It may develop into an aggressive egoism of the type represented by the sophist Thrasymachus, in his proclamation that "might is right, justice the interest of the stronger."[301:25] But more commonly it is tempered by a conception of social interest, and serves as the champion of action against contemplation. The gospel of action is always individualistic.
It requires of the individual a sense of his independence, and of the real virtue of his initiative. Hence those voluntarists who emphasize the many individual wills and decline to reduce them, after the manner of Schopenhauer, to a universal, may be said to afford a direct justification of it. It is true that this practical realism threatens the tenability of an epistemological idealism, but the two have been united, and because of their common emphasis upon the individual such procedure is not entirely inconsequential. Friedrich Paulsen, whose panpsychism has already been cited, is an excellent case in point. The only good, he maintains, is "welfare," the fulfilment of those natural desires which both distinguish the individual and signify his continuity with all grades of being.
"The goal at which the will aims does not consist in a maximum of pleasurable feelings, but in the normal exercise of the vital functions for which the species is predisposed. In the case of man the mode of life is on the whole determined by the nature of the historical unity from which the individual evolves as a member. Here the objective content of life, after which the will strives, also enters into consciousness with the progressive evolution of presentation; the type of life becomes a conscious ideal of life."[302:26]
Here, contrary to the teaching of Schopenhauer, the good consists in individual attainment, the extension and fulfilment of the _distinct_ interests that arise from the common fund of nature. To be and to do to the uttermost, to realize the maximum from nature"s investment in one"s special capacities and powers--this is indeed the first principle of a morality of action.
[Sidenote: The Ethical Community.]
- 145. But a type of ethics still further removed from the initial relativism has been adopted and more or less successfully a.s.similated by subjectivistic philosophies. Accepting Berkeley"s spirits, with their indefinite capacities, and likewise the stability of the ideal principles that underlie a G.o.d-administered world, and morality becomes the obedience which the individual renders to the law. The individual, free to act in his own right, cooperates with the purposes of the general spiritual community, whose laws are worthy of obedience though not coercive. The recognition of such a spiritual citizenship, entailing opportunities, duties, and obligations, rather than thraldom, partakes of the truth as well as the inadequacy of common-sense.
[Sidenote: The Religion of Mysticism.]
- 146. As for religion, at least two distinct practical appreciations of the universe have been historically a.s.sociated with this chapter in philosophy. The one of these is the mysticism of Schopenhauer, the religious sequel to a universalistic voluntarism. Schopenhauer"s ethics, his very philosophy, is religion. For the good and the true are alike attainable only through identification with the Absolute Will. This consummation of life, transcending practical and theoretical differences, engulfing and effacing all qualities and all values, is like the Nirvana of the Orient--a positive ideal only for one who has appraised the apparent world at its real value.
"Rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, which is so real, with all it"s suns and milky-ways--is nothing."[304:27]
[Sidenote: The Religion of Individual Cooperation with G.o.d.]
- 147. From the union of the two motives of voluntarism and individualism springs another and a more familiar type of religion, that of cooperative spiritual endeavor. In the religion of Schopenhauer the soul must utterly lose itself for the sake of peace; here the soul must persist in its own being and activity for the sake of the progressive goodness of the world. For Schopenhauer G.o.d is the universal solution, in which all motions cease and all differences disappear; here G.o.d is the General of moral forces. The deeper and more significant universe is
"a society of rational agents, acting under the eye of Providence, concurring in one design to promote the common benefit of the whole, and conforming their actions to the established laws and order of the Divine parental wisdom: wherein each particular agent shall not consider himself apart, but as the member of a great City, whose author and founder is G.o.d: in which the civil laws are no other than the rules of virtue and the duties of religion: and where everyone"s true interest is combined with his duty."[304:28]
But so uncompromising an optimism is not essential to this religion.
Its distinction lies rather in its acceptance of the manifest plurality of souls, and its appeal to the faith that is engendered by service.[305:29] As William James has said:
"Even G.o.d"s being is sacred from ours. To cooperate with his creation by the best and rightest response seems all he wants of us. In such cooperation with his purposes, not in any chimerical speculative conquest of him, not in any theoretical drinking of him up, must lie the real meaning of our destiny."[305:30]
FOOTNOTES:
[267:1] PRELIMINARY NOTE. By _Subjectivism_ is meant that system of philosophy which construes the universe in accordance with the epistemological principle that _all knowledge is of its own states or activities_. In so far as subjectivism reduces reality to _states of knowledge_, such as _perceptions_ or _ideas_, it is _phenomenalism_. In so far as it reduces reality to a more _internal active principle_ such as _spirit_ or _will_, it is _spiritualism_.
[268:2] Berkeley: _Complete Works_, Vol. I, p. 352. Fraser"s edition.
[269:3] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 156. Translation by Jowett. The italics are mine.
[270:4] Plato: _Op. cit._, 166.
[271:5] ?????? ? ???st? ???st?te d??e?.
[273:6] For another issue out of this situation, cf. -- 185-187.
[276:7] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 380-381.
[276:8] _Ibid._, p. 389.
[277:9] _Ibid._, p. 397.
[278:10] _Ibid._, p. 418.
[279:11] _Ibid._, pp. 403-404.
[282:12] Cf. Pearson: _Grammar of Science_, Chap. II. See above, - 118.
[283:13] See Chap. XI. Cf. also - 140.
[283:14] The same may be said of the "permanent possibilities of sensation," proposed by J. S. Mill. Such possibilities outside of actual perception are either nothing or things such as they are known to be _in_ perception. In either case they are not perceptions.
In Ernst Mach"s _a.n.a.lysis of Sensations_, the reader will find an interesting transition from sensationalism to realism through the subst.i.tution of the term _Bestandtheil_ for _Empfindung_. (See Translation by Williams, pp. 18-20.) See below, - 207.
[284:15] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, p. 447.
[287:16] Schopenhauer: _The World as Will and Idea_. Translation by Haldane and Kemp, Vol. I, p. 141.
[288:17] Quoted from Naegeli: _Die Mechanisch-physiologische Theorie der Abstammungslehre_, by Friedrich Paulsen, in his _Introduction to Philosophy_. Translation by Thilly, p. 103.
[294:18] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, p. 273.
[294:19] _Op. cit._, Vol. I, pp. 272-273.
[295:20] _Op. cit._, Vol. III, p. 278.
[297:21] _Op. cit._, Vol. III, p. 249.
[299:22] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 167. Translation by Jowett.
[299:23] See - 121.
[300:24] Schopenhauer: _Op. cit._ Translation by Haldane and Kemp, Vol.
I, pp. 253-254.
[301:25] See Plato: _Republic_, Bk. I, 338.
[302:26] Paulsen: _Op. cit._, p. 423.
[304:27] Schopenhauer: _Op. cit._ Translation by Haldane and Kemp, p.
532.
[304:28] Berkeley: _Op. cit._, Vol. II, p. 138.
[305:29] For an interesting characterization of this type of religion, cf. Royce: _Spirit of Modern Philosophy_, p. 46.
[305:30] James: _The Will to Believe_, p. 141.
CHAPTER X