An alien does not recognize the rightfulness of a government by living under it. It has always been held that an English subject may swear allegiance to an usurper and yet not be guilty of treason to the true king. Because he may innocently acknowledge the king _de facto_ (the king _in deed_,) without a.s.suming him to be king _de jure_ (king by _right_.) The distinction itself is as old as the time of Edward the First. The principle is equally applicable to suits. It has been universally acted on and allowed. The Catholic, who shrank from acknowledging the heretical Government of England, always, I believe, sued in her courts.
Who could convince a common man, that by sueing in Constantinople or Timbuctoo, he does an act which makes him responsible for the character of those governments?
Then, as for taxes. It is only our voluntary acts for which we are responsible. And when did government ever trust tax-paying to the voluntary good will of its subjects? When it does so, I, for one, will refuse to pay.
When did any sane man conclude that our Saviour"s voluntary payment of a tax acknowledged the rightfulness of Rome"s authority over Judea?
"The States," says Chief Justice Marshall, "have only not to elect Senators, and this government expires without a struggle."
Every November, then, we _create_ the government anew. Now, what "instinct" will tell a common-sense man, that the act of a _sovereign_,--voting--which creates a wicked government, is, _essentially_ the same as the submission of a _subject_,--tax-paying,--an act done without our consent. It should be remembered, that we vote as _sovereigns_,--we pay taxes as _subjects_. Who supposes that the humble tax-payer of Austria, who does not, perhaps, know in what name the charter of his bondage runs, is responsible for the doings of Metternich? And what sane man likens his position to that of the voting sovereign of the United States?
My innocent acts may, through others" malice, result in evil. In that case, it will be for my best judgment to determine whether to continue or cease them. They are not thereby rendered essentially sinful. For instance, I walk out on Sabbath morning. The priest over the way will exclaim, "Sabbath-breaker," and the infidel will delude his followers, by telling them I have no regard for Christianity. Still, it will be for me to settle which, in present circ.u.mstances, is best,--to remain in, and not be misconstrued, or to go out and bear a testimony against the superst.i.tious keeping of the day. Different circ.u.mstances will dictate different action on such a point.
I may often be the _occasion_ of evil when I am not responsible for it. Many innocent acts _occasion_ evil, and in such case all I am bound to ask myself before doing such _innocent act_, is, "Shall I occasion, on the whole, more harm or good." There are many cases where doing a duty even, we shall occasion evil and sin in others.
To save a slaveholder from drowning, when we know he has made a will freeing his slaves, would put off, perhaps forever, their emanc.i.p.ation, but of course that is not my fault. This making a man responsible for all the evil his acts, _incidentally_, without his will, occasion, reminds me of that principle of Turkish law which Dr. Clarke mentions, in his travels, and which they call "homicide by an intermediate cause." The case he relates is this: A young man in love poisoned himself, because the girl"s father refused his consent to the marriage. The Cadi sentenced the father to pay a fine of $80, saying "if you had not had a daughter, this young man had not loved; if he had not loved, he had never been disappointed; if not disappointed, he would never have taken poison." It was the same Cadi possibly, who sentenced the island of Samos to pay for the wrecking of a vessel, on the principle that "if the island had not been in the way, the vessel would never have been wrecked!"
Then of taxes on imports. Buying and selling, and carrying from country to country, is good and innocent. But government, if I trade here, will take occasion to squeeze money out of me. Very well. I shall deliberate whether I will cease trading, and deprive them of the opportunity, or go on and use my wealth to reform them. "Tis a question of expediency, not of right, which my judgment, not my conscience, must settle. An act of mine, innocent in itself, and done from right motives, no after act of another"s can make a sin.
To import, is rightful. After-taxation, against my consent, cannot make it wrong. Neither am I obliged to smuggle, in order to avoid it.
I include in these remarks, all taxes, whether on property, or imports, or railroads.
A chemist, hundreds of years ago, finds out how to temper steel. The art is useful for making knives, lancets, and machinery. But he knows that the bad will abuse it by making swords and daggers. Is he responsible? Certainly not.
Similar to this is trading in America,--knowing government will thus have an opportunity to increase its revenue.
But suppose the chemist to see two men fighting, one has the other down,--to the first our chemist presents a finely tempered dagger.
Such is voting under the United States Const.i.tution--appointing an officer to help the oppressor.
The difference between voting and tax-paying is simply this: I may do an act right in itself, though I know some evil will result. Paul was bound to preach the gospel to the Jews, though he knew some of them would thereby be led to add to their sins by cursing and mobbing him.
So I may locate property in Philadelphia, trade there, and ride on its railroads, though I know government will, without my consent, thereby enrich itself. Other things being equal, of course I shall not allow it the opportunity. But the advantages and good results of my doing so, _may be_ such as would make it my duty there to live and trade, even subject to such an evil.
But on the other hand, I may not do an act wrong in itself to secure any amount of fancied good.
Now, appointing a man by my vote to a pro-slavery office, (and such is every one under the United States Const.i.tution,) is wrong in itself, and no other good deeds which such officer may do, will justify an abolitionist in so appointing him.
Let it not be said, that this reasoning will apply to voting--that voting is the right of every human being, (which I grant only for the sake of argument,) and innocent in itself.
Voting _under our_ Const.i.tution is appointing a man to swear to protect, and actually to protect slavery. Now, appointing agents generally is the right of every man, and innocent in itself, but appointing an agent to commit a murder is sin.
I trade, and government taxes me; do I authorize it? No.
I vote, and the marshal whom my agent appoints, returns a slave to South Carolina. Do I authorize it? _Yes_. I knew it would be his _sworn duty_, when I voted; and I a.s.sented to it, by voting under the Const.i.tution which makes it his duty. If I trade, it is said, I may foresee that government will be helped by the taxes I pay, therefore I ought not to trade. But I do not trade _for the purpose_ of paying taxes! And if I am to be charged with all the foreseen results of my actions, then Garrison is responsible for the Boston mob!
The reason why I am responsible for the pro-slavery act of a United States officer, for whom I have voted, is this: I must be supposed to have _intended_ that which my agent is _bound_ by his contract with me (that is, his oath of office) to do.
Allow me to request our opposers to keep distinctly in view the precise point in debate. This is not whether Ma.s.sachusetts can rightfully trade and make treaties with South Carolina, although she knows that such a course will result in strengthening a wrongdoer.
Such are most of the cases which they consider parallel to ours, and for permitting which they charge us with inconsistency. But the question really is, whether Ma.s.sachusetts can join hands and strength with South Carolina, for the express and avowed purpose of sustaining Slavery. This she does in the Const.i.tution. For he who swears to support an instrument of twelve clauses, swears to support one as well as another,--and though one only be immoral,--still he swears to do an immoral act. Now, my conviction is, "which fire will not burn out of me," that to return fugitive slaves is sin--to promise so to do, and not do it, is, if possible, baser still; and that any conjunction of circ.u.mstances which makes either necessary, is of the Devil, and not of G.o.d.
OBJECTION XIV.
Duty requires of a non-voter to quit the country, and go where his taxes will not help to build up slavery.
ANSWER. G.o.d gave me my birth here. Because bad men about me "play such tricks before high Heaven, as make the angels weep," does it oblige me to quit? I have as good right here as they. If they choose to leave, let them--I Shall remain. "Twould be a pretty thing, indeed, if, as often as I found myself next door to a bad man, who would bring up his children to steal my apples and break my windows, I were obliged to take the temptation away by cutting down all my apple trees and moving my house further west, into the wilderness.
This would be, in good John Wesley"s phrase, "giving up all the good times to the devil," with a witness.
OBJECTION XV.
"Society has the right to prescribe the terms, upon the expressed or implied agreement to comply with which a person may reside within its limits."
ANSWER. This principle I utterly deny. All that Society has a right to demand is peaceful submission to its exactions:--_consent_ they have neither the power nor the right to exact or to imply. Twenty men live on a lone island. Nineteen set up a government and say, every man who lives there shall worship idols. The twentieth submits to all their laws, but refuses to commit idolatry. Have they the _right_ to say, "Do so, or quit;" or, to say, "If you stay, we will consider you as impliedly worshipping idols?" Doubtless they have the _power_, but the majority have no _rights_, except those which justice sanctions. Will the objector show me the justice of his principle? I was born here. I ask no man"s permission to remain.
All that any man or body of men have a right to infer from my staying here, is that, in doing this _innocent act_, I think, that on the whole, I am effecting more good than harm. Lawyers say, I cannot find this right laid down in the books. That will not trouble me.
Some old play has a character in it who never ties his neckcloth without a warrant from Mr. Justice Overdo. I claim no relationship to that very scrupulous individual.
OBJECTION XVI.
These clauses, to which you refer, are inconsistent with the Preamble of the Const.i.tution, which describes it as made "to establish justice" and "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity:" And as, when two clauses of the same instrument are inconsistent, one must yield and be held void--we hold these three clauses void.
ANSWER. A _specific_ clause is not to be held void on account of general terms, such as those of the preamble. It is rather to be taken as an exception, allowed and admitted at the time, to those general terms.
Again. You say they are inconsistent. But the Courts and the People do not think so. Now they, being the majority, settle the law. The question then is, whether the law being settled,--and according to your belief settled immorally,--you will _volunteer_ your services to execute it and carry it into effect? This you do by becoming an officeholder. It seems to me this question can receive but one answer from honest men.
LAST OF ALL, THE OBJECTOR CRIES OUT,
The Const.i.tution may be _amended_, and I shall vote to have it changed.
ANSWER. But at present it is necessary to swear to support it _as it is_. What the Const.i.tution may become, a century hence, we know not; we speak of it _as it is_, and repudiate it _as it is_.
How long may one promise to do evil, in hope some time or other to get the power to do good? We will not brand the Const.i.tution of the United States as pro-slavery, after--it had ceased to be so! This objection reminds me of Miss Martineau"s story of the little boy, who hurt himself, and sat crying on the sidewalk. "Don"t cry!" said a friend, "it won"t hurt you tomorrow."--"Well then," said the child, "I won"t cry tomorrow."
We come then, it seems to me, back to our original conclusion: that the man who swears to support the Const.i.tution, swears to support the whole of it, pro-slavery clauses and all,--that he swears to support it _as it is_, not as it hereafter may become,--that he swears to support it in the sense given to it by the Courts and the Nation, not as he chooses to understand it,--and that the Courts and the Nation expect such an one in office to do his share toward the suppression of slave, as well as other, insurrections, and to aid the return of fugitive slaves. After an _abolitionist_ has taken such an oath, or by his vote sent another to take it for him, I do not see how he can look his own principles in the face.
Thou that preachest a man should not steal, dost thou lie?
We who call upon the slaveholder to do right, no matter what the consequences or the cost, are certainly bound to look well to our own example. At least we can hardly expect to win the master to do justice by _setting him an example of perjury_. It is almost an insult in an abolitionist, while not willing to sacrifice even a petty ballot for his principles, to demand of the slaveholder that he give up wealth, home, old prejudices and social position at their call.
EXTRACTS FROM J.Q. ADAMS.
The benefits of the Const.i.tution of the United States, were the restoration of credit and reputation, to the country--the revival of commerce, navigation, and ship building--the acquisition of the means of discharging the debts of the Revolution, and the protection and encouragement of the infant and drooping manufactures of the country. All this, however, as is now well ascertained, was insufficient to propitiate the rulers of the Southern States to the adoption of the Const.i.tution. What they specially wanted was _protection_. Protection from the powerful and savage tribes of Indians within their borders, and who were hara.s.sing them with the most terrible of wars--and protection from their own negroes--protection from their insurrections--protection from their escape--protection even to the trade by which they were brought into this country--protection, shall I not blush to say, protection to the very bondage by which they were held. Yes! it cannot be denied--the slaveholding lords of the South prescribed, as a condition of their a.s.sent to the Const.i.tution, three special provisions to secure the perpetuity of their dominion over their slaves. The first was the immunity for twenty years of preserving the African slave-trade; the second was the stipulation to surrender fugitive slaves--an engagement positively prohibited by the laws of G.o.d, delivered from Sinai; and thirdly, the exaction, fatal to the principles of popular representation, of a representation for slaves--for articles of merchandise, under the name of persons.
In outward show, it is a representation of persons in bondage; in fact, it is a representation of their masters,--the oppressor representing the oppressed.--Is it in the compa.s.s of human imagination to devise a more perfect exemplification of the art of committing the lamb to the tender custody of the wolf?--The representative is thus const.i.tuted, not the friend, agent and trustee of the person whom he represents, but the most inveterate of his foes.
To call government thus const.i.tuted a democracy, is to insult the understanding of mankind. It is doubly tainted with the infection of riches and of slavery. _There is no name in the language of national jurisprudence that can define it_--no model in the records of ancient history, or in the political theories of Aristotle, with which it can be likened. Here is one cla.s.s of men, consisting of not more than one-fortieth part of the whole people, not more than one-thirtieth part of the free population, exclusively devoted to their personal interests identified with their own as slaveholders of the same a.s.sociated wealth, and wielding by their votes, upon every question of government or of public policy, two-fifths of the whole power of the House. In the Senate of the Union, the proportion of the slaveholding power is yet greater. Its operation upon the government of the nation is, to establish an artificial majority in the slave representation over that of the free people, in the American Congress, and thereby to make the PRESERVATION, PROPAGATION, AND PERPETUATION OF SLAVERY THE VITAL AND ANIMATING SPIRIT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.--The result is seen in the fact that, at this day, the President of the United States, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and five out of nine of the Judges of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the United States, are not only citizens of slaveholding States, but individual slaveholders themselves. So are, and constantly have been, with scarcely an exception, all the members of both Houses of Congress from the slaveholding States; and so are, in immensely disproportionate numbers, the commanding officers of the army and navy; the officers of the customs; the registers and receivers of the land offices, and the post-masters throughout the slaveholding States.
Fellow-citizens,--with a body of men thus composed, for legislators and executors of the laws, what will, what must be, what has been your legislation? The numbers of freemen const.i.tuting your nation are much greater than those of the slaveholding States, bond and free.