open a door to admit as citizens of our Nation the worst cla.s.s of citizens of the Confederate States ...
XII. INDIAN TERRITORY IN 1863, JULY TO DECEMBER INCLUSIVE
Independence Day, 1863, witnessed climacteric scenes in the war dramas, east and west. The Federal victories of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, all-decisive in the history of the great American conflict, when considered in its entirety, had each its measure of immediate and local importance. The loss of all control of the Mississippi navigation meant for the Confederacy its practical splitting in twain and the isolation of its western part. For the Arkansas frontier and for the Missouri border generally, it promised, since western commands would now recover their men and resume their normal size, increased Federal aggressiveness or the end of suspended. Initial preparation for such renewed aggressiveness was contemporary with the fall of Vicksburg and lay in the failure of the Confederate attack upon Helena, an attack that had been projected for the making of a diversion only. The failure compelled Holmes to draw his forces back to Little Rock.
Confederate operations in Indian Territory through May and June had been, as already described, confined to sporadic demonstrations against Federal herds and Federal supply trains, all having for their main object the dislodgment of Phillips from Fort Gibson. What proved to be their culmination and the demonstration most energetically conducted occurred at Cabin Creek,[797] while far away Vicksburg was falling and
[Footnote 797: For an official report of the action at Cabin Creek, see _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 378-382. While, as things eventuated, it was an endeavor (cont.)]
Gettysburg was being fought. A commissary train from Fort Scott was expected. It was to come down, escorted by Colonel Williams who was in command of the negro troops that Blunt had stationed at Baxter Springs. To meet the train and to reinforce Williams, Phillips despatched Major Foreman from Fort Gibson. Cooper had learned of the coming of the train and had made his plans to seize it in a fashion now customary.[798] The plans were quite elaborate and involved the cooperation[799] of Cabell"s Arkansas brigade,[800] which was to come from across the line and proceed down the east side of the Grand River. Thither also, Cooper sent a
[Footnote 797: (cont.) to cut off the supply train, there was throughout the possibility that it might also result in heading off Blunt, who was known to be on his way to Fort Gibson [Steele to Cooper, June 29, 1863; Duval to Cooper, June 29, 1863; Duval to Cabell, June 29, 1863].]
[Footnote 798: Steele to Cabell, June 25, 1863 [_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 97; _Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part ii, 885].]