[Footnote 799: Steele to Cabell, June 29, 1863 [_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 105; _Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part ii, 893-894].]
[Footnote 800: Of W.L. Cabell, the _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, has this to say: "Maj. W.L. Cabell, who had been sent to inspect the accounts of quartermasters in the department, having well acquitted himself of this duty, was, in March 1863, commissioned brigadier-general and requested to collect absentees from the service in northwestern Arkansas. Given Carroll"s and Monroe"s regiments, he was directed to perfect such organizations as he could ..." He collected his brigade with great rapidity and it soon numbered about four thousand men. Even, in April, Steele was placing much reliance upon it, although he wished to keep its relation to him a secret. He wrote to Cooper to that effect.
"Who will be in command of the Choctaws when you leave? Will they be sufficient to picket and scout on the other side of the river far enough to give notice of any advance of the enemy down the river? I do not wish it to be generally known that Cabell"s forces are under my command, but prefer the enemy should think them a separate command; for this reason I do not send these troops west until there is a necessity for it; in the meantime the other troops can be brought into position, where if we can get sufficient ammunition all can be concentrated. I cannot direct positively, not having the intimate knowledge of the country, but you should be in a position which would enable you to move either down the Ark. River or on to the road leading from Boggy Depot to Gibson as circ.u.mstances may indicate.
Let me hear from you frequently."--STEELE to Cooper, April 28, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 217-218.]
part of his own brigade and at the same time ordered another part under Stand Watie to go to Cabin Creek and to take such position on its south bank as to command the crossing. It was a time when the rivers were all in flood, a circ.u.mstance that greatly affected the outcome since it prevented the forces on the east side of the Grand from coming to Stand Watie"s support. As Foreman proceeded northward to effect a junction with Williams, he detached some Cherokees from the Third Indian, under Lieutenant Luke F. Parsons, to reconnoitre. In that way he became apprised of Watie"s whereabouts and enabled to put himself on his guard. The commissary train, in due time, reached Cabin Creek and, after some slight delay caused, not by Stand Watie"s interposition, but by the high waters, crossed. Federals and Confederates then collided in a somewhat disjointed but lengthy engagement with the result that Stand Watie retired and the train, nothing the worse for the hold-up, moved on without further molestation to Fort Gibson.[801]
The action at Cabin Creek, July 1 to 3, was the last attempt of any size for the time being to capture Federal supplies en route. The tables were thenceforth turned and the Confederates compelled to keep a close
[Footnote 801: In describing what appears to be the action at Cabin Creek, Steele refers to "bad conduct of the Creeks," and holds it partly responsible for the failure [_Official Records_, vol.
xxii, part ii, 910]. It is possible that he had in mind, however, a slightly earlier encounter, the same that he described, adversely to D.N. McIntosh"s abilities as a commander, in his general report [Ibid., part i, 32]. Steele had little faith in the Indian brigade and frankly admitted that he expected it in large measure, to "dissolve," if the Confederates were to be forced to fall back at Cabin Creek [Steele to Blair, July 1, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 902]. Nevertheless, he antic.i.p.ated a victory for his arms there [Steele to Blair, July 3, 1863, Ibid., 903].
From his general report, it might be thought that Stand Watie disappointed him at this time, as later; but the Confederate failure was most certainly mainly attributable to the high waters, which prevented the union of their expeditionary forces [Steele to Blair, July 5, 1863, Ibid., 905].]
watch on their own depots and trains. Up to date, since his first arrival at Fort Gibson, Colonel Phillips had been necessarily on the defensive because of the fewness of his men. Subsequent to the Cabin Creek affair came a change, incident to events and conditions farther east. The eleventh of July brought General Blunt, commander of the District of the Frontier, to Fort Gibson. His coming was a surprise, as has already been casually remarked, but it was most timely. There was no longer any reason whatsoever why offensive action should not be the main thing on the Federal docket in Indian Territory, as elsewhere.
To protect its own supplies and to recuperate, the strength of the Confederate Indian brigade was directed toward Red River, notwithstanding that Steele had still the hope of dislodging the Federals north of the Arkansas.[802] His difficulties[803] were no less legion than before, but he thought it might be possible to accomplish the end desired by invading Kansas,[804] a plan that seemed very feasible after S.P. Bankhead a.s.sumed command of the Northern Sub-District of Texas.[805] Steele himself had "neither the artillery nor the kind of force necessary to take a place" fortified as was Gibson; but to the westward of the Federal stronghold Bankhead might move. He might attack Fort Scott, Blunt"s headquarters but greatly weakened now, and possibly also some small posts in southwest Missouri, replenishing his resources from time to time in the fertile and well settled Neosho River Valley. Again
[Footnote 802: Steele took umbrage at a published statement of Pike that seemed to doubt this and to intimate that the line of the Arkansas had been definitely abandoned [Steele to Pike, July 13, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 925].]
[Footnote 803: For new aspects of his difficulties, see Steele to Boggs, chief of staff, July 7, 1863, Ibid., 909-911.]
[Footnote 804:--Ibid., p. 910.]
[Footnote 805: Steele to Bankhead, July 11, 1863, Ibid., 921-922.]
local selfishness rose to the surface[806] and Bankhead, surmising Steele"s weakness and that he would almost inevitably have to fall back, perhaps vacating Indian Territory altogether, became alarmed for the safety of Texas.[807]
Steele"s recognition and admission of material incapacity for taking Fort Gibson in no wise deterred him from attempting it. The idea was, that Cooper should encamp at a point within the Creek Nation, fronting Fort Gibson, and that Cabell should join him there with a view to their making a combined attack.[808] As entertained, the idea neglected to give due weight to the fact that Cabell"s men were in no trim for immediate action,[809] notwithstanding that concerted action was the only thing likely to induce success. Blunt, with
[Footnote 806: Arkansas betrayed similar selfishness. President Davis"s rejoinder to a protest from Flanagin against a tendency to ignore the claims of the West struck a singularly high note. Admitting certain errors of the past, he prayed for the generous cooperation of the future; for "it is to the future, not to the past, that we must address ourselves, and I wish to a.s.sure you, though I hope it is unnecessary, that no effort shall be spared to promote the defense of the Trans-Mississippi Department, and to develop its resources so as to meet the exigencies of the present struggle" [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 932]. Five days afterwards, Governor Reynolds, in commending Secretary Seddon for a very able ministry, expressed confidence that his gubernatorial colleagues in Arkansas, Texas, and Louisiana would, with himself, "act in no sectional or separatist spirit." It was saying a good deal, considering how strong the drift of popular opinion had been and was to be in the contrary direction. However, in August, the four governors appealed collectively to their const.i.tuents and to "the Allied Indian Nations,"
proving, if proof were needed, that they personally were sincere [Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 892-894; Moore"s _Rebellion Record_, vol. vii, 406-407].]
[Footnote 807: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 922.]
[Footnote 808: The plans for such concerted action were made as early as July 8 [Steele to Cooper, July 8, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 911-912]. Cabell was instructed to take position between Webber"s Falls and Fort Gibson [Duval to Cabell, July 10, 1863, Ibid., 916-917] and more specifically, two days before the battle, "within 15 or 20 miles of Gibson and this side of where Gen. Cooper is now encamped on Elk Creek" [Steele to Cabell, July 15, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 145].]
[Footnote 809: Steele knew of the deficiencies in their equipment, however, and of their exhausted state (cont.)]
scouts out in all directions and with spies in the very camps of his foes, soon obtained an inkling of the Confederate plan and resolved to dispose of Cooper before Cabell could arrive from Arkansas.[810]
Cooper"s position was on Elk Creek, not far from present Muskogee,[811] and near Honey Springs on the seventeenth of July the two armies met, Blunt forcing the engagement, having made a night march in order to do it. The Indians of both sides[812] were on hand, in force, the First and Second Home Guards, being dismounted as infantry and thus fighting for once as they had been mustered in. Of the Confederate, or Cooper, brigade Stand Watie, the ever reliable, commanded the First and Second Cherokee, D.N. McIntosh, the First and Second Creek, and Tandy Walker, the regiment of Choctaws and Chickasaws. The odds were all against Cooper from the start and, in ways that Steele had not specified, the material equipment proved itself inadequate indeed. Much of the ammunition was worthless.[813]
Nevertheless, Cooper stubbornly contested every inch of the ground and finally gave way only when large numbers of his Indians, knowing their guns to be absolutely useless to them, became disheartened and then demoralized. In confusion, they led the van in
[Footnote 809: (cont.) [Duval to W.H. Scott, Commanding Post at Clarksville, Ark., July 8, 1863, _Confederate Records_, p. 133; Steele to Blair, July 10, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 917; same to same, July 13, 1863, Ibid., 925].]
[Footnote 810: See Blunt"s official report, dated July 26, 1863 [Ibid., part i, 447-448].]
[Footnote 811: Anderson, _Life of General Stand Watie_, 21.]
[Footnote 812: With respect to the number of white troops engaged on the Federal side there seems some discrepancy between Blunt"s report [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 448] and Phisterer"s statistics [_Statistical Record_, 145].]
[Footnote 813: See Cooper"s report, dated August 12, 1863 [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 457-461]. The following references are to letters that substantiate, in whole or in part, what Cooper said in condemnation of the ammunition: Duval to Du Bose, dated Camp Prairie Springs, C.N., July 27, 1863 [_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no.
268, p. 159]; Steele to Blair, dated Camp Imochiah, August 9, 1863 [Ibid., 185-187; _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 961].]
flight across the Canadian; but enough of those more self-contained went thither in an easterly or southeasterly direction so as to create the impression among their enemies that they were retiring to meet the expected reinforcements from Fort Smith.[814]
But the reinforcements were yet far away. Indeed, it was not until all was over and a day too late that Cabell came up. A tragic sight confronted him; but his own march had been so dismal, so inauspicious that everything unfortunate that had happened seemed but a part of one huge catastrophe. He had come by the "old Pacific mail route, the bridges of which, in some places, were still standing in the uninhabited prairies."[815] The forsaken land broke the morale of his men--they had never been enthusiastic in the cause, some of them were conscripted unionists, forsooth, and they deserted his ranks by the score, by whole companies. The remnant pushed on and, in the far distance, heard the roaring of the cannon. Then, coming nearer, they caught a first glimpse of Blunt"s victorious columns; but those columns were already retiring, it being their intention to recross to the Fort Gibson side of the Arkansas. "Moving over the open, rolling prairies,"[816] Nature"s vast meadows, their numbers seemed great indeed and Cabell made no attempt to pursue or to court further conflict. The near view of the battle-field dismayed[817] him; for its gruesome records all too surely told him of another Confederate defeat.
[Footnote 814: Cooper intended to create such an impression [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 460] and he did [Schofield to McNeil, July 26, 1863, Ibid., part ii, 399-400].]
[Footnote 815: _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 199.]
[Footnote 816: Ibid., 200.]
[Footnote 817: Cabell might well be dismayed. Steele had done his best to hurry him up. A letter of July 15 was particularly urgent [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 933].]
In the fortunes of the Southern Indians, the Battle of Honey Springs was a decisive event. Fought and lost in the country of the Creeks, it was bound to have upon them a psychological effect disastrous to the steady maintenance of their alliance with the Confederacy, so also with the other great tribes; but more of that anon. In a military way, it was no less significant than in a political; for it was the beginning of a vigorously offensive campaign, conducted by General Blunt, that never ended until the Federals were in occupation of Fort Smith and Fort Smith was at the very door of the Choctaw country. No Indian tribe, at the outset of the war, had more completely gone over to the South than had the Choctaw. It had influenced the others but had already come to rue the day that had seen its own first defection.
Furthermore, the date of the Confederate rout at Honey Springs marked the beginning of a period during which dissatisfaction with General Steele steadily crystallized.
Within six weeks after the Battle of Honey Springs, the Federals were in possession of Fort Smith, which was not surprising considering the happenings of the intervening days. The miscalculations that had eventuated in the routing of Cooper had brought Steele to the decision of taking the field in person; for there was just a chance that he might succeed where his subordinates, with less at stake than he, had failed. Especially might he take his chances on winning if he could count upon help from Bankhead to whom he had again made application, nothing deterred by his previous ill-fortune.
It was not, by any means, Steele"s intention to attempt the reduction of Fort Gibson;[818] for, with such artillery
[Footnote 818: Steele to Blair, July 22, 1863 [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 940-941].]
as he had, the mere idea of such an undertaking would be preposterous.
The defensive would have to be, for some time to come, his leading role; but he did hope to be able to harry his enemy, somewhat, to entice him away from his fortifications and to make those fortifications of little worth by cutting off his supplies. Another commissary train would be coming down from Fort Scott via Baxter Springs about the first of August.[819] For it, then, Steele would lie in wait.
When all was in readiness, Fort Smith was vacated, not abandoned; inasmuch as a regiment under Morgan of Cabell"s brigade was left in charge, but it was relinquished as department headquarters. Steele then took up his march for Cooper"s old battle-ground on Elk Creek.
There he planned to ma.s.s his forces and to challenge an attack. He went by way of Prairie Springs[820] and lingered there a little while, then moved on to Honey Springs, where was better grazing.[821] He felt obliged thus to make his stand in the Creek country; for the Creeks were getting fractious and it was essential for his purposes that they be mollified and held in check. Furthermore, it was inc.u.mbent upon him not to expose his "depots in the direction of Texas."[822]
As the summer days pa.s.sed, Cabell and Cooper drew into his vicinity but no Bankhead, notwithstanding that Magruder had ordered him to hurry to Steele"s
[Footnote 819: Steele to Bankhead, July 22, 1863 [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 940]]
[Footnote 820: Duval to A.S. Morgan, July 18, 1863 [Ibid., 933]; Steele to Blair, July 22, 1863 [Ibid., 940-941].]
[Footnote 821: Steele arrived at Prairie Springs on the twenty-fourth [Steele to Blair, July 26, 1863, Ibid., 948] and moved to Honey Springs two days later [same to same, July 29, 1863, Ibid., 950-951]. On August 7, his camp was at Soda Springs, whither he had gone "for convenience of water and gra.s.s" [same to same, August 7, 1863, Ibid., 956].]
[Footnote 822:--Ibid., 951.]
support.[823] Bankhead had not the slightest idea of doing anything that would put Texas in jeopardy. In northern Texas sympathy for the Federal cause, or "rottenness" as the Confederates described it, was rife.[824] It would be suicidal to take the home force too far away.
Moreover, it was Bankhead"s firm conviction that Steele would never be able to maintain himself so near to Fort Gibson, so he would continue where he was and decide what to do when time for real action came.[825] It would be hazarding a good deal to amalgamate his command,[826] half of which would soon be well disciplined, with Steele"s, which, in some of its parts, was known not to be.
As a matter of fact, Steele"s command was worse than undisciplined. It was permeated through and through with defection in its most virulent form, a predicament not wholly unforeseen. The Choctaws had pretty well dispersed, the Creeks were sullen, and Cabell"s brigade of Arkansans was actually disintegrating. The prospect of fighting indefinitely in the Indian country had no attractions for men who were not in the Confederate service for pure love of the cause. Day by day desertions[827] took place until the number became alarming and, what was worse, in some cases, the officers were in collusion with the men in delinquency. Cabell himself was not above suspicion.[828] To prevent the spread of
[Footnote 823: By August third, Bankhead had not been heard from at all [Steele to Blair, August 3, 1863, _Official Records_, vol.