Rosecrans"s force on the battle-field was: Infantry, 37,977; artillery, 2,223; cavalry, 3,200; total, 43,400. His loss was: killed, 1,553; wounded, 7,245. The enemy captured about 2,800 men. Making his total loss about twenty-five per cent. of his force in action. Rosecrans lost twenty-eight pieces of artillery and a large portion of his wagon train. Bragg lost three pieces of artillery.
Why did Rosecrans"s plan of battle miscarry so fatally and Bragg"s come so near absolute success? The fault was not the plan as conceived by the former. The near success of the latter proved a vindication of that. The originator of the plan was not at fault personally, for at no time during the battle did he falter or prove unequal to his command. When called on to give up his plan of the offensive and a.s.sume the defensive to save his army, the wonderful power of Rosecrans as a general over troops was never displayed to a greater advantage. With the blood from a slight wound on his cheek, in a light blue army overcoat, through the mud and rain of the battle-field, he rode along the line inspiring his troops with the confidence he felt as to the final result. To Rosecrans there was but one outcome to the battle at Stone"s River, and that was victory. When some of his general officers advised retreat to Nashville, not for an instant did he falter in his determination to "fight or die right here." The demoralization of one of his division commanders was so great, that on Thursday afternoon, when the rebels were ma.s.sing on Rosecrans"s right, this general, commanding a division, announced to his brigade commanders that in the event of the antic.i.p.ated a.s.sault resulting disastrously, he proposed to take his division and cut his way through to Nashville. To his troops-the greater part of whom had never seen Rosecrans under the enemy"s fire-when on the return from the cedars, they formed anew in front of the Nashville pike-seeing the Commanding General of the army riding fearlessly on the extreme front, in the heat of battle, cool and collected, giving orders and encouraging his men-his mere presence was an inspiration. His personal bravery was never more fully shown than when he rode down to the "Round Forest" with his staff, under fire, at the time Garesche was killed by a sh.e.l.l that only missed the chief by a few inches. In this ride Rosecrans had three mounted orderlies shot dead while following him. When the entire extent of McCook"s disaster in its crushing force was revealed to him, he felt the full burden of his responsibility, and rising to the demands of the hour he was superb. Dashing from one point to another, quick to discern danger and ready to meet it, shrinking from no personal exposure, dispatching his staff on the gallop, hurrying troops into position, ma.s.sing the artillery and forming his new lines on grounds of his own choosing, confident of ultimate success, and showing his troops that he had all confidence in them, it was worth months of ordinary life-time to have been with Rosecrans when by his own unconquered spirit he plucked victory from defeat and glory from disaster.
But if the plan was not at fault, what was? Rosecrans started from Nashville for an offensive campaign, and before his plan of battle had met the test, he was compelled to abandon it, and a.s.sume the defensive. Where was the fault and who was to blame? The fault was McCook"s defective line, and in part Rosecrans was responsible for it. He ought never to have trusted the formation of a line of battle so important to the safety of his whole army to McCook alone, and he certainly knew this. Rosecrans gave his personal attention to the left, but he should at least have ordered the change his quick eye had detected as necessary in McCook"s line, and not trusted to chance and McCook"s ability to withstand the attack with his faulty line. No one who saw him at Stone"s River the 31st of December will say aught against the personal bravery and courage of McCook under fire. All that he could do to aid in repairing the great disaster of that day he did to the best of his ability. He stayed with Davis"s division under fire as long as it held together, and then gave personal directions to Sheridan"s troops, in the gallant fight they made against overwhelming odds. As Rosecrans himself says in his official report of McCook, "a tried, faithful, and loyal soldier, who bravely breasted the battle at Shiloh and Perryville, and as bravely on the b.l.o.o.d.y field of Stone"s River." But there is something more than mere physical bravery required in a general officer in command of as large a body of troops as a corps d"armee. As an instructor at West Point, McCook maintained a high rank. As a brigade and division commander under Buell, there was none his superior in the care and attention he gave his troops on the march, in camp, or on the drill-ground. His division at Shiloh as it marched to the front on the second day did him full credit, and in his handling of it on that field he did credit to it and to himself. What McCook lacked was the ability to handle large bodies of troops independently of a superior officer to give him commands. This was his experience at Perryville, and it was repeated at Stone"s River. With the known results of Perryville, McCook ought never to have been placed in command of the "right wing." Rosecrans at Stone"s River, of necessity was on the left, and being there he should have had a general in command of the right with greater military capacity than McCook. Rosecrans"s confidence was so slight in his commander of the left that he felt his own presence was needed there in the movement of the troops in that part of the plan of battle.
Rosecrans in his report repeatedly speaks of "the faulty line of McCook"s formation on the right." But he knew this on the 30th, and told McCook that it was improperly placed. McCook did not think so. Rosecrans told him that it faced too much to the east and not enough to the south, that it was too weak and long, and was liable to be flanked. Knowing all this and knowing McCook"s pride of opinion, for McCook told him he "did not see how he could make a better line," or a "better disposition of my troops," it was the plain duty of Rosecrans to reform the line, to conform to what it should be in his judgment. The order to McCook to build camp fires for a mile beyond his right was another factor that brought about the combination that broke the line on the right. Rosecrans was correct in his conception of this, in order to mislead Bragg and cause him to strengthen his left at the expense of his right. Had Bragg awaited Rosecrans"s attack, this building of fires was correct-if it took troops away from the right to reinforce the left; but this it did not do. Bragg moved McCown and Cleburne"s divisions from his right to his left on Tuesday, but after this Bragg brought none of his forces across the river until Wednesday afternoon. The building of the fires caused Bragg to prolong his lines, lengthening them to the extent that before Hardee struck Kirk"s and Willich"s brigades, he thought our line extended a division front to their right. Finding this not to be the case, he whirled his left with all the force of double numbers on to the right of McCook. The rebels then swinging around found themselves in the rear of Johnson"s division before they struck any troops on their front. Of course it is mere guess-work to say just what the outcome might have been of any other formation of the line, but it is safe to say that had the left instead of the centre of Hardee struck the right of McCook, there would have been a better chance for the troops on the extreme right of his line to have shown the spirit that was in them, before they were overpowered by mere superiority of numbers.
Then there were some minor mistakes that aided in a great degree the bringing about of that mishap which imperiled the safety of the entire army. Even granting that Johnson was not in any way responsible for the position occupied by his troops on the front line of battle, still it is hard to find any excuse or even explanation for a general officer in command of a division who, knowing the enemy were in force on his front, and intending to attack his command at daylight the next morning, would place his headquarters a mile and a half in the rear. This too, when he knew that the post of honor and responsibility for the safety of the entire army had been committed to his keeping. What then shall be said for him when it appears by the report of the commanding officer of his reserve brigade that when it returned from the support of a cavalry reconnoissance, the general commanding the division ordered this brigade, on the eve of the battle, to take position in the woods, "near the headquarters of the division," instead of in supporting distance of the front line? He could not have thought that the division headquarters needed the support of the reserve more than the line of battle. It is safe to say that had the line of Johnson"s division been properly formed, so as to give the most strength to the command-short and well centered, with a good brigade like that of Baldwin"s in reserve, with all officers in their places-these troops would have given a very different account of themselves when the blow struck the right. There was no commanding officer in the front with Johnson"s division, of greater command than a regiment-save General Kirk. The troops of Willich"s brigade on the right flank refused to come to his a.s.sistance, because there was no one there to give them orders. Johnson says in his official report that "In consultation with Major-General McCook, late in the afternoon of December 30th, he informed me that he had reliable information to the effect that the centre of the rebel line of battle was opposite our extreme right, and that we would probably be attacked by the entire rebel army early on the following morning." Johnson then coolly adds: "His prediction proved true." Yet with these facts staring them in the face, McCook and Johnson made no other efforts to strengthen the right of the line, and Johnson, on the arrival of his reserve brigade later, posted it in the woods a mile and a half from his front "near his headquarters." General Kirk was mortally wounded in the attack on his command, but lived long enough after the battle to make a report of the part taken in the engagement by his brigade. He states in his report, that he suggested to Johnson to send his reserve brigade to support the main lines, and that Johnson declined to do so.
The location of Johnson"s headquarters, and Johnson being there, makes him responsible for the capture of Willich, and the breaking up of that brigade. Willich had been on the line for an hour before daylight with his brigade under arms, and from what he heard of the movements of the enemy to his front, he was satisfied that a change should be made in the position of his division, and started to Johnson"s headquarters to communicate with him. Before he could return to his troops, the enemy was upon them, and drove them from the position they held, without their making a stand. Being without either division or brigade commander, they drifted to the rear. Willich had a horse shot under him, and was captured without giving an order, before he reached his command.
When the artillery was posted in line of battle on the 30th, roads were cut through the cedars to allow the batteries to reach the front line. The heavy loss of guns, reported by Rosecrans, was occasioned by these batteries being unable to reach the roads through the cedar thickets in the retreat, and in many instances guns were abandoned in the woods, through which it was impossible to haul them.
Bragg alleges in his official report that our troops were surprised, and cites the fact that his men pa.s.sed through the camps where breakfast was being prepared. He was right as to this fact, but wrong about his deduction. Willich"s brigade was the only one that was not through the morning meal, and this was by reason of his troops being under arms for nearly two hours prior to this time, after which Willich gave them orders to prepare their meal. Kirk"s brigade had been under arms since five o"clock in the morning, ready for action an hour before the battle commenced, and in Post"s brigade the men were in order of battle for an hour before the first dawn of light. The front of all these brigades was covered with heavy picket lines well thrown out. General Sill reported to General Sheridan at two o"clock in the morning, "great activity on the part of the enemy immediately in his front, with movements of troops to their left," and from four o"clock in the morning until seven, Sheridan"s troops were standing under arms, and the cannoneeers were at their places.
It is difficult to determine which to admire more, the heavy, quick, decided onset of the rebels, as with ranks well closed up, without music, and almost noiselessly, they moved in the gray light of the early December morning, out of the cedars, across the open fields, hurling the full weight of their advancing columns upon our right, with all the dash of Southern troops, sweeping on with rapid stride, and wild yells of triumph, to what appeared to them an easy final victory; or, later in the afternoon, when our troops that had been driven from the field early in the morning, were reformed under the eye of the commanding general, met and threw back from the point of the bayonet, and from the cannon mouth, the charge after charge of the same victorious troops of the earlier portion of the day. One was like the resistless sweep of a whirlwind in its onward course of destruction, the other the grand st.u.r.dy resistance of the rocky coast, which the waves only rush upon to be dashed to pieces. In each of these, the two armies displayed their distinctive feature to the best. Under Thomas, the Centre of the army evinced, in a marked degree, the staying qualities of that commander, which afterward were shown so conspicuously at Chickamauga.
Chapter IX.
In Murfreesboro.
During the first six months of 1863, the military operations of the Army of the c.u.mberland were of a minor character. The exhaustion attending the severe fighting of the last week of the previous year, kept that army in camp for some time to restore the losses of arms and material, to reclothe the army, to recruit the strength of the troops, to forward the needed supplies, and to build the necessary works to fortify Murfreesboro as a new base. The rebuilding of the Muldraughs Hills" trestleworks, and the heavy repairs elsewhere needed on the railroad north of Nashville, together with having the road from Nashville to Murfreesboro placed in proper order, all required time and were necessary to be done, to supply the wants of the army in the immediate present. But the future was what demanded the greatest thought and most careful planning. The problem that gave Buell the greatest trouble to solve-the protection of his lines of communication and supplies-was now forced upon Rosecrans. The enemy with more than one-half of his cavalry force absent during the battle of Stone"s River, under Morgan in Kentucky and Forrest in West Tennessee, outnumbered that arm of the service of the Army of the c.u.mberland during the battle almost two to one. These troopers were nearly all old veterans, accustomed to the severest hardships of service, and it was wonderful the rapidity with which they got over ground and the amount of fatigue they could undergo. To afford perfect protection to his line supplying the army from its base at Louisville, as against these raiding bands, if infantry was to be employed, Rosecrans"s entire force was needed, posted by brigades at the vulnerable points. To make an advance and thus lengthen his lines, simply increased the present difficulties. Without making the necessary preparation to protect his line of supplies, Rosecrans would hamper his forward movement and r.e.t.a.r.d and cripple his advance when commenced. The only proper force to meet the enemy"s troopers was cavalry. In the early days of the Army of the Ohio, under Buell, a number of unsuccessful attempts were made to chase and fight cavalry with infantry, and in every instance the effort was crowned with failure, the only result being the discomfort and complete exhaustion of the marching troops.
The repair of the most complete wrecking the Louisville road ever suffered, demanded Rosecrans"s attention the first thing after the Battle of Stone"s River. When the army left Nashville, on the advance to meet Bragg, the supplies in that city were very limited. With the disabling of the road it was impossible at that time to forward sufficient supplies to meet the wants of the command, and for the first few weeks while the army remained at Murfreesboro the troops were on half rations, and many of the articles const.i.tuting the "ration" entirely dispensed with, leaving but three or four on the list. The surrounding country for miles was scoured for forage and provisions. Everything of that kind was gathered in by raiding parties, not leaving sufficient for the actual necessities of the inhabitants. To such an extent did this go, that to the officers with means to purchase such provisions as were to be had, potatoes and onions became luxuries. The whole army was threatened with scurvy.
The number and extent of these raids, and the damage sustained by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad during the year from July 1, 1862, is concisely set forth in the report of the superintendent of that road. His report shows that during this time "the road has been operated for its entire length only seven months and twelve days;" "all the bridges and trestleworks on the main stem and branches, with the exception of the bridge over Barren River and four small bridges, were destroyed and rebuilt during the year. Some of the structures were destroyed twice and some three times. In addition to this, most of the water stations, several depots, and a large number of cars were burnt, a number of engines badly damaged, and a tunnel in Tennessee nearly filled up for a distance of eight hundred feet."
By reason of this condition of things, Rosecrans determined to increase the cavalry arm of his army, so that he could meet the ten or twelve thousand cavalry of the enemy in their detached raids on more of an equal footing. From the commencement of operations in Tennessee under Buell, the enemy"s cavalry had been steadily increasing in numbers and in efficiency, until at this time it was a greater problem how to meet this arm of the enemy"s force than his infantry. Rosecrans made repeated urgent applications to the department at Washington for additional cavalry; for horses and improved arms for those already under his command. He detailed infantry to be mounted and armed as cavalry, organizing a brigade of "mounted infantry" under Colonel John T. Wilder.
On Bragg"s retreating from Murfreesboro, he took position with a portion of his army and established his headquarters at Shelbyville. He then ordered part of his command to move to Tullahoma, and there intrench, throwing up extensive earthworks and fortifications. Later, he placed his troops in winter quarters. In addition to the cavalry that had formerly been under Bragg, Van Dorn in February reported to him with his command of three brigades of cavalry, about five thousand effective troops. Bragg placed Van Dorn and Wheeler to protect the front and flanks of his army, a.s.signing the former to the left, with his headquarters at Columbia, and directing the latter to take position on the right, const.i.tuted each command a corps. To Wheeler"s command he a.s.signed Morgan"s, Wharton"s, and Martin"s divisions. Forrest"s command was a.s.signed to Van Dorn. Some important events took place during the first six months of 1863, that had a bearing on the fortunes of the Army of the c.u.mberland.
On January 9th, in recognition of the services of that army, by General Order No. 9 of the War Department, that command was reorganized, and the Centre, Right, and Left were const.i.tuted corps d"armee, with the designation of Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first Corps, under the same commanders, who were thus advanced to this higher command. During this month, Steedman, in command of Fry"s old division, was ordered from Gallatin to the front, and posted at Triune and La Vergne. Reynold"s division was ordered from Gallatin to Murfreesboro. A slight change was also made in the boundaries of the Department. On the 25th, by order of the War Department, the commands of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson were transferred from the department under Grant, to that under Rosecrans, and later Fort Heiman. To Rosecrans was then committed the care and control of the c.u.mberland River, his second and secondary line of communication and supplies connecting his two princ.i.p.al depots.
On January 26th, Bragg ordered Wheeler on an expedition to capture Fort Donelson. Wheeler directed Forrest to move his brigade with four guns on the river road, via the c.u.mberland Iron Works, to the vicinity of Dover, which was the real position occupied and fortified by Federal forces, and not the old site of Fort Donelson, while Wheeler with Wharton"s command of some twenty-five hundred men moved on a road to the left. Rosecrans, hearing from his scouts that this movement was contemplated, ordered Davis in command of his division and two brigades of cavalry under Minty, to march by the Versailles road, and take Wheeler in the rear. Steedman was directed to watch Wheeler"s movements by way of Triune. Davis despatched Minty to move with his cavalry around by way of Unionville and Rover, while he moved with the infantry direct to Eaglesville. At Rover, Minty captured a regiment of some three hundred and fifty men. Davis and Steedman"s forces united at Franklin, the latter marching by way of Nolinsville. Wheeler, advancing rapidly, pa.s.sed between the troops in pursuit, and, on February 3d, his entire force attacked the post at Dover, occupied by Colonel Harding with the Eighty-third Illinois, some six hundred men in the command. The rebels opened fire at once, and made vigorous a.s.sault in force upon Harding"s position. His little command repulsed the enemy with heavy loss. Again they advanced, making a more determined a.s.sault than before, but again they were driven back with still greater loss. In this last repulse Harding ordered his men to charge beyond his works, which they did with great gallantry, capturing forty-two of the rebels. Wheeler then withdrew with a total loss of one hundred and fifty killed, four hundred wounded, and one hundred and fifty captured. Colonel Harding lost sixteen killed, sixty wounded, and fifty captured. Efforts were made to cut off the retreat of Wheeler"s force by Davis"s command, re-enforced by five hundred cavalry, which went as far west as Kinderhook and Bon Aqua Springs, but Wheeler took the road through Centreville, where he crossed Duck River.
In the latter part of the engagement at Dover, Harding was aided by the fire from six gunboats which were acting as convoys for a fleet of transports conveying reinforcements to Rosecrans"s command, consisting of eighteen regiments of infantry, with four batteries of artillery that had been serving in Kentucky under the command of General Gordon Granger. The troops forming this column were under the immediate command of Crook, Baird, and Gilbert. After the danger at Dover had pa.s.sed, the fleet steamed up to Nashville, and there the troops disembarked. During February Crook was sent with his command to take post at Carthage, on the c.u.mberland River, and watch the movements of the enemy from there to Rome, and Gilbert was ordered to proceed with his brigade to Franklin.
On March 4th, Gilbert at Franklin ordered Colonel Coburn, with five regiments of infantry, four detachments of cavalry under Colonel Jordan, and Aleshire"s battery, the whole command nearly three thousand strong, to proceed south from Franklin with a wagon-trail of one hundred wagons, ostensibly on a foraging expedition, but also to reconnoitre the enemy"s front toward Columbia. Coburn"s command some twelve miles south of Franklin, was to meet a force moving from Murfreesboro toward Columbia, and these commands were to co-operate and determine the position of the enemy. Unknown to Gilbert, Van Dorn, on a.s.suming command in Columbia, in February, determined to establish outposts and picket-lines within sight of Franklin and Triune, and to move his headquarters north of Duck River to Spring Hill. Jordan"s cavalry struck the enemy only three miles from town, formed in line of battle. Opening with artillery, Jordan advanced, and, after a sharp conflict, the enemy retreated to Spring Hill. That night Coburn notified Gilbert that he was confronted by a largely superior force, and suggested that he fall back. Gilbert, however, ordered him to advance. Proceeding next morning, the column met the enemy drawn up in line of battle a short distance from Thompson"s Station. Forrest"s command occupied the extreme right, with a battery of artillery on the left of this, and some paces retired was Armstrong"s brigade. On the left of his command and in line with it was the Texan brigade under Whitfield, with two guns on each side of the Columbia turnpike, making a force of 10,000 men under Van Dorn. It was about half-past nine o"clock in the morning when Coburn struck these troops in line. He immediately deployed his infantry across the pike and to the right, and ordered his command to advance. The enemy"s battery posted at the pike opening fire, Coburn"s troops charged it handsomely, his entire command moving in line of battle down the pike. When within one hundred and fifty yards, Armstrong"s and Whitfield"s brigades sprang forward and opened a destructive fire. Coburn"s troops held their lines for over half an hour under heavy fire, replying with the same, when he ordered his command to fall back. Finding this large force in his front, he directed Jordan with his cavalry to cover his retreat. Van Dorn now advanced his line, pressed forward his right and left to surround Coburn and capture the entire force. Jordan formed two detachments, dismounted behind a stone fence to check the advance of Forrest and enable the artillery to escape. Forrest made two sustained attempts to dislodge these detachments from their position, but he was repulsed each time; on a third attempt they were surrounded and captured. The regiment in charge of the train with the artillery and cavalry now moved off rapidly on the pike to Franklin, and Coburn, being surrounded by the rebels in overwhelming numbers, and finding his ammunition exhausted, surrendered. His loss was 40 killed, and 150 wounded, and 2,200 prisoners, including his wounded. The enemy"s loss was 35 killed and 140 wounded. The rebels lost heavily in officers, several of the most valued of Forrest"s falling in the repulses of his command.
The surrender of Coburn weakened the forces at Franklin, and revealed the enemy in such strong force on the immediate front, that Gordon Granger at once ordered Baird to proceed by rail to Franklin, and moving his own headquarters there, a.s.sumed the command in person.
On the 7th, Sheridan"s division was ordered to the front to reconnoitre the enemy"s position. He reached Franklin, and the force at that place was further increased by the arrival of a brigade from Nashville. On the 9th, Minty"s brigade of cavalry also reported, and on the day following, Granger with his troops advanced from there upon Van Dorn"s encampment at Spring Hill. In support of Granger"s movement on Van Dorn, Rosecrans ordered Davis to move with his division from Salem to Eaglesville, with R. S. Granger"s brigade in supporting distance, posted at Versailles. Gordon Granger drove Van Dorn from Spring Hill, and the next day compelled his entire command to retire south of Rutherford"s Creek. On account of the high water the pursuit was not continued further.
During March the rebel cavalry under Morgan met with one of the most decisive repulses yet experienced by that command. On the 18th of March Colonel Hall with his command, the second brigade of Reynolds"s division, was sent from Murfreesboro after Morgan. Starting northeast from that place he advanced beyond Statesville, when hearing that Morgan was advancing on him he retired toward Milton, posted his command on some high ground near that place and awaited the attack. Morgan endeavored first to turn the right and then the left of Hall"s command, but in each of these attempts he was driven off with heavy loss. He then dismounted the main portion of his command and ordered an attack to be made on the front. A vigorous a.s.sault was at once made with a heavy force, but this was also repulsed, Morgan losing a large number of men. After an engagement lasting some four hours, in which Hall"s brigade fought with the utmost determination, Morgan"s command, being repulsed at all points and in every a.s.sault, withdrew from the field with a loss of some ninety-five killed, three hundred and fifty wounded, and twenty prisoners.
Early in April, Morgan"s troopers were defeated with great loss. On the 2d of April Stanley advanced with his cavalry to Liberty, where Morgan met them with his entire command. The two forces encamped within two miles of each other. On the morning of the 3d, Stanley advanced, intending to engage Morgan"s command at once, but found that he had retreated to what he regarded as a very strong position at Snow Hill. Morgan, however, had left a strong force at Liberty to watch Stanley"s movements. As Stanley advanced, he struck this force and quickly drove upon it with part of his command, sending a portion around to the right, which turned the enemy"s left flank. Pressing Morgan"s command from both positions, it soon gave way at all points, and was in full retreat. Morgan"s officers tried to rally their men, but the latter were thoroughly demoralized and had no fight in them. The teamsters became panic-stricken and added to the general rout. It was two weeks before Morgan succeeded in getting his men together again.
Early in April, Rosecrans ordered Colonel Streight to the command of a brigade he had organized for the purpose of making a raid on the lines of communication of the rebels, and to move through the country south and southeast, destroying as he went all property of use to them. Streight"s command started from Nashville, partially mounted, going by way of Clarksville to Fort Henry, at which place he took steamer from Eastport, Miss. En route to Fort Henry his command secured as many animals as they could, but only four-fifths of the men were mounted, and they poorly. The animals were nearly all mules, and very few of them were fit for the service required. It was expected that the command would capture enough good animals to carry the expedition successfully through, but this was not realized. Leaving Eastport on the 21st, he pa.s.sed through Tusc.u.mbia three days later, and reached Moulton on the 26th. From here on the 28th he pressed forward through Day"s Gap on Sand Mountain, in the direction of Blountsville. In the gap their rear guard was overtaken and attacked on the 30th by the enemy"s cavalry under Forrest, who had pressed forward, riding night and day. Selecting the best mounted of his men, he pushed at once to Streight"s camp. Here coming upon the rear of Streight"s force as it was leaving camp, Forrest opened with artillery firing. Dismounting his men, Streight formed his command on the crest of a hill on each side of the road and awaited the enemy"s attack. As Forrest advanced, Streight ordered a charge to be made which drove the enemy at all points, capturing their two pieces of artillery. Forrest lost in killed and wounded seventy-five men, a large percentage of whom were killed. Streight"s loss was twenty-one killed and wounded. A good many of horses were captured from the enemy, on which Streight mounted a number of his men. On the same afternoon the enemy attacked again, but was driven back with considerable loss, after a severe engagement lasting from three o"clock until dark. On May 1st, the Federal forces reached Blountsville at noon. Here all the wagons save one were burned, and the ammunition placed on pack mules, after distributing to the men all that they could carry. At three o"clock Streight started again, and skirmishing commenced at once on their rear. Pressing on, the command marched until twelve o"clock that night. Resuming their march in the morning, the rear skirmished all the forenoon of the 2d with the rebels. Arriving at Gadsden, Streight remained long enough to destroy a large quant.i.ty of provisions in store there for the enemy. It was expected at this place that a small steamer would be found, upon which a detachment of men could be sent to capture Rome. In this Streight was disappointed. From this point Streight"s animals became much exhausted, and the men were falling to the rear and getting captured. To prevent this the command had to go much slower. Forrest coming up about one o"clock on the 2d, attacked the command while the horses were being fed at Blount"s farm. Here Colonel Hathaway fell, shot through the breast. Again the rebels were repulsed, but they constantly pressed upon the rear of Streight"s command, keeping up a brisk skirmish fire. The enemy were kept in check at Blount"s farm until after dark. In the meantime the main command had crossed the Coosa. Here the river was so high that the ammunition was damaged by being wet. From this place Streight sent a detachment to burn the Round Mountain iron works, one of the princ.i.p.al manufactories of munitions of war in the South. It was burned to the ground and all the machinery destroyed. On arriving at the other branch of the Coosa a bridge was found, and, as soon as the command had crossed, it was destroyed. On the morning of the 3d, as the men were preparing their breakfast, the enemy again attacked. Shortly afterward Forrest sent in a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of the entire command. This was at first refused, but on consultation with his officers, and considering the damaged condition of his ammunition and the complete exhaustion of his command, Streight, after making a personal inspection of Forrest"s artillery, finally yielded, and the entire force of 1,466 officers and men was surrendered.
On April 20th, Thomas sent J. J. Reynolds with three brigades of infantry and Minty"s brigades of cavalry, together with Wilder"s brigade of mounted infantry, to proceed to McMinnville, capture what force was there, destroy the railroad from Manchester to McMinnville, and co-operate with a force to move from Carthage against Morgan. Reynolds made a successful raid on the railroad and nearly destroyed it; burned all the bridges, trestle-work, cars, and locomotives on the road, also the depot in McMinnville, and several cotton mills. A large amount of supplies was captured, some one hundred animals picked up. The command from Carthage failed to aid in the expedition, and Morgan"s command in the main effected their escape.
Colonel Lewis D. Watkins on the 27th made a gallant charge on the Texas Legion, encamped close to Van Dorn"s main command near Spring Hill. Dashing in upon the enemy early in the morning, he was among them before they could rally for defence, capturing one hundred and twenty-eight prisoners, over three hundred animals, and their camp equipage without the loss of a man.
It was during the six months waiting at Murfreesboro that the unfortunate controversy arose between Rosecrans and the authorities at Washington, represented by General Halleck, as Commander-in-Chief, and Mr. Secretary Stanton of the War Department. The Army of the c.u.mberland, during the period of the active movements of that command, congratulated itself that the field of operations was so far removed from Washington City, that it did not come under the influence of the authority that seemed to paralyze every effort of the commands immediately around the seat of war at the East. But in this they were mistaken. The future student of the history of the war, in the light of the full official records, will wonder most at the fact that, under the orders from Washington, the commanders in the field were at all able to finally crush the rebellion. It was only when the armies at the East were placed under a general who was practically untrammeled in the exercise of his power, and who conducted his campaigns upon military principles, and not as the result of orders from Washington that the beginning of the end of the rebellion in the East began to dawn. In Tennessee we have seen how Halleck gave Buell orders and then attached such conditions to them as to render their proper execution absolutely impossible. There was nothing to prevent Buell from occupying Chattanooga in June, 1862, as he was directed, while Bragg with his command was in Northern Mississippi, except the utterly useless condition attached to his orders, that he should repair the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as he moved east. Buell urged, in forcible terms, the foolishness and even impropriety of this delay, but Halleck, who knew much of the theory of war as learned from books, and in a general way wished to apply these principles to the practical movements of troops, overruled Buell. The latter knew that the enemy in his front always resolutely refused to be bound in his operations by such rules in conducting campaigns. The result of Halleck"s wisdom soon became manifest when Bragg started for Kentucky, after the waste of Buell"s time in repairing this railroad, which, when completed, was at once turned over to the enemy in good condition for immediate use against our own forces. On Buell fell the force of the blow that some one had to bear for this failure to take advantage of a patent opportunity. Buell"s obedience to Halleck"s orders rendered Bragg"s advance into Kentucky possible, while Buell"s failure to bring Bragg to a decisive action in Kentucky, and his refusal to follow Bragg into the mountains of Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee, was deemed sufficient cause by Halleck to issue the order removing him from his command. If Halleck"s order to Buell to repair this railroad had never been issued, Bragg"s campaign in Kentucky would never have been made. Halleck"s removal of Buell was the direct result of the latter"s obedience to orders received from the former. On Rosecrans a.s.suming command, almost the first order he received from Halleck was one directing him to advance into East Tennessee after Bragg. With a full knowledge of the military situation obtained from Buell, Rosecrans proceeded at once to protect the line established by Buell, and await the advance of Bragg in the vicinity of Nashville. The battle of Stone"s River was for the time sufficient to prove, even to Halleck, that Buell and Rosecrans were correct, and Rosecrans was allowed for the time to attend to his command without being interfered with. During the encampment at Murfreesboro, the first object of Rosecrans was to properly mount and equip his cavalry. In this he received at first faint encouragement, which soon ceased altogether.
On March 1st Halleck, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, wrote a letter, sending a copy to Rosecrans and Grant, offering the position of the then vacant major-generalship in the regular army, to the general in the field who should first achieve an important and decisive victory. Grant very quietly folded up the letter, put it by for future reference, and proceeded with the plans of his campaign, saying nothing. To Rosecrans"s open, impulsive, and honorable nature, engaged with all his powers in furthering the interests of the Government and the general welfare of his command, this letter was an insult, and he treated it accordingly. On March 6th he prepared his reply, and forwarded it to Washington. In this letter he informs the General-in-Chief that, "as an officer and as a citizen," he felt "degraded at such an auctioneering of honors," and then adds: "Have we a general who would fight for his own personal benefit when he would not for honor and for his country? He would come by his commission basely in that case, and deserve to be despised by men of honor. But are all the brave and honorable generals on an equality as to chances? If not, it is unjust to those who probably deserve most."
The effect of this letter was to widen the breach between the authorities at Washington and Rosecrans. Halleck"s letter and Rosecrans"s reply were both characteristic of the men. Halleck, fresh from the results of a large law practice in California-princ.i.p.ally devoted to the establishment of the validity of land grants in favor of his clients, in the success of which large contingent fees were gained-saw nothing improper in such an offer to an officer of sufficient ability and standing to be in command of one of the armies of the United States. With Rosecrans, all the honest, generous impulses of a high-principled, honorable gentleman, who had imperiled his life on many a battlefield, fighting solely from a sense of duty to his country, led to the expression of his contempt for the author of such an offer. The mistake that Halleck made was in thinking that what would prove a tempting offer to a man like himself, would be so to Rosecrans. No one will attempt to maintain the wisdom of Rosecrans"s course as a matter of policy, however much they may sympathize with and admire the spirit of his letter. It was an impolitic letter, and one that aided in drawing the ill-will and resentment of Halleck and Stanton upon him in full force later.
From this time forward, all the requests of Rosecrans for the improvement of the efficiency of his army were treated with great coolness, and in many instances it was only after the greatest importunity that he was able to secure the least attention to his recommendations for the increased usefulness of his command. His repeated applications for more cavalry, and that they be armed with revolving rifles, were treated with little attention. In the meantime nearly every communication from Washington intimated that he was unnecessarily delaying his advance upon Bragg in his works at Shelbyville and Tullahoma. Grant, on his Vicksburg campaign, became very anxious for the advance of the Army of the c.u.mberland, to engage Bragg and prevent reinforcements being sent from him to Pemberton or Johnston, operating on his front and rear; and urged Rosecrans to move, and wrote to Halleck, requesting him to direct an advance of the Army of the c.u.mberland on Bragg"s position. Rosecrans regarded it for the best interest of the country for his army to remain constantly threatening Bragg, in order to hold the entire army of the latter in his immediate front, and also in the event of the defeat of Grant, and a concentration of the enemy on Rosecrans"s position, that he should be close to his base, his army being then the reserve. If an advance succeeded in driving Bragg from Tullahoma, a greater danger than his remaining inactive on our front might ensue. To Bragg, the occupancy of Middle Tennessee was of sufficient importance to justify him in remaining inactive with his entire command, waiting for the advance of Rosecrans some six months. If driven from Tennessee, his troops were ready to unite with the command in Mississippi and defeat Grant"s movements. If Bragg could be held in Tennessee after until after Grant"s success was a.s.sured, then, by waiting at Murfreesboro with his army quiet, Rosecrans could render better service than by moving on the enemy. This was a matter of military judgment, on one side espoused by Rosecrans and all his corps and division commanders, who were on the ground, and on the other by Halleck, Stanton, and Grant; and this question served to increase the feeling against Rosecrans in those quarters. Bragg also considered that his presence on the front of the Federal army would prevent any troops from it being sent to aid Grant. And thus the year wore away until early summer. Still another consideration with Rosecrans, was the character of the soil in Tennessee from a short distance south of Murfreesboro to the foot of the c.u.mberland Mountains. This was a light sandy loam, that in winter and spring, during the rains of those seasons, became like quicksand, allowing the artillery and wagon to sink almost to the hub, and rendering the rapid movement of a large army absolutely impossible.
During the early part of June, Rosecrans commenced placing his troops in position, preparatory to a general advance. He ordered the brigade that had been encamped at Gallatin, under General Ward, to Lavergne, and despatched Gordon Granger to take post at Triune, moving his command from Franklin up to that place. Crook was ordered from Carthage to report to Murfreesboro, and on his arrival, was placed in Reynolds"s division. Rosecrans organized a reserve corps, consisting of three divisions designated as First, Second, and Third, under Baird, J. D. Morgan, and R. S. Granger, respectively, and he a.s.signed Gordon Granger to the command of this corps.
Early in June, Garfield, then Chief-of-Staff of the General commanding, urged Rosecrans to make an advance movement, both as a military and political measure with reference to the sentiment of the North. General Rosecrans had matured his plans for an advance, but decided to refer the question to his general officers in command of corps and divisions. The matter being submitted to them, the universal sentiment of these officers was that the movement should be further delayed. However, on the 23rd of June, Rosecrans having made all necessary arrangements for his command, according to his plans, and learning of the favorable prospects at Vicksburg, and of the movement of the force under Burnside into East Tennessee to take and hold Knoxville, issued the necessary orders for the advance of his army on that of the enemy.
Chapter X.
The Advance on Tullahoma.
At the time of the advance of the Army of the c.u.mberland, Polk"s corps of Bragg"s army occupied the main position at Shelbyville, strongly intrenched behind heavy works thrown up during the six months of waiting. These added to the natural strength of the position, and extended from Horse Mountain on the east, to Duck River on the west, and were covered by a line of abattis. The town was noted for the strong Union sentiment of its inhabitants, of which fact the rebels took full advantage to the loss and distress of the people. It is situated about twenty-five miles south of Murfreesboro, and some twenty miles North of Tullahoma, on a branch railroad from the main Nashville line, starting west from Wartrace. Bragg"s right was posted at Wartrace, with Hardee"s corps occupying the pa.s.ses at Liberty, Hoover, and Bellbuckle Gaps. These gaps were all held by strong forces of the enemy, supported by the main command. Polk had an advance in Guy"s Gap with his entire command in supporting distance. Bragg"s extreme right was protected by cavalry with headquarters at McMinnville, while his cavalry on the left, under Forrest, had headquarters at Columbia, threatening Franklin.
At this time the main base of supplies of the enemy was at Chattanooga, to which the entire country south of Duck River had been made tributary. From Duck River, south, the country is rough, with rocky ranges of hills, which divide the "barrens" from the fertile parts of Middle Tennessee. These "barrens" const.i.tute a high rolling plateau of ground between the ranges of hills at Duck River and the c.u.mberland Mountains. It is here that the soil during a rainy season offers the greatest obstacle to active campaigning. Situated on the "barrens," at the junction of the McMinnville branch with the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, was Tullahoma, a small straggling village, where Bragg had established his main depot and made a large intrenched camp. The defiles of Duck River, a deep, narrow stream with but few fords or bridges, covered its front, with a rough rocky range of hills immediately south of the river. The princ.i.p.al roads as they pa.s.sed through these hills bore southwardly toward the line of the enemy"s communications and Tullahoma. The Manchester pike pa.s.sed through Hoover"s Gap and reached the "barrens" by ascending a long, difficult canon called Matt"s Hollow. The Wartrace road pa.s.sed through Liberty Gap, and from there it ran into the road along the railroad through Bellbuckle Gap. The direct road to Shelbyville goes through Guy"s Gap.
Rosecrans was satisfied from the information he had received that Bragg intended to fight in his intrenchments at Shelbyville, in the event of the army advancing in that direction. The "effective total present," as reported by Bragg as the strength of his army on June 20, 1863, at Shelbyville, was 43,089, of all arms. If he were attacked at Shelbyville and beaten, he would then be in good position to retreat to his strong intrenchments at Tullahoma, and on his retreat could so r.e.t.a.r.d Rosecrans"s advance through the narrow winding roads leading up to the "barrens," as to fully protect his own line of retreat and inflict severe loss on the advancing force without exposing his own troops. Rosecrans"s plan of campaign was to render useless Bragg"s intrenchments by turning his right, and then if possible secure his line of retreat by moving on the railroad bridge at Elk River. Bragg by this means would either be forced to accept battle on ground chose by Rosecrans, or be compelled to beat a retreat on a disadvantageous line, neither as direct nor by as good roads as he would have from Shelbyville and Tullahoma due south. To carry out this plan it was necessary to impress Bragg with the idea that our advance would be in force on Shelbyville, and, if possible, to keep up this impression until the main body of our army reached Manchester. The success of this would keep Bragg"s attention on the movement on his front at Shelbyville, and enable our army to pa.s.s through the dangerous defile of Hoover"s Gap, a narrow pa.s.sage-way three miles long, between two hills, and so on through Matt"s Hollow, an equally dangerous defile, being a gorge two miles long with hardly room anywhere for wagons to pa.s.s each other. These pa.s.ses were only eight miles from Hardee"s headquarters and sixteen from Shelbyville.
The plan then of Rosecrans in the advance on Tullahoma, was to make a feint with Granger"s corps and the main portion of the cavalry, on Polk"s command in his strong position at Shelbyville, and to ma.s.s the three main corps on Bragg"s right at Wartrace. The army being all ready for the opening campaign, on the 23d of June General R. B. Mitch.e.l.l with his command-the First Cavalry Division-commenced the advance from Triune on the Eaglesville and Shelbyville pike, in the feint on Polk"s command, made a furious attack on Bragg"s cavalry and drove in his infantry guards on their main force, pressing the whole line on that front. Granger with the three divisions of his corps and Brannan"s division of Thomas"s corps, on that day moved with three days" rations from Triune to Salem.
On the same day, Palmer"s division and a brigade of cavalry marched to the vicinity of Bradyville, for the purpose of seizing with his advance the head of the defile leading over an obscure road by Lumley"s Station to Manchester, and so up to the "barrens." All the other troops were supplied with twelve days" rations of bread, coffee, sugar, and salt, with six days" pork and bacon, and six days" meat on hoof, and were held in readiness to move southward. These movements being made, the next day the entire army pressed forward on the advance.
In the evening of the 23d, the corps commanders met at army headquarters. The plan of the campaign was fully explained to them, and each one received in writing his orders as to his part in the movement.
"Major-General McCook"s corps to advance on the Shelbyville road, turn to the left, move two divisions by Millersburg, and advancing on the Wartrace road seize and hold Liberty Gap. The third division to advance on Fosterville and cover the crossing of General Granger"s command from the Middleton road, and then move by Christiana to join the rest of the corps.
"General Granger to advance on the Middleton road, threatening that place, and cover the pa.s.sing of General Brannan"s division of the Fourteenth Corps, which was to pa.s.s by Christiana and bivouac with the rear division of the Twentieth Corps.
"The Fourteenth Corps, Major-General Thomas, to advance on the Manchester pike, seize and hold with its advance, if practicable, Hoover"s Gap, and bivouac so as to command and cover that and the Millersburg road, so that McCook and himself could be within supporting distances of each other.
"Major-General Crittenden to leave Van Cleve"s division of the Twenty-first Army Corps at Murfreesboro, concentrate at Bradyville with the other two, and await orders."
One brigade of cavalry under Turchin was sent with Crittenden to establish a lookout toward McMinnville. All the remaining cavalry under Stanley was to meet Mitch.e.l.l as he came in from Versailles and at once attack the rebel cavalry at Middleton.
These movements were all promptly executed in the midst of heavy drenching rains, as it only could rain in the mountains and hills of Tennessee, whenever the Army of the c.u.mberland made a forward movement. The ground was so softened on all the dirt roads as to render them next to impa.s.sable.
The Twentieth Corps, consisting of Johnson"s, Davis"s, and Sheridan"s divisions, started on the Shelbyville pike, and by different cross roads moved to the left to Millersburg, where Davis"s and Sheridan"s divisions encamped for the night. Johnson"s division was advanced up to Liberty Gap, with the Thirty-ninth Indiana, under Colonel Harrison, thrown forward to skirmish. Harrison developed the enemy in front of the Gap. Willich"s brigade was moved forward, and drove the skirmishers in the rebel front back upon their main line, placed on the crest of the hills, on each side of the entrance to the gap. Here the enemy was too strongly posted to attack his front. Another brigade under Colonel John F. Miller, who had been transferred from Negley"s division to Johnson"s, was then brought forward. These two brigades were at once deployed in line, making a front of such length as to envelop both flanks of the enemy"s line, and advancing, these brigades gallantly drove the rebels through the defile, a distance of two miles. After clearing the gap, the troops returned to the north end of it and there bivouacked. On the following day, late in the afternoon, an attack was made on Willich"s and Miller"s brigades, to drive them out of the north end of the gap. Johnson"s failure to hold the southern entrance enabled the enemy again to enter it, and to secure it entirely they made this attack. The engagement opened with a heavy fire on the centre of the command, the enemy attacking in force. They were handsomely repulsed. Renewing the attack, Hardee then endeavored to secure positions on the hills to the right and left, so as to command Johnson"s flanks with his fire, but each movement was met by Johnson"s troops, supported by Carlin"s brigade of Davis"s division, and every attack was repulsed. Beaten at every point, late in the evening the enemy withdrew entirely, taking position at Bellbuckle. The fighting at Liberty Gap was the most severe of the campaign, and in this attack Johnson"s command, including Carlin"s brigade, lost two hundred and thirty-one killed and wounded. The enemy"s loss was still greater. It was in repelling one of the attacks on the left that Colonel Miller fell severely wounded with a minie ball through his left eye while leading his brigade.
On the 24th, General Thomas moved direct on the Manchester pike from Murfreesboro, Reynold"s division in advance, starting at 4 o"clock in the morning, under orders, if possible, to seize and hold Hoover"s Gap. At 7 A.M., Rousseau"s division followed in support of Reynold"s division, which encountered the mounted videttes of the enemy a few miles beyond our picket station, forced them upon their reserve, and then resolutely pressing on drove the entire force on the run, through Hoover"s Gap and beyond McBride"s Creek. Wilder, finding the enemy about to attack him with two brigades from the division of Fairfield, occupied a strong position on the hills at the southern entrance of the gap. Reynolds at once moved his two infantry brigades forward and occupied the gap in the rear of Wilder"s command, prepared to resist the enemy on the front. Wilder"s brigade was immediately attacked by the enemy"s force. Reynolds supported him at once with his other brigades, which were posted on the ridge of woods on the extreme right to prevent the enemy turning our right flank, then heavily engaged by a superior force. With these reinforcements the enemy was driven back out of the woods, and three regiments were posted on the right, making that position secure. Major Coolidge, commanding the brigade of regulars of Rousseau"s division, was ordered to reinforce Reynolds, and every preparation was made for an attack on the following morning. The other brigades of Rousseau"s command, with Negley"s division, occupied the gap in the rear of Reynolds during the night. Early on the morning of the 25th, Scribner was ordered with his brigade to the front, in support of the batteries and to form a picket line on the extreme left.
On the 24th, Crittenden, with Wood"s and Palmer"s divisions, marched to Bradyville, leaving Van Cleve"s division to garrison Murfreesboro. Granger, with his three divisions and Brannan"s, advanced from Salem to Christiana. Turchin"s division of cavalry under Stanley moved on the Woodbury pike to Cripple Creek, and thence through Salem. During the day Mitch.e.l.l advanced from Rover through Versailles to Middleton, where he had a sharp engagement with the enemy"s cavalry.