During my absence General Cooper urged General McCulloch to help him in this particular; General M. replies he can do "absolutely nothing." I am not disposed to complain about anything, but I do think this thing ought to be understood and regulated. Supplies of breadstuffs and forage, as well as clothing, sugar, etc., all having to be drawn from beyond the limits of this Territory, a more than ordinary supply of transportation is necessary. To that for the troops must be added that made necessary by the dest.i.tute thrown on the hands of the Government and who must be taken care of. I do not expect General Smith to investigate and study the peculiar
[Footnote 956: (cont.) the relative rank of officers [Maxey to Cooper, June 29, 1864, _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part iv, 698-699]
and he held that Confederate law recognized no distinction between Indian and white officers of the same rank. Charles de Morse, a Texan, with whom General Steele had had several differences, took great exception to Maxey"s decision. Race prejudice was strong in him. Had there been many like him, the Indians, with any sense of dignity, could never have continued long identified with the Confederate cause.
For De Morse"s letter of protest, see Ibid., 699-700.]
characteristics of command here so closely as I have. He hasn"t the time, nor is it necessary. In my opinion no effort should be spared to hold this country. Its loss would work a more permanent injury than the loss of any State in the Confederacy. States can be recovered--the Indian Territory, once gone, never. Whites, when exiled by a cruel foe, find friends amongst their race; Indians have nowhere to go. Let the enemy once occupy the country to Red River and the Indians give way to despair. I doubt whether many of the highest officials in our Government have ever closely studied this subject. It is the great barrier to the empire State of the South from her foe now and in peace. Let Federalism reach the Red River, the effects will not stop there. The doctrine of _uti possidetis_ may yet play an important part.
I believe from what I have heard that Mr. Davis has a fair knowledge of this subject, and I think from conversations with General Smith he has, but his whole time being occupied with his immense department--an empire--I trust he will pardon me when I say that no effort of commissaries, quartermasters, or anybody else should be spared to hold this country, and I only regret that it has not fallen into abler hands than mine....[957]
Military reorganization[958] for the Indian troops had, in reality, come too late. Confederate warfare all along the frontier, in the summer and autumn of 1864, was little more than a series of raids, of which Price"s Missouri was the greatest. For raiding, the best of organization was never needed. Watie, Shelby, Price were all men of the same stamp. Watie was the greatest of Indian raiders and his mere name became almost as much of a terror as Quantrill"s with which it was frequently found a.s.sociated, rightly or wrongly. Around Fort Smith in July and farther north in August the Indian raided to good effect.
Usually, when he raided in the upper part of his own country, Federal
[Footnote 957: Maxey to Boggs, May 11, 1864, _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part iii, 820.]
[Footnote 958: For progress reached in reorganization by October, see orders issued by direction of Maxey, Ibid., vol. liii, supplement, 1023.]
supply trains were his objective, but not always. The refugees were coming back from Kansas and their new home beginnings were mercilessly preyed upon by their Confederate fellow tribesmen, who felt for the owners a vindictive hatred that knew no relenting.
Watie"s last great raid was another Cabin Creek affair that reversed the failure of two years before. It occurred in September and was undertaken by Watie and Gano together, the former waiving rank in favor of the latter for the time being.[959] A brilliant thing, it was, so Maxey, and Smith"s adjutant after him, reported.[960] The booty taken was great in amount and as much as possible of it utilized on the spot. Maxey regretted that the Choctaws were not on hand also to be fitted out with much-needed clothing.[961] It was in contemplation that Watie should make a raid into Kansas to serve as a diversion, while Price was raiding Missouri.[962] The Kansans had probably much to be thankful for that circ.u.mstances hindered his penetrating far, since, at Cabin Creek, some of his men, becoming intoxicated, committed horrible excesses and "slaughtered indiscriminately."[963]
Had the force at Fort Gibson been at all adequate to the needs of the country it was supposed to defend, such raids as Watie"s would have been an utter impossibility. Thanks to Federal indifference and mismanagement, however, the safety of Indian Territory was
[Footnote 959: Cooper to T.M. Scott, October 1, 1864, _Official Records_, vol. xli, part i, 783; Watie to T.B. Heiston, October 3, 1864, Ibid., 785.]
[Footnote 960:--Ibid., 793, 794. Cooper described it "as brilliant as any one of the war" [Ibid., 783] and Maxey confessed that he had long thought that movements of the raiding kind were the most valuable for his district [Ibid., 777].]
[Footnote 961: Maxey to Boggs, October 9, 1864, Ibid., part iii, 990.]
[Footnote 962: Cooper to Bell, October 6, 1864, Ibid., 982-984.]
[Footnote 963: Curtis Johnson to W.H. Morris, September 20, 1864 [Ibid., part i, 774].]
of less consequence now than it had been before. The incorporation with the Department of Arkansas and the consequent separation from that of Kansas had been anything but a wise move. The relations of the Indian country with the state in which its exiles had found refuge were necessarily of the closest and particularly so at this time when their return from exile was under way and almost over. For reasons not exactly creditable to the government, when all was known, Colonel Phillips had been removed from command at Fort Gibson. At the time of Watie"s raid, Colonel C.W. Adams was the inc.u.mbent of the post; but, following it, came Colonel S.H. Wattles[964] and things went rapidly from bad to worse. The grossest corruption prevailed and, in the midst of plenty, there was positive want. Throughout the winter, cattle-driving was indulged in, army men, government agents, and civilians all partic.i.p.ating. It was only the ex-refugee that faced starvation. All other folk grew rich. Exploitation had succeeded neglect and Indian Territory presented the spectacle of one of the greatest scandals of the time; but its full story is not for recital here.
Great as Maxey"s services to Indian Territory had been and yet were, he was not without his traducers and Cooper was chief among them, his overweening
[Footnote 964: _Official Records_, vol. xli, part iii, 301.
Wattles was not at Fort Gibson a month before he was told to be prepared to move even his Indian Brigade to Fort Smith [Ibid., part iv, 130]. The necessity for executing the order never arose, although all the winter there was talk off and on of abandoning Fort Gibson entirely, sometimes also there was talk of abandoning Fort Smith. So weak had the two places been for a long time that Cooper insisted there was no good reason why the Confederates should not attempt to seize them. It is interesting that Thayer notified Wattles to be prepared to move just when there was the greatest prospect of a Confederate Indian raid into Kansas.]
ambition being still unsatisfied. In November, at a meeting of the general council for the confederated tribes, Maxey spoke[965] in his own defence and spoke eloquently; for his cause was righteous. General Smith was his friend[966] in the sense that he had been Steele"s; but there soon came a time when even the department commander was powerless to defend him further. Early in 1865, Cooper journeyed to Richmond.[967] What he did there can be inferred from the fact that orders were soon issued for him to relieve Maxey.[968] He a.s.sumed command of the district he had so long coveted and had sacrificed honor to get, March first,[969] General Smith disapproving of the whole procedure. "The change," said he, "has not the concurrence of my judgment, and I believe will not result beneficially."[970]
But Smith was mistaken in his prognostications. The change was not just but it did work beneficially. Cooper knew how to manage the Indians, none better, and the time was fast approaching when they would need managing, if ever. As the absolute certainty of Confederate defeat gradually dawned upon them, they became almost desperate.
They had to be handled very carefully lest they break out beyond all restraint.[971]
[Footnote 965: _Official Records_, vol. xli, part iv, 1035-1037; vol. liii, supplement, 1027.]
[Footnote 966: In July, 1864, orders issued from Richmond for the retirement of Maxey and the elevation of Cooper [Ibid., part ii, 1019]; but Smith held them in abeyance [Ibid., part iii, 971]; for he believed that Maxey"s "removal, besides being an injustice to him, would be a misfortune to the department." The suppression of the orders failed to meet the approval of the authorities at Richmond and some time subsequent to the first of October Smith was informed that the orders were "imperative and must be carried into effect" [Ibid.,].]
[Footnote 967: _Official Records_, vol. xlviii, part i, 1382.]
[Footnote 968:--Ibid., 1403.]
[Footnote 969:--Ibid., 1408.]
[Footnote 970:--Ibid.]
[Footnote 971: The evidence for this is chiefly in Cooper"s own letter book. One published letter is especially valuable in this connection.
It is from Cooper (cont.)]
Phillips was again in charge of their northern compatriots[972] and, at Fort Gibson, he, too, was handling Indians carefully. It was in a final desperate sort of a way that a league with the Indians of the Plains was again considered advisable and held for debate at the coming meeting of the general council. To effect it, when decided upon, the services of Albert Pike were solicited.[973] No other could be trusted as he. Apparently he never served or agreed to serve[974]
and no alliance was needed; for the war was at an end. On the twenty-sixth of May, General E. Kirby Smith entered into a convention with Major-general E.R.S. Canby, commanding the Military Division of West Mississippi, by which he agreed to surrender the Trans-Mississippi Department and everything appertaining to it.[975]
The Indians had made an alliance with the Southern Confederacy in vain. The promises of Pike, of Cooper, and of many another government agent had all come to naught.
[Footnote 971: (cont.) confidentially to Anderson, May 15, 1865.
_Official Records_, vol. xlviii, part ii, 1306.]
[Footnote 972: For Phillips"s own account of his reinstallment, see his letter to Herron, January 16, 1865, Ibid., part i, 542-543.]
[Footnote 973: Smith to Pike, April 8, 1864, Ibid., part ii, 1266-1269. It was necessary to have someone else beside Throckmorton, who was a Texan, serve; because the Indians of the Plains had a deep distrust of Texas and of all Texans [Smith to Cooper, April 8, 1864, Ibid., 1270-1271; and Smith to Throckmorton, April 8, 1864, Ibid., 1271-1272].]
[Footnote 974: Smith issued him a commission however. See Ibid., 1266.]
[Footnote 975:--Ibid., 604-606.]