It is not always easy for the court or the reporter to determine what decision may thereafter be relied on as a precedent.
Repeated instances have occurred in which such a use has in fact been made and properly made of some not noted in the regular reports, and not infrequently they have subsequently been inserted in them.[Footnote: In the centennial volume (Vol. Cx.x.xI) of those of the Supreme Court of the United States, one hundred and twelve opinions are printed, the first delivered over fifty years before, which previous reporters had thought best to omit, and two hundred and twenty-one more such are published in Vol. CLIV. Whoever runs them over will be apt to think that the previous reporters were right.] There is also in case of an opinion not to be officially reported a loss of a valuable safeguard against unsound decisions. A judge writes with more care and examines the points of law which may be presented more closely if he writes for the public and for posterity.
On the whole the prevailing sentiment is that the reasons for repressing some are stronger than those for publishing all judicial opinions. It will be few only that, under any circ.u.mstances, will be omitted. The leading lawyers in every State are expected to run over, if they do not read, every case in every new volume of its reports. Every case dropped lightens this task. It helps to keep indexes of reports and digests of reports and legal treatises within reasonable limits. It cuts into an acc.u.mulating ma.s.s of material, most of which must, in any event, so far as points of law are concerned, be a mere repet.i.tion of twice-told tales, that is becoming so vast in the United States as to becloud rather than illuminate whoever seeks to know what American law really is.
If reporters will not select and discriminate between adjudged cases publishers can and will. Many sets have been prepared and issued in recent years of selected cases on all subjects taken from the official reports of all the States. Their professed aim has been to include all worth preserving. In fact, they have naturally been guided to a considerable extent by commercial considerations. To every lawyer the leading cases in his own State are of the first importance. He is not likely to buy any compilation in which a number of these do not appear, even if intrinsically, as statements of law, they may be of no great value. Hence in the collections in question the rule of selection is often the rule of three, and they are apt to contain a certain proportion of the decisions of every State.
The leading sets are the "American Decisions," running from 1760[Footnote: Long after the publication of Kirby"s Reports in 1784, some unofficial reports were published of cases decided in colonial courts prior to any which he included.] to 1869; the "American Reports," from 1869 to 1886; the "American State Reports," from 1886 to the present time, which three sets include over two hundred and fifty volumes and nearly 40,000 opinions; and the "Lawyers" Reports Annotated," now extending over more than sixty volumes, the first of which was published in 1888, and contains no cases reported prior to the preceding year.
Spencer"s rule of social evolution that all progress is from the h.o.m.ogeneous to the heterogeneous tends steadily and inexorably in the United States to lessen the value of judicial reports out of the State in which the cases were decided. Each of forty-five different commonwealths is building upon legal foundations that are not dissimilar, but some of them are advancing far faster than others, and none proceed at exactly the same rate or on exactly the same lines. They are building by statute, by popular usage and by judicial decision. Heterogeneity is most marked in legislation and it tells most there. Whoever looks over a volume of reports will find a large proportion of the cases turning upon some local statute. An important index t.i.tle is that of "Statutes Cited and Expounded." In Vol. 138, for instance, of the Ma.s.sachusetts Reports (a volume selected at random for this purpose), 223 statutes or sections of statutes are noted as having been made the subject of remark in the 170 cases which it contains. Almost all are Ma.s.sachusetts statutes, a very small proportion of which have been re-enacted elsewhere.
Appellate courts thus forced at every turn to study with care into the effect of local legislation, much of which, to get at its meaning, must be traced back historically through various changes during a long course of years, and in the older States sometimes for centuries, listen unwillingly to citations from decisions of other States which are even remotely affected by the statutes that may be there in force.
The newer States and those with a small population are naturally the ones that rely most on foreign authority. In the last volume (Vol. 26) of the Nevada Reports, sixty-two per cent, of the cases cited in the opinions of the court are of that kind. In the last volume (Vol. 178) of the New York Reports, the percentage is but thirty, and in the last of the Ma.s.sachusetts Reports (Vol. 185) it is only twenty-five.[Footnote: _Law Notes_ for April, 1905, 8.]
In the Supreme Court of the United States and in several of the appellate courts of the larger States each judge is provided with a clerk at public expense. While this is a means of relief from much which is in the nature of drudgery, it sometimes leads to a deterioration in the quality of the judicial opinions. A dictated opinion is apt to be unnecessarily long, and when a clerk is set to looking up authorities, although he can hardly be expected always to select the most apposite, it is easier to accept his work and use what he has gathered than to inst.i.tute an independent search.
Some of the appellate courts which are most fully employed, both State and federal, are provided with special libraries of considerable extent, and each of the individual judges is also often furnished with an official library, sometimes containing several thousand volumes, for his personal use, to be handed over to his successor when he retires from office.[Footnote: In New York, the private library of the Court of Appeals contains over 6,000 volumes, comprehending all the reports of all the States, and the personal libraries provided for each judge have come to comprise 3,500 volumes.]
In some States counsel have the right to demand to be heard before a full court, and those who have taken the appeal generally exercise it. As decisions go by majorities, the chance of reversing a judgment before, for instance, a court of five, which is a common number, is obviously greater when all its members sit than when four do. In either case it must be the act of three judges, and one is more likely to convince three out of five than three out of four.
In the Supreme Court of the United States there is no means of supplying the place of a judge who is absent or disqualified.
The remaining members, provided they const.i.tute a quorum (that is, a majority), proceed without him. In most of the States there is some provision for filling the vacancy in such a contingency. Sometimes it is by calling in a judge of an inferior court; sometimes by application to the Governor for the temporary appointment of some member of the bar as a special a.s.sociate justice to sit in a particular case.
In several of the larger States all the members of the court of last resort do not and need not sit in every case. In some two permanent divisions are const.i.tuted, to each of which certain judges are a.s.signed, and both divisions may be in session at the same time. In other States certain judges are detached for a certain time, during which they study causes which have been argued and prepare opinions. This done, they resume their seats, and others are released for similar duties.
In Ohio, for instance, the Supreme Court consists of six judges and commonly sits in two divisions of three each, having equal authority. The whole court sits to hear any cause involving a point of const.i.tutional law. It also decides those which have been heard in one of its divisions and in which the divisional court is in favor of reversing the judgment appealed from. An affirmance by the divisional court is final, but if it inclines to a reversal the judges communicate their opinions to the full court, which also reads the printed briefs submitted on the original argument, and then without any further oral hearing p.r.o.nounces final judgment. Four judges, therefore, at least, must concur to accomplish a reversal. Should the full court in any case be equally divided, the judgment appealed from stands.
Under the Const.i.tution of California (Art. VI, Sec. 2) the Supreme Court, which consists of seven judges, ordinarily sits in two departments. Three judges can render a decision, but the judgment does not go into full effect for thirty days unless three, including the Chief Justice, have given it their approval.
The Chief Justice also, with the concurrence of two of his a.s.sociates, or four of these without his concurrence, can direct that any cause be heard before a full court within thirty days after judgment by a department court. He can also order the removal into the full court of any cause before judgment.
In Michigan only five out of the eight judges sit to hear a case, and if one of them files an opinion dissenting from that of his a.s.sociates, the losing party can demand a rehearing before the full court.
Neither the bar nor the bench are quite satisfied with such methods of appellate procedure. The Ohio scheme is excellently adapted for the dispatch of business, but may prevent an oral argument before those who are ultimately to decide the cause.
That of California often protracts litigation. Any such plan of division also must increase the risk of the court"s taking a position inconsistent with one which it had previously a.s.sumed.
The judges in one division may come to conclusions different from those reached in the other division; or where the court does not sit in divisions, a point may be determined by a narrow majority in one case which in a later one, through the subst.i.tution of one or two judges for those who heard the former, may be ruled the other way.
The freedom of appeal which is generally conceded to defeated litigants in this country has been made the subject of severe criticism. It seems, however, a necessary incident of our political inst.i.tutions. They are built upon the foundation of a profound reverence for the rights of the individual and of the equality of all before the law. Our Const.i.tutions guaranty every man against deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law. If we could count on having as judges of our trial courts none but men of ability, learning and independence, it might be safe to leave it to them to say what this due process was. But the tenure of judicial office in most States is too brief, the pay too meagre, and the mode of appointment too subject to political influence to give always that a.s.surance that could be wished either of the independence of the judiciary or of its representing only what is best in the legal profession.
In England, until recently, there was little or no right of review in favor of one convicted of crime. But the judges are appointed for life on ample salaries, and tradition requires that they be selected only from among the leaders at the bar. Nor is the right of the individual against the State deemed so sacred under English as under American inst.i.tutions. It cannot be in any country where an hereditary aristocracy has from ancient times had a share in government. As has been seen, the English practice in this respect for nearly a hundred years was adopted in the courts of the United States, but public sentiment finally p.r.o.nounced against it. Much less could it be safely followed in the States, where criminal courts are often held by judges of little ability, less learning, and inferior standing at the bar, to which, after the expiration of a brief term, perhaps of but a year, they will return should they fail to secure a party renomination.
The same reasons, if in less degree, support a liberal right of appeal in cases involving property only, and oppose restrictions based only on the amount in controversy. Americans could never tolerate keeping their appellate courts for the trial of large causes only. There must be no rich men"s courts. There certainly must be none to which a claim of right founded on a const.i.tutional provision cannot be carried up, however trifling in pecuniary value may be the matter in demand.
Most appeals fail. There are few in which the counsel who takes them are fully confident of success. Every lawyer of large experience knows that he has often won when he expected to lose, and lost when he expected to prevail. There are not many cases involving large pecuniary interests or strong personal feeling that are not appealed if there is any color for it. The proportion of appeals which are successful will generally be not far from a third of the whole number taken. Of course, however, this must depend largely on the competency of the trial judges in the court where it is claimed that errors have occurred. The abler and more experienced those who do circuit duty may be, the oftener will their doings be supported in the court of last resort.
Short terms of office and consequent lack of practical acquaintance with the business of a trial judge is the real cause why so many appeals are taken, and are allowed to be taken in our American States. As for the federal courts of appeal, there is another and unavoidable occasion for large dockets. They have the last word to p.r.o.nounce on const.i.tutional questions, and there has probably never been a year since the United States came into existence when the legitimate powers of the general government have not been repeatedly infringed upon by State legislation.
In the Supreme Court of the United States, the reporter began its second century with a plan of stating the number of cases affirmed or reversed at each term, but dropped it after two years. The record of these years was as follows:
Affirmed Reversed October Term, 1890 248 104 October Term, 1891 185 103
A tabulation of the decisions reported in the various States in their last volumes published prior to June, 1904, shows that on a general average, in sixty-three out of every hundred appeals the judgment of the inferior court was affirmed. In Ma.s.sachusetts the percentage was eighty-seven per cent. In Texas it was only thirty-four per cent., and in Arkansas and Kentucky not much over forty per cent.[Footnote: _Law Notes_ for June 1904, p. 285.]
Many more appeals are taken by convicted persons in criminal cases at the South than in the North. Many more criminal prosecutions are brought there, in proportion to the population.
This is due largely to the presence of so large a body of colored people, most of whom have had a very inferior education and training. Many more such appeals are successful also in the South than in the North. In the reports of the courts of last resort of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi between December 20, 1902, and April 25, 1903,[Footnote: As given in Vol. x.x.xIII of the Southern Reporter.] ninety-four criminal cases appear, in forty-six of which the judgment of conviction was set aside. In Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Vermont between March 12 and June 25, 1903,[Footnote: As given in Vol. LIV of the Atlantic Reporter.] the reports show only twenty such cases, of which seven were set aside.[Footnote: _Law Notes_ for September, 1903, 105.] This would seem to indicate either that the trial judges of criminal courts in the Gulf States are careless or that the appellate courts there (under the pressure, perhaps, of unwise statutes)[Footnote: See Paper on "Judicial Independence," by Justice Henry B. Brown in the Reports of the Am. Bar a.s.sociation for 1889, 265.] are inclined to be too technical. If either is true it is a just cause for public dissatisfaction with the administration of criminal justice, and some palliation for the frequent resorts to Lynch law by the Southern people.
The American plan of written opinions, at least in all cases of novelty or general interest, works better in small States than in large ones. No judge can find time to prepare more than a certain and quite moderate number in a year, if they are such as they should be. The shorter they are, the more time generally has been spent in condensing them. In a great State there must, therefore, either be a larger number of judges, or every few years there must be a temporary addition to the judicial force to clear off an acc.u.mulation of cases. The latter expedient is generally preferred. Sometimes a small number of lawyers are selected to serve as a special commission of appeals. They sit by themselves, but there may be a provision for their submitting their opinions to review by the regular court. Some of the leading cases in our reports have been decided by such commissioners. In California, where such a body now exists, its members are appointed by the court, and removable at its pleasure; but ordinarily they are chosen by the executive or legislative departments.
Sometimes when the cases on the docket of the court of last resort reach a certain number (in New York this is put at 200) the Governor may call in judges of the next court in rank to sit with the regular judges until the acc.u.mulation is cleared off.
Fewer causes can be heard and disposed of in American appellate courts than in those of other countries by reason of two things, our practice of delivering written opinions and the fulness of treatment thought necessary in such opinions, especially when they deal with questions of const.i.tutional law. In France, the Court of Ca.s.sation in 1901 heard 816 appeals.[Footnote: Of these, 219 were sustained and 597 rejected.] Nothing approaching this number could be properly disposed of on the merits in any American Court of last resort. Many appeals, however, are here, as everywhere, abandoned or dismissed for some failure to comply with the rules of practice or because manifestly frivolous, and in these no opinions are ordinarily given. During the court year closing with the Summer of 1903, the Court of Appeals of New York filed only 221 opinions, although it disposed, in one way or another, of 640 cases; and the Supreme Court of the United States filed 212 opinions and disposed of 420 cases.[Footnote: See Chap. XXIV.]
In the calendar year 1904, the Court of Appeals of New York filed 327 opinions, and the Supreme Court of Illinois over 500.
CHAPTER XX
THE ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND PUNISHMENT OF CONTEMPTS OF COURT
No court can with propriety pa.s.s a decree which it cannot enforce.[Footnote: Clarke"s Appeal from Probate, 70 Conn. Reports, 195, 209; 39 Atlantic Reporter, 155; 178 U. S. Reports, 186.] After the judgment comes the issue of appropriate process to compel obedience to it, unless such obedience (as is generally the case) is voluntarily rendered.
The whole power of government is at the command of the court for this purpose. A sheriff with a judicial process to serve who meets with resistance can summon to his aid the _posse comitatus_. By this term is meant the whole power of his county; that is, any or all of its able-bodied inhabitants on whom he may choose to call. Not to respond to such a call is a legal offense. The marshals have similar powers in serving process from the Federal courts.
The fact that there is this force behind a writ is so well understood by the community that occasions for resorting to its use, or indeed to the use of any actual force, are extremely rare. If the process was lawfully issued, it would be useless to resist. If unlawfully, it is easier and safer to seek relief by an injunction, or in case of an arrest, by a writ of _habeas corpus_. But there have been occasions in the judicial history of the United States when, under the influence of a general popular ferment, the service of process from the courts, and even the holding of courts, have been forcibly prevented.
Shay"s Rebellion in Ma.s.sachusetts (in 1786) was the first of these after the Revolution. Similar uprisings of less importance took place at about the same time in New Hampshire and Vermont.
A few years later, the service of process from the New York courts was interrupted in Columbia County. There was a strip of territory adjoining the Hudson River, t.i.tle to which was claimed both by New York and Ma.s.sachusetts. Conflicting claims, awaking much bitter feeling, arose under grants from each government. In 1791, the sheriff of Columbia County was ordered by the courts, in the course of a lawsuit, to sell a tract of this land.
Seventeen persons disguised as Indians appeared at the time of sale to resist it, and he was killed by a shot from one of them.[Footnote: Report Am. Historical a.s.sociation for 1896, I, 152, note.]
Then came the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania. The statutes of the United States[Footnote: United States Revised Statues, 5299.]
provide that if their courts meet with opposition of a serious nature, the President may use the army or call out the militia of one or more States to restore order. Opposition to the enforcement of the revenue tax on whiskey in 1794 called for the first exercise of this power. Marshals were resisted in serving process, and several counties were in a state of insurrection.
Washington sent so large a force of troops to suppress it that the rioters vanished on their approach, and there was no further obstruction of the ordinary course of justice. The total expense to the government in this affair was nearly $1,000,000.[Footnote: Wharton"s "State Trials," 102.] In 1799, somewhat similar opposition arose in the same State against the enforcement of the house taxes laid by Congress. President Adams here also sent a sufficient force of militia to suppress it.[Footnote: _Ibid_., 48, 459.]
In 1839, a general combination was formed among the tenant farmers in New York holding long or perpetual leases from manorial proprietors to resist the payment of the stipulated rents. In several counties the greater part of the land was occupied under such a tenure. The design was to compel the landlords to sell to the existing tenants at a price fixed by public appraisal, or else that the State should take the lands by eminent domain and dispose of them to the same persons on reasonable terms. Sheriffs were forcibly prevented from serving writs in dispossession proceedings. One who took with him a _posse comitatus_ of five hundred armed men, a hundred of whom were mounted, was met and turned back by a larger band, who were all mounted. The Governor was finally compelled to issue a proclamation against the "up-renters," as they were called, and to protect the sheriff by a large body of militia. Put down in one county, the movement soon reappeared in others. Disguises were a.s.sumed, the rioters figuring under Indian names and wearing more or less of the Indian garb. Three hundred of them, with twice that number not in disguise, prevented a sheriff from levying an execution for rent on tenants upon the Livingston manor. For six years the contest went on in several counties.
Several lives were lost on both sides. Sheriff"s officers were tarred and feathered and their writs destroyed. Of the rioters many were arrested and prosecuted from time to time and some convicted. Five were sent to the State"s prison for life. Two were sentenced to be hanged. The State used its militia freely to defend the sheriffs, at a cost in one county of over $60,000, and in 1845 a series of prosecutions and convictions, resulting in over eighty sentences at one term of court, broke the back of the insurrection. It died half-victorious, however, for an "anti-rent" Governor and Lieutenant-Governor were elected the next year, and several statutory changes in the law of leases which the malcontents had desired were soon afterwards enacted.[Footnote: See Paper by David Murray on the "Anti-rent Episode in New York," Report of the American Historical a.s.sociation for 1896, I, 139.]
During the period of reconstruction in the Southern States, following the civil war, the courts were repeatedly broken up by violence and the service of legal process resisted, in some instances by authority of the military Governor.[Footnote: S. S. c.o.x, "Three Decades of Federal Legislation," 469, 472, 495, 496, 509, 544, 565.]
The writ to enforce the judgment of a court of law is called an execution. It is directed to the sheriff or other proper executive officer, and requires him to seize and sell the defendant"s property or, as the case may be, to arrest and imprison him, to turn him out of possession of certain lands, or to take some other active step against one who has been adjudged in the wrong, in order to right the wrong, as the judgment may command.
A judgment for equitable relief is not ordinarily the subject of an execution.[Footnote: See Chap. VIII.]
A judgment at law is generally to the effect that one of the parties shall recover certain money or goods or land from the other. On the prevailing party lies the burden of moving to get possession of what has thus been adjudged to be due. This he does by taking out an execution. A judgment in equity is an order on the defendant to do or not to do some particular act.