His first care was to give his troops some rest, which they very much wanted. When he perceived that they were fit for action, the inhabitants of the territories of Turin(747) refusing to conclude an alliance with him, he marched and encamped before their chief city; carried it in three days, and put all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck the barbarians with so much dread, that they all came voluntarily, and surrendered at discretion. The rest of the Gauls would have done the same, had they not been awed by the terror of the Roman arms, which were now approaching. Hannibal thought therefore that he had no time to lose; that it was his interest to march up into the country, and attempt some great exploit; such as might inspire those who should have an inclination to join him with confidence.
The rapid progress which Hannibal had made, greatly alarmed Rome, and caused the utmost consternation throughout the city. Semp.r.o.nius was ordered to leave Sicily, and hasten to the relief of his country; and P.
Scipio, the other consul, advanced by forced marches towards the enemy, crossed the Po, and pitched his camp near the Ticinus.(748)
_Battle of the Cavalry near the Ticinus._-The armies being now in sight, the generals on each side made a speech to their soldiers before they engaged.(749) Scipio, after having represented to his forces the glory of their country, the achievements of their ancestors, observed to them, that victory was in their hands, since they were to combat only with Carthaginians, a people who had been so often defeated by them, as well as forced to be their tributaries for twenty years, and long accustomed to be almost their slaves: that the advantage they had gained over the flower of the Carthaginian horse, was a sure omen of their success during the rest of the war: that Hannibal, in his march over the Alps, had just before lost the best part of his army; and that those who survived were exhausted by hunger, cold, and fatigue: that the bare sight of the Romans was sufficient to put to flight a parcel of soldiers, who had the aspects of ghosts rather than of men: in a word, that victory was become necessary, not only to secure Italy, but to save Rome itself, whose fate the present battle would decide, as that city had no other army wherewith to oppose the enemy.
Hannibal, that his words might make the stronger impression on the rude minds of his soldiers, speaks to their eyes, before he addresses their ears; and does not attempt to persuade them by arguments, till he has first moved them by the following spectacle. He arms some of the prisoners whom he had taken in the mountains, and obliges them to fight, two and two, in sight of his army; promising to reward the conquerors with their liberty and rich presents. The alacrity wherewith these barbarians engaged upon these motives, gives Hannibal an occasion of exhibiting to his soldiers a lively image of their present condition; which, by depriving them of all means of returning back, puts them under an absolute necessity either of conquering or dying, in order to avoid the endless evils prepared for those that should be so base and cowardly as to submit to the Romans. He displays to them the greatness of their reward, _viz._ the conquest of all Italy; the plunder of the rich and wealthy city of Rome; an ill.u.s.trious victory, and immortal glory. He speaks contemptibly of the Roman power, the false l.u.s.tre of which (he observed) ought not to dazzle such warriors as themselves, who had marched from the pillars of Hercules, through the fiercest nations, into the very centre of Italy. As for his own part, he scorns to compare himself with Scipio, a general of but six months" standing: himself, who was almost born, at least brought up, in the tent of Hamilcar his father; the conqueror of Spain, of Gaul, of the inhabitants of the Alps, and what is still more, conqueror of the Alps themselves. He rouses their indignation against the insolence of the Romans, who had dared to demand that himself, and the rest who had taken Saguntum, should be delivered up to them; and excites their jealousy against the intolerable pride of those imperious masters, who imagined that all things ought to obey them, and that they had a right to give laws to the whole world.
After these speeches, both sides prepare for battle. Scipio, having thrown a bridge across the Ticinus, marched his troops over it. Two ill omens(750) had filled his army with consternation and dread. As for the Carthaginians, they were inspired with the boldest courage. Hannibal animates them with fresh promises; and cleaving with a stone the skull of the lamb he was sacrificing, he prays Jupiter to dash to pieces his head in like manner, in case he did not give his soldiers the rewards he had promised them.
Scipio posts, in the first line, the troops armed with missive weapons, and the Gaulish horse; and forming his second line of the flower of the confederate cavalry, he advances slowly. Hannibal advanced with his whole cavalry, in the centre of which he had posted the troopers who rid with bridles, and the Numidian hors.e.m.e.n on(751) the wings, in order to surround the enemy. The officers and cavalry being eager to engage, a charge ensues. At the first onset, Scipio"s light-armed soldiers had scarcely discharged their darts, when, frighted at the Carthaginian cavalry, which came pouring upon them, and fearing lest they should be trampled under the horses" feet, they gave way, and retired through the intervals of the squadrons. The fight continued a long time with equal success. Many troopers on both sides dismounted, so that the battle was carried on between infantry as well as cavalry. In the mean time, the Numidians surround the enemy, and charge the rear of the light-armed troops, who at first had escaped the attack of the cavalry, and tread them under their horses" feet. The centre of the Roman forces had hitherto fought with great bravery. Many were killed on both sides, and even more on that of the Carthaginians. But the Roman troops were put into disorder by the Numidians, who attacked them in the rear; and especially by a wound the consul received, which disabled him from continuing the combat. However, this general was rescued out of the enemy"s hands by the bravery of his son, then but seventeen years old; and who afterwards was honoured with the surname of Africa.n.u.s, for having put a glorious period to this war.
The consul, though dangerously wounded, retreated in good order, and was conveyed to his camp by a body of horse, who covered him with their arms and bodies: the rest of the army followed him thither. He hastened to the Po, which he crossed with his army, and then broke down the bridge, whereby he prevented Hannibal from overtaking him.
It is agreed, that Hannibal owed this first victory to his cavalry; and it was judged from thenceforth that the main strength of his army consisted in his horse; and therefore, that it would be proper for the Romans to avoid large open plains, such as are those between the Po and the Alps.
Immediately after the battle of the Ticinus, all the neighbouring Gauls seemed to contend who should submit themselves first to Hannibal, furnish him with ammunition, and enlist in his army. And this, as Polybius has observed, was what chiefly induced that wise and skilful general, notwithstanding the small number and weakness of his troops, to hazard a battle; which he indeed was now obliged to venture, from the impossibility of marching back whenever he should desire to do it; because nothing but a battle would oblige the Gauls to declare for him, whose a.s.sistance was the only refuge he then had left.
_Battle of the Trebia._-Semp.r.o.nius the consul, upon the orders he had received from the senate, was returned from Sicily to Ariminum.(752) From thence he marched towards the Trebia, a small river of Lombardy, which falls into the Po a little above Placentia, where he joined his forces to those of Scipio. Hannibal advanced towards the camp of the Romans, from which he was separated only by that small river. The armies lying so near one another, gave occasion to frequent skirmishes, in one of which Semp.r.o.nius, at the head of a body of horse, gained some advantage over a party of Carthaginians, very trifling indeed, but which nevertheless very much increased the good opinion this general naturally entertained of his own merit.
This inconsiderable success seemed to him a complete victory. He boasted his having vanquished the enemy in the same kind of fight in which his colleague had been defeated, and that he thereby had revived the courage of the dejected Romans. Being now resolutely bent to come, as soon as possible, to a decisive battle, he thought it proper, for decency"s sake, to consult Scipio, whom he found of a quite different opinion from himself. Scipio represented, that in case time should be allowed for disciplining the new levies during the winter, they would be much fitter for service in the ensuing campaign; that the Gauls, who were naturally fickle and inconstant, would disengage themselves insensibly from Hannibal; that as soon as his wounds should be healed, his presence might be of some use in an affair of such general concern: in a word, he besought him earnestly not to proceed any further.
These reasons, though so just, made no impression upon Semp.r.o.nius. He saw himself at the head of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand allies, exclusive of cavalry, (a number which, in those ages, formed a complete army,) when both consuls joined their forces. The troops of the enemy amounted to near the same number. He thought the juncture extremely favourable for him. He declared publicly, that all the officers and soldiers were desirous of a battle, except his colleague, whose mind (he observed) being more affected by his wound than his body, could not, for that reason, bear to hear of an engagement. But still, continued Semp.r.o.nius, is it just to let the whole army droop and languish with him?
What could Scipio expect more? Did he flatter himself with the hopes that a third consul, and a new army, would come to his a.s.sistance? Such were the expressions he employed both among the soldiers, and even about Scipio"s tent. The time for the election of new generals drawing near, Semp.r.o.nius was afraid a successor would be sent before he had put an end to the war; and therefore it was his opinion, that he ought to take advantage of his colleague"s illness, to secure the whole honour of the victory to himself. As he had no regard, says Polybius, to the time proper for action, and only to that which he thought suited his own interest, he could not fail of taking wrong measures. He therefore ordered his army to prepare for battle.
This was the very thing Hannibal desired; as he held it for a maxim, that a general who has entered a foreign country, or one possessed by the enemy, and has formed some great design, has no other refuge left, than continually to raise the expectations of his allies by some fresh exploits. Besides, knowing that he should have to deal only with new-levied and unexperienced troops, he was desirous of taking advantage of the ardour of the Gauls, who were extremely desirous of fighting; and of Scipio"s absence, who, by reason of his wound, could not be present in the battle. Mago was therefore ordered to lie in ambush with two thousand men, consisting of horse and foot, on the steep banks of a small rivulet which ran between the two camps, and to conceal himself among the bushes that were very thick there. An ambuscade is often safer in a smooth open country, but full of thickets, as this was, than in woods, because such a spot is less apt to be suspected. He afterwards caused a detachment of Numidian cavalry to cross the Trebia with orders to advance at break of day as far as the very barriers of the enemy"s camp, in order to provoke them to fight; and then to retreat and repa.s.s the river, in order to draw the Romans after them. What he had foreseen, came directly to pa.s.s. The fiery Semp.r.o.nius immediately detached his whole cavalry against the Numidians, and then six thousand light-armed troops, who were soon followed by all the rest of the army. The Numidians fled designedly; upon which the Romans pursued them with great eagerness, and crossed the Trebia without resistance, but not without great difficulty, being forced to wade up to their very arm-pits through the rivulet, which was swoln with the torrents that had fallen in the night from the neighbouring mountains. It was then about the winter-solstice, that is, in December. It happened to snow that day, and the cold was excessively piercing. The Romans had left their camp fasting, and without having taken the least precaution; whereas the Carthaginians had, by Hannibal"s order, eaten and drunk plentifully in their tents; had got their horses in readiness, rubbed themselves with oil, and put on their armour by the fire-side.
They were thus prepared when the fight began. The Romans defended themselves valiantly for a considerable time, though they were half spent with hunger, fatigue, and cold; but their cavalry was at last broken and put to flight by that of the Carthaginians, which much exceeded theirs in numbers and strength. The infantry also were soon in great disorder. The soldiers in ambuscade sallying out at a proper time, rushed on a sudden upon their rear, and completed the overthrow. A body of above ten thousand men resolutely fought their way through the Gauls and Africans, of whom they made a dreadful slaughter; but as they could neither a.s.sist their friends, nor return to the camp, the way to it being cut off by the Numidian horse, the river, and the rain, they retreated in good order to Placentia. Most of the rest lost their lives on the banks of the river, being trampled to pieces by the elephants and horses. Those who escaped, went and joined the body above mentioned. The next night Scipio retired also to Placentia. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory, and their loss was inconsiderable, except that a great number of their horses were destroyed by the cold, the rain, and the snow; and that, of all their elephants, they saved but one only.
In Spain, the Romans had better success in this and the following campaign;(753) for Cn. Scipio extended his conquests as far as the river Iberus,(754) defeated Hanno, and took him prisoner.
Hannibal took the opportunity, whilst he was in winter quarters, to refresh his troops, and gain the affection of the natives.(755) For this purpose, after having declared to the prisoners whom he had taken from the allies of the Romans, that he was not come with the view of making war upon them, but of restoring the Italians to their liberty, and protecting them against the Romans, he sent them all home to their own countries, without requiring the least ransom.
The winter was no sooner over, than he set out towards Tuscany,(756) whither he hastened his march for two important reasons: first, to avoid the ill effects which would arise from the ill will of the Gauls, who were tired with the long stay of the Carthaginian army in their territories; and were impatient of bearing the whole burden of a war, in which they had engaged with no other view than to carry it into the country of their common enemy: secondly, that he might increase, by some bold exploit, the reputation of his arms in the minds of all the inhabitants of Italy, by carrying the war to the very gates of Rome; and at the same time reanimate his troops, and the Gauls his allies, by the plunder of the enemy"s lands.
But in his march over the Apennines, he was overtaken by a dreadful storm, which destroyed great numbers of his men. The cold, the rain, the wind and hail, seemed to conspire his ruin; so that the fatigues which the Carthaginians had undergone in crossing the Alps, seemed less dreadful than those they now suffered. He therefore marched back to Placentia, where he again fought Semp.r.o.nius, who was returned from Rome. The loss on both sides was very nearly equal.
Whilst Hannibal was in these winter quarters, he hit upon a true Carthaginian stratagem.(757) He was surrounded with fickle and inconstant nations: the friendship he had contracted with them was but of recent date. He had reason to apprehend a change in their disposition, and, consequently, that attempts would be made upon his life. To secure himself, therefore, he got perukes made, and clothes suited to every age.
Of these he sometimes wore one, sometimes another; and disguised himself so often, that not merely such as saw him only transiently, but even his intimate acquaintance, could scarce know him.
(M121) At Rome, Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius had been appointed consuls.(758) Hannibal having advice that the latter was advanced already as far as Arretium, a town of Tuscany, resolved to go and engage him as soon as possible. Two ways being shown him, he chose the shortest, though the most troublesome, nay, almost impa.s.sable, by reason of a fen which he was forced to go through. Here the army suffered incredible hardships.
During four days and three nights they marched halfway up the leg in water, and, consequently, could not get a moment"s sleep. Hannibal himself, who rode upon the only elephant he had left, could hardly get through. His long want of sleep, and the thick vapours which exhaled from that marshy place, together with the unhealthiness of the season, cost him one of his eyes.
_Battle of Thrasymenus._(_759_)-Hannibal being thus got, almost unexpectedly, out of this dangerous situation, and having refreshed his troops, marched and pitched his camp between Arretium and Fesulae, in the richest and most fruitful part of Tuscany. His first endeavours were, to discover the disposition of Flaminius, in order that he might take advantage of his weak side, which, according to Polybius, ought to be the chief study of a general. He was told, that Flaminius was greatly conceited of his own merit, bold, enterprising, rash, and fond of glory.
To plunge him the deeper into these excesses, to which he was naturally p.r.o.ne,(760) he inflamed his impetuous spirit, by laying waste and burning the whole country in his sight.
Flaminius was not of a temper to continue inactive in his camp, even if Hannibal had lain still. But when he saw the territories of his allies laid waste before his eyes, he thought it would reflect dishonour upon him, should he suffer Hannibal to ransack Italy without control, and even advance to the very walls of Rome without meeting any resistance. He rejected with scorn the prudent counsels of those who advised him to wait the arrival of his colleague, and to be satisfied, for the present, with putting a stop to the devastation of the enemy.
In the mean time, Hannibal was still advancing towards Rome, having Cortona on the left hand, and the lake Thrasymenus on his right. When he saw that the consul followed close after him, with design to give him battle, in order to stop him in his march; having observed that the ground was convenient for an engagement, he thought only of making preparations for it. The lake Thrasymenus and the mountains of Cortona form a very narrow defile, which leads into a large valley, lined on both sides with hills of a considerable height, and closed, at the outlet, by a steep hill of difficult access. On this hill, Hannibal, after having crossed the valley, came and encamped with the main body of his army; posting his light-armed infantry in ambuscade upon the hills on the right, and part of his cavalry behind those on the left, as far almost as the entrance of the defile, through which Flaminius was obliged to pa.s.s. Accordingly, this general, who followed him very eagerly with the resolution to fight him, being come to the defile near the lake, was forced to halt, because night was coming on; but he entered it the next morning at daybreak.
Hannibal having permitted him to advance, with all his forces, above half way through the valley, and seeing the Roman van-guard pretty near him, gave the signal for the battle, and commanded his troops to come out of their ambuscade, in order that he might attack the enemy at the same time from all quarters. The reader may guess at the consternation with which the Romans were seized.
They were not yet drawn up in order of battle, neither had they got their arms in readiness, when they found themselves attacked in front, in rear, and in flank. In a moment, all the ranks were put into disorder.
Flaminius, alone undaunted in so universal a consternation, animates his soldiers both with his hand and voice, and exhorts them to cut themselves a pa.s.sage with their swords through the midst of the enemy. But the tumult which reigned every where, the dreadful shouts of the enemy, and a fog that was risen, prevented his being seen or heard. However, when the Romans saw themselves surrounded on all sides, either by the enemy or the lake, the impossibility of saving their lives by flight roused their courage, and both parties began the fight with astonishing animosity.
Their fury was so great, that not a soldier in either army perceived an earthquake which happened in that country, and buried whole cities in ruins. In this confusion, Flaminius being slain by one of the Insubrian Gauls, the Romans began to give ground, and at last fairly fled. Great numbers, endeavouring to save themselves, leaped into the lake; whilst others, directing their course towards the mountains, fell into the enemy"s hands whom they strove to avoid. Six thousand only cut their way through the conquerors, and retreated to a place of safety; but the next day they were taken prisoners. In this battle fifteen thousand Romans were killed, and about ten thousand escaped to Rome by different roads.
Hannibal sent back the Latins, who were allies of the Romans, into their own country, without demanding the least ransom. He commanded search to be made for the body of Flaminius, in order to give it burial; but it could not be found. He afterwards put his troops into quarters of refreshment, and solemnized the funerals of thirty of his chief officers who were killed in the battle. He lost in all but fifteen hundred men, most of whom were Gauls.
Immediately after, Hannibal despatched a courier to Carthage, with the news of his good success. .h.i.therto in Italy. This caused the greatest joy for the present, gave birth to the most promising hopes with regard to the future, and revived the courage of all the citizens. They now prepared, with incredible ardour, to send into Italy and Spain all necessary succours.
Rome, on the contrary, was filled with universal grief and alarm, as soon as the praetor had p.r.o.nounced from the rostra the following words, "We have lost a great battle." The senate, studious of nothing but the public welfare, thought that in so great a calamity and so imminent a danger, recourse must be had to extraordinary remedies. They therefore appointed Quintus Fabius dictator, a person as conspicuous for his wisdom as his birth. It was the custom at Rome, that the moment a dictator was nominated, all authority ceased, that of the tribunes of the people excepted. M. Minucius was appointed his general of horse. We are now in the second year of the war.
_Hannibal"s Conduct with respect to Fabius._(_761_)-Hannibal, after the battle of Thrasymenus, not thinking it yet proper to march directly to Rome, contented himself, in the mean time, with laying waste the country.
He crossed Umbria and Picenum; and after ten days" march, arrived in the territory of Adria.(762) He got a very considerable booty in this march.
Out of his implacable enmity to the Romans, he commanded, that all who were able to bear arms, should be put to the sword; and meeting no obstacle any where, he advanced as far as Apulia; plundering the countries which lay in his way, and carrying desolation wherever he came, in order to compel the nations to disengage themselves from their alliance with the Romans; and to show all Italy, that Rome itself, now quite dispirited, yielded him the victory.
Fabius, followed by Minucius and four legions, had marched from Rome in quest of the enemy, but with a firm resolution not to let him take the least advantage, nor to advance one step till he had first reconnoitred every place; nor hazard a battle till he should be sure of success.
As soon as both armies were in sight, Hannibal, to terrify the Roman forces, offered them battle, by advancing almost to the very entrenchments of their camp. But finding every thing quiet there, he retired; blaming, in appearance, the cowardice of the enemy, whom he upbraided with having at last lost that valour so natural to their ancestors; but fretted inwardly, to find he had to do with a general of so different a disposition from Semp.r.o.nius and Flaminius; and that the Romans, instructed by their defeat, had at last made choice of a commander capable of opposing Hannibal.
From this moment he perceived that the dictator would not be formidable to him by the boldness of his attacks, but by the prudence and regularity of his conduct, which might perplex and embarra.s.s him very much. The only circ.u.mstance he now wanted to know, was, whether the new general had firmness enough to pursue steadily the plan he seemed to have laid down.
He endeavoured, therefore, to shake his resolution by the different movements which he made, by laying waste the lands, plundering the cities, and burning the villages and towns. He, at one time, would raise his camp with the utmost precipitation; and, at another, stop short in some valley out of the common route, to try whether he could not surprise him in the plain. However, Fabius still kept his troops on the hills, but without losing sight of Hannibal; never approaching near enough to come to an engagement; nor yet keeping at such a distance, as might give him an opportunity of escaping him. He never suffered his soldiers to stir out of the camp, except to forage, nor ever on those occasions without a numerous convoy. If ever he engaged, it was only in slight skirmishes, and so very cautiously, that his troops had always the advantage. By this conduct he revived, by insensible degrees, the courage of the soldiers, which the loss of three battles had entirely damped; and enabled them to rely, as they had formerly done, on their valour and good fortune.
Hannibal, having got an immense booty in Campania, where he had resided a considerable time, left that country, in order that he might not consume the provisions he had laid up, and which he reserved for the winter season. Besides, he could no longer continue in a country of gardens and vineyards, which were more agreeable to the eye than useful for the subsistence of an army; a country where he would have been forced to take up his winter quarters among marshes, rocks, and sands; while the Romans would have drawn plentiful supplies from Capua, and the richest parts of Italy. He therefore resolved to settle elsewhere.
Fabius naturally supposed, that Hannibal would be obliged to return the same way he came, and that he might easily annoy him during his march. He began by throwing a considerable body of troops into Casilinum, and thereby securing that small town, situated on the Vulturnus, which separated the territories of Falernum from those of Capua: he afterwards detached four thousand men, to seize the only pa.s.s through which Hannibal could come out; and then, according to his usual custom, posted himself with the remainder of the army on the hills adjoining to the road.
The Carthaginians arrive, and encamp in the plain at the foot of the mountains. And now the crafty Carthaginian falls into the same snare he had laid for Flaminius at the defile of Thrasymenus; and it seemed impossible for him ever to extricate himself out of this difficulty, there being but one outlet, of which the Romans were possessed. Fabius, fancying himself sure of his prey, was only contriving how to seize it. He flattered himself, and not without the appearance of probability, with the hopes of putting an end to the war by this single battle. Nevertheless, he thought fit to defer the attack till the next day.
Hannibal perceived, that his own artifices were now employed against him.(763) It is in such junctures as these, that a general has need of unusual presence of mind and fort.i.tude, to view danger in its utmost extent, without being dismayed; and to find out sure and instant expedients without deliberating. Immediately, the Carthaginian general caused two thousand oxen to be got together, and ordered small bundles of vine-branches to be tied to their horns. Towards the dead of night, having commanded the branches to be set on fire, he caused the oxen to be driven with violence to the top of the hills where the Romans were encamped. As soon as these creatures felt the flame, the pain rendering them furious, they flew up and down on all sides, and set fire to the shrubs and bushes they met in their way. This squadron, of a new kind, was sustained by a good number of light-armed soldiers, who had orders to seize upon the summit of the mountain, and to charge the enemy, in case they should meet them. All things happened as Hannibal had foreseen. The Romans who guarded the defile, seeing the fires spread over the hills which were above them, and imagining that it was Hannibal making his escape by torch-light, quit their post, and run up to the mountains to oppose his pa.s.sage. The main body of the army not knowing what to think of all this tumult, and Fabius himself not daring to stir, while it was dark, for fear of a surprise, wait for the return of the day. Hannibal seizes this opportunity, marches his troops and the spoils through the defile, which was now unguarded, and rescues his army out of a snare in which, had Fabius been but a little more vigorous, it would either have been destroyed, or at least very much weakened. It is glorious for a man to turn his very errors to his advantage, and make them subservient to his reputation.
The Carthaginian army returned to Apulia, still pursued and hara.s.sed by the Romans. The dictator, being obliged to take a journey to Rome on account of some religious ceremonies, earnestly entreated his general of horse, before his departure, not to fight during his absence. However, Minucius did not regard either his advice or his entreaties; but the very first opportunity he had, whilst part of Hannibal"s troops were foraging, he charged the rest, and gained some advantage. He immediately sent advice of this to Rome, as if he had obtained a considerable victory. The news of this, with what had just before happened at the pa.s.sage of the defile, raised complaints and murmurs against the slow and timorous circ.u.mspection of Fabius. In a word, matters were carried so far, that the Roman people gave his general of horse an equal authority with him; a thing unheard-of before. The dictator was upon the road when he received advice of this: for he had left Rome, in order that he might not be an eye-witness of what was contriving against him. His constancy, however, was not shaken. He was very sensible, that though his authority in the command was divided, yet his skill in the art of war was not so.(764) This soon became manifest.
Minucius, grown arrogant at the advantage he had gained over his colleague, proposed that each should command a day alternately, or even a longer time. But Fabius rejected this proposal, as it would have exposed the whole army to danger whilst under the command of Minucius. He therefore chose to divide the troops, in order that it might be in his power to preserve, at least, that part which should fall to his share.
Hannibal, fully informed of all that pa.s.sed in the Roman camp, was overjoyed to hear of this dissension between the two commanders. He therefore laid a snare for the rash Minucius, who accordingly plunged headlong into it; and engaged the enemy on an eminence, in which an ambuscade was concealed. But his troops being soon put into disorder, were just upon the point of being cut to pieces, when Fabius, alarmed by the sudden outcries of the wounded, called aloud to his soldiers: "Let us hasten to the a.s.sistance of Minucius: let us fly and s.n.a.t.c.h the victory from the enemy, and extort from our fellow-citizens a confession of their fault." This succour was very seasonable, and compelled Hannibal to sound a retreat. The latter, as he was retiring, said, "That the cloud which had been long hovering on the summit of the mountain, had at last burst with a loud crack, and caused a mighty storm." So important and seasonable a service done by the dictator, opened the eyes of Minucius. He accordingly acknowledged his error, returned immediately to his duty and obedience, and showed, that it is sometimes more glorious to know how to atone for a fault, than not to have committed it.
_The state of Affairs in Spain._(_765_)-In the beginning of this campaign, Cn. Scipio, having suddenly attacked the Carthaginian fleet, commanded by Hamilcar, defeated it, and took twenty-five ships, with a great quant.i.ty of rich spoils. This victory made the Romans sensible, that they ought to be particularly attentive to the affairs of Spain, because Hannibal could draw considerable supplies both of men and money from that country.
Accordingly, they sent a fleet thither, the command whereof was given to P. Scipio, who, after his arrival in Spain, having joined his brother, did the commonwealth very great service. Till that time the Romans had never ventured beyond the Ebro. They had been satisfied with having gained the friendship of the nations situated between that river and Italy, and confirming it by alliances: but under Publius, they crossed the Ebro, and carried their arms much further up into the country.
The circ.u.mstance which contributed most to promote their affairs, was, the treachery of a Spaniard in Saguntum. Hannibal had left there the children of the most distinguished families in Spain, whom he had taken as hostages. Abelox, for so this Spaniard was called, persuaded Bostar, the governor of the city, to send back these young men into their country, in order, by that means, to attach the inhabitants more firmly to the Carthaginian interest. He himself was charged with this commission. But he carried them to the Romans, who afterwards delivered them to their relations, and, by so acceptable a present, acquired their amity.
(M122) _The Battle of Cannae._(_766_)-The next spring, C. Terentius Varro and L. aemilius Paulus were chosen consuls at Rome. In this campaign, which was the third of the second Punic war, the Romans did what had never been practised before, that is, they composed the army of eight legions, each consisting of five thousand men, exclusive of the allies. For, as we have already observed, the Romans never raised but four legions, each of which consisted of about four thousand foot, and three hundred horse.(767) They never, except on the most important occasions, made them consist of five thousand of the one, and four hundred of the other. As for the troops of the allies, their infantry was equal to that of the legions, but they had three times as many horse. Each of the consuls had commonly half the troops of the allies, with two legions, in order for them to act separately; and it was very seldom that all these forces were used at the same time, and in the same expedition. Here the Romans had not only four, but eight legions, so important did the affair appear to them. The senate even thought fit, that the two consuls of the foregoing year, Servilius and Attilius, should serve in the army as proconsuls; but the latter could not go into the field, by reason of his great age.
Varro, at his setting out from Rome, had declared openly, that he would fall upon the enemy the very first opportunity, and put an end to the war; adding, that it would never be terminated, so long as men such as Fabius should be at the head of the Roman armies. An advantage which he gained over the Carthaginians, of whom near seventeen hundred were killed, greatly increased his boldness and arrogance. As for Hannibal, he considered this loss as a real advantage; being persuaded that it would serve as a bait to the consul"s rashness, and prompt him on to a battles which he wanted extremely. It was afterwards known, that Hannibal was reduced to such a scarcity of provisions, that he could not possibly have subsisted ten days longer. The Spaniards were already meditating to leave him. So that there would have been an end of Hannibal and his army, if his good fortune had not thrown a Varro in in his way.
Both armies, having often removed from place to place, came in sight of each other near Cannae, a little town in Apulia, situated on the river Aufidus. As Hannibal was encamped in a level open country, and his cavalry much superior to that of the Romans, aemilius did not think proper to engage in such a place. He wished to draw the enemy into a spot, where the infantry might have the greatest share in the action. But his colleague, who was unexperienced, was of a contrary opinion. Such is the inconveniency of a divided command; jealousy, a disparity of tempers, or a diversity of views, seldom failing to create a dissension between the two generals.
The troops on each side were, for some time, contented with slight skirmishes. But, at last, one day, when Varro had the command, (for the two consuls took it by turns,) preparations were made on both sides for battle. aemilius had not been consulted; yet, though he extremely disapproved the conduct of his colleague, as it was not in his power to prevent it, he seconded him to the utmost.
Hannibal, after having made his soldiers observe, that, being superior in cavalry, they could not possibly have pitched upon a better spot for fighting, had it been left to their choice: "Return, then," says he, "thanks to the G.o.ds for having brought the enemy hither, that you may triumph over them; and thank me also, for having reduced the Romans to a necessity of coming to an engagement. After three great successive victories, is not the remembrance of your own actions sufficient to inspire you with courage? By the former battles, you are become masters of the open country; but this will put you in possession of all the cities, and, I presume to say it, of all the riches and power of the Romans. It is not words that we want, but action. I trust in the G.o.ds, that you shall soon see my promises verified."