The Army of the Cumberland

Chapter VII.

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On the 29th, Colonel Harlan with his brigade attacked and routed Morgan"s troopers at Rolling Fork of Salt River, and drove them to Bardstown. While Morgan was moving around Lebanon, Colonel Hoskins"s command attacked him and captured 150 men. Morgan pa.s.sed between the forces sent against him, showing again that it is impossible to catch cavalry with infantry. Morgan then commenced his retreat form the State. On the morning of January 1, 1863, as his command was pa.s.sing Columbia, 115 miles in an air-line from Murfreesboro, his men reported hearing distinctly the roar of heavy cannonading in that direction. On the 2d Morgan crossed the c.u.mberland, and felt safe once more from all pursuit.

On December 21st, General Carter moved with three regiments of cavalry toward East Tennessee, from Lebanon, Ky., to raid on the rebel line of communication. Crossing the c.u.mberland Mountains forty miles northeast of c.u.mberland Gap, he pa.s.sed through Southwestern Virginia and Tennessee to Carter"s Station, destroying the Holston and Watauga bridges and several miles of railroad. He then leisurely returned to Kentucky by the same route he had advanced.

Chapter VII.

The Advance to Murfreesboro.

On December 22d, General Thomas moved his headquarters from Gallatin to Nashville, and there concentrated the divisions of Rousseau and Negley, and Walker"s brigade of Fry"s division. Of the five divisions composing the Centre, that of J. J. Reynolds was guarding the Louisville and Nashville railroad; and on the same duty were the remaining two brigades of Fry"s division. R. B. Mitch.e.l.l was a.s.signed to the command of Nashville with his division as the garrison. This left, under the immediate command of Thomas, the two divisions and the brigade as above, as his only available force. McCook with three divisions under Johnson, Davis, and Sheridan, and Crittenden, also with three divisions under Wood, Palmer, and Van Cleve, were in camp in front of Nashville, on the Franklin, Nolinsville, and Murfreesboro turnpikes.

The position of the enemy under Bragg was fully known to Rosecrans. Two corps under Polk and Kirby Smith were at Murfreesboro with strong outposts at Stewart"s Creek and Lavergne. The corps under Hardee was on the Shelbyville and Nolinsville pike, between Triune and Eaglesville, with an advance guard at Nolinsville. Rosecrans, on the morning of the 26th, directed the advance movement to commence in the following order. McCook was to move his command of three divisions direct on the Nolinsville pike to Triune. Thomas was to advance his command of two divisions and a brigade on McCook"s right by the Franklin and Wilson pikes, threatening Hardee"s left, and on his falling back was then to cross over on country roads and occupy Nolinsville. Crittenden was ordered to move his command direct on the Murfreesboro pike. On the arrival of Thomas at Nolinsville, and being in a position to support, McCook was to attack Hardee at Triune, and if the latter was re-enforced and McCook"s advance resisted, Thomas was to go to his aid. If Hardee fell back to Stewart"s Creek, five miles south of Lavergne, and the enemy made a stand there, then Crittenden was to attack him at once, and Thomas was to come in on his left flank, while McCook was to bring his forces in supporting distance of Thomas and Crittenden as needed, after sending a division to watch Hardee and to pursue him if retreating.

Davis took the advance of the Right Wing with the First Division. He moved from camp at 6 A.M. on the Edmondson pike, on which he was ordered to move to Prim"s blacksmith shop, from whence he was to march direct on a country road to Nolinsville. The Third Division under Sheridan moved on the Nolinsville pike, followed by the Second under Johnson. The advance of both these columns encountered the cavalry pickets of the enemy, within two miles of the Federal picket line. As these commands advanced, there was constant skirmishing until the heads of each of these columns reached Nolinsville. About one mile south of the town the enemy made a determined stand in a defile, and upon the hills through which the pike ran at this place, known as k.n.o.bb"s Gap. This was a favorable position for the rebels, well guarded by their artillery, which opened fire at long range upon Carlin"s lines. Davis then brought up two batteries and opened fire upon the enemy, while Carlin charged their position, capturing two guns and several prisoners. Davis"s other brigades carried the enemy"s position on the right and left. His divisions then bivouacked for the night. McCook"s loss that day was about seventy-five killed and wounded.

Early on the morning of the 27th, McCook"s command pressing forward, encountered the enemy in force. A dense fog prevailed at the time, rendering it hazardous in the extreme to open an engagement at that time, as McCook"s troops could not distinguish friend from foe at one hundred and fifty yards, and his cavalry had been fired on by his infantry. On learning that Hardee was in position and had been in line of battle since the night before, McCook ordered a halt until the fog lifted. This it did about noon, when Johnson"s division was pushed rapidly forward, followed by that of Sheridan. As the command approached Triune they found the enemy had burned the bridge across Wilson"s Creek and retired, leaving a battery of six pieces with cavalry supports to hold the crossing. As the skirmishers of Johnson"s command advanced, the battery withdrew, and with the cavalry moved off rapidly on the Eaglesville road. Johnson"s division then repaired the bridge, crossed and went into camp beyond Wilson"s Creek.

On Sunday the 28th, there was no general movement of the troops. McCook, however, sent Willich"s brigade out on reconoissance, to learn whether the enemy had retired to Murfreesboro or Shelbyville. Willich went several miles on the Shelbyville road and found that the force in his front had turned to the left and moved toward that former place. Stanley with the cavalry also made a reconoissance, and reported that Hardee had retreated to Murfreesboro.

On the 29th, McCook, leaving Baldwin"s brigade at Triune to cover the extreme right, moved forward with the remainder of his command on a country road known as the Bole Jack road toward Murfreesboro. The command did not reach their encampment until late in the evening, when from the movements of the enemy it was concluded that he intended to give battle at Murfreesboro, and every disposition of troops was made with reference to this. That night McCook"s command was encamped in line of battle with two brigades of Johnson"s division watching the right, Woodruff"s brigade guarding the bridge at Overall"s Creek, Davis on the right of the Wilkinson pike, with Sheridan on the left of that road. The brigade that McCook had left at Triune was ordered up and a.s.sumed its position with the troops on the 30th. McCook"s entire command on the morning of that day advanced down the Wilkinson turnpike until the head of the column encountered the enemy"s pickets. The line of battle was at once formed with the division deployed in a line running to the right in a southeast direction with the left of Sheridan upon the Wilkinson pike immediately on Negley"s right. Davis"s division was at once thrown into line of battle with his left resting on Sheridan"s right, and Johnson"s held in reserve. Covering the front with a strong line of skirmishers, McCook moved his men slowly forward, the enemy stubbornly contesting every foot of ground. McCook"s skirmishers soon became sharply engaged with those of the rebels. The ground was very favorable to the enemy, they being under cover of heavy woods and cedar thickets. At 12 o"clock part of the enemy"s line of battle was determined, McCook"s skirmishers being then about five hundred yards from it. The resistance to Davis"s advance was especially stubborn, and the losses of the day footed up seventy-five in Sheridan"s division and some two hundred in Davis"s. Shortly before sunset the rebel position was plainly discernible from Davis"s front, and was formed diagonally across the old Murfreesboro and Franklin road. In the afternoon, McCook learned from a citizen who had seen the enemy"s line of battle and the position of his troops, that they were posted with the right of Cheatham"s division resting on the Wilkinson pike; Wither"s division on Cheatham"s left, with his left resting on the Franklin road; the entire of Hardee"s corps to the left of that road extending toward Salem pike. This formation of the enemy"s line placed the right of McCook"s line as then formed directly in front of the enemy"s centre. Information was at once sent to Rosecrans, and McCook informed his three division commanders of this fact and then placed two brigades of the reserve division under Willich and Kirk-two of the best and most experienced brigade commanders in the army-on the right of Davis, to protect the right flank and guard against surprise-that of Kirk with his left resting on Davis"s right, with his right refused, Willich on Kirk"s right and in a line nearly perpendicular to the main line, thus covering the right flank. The third brigade of Johnson"s division was held as reserve. McCook"s line of battle as thus formed was broken in several points. The general direction of Sheridan"s line was to the east and south, facing nearly at right angles with Negley, that of Davis was to the west, facing south, nearly at right angles to Sheridan, Kirk"s brigade to Davis"s right faced more to the east, while Willich"s faced due south. The general direction of McCook"s line, however, conformed to the line of the enemy in its front, except the latter had no breaks in the line and that its left division under McCown had its left extended due south. The main portion of the enemy"s battle-line faced northwest. Breckinridge on the right of the line was facing nearly north while McCown on the left faced due west. The enemy awaiting attack-acting on the defensive-had as far as practicable located its line in the cedars, with open ground in the front. McCook considered his line a strong one, with "open ground in the front for a short distance." Rosecrans, on being informed by McCook of the location of his line of battle, expressed himself against it, saying: "I don"t like the facing so much to the east, but must confide that to you, who know the ground. If you don"t think you present the best position, change it." At six o"clock in the evening McCook received an order from Rosecrans to have large and extended camp-fires made on the right, extending far beyond the right of the line, to deceive the enemy and make him believe that troops were being ma.s.sed there. Fires were built extending nearly a mile beyond the right of McCook"s line. In this position the right wing rested in the cedars the night before the battle. The troops, cutting cedar boughs for beds, and officers and men, wrapping themselves in their blankets, slept in the frosty night air with the silent stars looking down.

On the 26th, Thomas"s command, "the Centre," with Negley"s division in the advance, moved out promptly to Brentwood on the Franklin pike, and from there turned to the left and advanced on the Wilson pike to Owen"s store, where the troops were to encamp for the night. But on arriving there, Negley left his train and pushed on at once with his troops to Nolinsville, from whence the sound of Davis"s guns had reached him, to his support. Negley encamped at Nolinsville, Rousseau at Owen"s store, and Walker"s brigade at Brentwood. A very heavy rain during the night rendered the country roads impa.s.sable, and it was not until the night of the 27th that Rousseau"s command reached Nolinsville. On the morning of the 27th, Negley"s train coming up, his division moved to the east, over an extremely rough by-road, to the right of Crittenden on the Murfreesboro pike, taking position at Stewartsboro. Walker was sent back by Thomas from Brentwood, to take the direct Nolinsville pike. On the 28th, Rousseau, under order, marched to Stewartsboro, where he joined Negley"s division. On the 29th Negley crossed Stewart"s Creek at the ford southwest of, and two miles above the turnpike bridge, and marched in supporting distance of the head of Crittenden"s command on the Murfreesboro pike. Rousseau was ordered to remain in camp at Stewartsboro, detaching Starkweather"s brigades with a section of artillery to the Jefferson pike, to watch the movements of the enemy. Negley"s division moved eight miles that day and took position within three miles of Murfreesboro. Walker reached Stewartsboro from the Nolinsville pike about dark. Early in the morning, Crittenden"s command moved into line of battle on the left, under a brisk fire, while Negley"s division, by an oblique movement to the right, took position on the right of Palmer"s division, and was then advanced through a dense cedar thicket several hundred yards in width to the Wilkinson cross roads, driving the enemy"s skirmishers steadily, and with considerable loss. Rousseau"s division, with the exception of Starkweather"s brigade, was ordered up from Stewartsboro, reached the front, and bivouacked on the Murfreesboro pike in the rear of the centre. Thomas during the night ordered Walker"s brigade to take a strong position near the bridge over Stewart"s Creek, and to defend it against any attempt of the enemy"s cavalry to destroy it. Rousseau was ordered to take position in rear of Negley"s division, with his left on the Murfreesboro pike, and his right extending into the cedar thicket through which Negley had marched to take position. The troops held every foot of ground that had been won from the enemy and remained in line of battle during the night.

The "Left Wing" under Crittenden advanced on the 26th to Lavergne, Palmer"s division in the front. He was engaged in a short time with heavy skirmishing, which increased as the command moved south. The advance of the column was over a rough country, intersected with forests and cedar thickets. Crittenden was ordered to delay his movements until McCook reached Triune, in order to determine the direction in which Thomas should move as support; Crittenden"s command encamped that night four miles north of Lavergne. On the 27th Wood"s division was placed in the advance of Crittenden"s column. Hascall"s brigade drove the enemy from Lavergne with a loss of twenty men wounded, and pushing rapidly on, forced them south of Stewart"s Creek, five miles beyond. At this place the enemy set fire to the bridge, which Hascall"s advance reached in time to save. Hazen"s brigade of Palmer"s division was sent down the Jefferson pike to seize the bridge over Stewart"s Creek at the crossing of that road. That night the "Left Wing" went into camp at Stewartsboro, and remained there over the next day, Sunday. On the 29th, Crittenden"s command crossed Stewart"s Creek by the Smyrna bridge, and the main Murfreesboro pike, and advanced that day-Palmer"s division leading-to within two miles of Murfreesboro, driving back the enemy after several severe skirmishes, saving two bridges on the route, and forcing the enemy into his intrenchments.

Rosecrans, about three o"clock in the afternoon, received a signal message from Palmer at the front, that he was in sight of Murfreesboro, and that the enemy was running. Rosecrans then sent an order to Crittenden to send a division to occupy Murfreesboro, camping the other two outside. Crittenden received this order as he reached the head of his command, where Wood and Palmer were gathering up their troops prepatory to encamping for the night. These divisions were in line of battle,-Wood on the left and Palmer on the right,-with the rebels in sight in such heavy force that it was evident that they intended to dispute the pa.s.sage of the river, and to fight a battle at or near Murfreesboro. On receipt of the order, Crittenden gave the command to advance. Wood was ordered to occupy the place, and Palmer to advance in line of battle until the pa.s.sage of the river had been forced. Wood on receiving the order objected greatly to carrying it out, saying that it was hazarding a great deal for very little, to move over unknown ground in the night, instead of waiting for daylight, and that Crittenden ought to take the responsibility of disobeying the order. This the latter refused to do. After Wood and Palmer had issued their orders to advance, they both insisted that the order should not be carried out. The order was then suspended an hour, so that Rosecrans could be heard from. During this interval the general himself came to this portion of the front, and approved of the action of Crittenden, as the order had been issued on the report that the enemy had evacuated Murfreesboro. Under the order, before it was suspended, Harker with his brigade had crossed the river at a ford on his left, where he surprised a regiment of Breckinridge"s division, and drove it back on its main lines, not more than five hundred yards distant, in considerable confusion. He held this position until it was dark, with Breckinridge in force on his front, when Crittenden ordered his return. Hascall"s command was fording the river, advancing when the order was suspended. Harker succeeded in recrossing the river in the face of this strong force of the enemy without any serious loss. Crittenden placed Van Cleve"s division, which had reported marching from the Jefferson turnpike to the Murfreesboro road, in reserve behind Wood. During the 30th there was but little change in the position of the Left Wing, while the other troops were moving into position on the line of battle. Palmer"s division was advanced a short distance, the enemy contesting stubbornly.

The pioneer brigade had prepared the banks at three places for the fording of the river. Wood"s division covered two, and the pioneer brigade, under Captain St. Clair Morton, covered the lower one. At night Crittenden"s corps with Negley"s division bivouacked in order of battle, being on seven hundred yards from the enemy"s entrenchments. The left of Crittenden"s command extended down the river some five hundred yards.

The first movement of Rosecrans"s advance was made known to Bragg as soon as it had reached a point two miles beyond the Federal picket-line, where the heads of the several columns encountered the rebel cavalry pickets. For all Bragg had placed his army in winter quarters, and presumed that Rosecrans had done the same, his experience with the matter of surprise to an army led him to be well prepared to know and take advantage of the slightest change in his immediate front. By the night of the 26th Bragg knew that Rosecrans"s entire army was moving out to force him to fight or compel his retreat. He at once selected his line of battle at Stone"s River, and directed his three cavalry brigades, under Wheeler, Wharton, and Pegram, supported by three brigades of infantry with artillery, to check the advance of the several columns until he could unite this army. He then gave the necessary orders for the concentration of his command and the formation of his line of battle.

Murfreesboro is situated on the railroad to Chattanooga, thirty miles southeast of Nashville, in the midst of the great plain stretching from the base of the c.u.mberland Mountains toward the c.u.mberland River, and is surrounded by a gently undulating country, exceedingly fertile and highly cultivated. Leading in every direction from the town are numerous excellent turnpikes. Stone"s River-named after an early settler-is formed here by the middle and south branches of the stream uniting, and flows in a northerly direction between low banks of limestone, generally steep and difficult to cross, emptying into the c.u.mberland. At the time of the battle the stream was so low that it could be crossed by infantry everywhere. The Nashville Railroad crosses the river about two hundred yards above the turnpike bridge. At some five hundred yards beyond, it intersects the Nashville turnpike at a sharp angle, then runs some eight hundred yards between the pike and the river, when the stream turns abruptly to the east and pa.s.ses to the north. Open fields surrounded the town, fringed with dense cedar-brakes. These afforded excellent cover for approaching infantry, but were almost impervious to artillery.

The centre of Bragg"s army was at Murfreesboro, under Polk. The right was at Readyville, under McCown, and the left at Triune and Eaglesville, under Hardee. Polk"s command consisted of Cheatham"s and Wither"s divisions. These divisions and three brigades of Breckenridge"s division of Hardee"s corps were at Murfreesboro. Cleburne"s division and Adams"s brigade of Breckinridge"s division were under the immediate command of Hardee, near Eaglesville, about twenty miles west of Murfreesboro. McCown"s division of Kirby Smith"s corps was at Readyville, twelve miles east of Murfreesboro. Each of the two divisions of Hardee"s corps consisted of four brigades of infantry. To this corps Wheeler"s brigade of cavalry was attached. The brigade of T. R. Jackson-which was in the rear, guarding the railroad from Bridgeport to the mountains-Bragg also ordered up. On Sunday, the 28th, Bragg formed his line of battle, placing Breckinridge"s division on his extreme right, across Stone"s River, to protect that flank and cover the town. Adams"s brigade rested on the Lebanon road, about a mile and a half from town. Breckinridge"s division formed the first line, facing north, and was posted in the edge of the forest, with Cleburne"s division in the second line, 800 yards to the rear. To the left of Adams the line was broken by an intervening field, about three hundred yards in width, which was apparently left unoccupied, but was covered by the Twentieth Tennessee and Wright"s battery, of Preston"s brigade, which swept it and the fields in front. The remainder of Preston"s brigade rested with its right in the woods, and extended along the edge with its left toward the river. On the left of Preston, Palmer"s brigade was formed, and on his left Hanson"s completed that portion of the line. Jackson"s brigade reported to Breckinridge and was placed on the east side of the Lebanon road, on commanding ground, a little in the advance of the right of Adams. On the other side of the river the right of Withers"s division rested at the bank, near the intersection of the turnpike with the railroad, and was slightly in advance of Hanson"s right. It extended southwardly across the Wilkinson pike to the Triune or Franklin road, in an irregular line adapted to the topography of the country. In the rear of Withers"s division that of Cheatham was posted as a supporting force. McCown"s division was placed in the rear of these divisions as the reserve. This was Bragg"s first disposition of his troops for battle. On Monday, the 29th, no change of importance was made, the troops remaining in line of battle. In the evening, when Harker"s brigade crossed the river, Bragg thought this was a movement to occupy a hill situated about six hundred yards in front of Hanson"s centre. This commanded the ground sloping to the river south and west, and from it the right of Withers"s division across the river could be enfiladed. Hanson"s brigade was sent out, and, on Harker"s return, the hill was occupied by the batteries of the enemy. On Monday Bragg, finding that Rosecrans was extending his line on his right,-as Bragg supposed to operate on that flank-threw his reserve division under McCown on Withers"s left. Hardee was ordered to take command of McCown"s division, and to move Cleburne from the second line in the rear of Breckinridge, and place him on the left as support to McCown. Cleburne was brought forward and placed five hundred yards in rear of the latter. Bragg"s main line of battle was in the edge of the woods, with open ground to the front. His troops were formed in two lines, the first line protected by intrenchments, and his second line formed some six hundred yards to the rear. He awaited the attack of Rosecrans on the 30th, and not receiving it, on Tuesday made his arrangements for an advance and attack in force on the morning of the 31st. His troops remained in line of battle, ready to move with the early dawn of the coming day. The two armies were now arrayed only some five hundred yards apart, facing each other, and eager for the conflict of the morrow.

At nine o"clock on the evening of the 30th, the corps commanders met at Rosecrans"s headquarters, in the cedars near the Murfreesboro pike, to receive their final instructions and to learn the details of the plan of battle for the next day. McCook was directed with his three divisions to occupy the most advantageous position, refusing his right as much as practicable and necessary to secure it, to await the attack of the enemy, and in the event of that not being made, to himself engage and hold the force on his front, Johnson"s division held the extreme right of his line; on Johnson"s left was Davis"s division, and on Davis"s left Sheridan"s was posted. Thomas was instructed to open with skirmishing and engage the enemy"s centre with Negley"s division of his command and Palmer"s of Crittenden"s corps, Negley"s right resting on Sheridan"s left, and Palmer"s right on the left of Negley, Rousseau being in reserve. Crittenden was ordered to move Van Cleve"s division across the river at the lower ford, covered and supported by the pioneer brigade and at once advance on Breckinridge. Wood"s division was to follow-crossing at the upper ford and joining Van Cleve"s right-when they were to press everything before them into Murfreesboro. This gave a strong attack from two divisions of Federal troops on the one of Breckinridge"s, which was known to be the only one of the enemy"s on the east of the river. As soon as Breckinridge had been dislodged from his position, the artillery of Wood"s division was to take position on the heights east of the river and open fire on the enemy"s lines on the other side, which could here be seen in reverse, and dislodge them, when Palmer was to drive them southward across the river or through the wood. Sustained by the advance of the Centre under Thomas crushing their right, Crittenden was to keep advancing, take Murfreesboro, move rapidly westward on the Franklin pike, get on their flank and rear and drive them into the country toward Salem, with the prospect of cutting off their retreat and probably destroying their army. Rosecrans called the attention of the corps commanders to the fact that this combination, which gave to him such a superiority on the left, depended for its success upon McCook"s maintaining his position on the right for at least three hours, and if compelled to fall back that he should do so in the same manner he had advanced the day before, slowly and steadily, refusing his right. McCook was asked if he could hold his position for three hours, and replied that he thought he could. The importance of doing so was again impressed upon him, and the officers then separated.

As will be seen, the plan of battle as formed by Rosecrans contemplated a feint attack by his right, which in the event of a repulse was to fall back slowly, contesting the ground stubbornly, while the main attack was to be made by the forces on the left, followed up the advance of the centre, the right to be temporarily sacrificed for the success of the general plan. Rosecrans knew that Bragg had weakened his right to support his left, looking to offensive movements on his part, and that the vital point in his own plan was the ability of McCook to hold the enemy in check on his front.

During the 30th, Bragg formed his plan of battle, which, singular as it appears, was the exact counterpart of that of the Federal commander. Hardee on the left, with McCown"s and Cleburne"s divisions, was to advance against the Federal right, which being forced back, Polk and Withers"s and Cheatham"s divisions were then to push the centre. The movement made by a steady wheel to the right on the right of Polk"s command as a pivot. Bragg"s plan was to drive our right and centre back against our left on Stone"s River, seize our line of communication with Nashville, thus cutting us off from our base of operations and supplies, and ultimately securing the objective of his campaign, Nashville. Bragg"s plan was equally as bold as that of his opponent-whose command was slightly inferior in strength to the rebel force-and the success of either depended very largely on the degree of diligence in opening the engagement. Rosecrans"s orders were for the troops to breakfast before daylight and attack at seven o"clock. Bragg issued orders to attack at daylight.

Chapter VIII.

The Battle of Stone"s River.

With early light, on the morning of the 31st, the movement in each army began. Rosecrans had established his headquarters in the rear of the left, in order to direct in person the forward movement of that portion of his army which was to cross Stone"s River, sweep all resistance before it, and swing into Murfreesboro. The command was given, and at once Van Cleve advanced two brigades, making the crossing of the river at the lower ford without opposition. Wood"s division had reached the river bank prepared to make the crossing and support Van Cleve. Everything on the left appeared to be working satisfactorily, when the opening sounds of the enemy"s attack on the right reached the left. This was as intended, and went to show that if Bragg"s left was fully occupied he then could give the less attention to his right, engaged by our army. with high hopes the troops then pressing forward continued to cross the river. Within an hour after the opening of the battle, one of McCook"s staff officers reported to Rosecrans that the Right Wing was heavily pressed and needed a.s.sistance. Rosecrans was not told of the rout of Johnson"s division, nor of the rapid withdrawal of Davis, made necessary thereby. Rosecrans, sending word to McCook to make a stubborn fight, continued his own offensive movement. Everything was working well as far as he knew. His strong force on the left was not yet engaged. This he could hurl at the enemy"s line of communications and strike on the flank of Bragg"s army that was flanking him. Soon after another staff officer from McCook arrived and reported that the entire Right Wing was being driven, a fact that manifested itself by the troops from the broken divisions pouring forth from the cedars in alarming numbers, and by the rapid movement of the noise of the battle to the north. Then Rosecrans saw the necessity of abandoning his own movement, of recalling the left, and of proceeding at once to the right to save what was left of that corps as speedily as possible. He ordered back his left from across the river, and calling on his staff to mount, rode full gallop over to the right to reform that command on a new line and save his army. Now that he was on the defensive, after McCook"s disaster, it was impossible to carry out his original plan of battle.

On the 30th, McCown in posting his division placed Ector"s and Rains"s brigades in the first line, and McNair"s brigade in the second. Hardee ordered McCown at once to change this so as to bring McNair on the front line. This order was not obeyed until the morning of the 31st, when the movement was made, causing, however, some delay in the advance of Hardee"s command on our right. At half past six o"clock, McCown"s division in the front line with Cleburne"s division in the second swinging around by a continuous change of direction to the right, advanced on to the right of McCook. McCown did not properly execute the movement as intended, and was carried so far west as to leave a gap in the rebel front between Withers"s left and McCown"s right. Into this gap Cleburne immediately threw his division, and advanced, filling the interval in the front line between McCown and Polk. This gave Hardee double the length of front originally contemplated, and made it a single line instead of a double with division front. These two divisions thus formed then struck McCook"s right flank-Johnson"s division. McCook"s line was very weak and poorly posted. It was thin and light, without reserves, with neither the troops nor commanding officers in their places, as they should have been, under Rosecrans"s orders of the evening before.

Every soldier on that field knew when the sun went down on the 30th that on the following day he would be engaged in a struggle unto death, and the air was full of tokens that one of the most desperate of battles was to be fought. In the face of all this, Johnson, the commander of the First Division on the right, was not on the line nor near enough to his troops to give orders to them, his headquarters being a mile and a half in the rear. General Willich the commander of the Second Brigade, which had been posted for the express purpose of protecting the extreme right of our army, was absent from his command at division headquarters. His brigade was not even in line, as they had been ordered to get their breakfast. The batteries of the division were not properly posted, and in some cases the horses were away from the guns to the rear for water. All this was criminal negligence-a failure in the performance of duty-for which some one should have suffered. To the faulty position of the line and to the unprepared condition of the troops is to be attributed the almost overwhelming disaster that overtook our army on that day. As the two divisions of the enemy advanced, Kirk threw forward the Forty-fourth Illinois to support the skirmish line, and called on Willich"s brigade for help. This brigade being without an immediate commander, no effort was made to support Kirk. The contest was too unequal to be maintained for any great length of time, and Johnson"s division, after a sharp and spirited but fruitless contest, crumbling to pieces, was driven back with a loss of eleven guns. Kirk was mortally wounded and Willich was captured, returning to his command as it was driven back. Kirk"s brigade lost 473 killed and wounded, and had 342 captured. Willich"s brigade had a few less killed and wounded, but more than twice that number captured.

Baldwin in reserve near headquarters was too far from the front to aid in supporting either of the other brigades of Johnson"s division. Stragglers from Kirk"s and Willich"s brigades gave the first information to Baldwin of the disaster on the right. Hastily forming his troops, he had barely time to post them in line of battle before the enemy in immense ma.s.ses appeared on his front at short range, their left extending far beyond the extreme right of his line. Opening at once a destructive fire upon their dense ma.s.ses with his infantry and artillery, Baldwin succeeded in checking their advance in his front, but their left continued to swing around on his right. Here four pieces of Simonson"s battery posted near the woods in the rear of the first position opened with terrible effect. The enemy came on in such overwhelming numbers, that after half an hour"s stubborn resistance Baldwin was compelled to retire, not however until the enemy had flanked his right and were pouring in an enfilading fire. As it was he barely made his escape, since in a moment longer his entire command would have been surrounded and captured. At the edge of the woods Baldwin endeavored to make another stand, but before he could form his line he was again forced back. Retiring slowly, with several halts in the cedars, Baldwin with his brigade reached the railroad where the rest of the division was being reformed.

The right flank being driven from its position by the left of the enemy, Davis"s division then felt the full force of the victorious sweep of the rebel troops, flushed with success and aided by the forces immediately in his front. Davis, as soon as the disaster on his right had fully developed, at once changed front and formed a new line, with his right brigade under Post nearly at right angles to its former position, and made all necessary disposition of his troops to receive the attack. Baldwin"s brigade had hastily taken position and had already felt the force of the enemy"s concentrated attack. Still the advancing lines of the enemy greatly overlapped the extreme right of Baldwin. Hardly had the troops been placed in this position before the enemy swept down in heavy ma.s.ses upon both the flank and front, charging with the rebel yell. The two divisions of McCown"s and Cleburne"s troops which had driven Johnson, hurled themselves upon Baldwin"s and Post"s brigades, while the fresh troops of Withers"s division, composed of Manigualt"s and Loomis"s brigades, rushed upon those of Davis, under Carlin and Woodruff, and upon that on the right of Sheridan"s line under Sill. The change of position of Post"s brigade gave to the two remaining brigades of Davis"s division, and Sill"s brigade of Sheridan"s command, the length of division front, and on this the enemy made a united attack. After Baldwin had been compelled to retire, Post repulsed the attack on his brigade, and Carlin, Woodruff, and Sill in the front drove back the a.s.saulting column of the rebels with heavy loss. The enemy then reformed his lines, strengthened them with his reserves under Vaughan and Maney of Cheatham"s division and once more pressed forward. Again these heavy lines struck Carlin, Woodruff, and Sill, and were again handsomely repulsed; Sill gallantly charging the rebels and driving them into their line of intrenchments. In this charge, General Sill was killed. His brigade then slowly retired and formed anew in line of battle. Cleburne at the same time charged down on Post"s brigade, and he too was a second time repulsed.

The formation of the battle-front of Davis"s two left brigades under Carlin and Woodruff was almost perpendicular to that of Sheridan"s division, and the left of Woodruff"s with the right of Sill"s brigade formed the apex of a right triangle. This position was at once observed by the enemy, who saw that if he could take this extreme point of the angle he would be in position to enfilade both lines at once. For the possession of this point every effort was made, and a third attack was ordered upon it with four brigades, under the immediate command of Cheatham, in double lines. Hardee had gathered his command together again for another attack on Post"s position. Pressing forward with the victorious troops of McCown"s and Cleburne"s divisions-the troops that had swept Johnson from the field-he enveloped both flanks of Post"s brigade, and compelled him to fall back, with the loss of one gun, to the Nashville pike, where he also reformed his command.

On the withdrawal of Post"s brigade, Carlin"s right was left exposed to the enemy, who with renewed vigor pressed forward in overwhelming numbers on converging lines, ma.s.sing as they advanced. Circling around on their right the rebels swept down on the remaining brigades of Davis"s division in dense columns. In the previous charge the attack had been so heavy upon the angle formed by Woodruff"s left and Sill"s right, that in the new formation-after the second repulse-the line at this point was somewhat broken, and after Sill"s death the right of the brigade was reformed somewhat to the rear of the former line, the better to support the battery attached to it. In the heavy fighting of the morning the position of all the brigades had been more or less changed, and in several instances the commanding officer of each brigade considered his command as being without support on either flank. On the third a.s.sault both Carlin and Woodruff thought this to be the case with their commands, and in the attack then made upon their brigades they became almost surrounded. Carlin stubbornly resisted every effort to drive him from his position until by his remaining longer the loss of his entire brigade became imminent. His regiment on the left gave way and he then retreated across open fields in the rear to the edge of the woods, where Davis was attempting to reform his line, having placed Hotchkiss"s battery just within the timber. Woodruff then fell back, but being closely pressed, turned and with a determined charge sent the enemy beyond his original position. Being unsupported he was compelled to retire into the cedars. Before Woodruff reached the new lines that Davis was trying to form, Carlin"s troops opened fire on the advancing enemy, when he was informed that Davis had ordered a farther withdrawal. He then fell back across the Wilkinson pike, where he rallied his men, who however, on the advance of the enemy, fired one volley and broke to the rear without orders. Carlin then went with them through the lines of reserves, halting at the railroad, where he reformed his command. After reaching the cedars Woodruff charged a second time, and compelled the enemy to fall back, but his ammunition giving out, his troops pa.s.sed to the rear, resisting every effort to rally them until they reached the Murfreesboro pike.

Davis"s division had up to this time protected Sheridan"s right, and these divisions unitedly had resisted two a.s.saults. After the charge of the enemy that broke Davis"s division and sent it through the cedars, Sheridan was compelled to change his line and to protect the right flank of his command from the enemy, now pressing that part of his position, as well as his front, in increasing numbers, as the line became shortened. Hastily withdrawing Sill"s brigade, with the reserves sent it as support, he directed Roberts, with the left brigade, which had changed front and formed in columns of regiments, to charge the enemy in the cedars from which he had withdrawn Sill"s brigade and the reserves. This charge was at once made by Roberts, and the enemy"s advance checked sufficiently to give Sheridan time to form his troops on the new line, which he at once did by placing Sill"s and Shafer"s brigades on a line at right angles to his first one, and ordered Roberts to return and form his command on this same line. Sheridan now attempted to form the broken troops of the other division on the right of his new line, but in this he was not successful. After making a gallant fight with his division, finding the right of his new line turned, Sheridan was directed by McCook to advance to the front and reform his troops to the right of Negley"s division of the Centre under Thomas. Throwing forward his left to join Negley"s right, he placed Roberts"s brigade in position at right angles to Negley"s line, facing south, and then placed his two other brigades in the rear, and at right angles to Roberts, so as to face westward and to cover the rear of Negley"s lines. In the angle of these lines on the right of Negley, he placed his artillery. Here he was again fiercely a.s.saulted by the enemy, and one of the fiercest and most sanguinary contests of the day ensued. Ma.s.sing the four divisions of Hardee"s and Polk"s corps-each of four brigades-Bragg hurled them against the divisions of Sheridan and Negley, and at the same time the enemy opened fire from the intrenchments in the direction of Murfreesboro. Here the fighting was terrific. Five batteries were posted with these two divisions, the artillery range of the respective forces being not to exceed two hundred yards. Three times in dense ma.s.ses the enemy charged on these divisions, and three times were they repulsed. Here Colonel Roberts was killed. Sheridan"s troops having now exhausted their ammunition-Shafer"s brigade being entirely out and nearly all his horses killed-then gave way, after over four hours of some of the hottest fighting of the day. Sheridan lost in falling back from this position eight guns. Nearly all the remainder of his artillery was drawn by his men through the cedars. On arriving at the Murfreesboro pike, Sheridan reformed his command in an open s.p.a.ce near the right of Palmer.

Before a.s.sisting in the gallant fight on the right of the center with Sheridan in his new position, Negley"s division, after repelling all a.s.saults made on it, had been engaged in heavy fighting on its front since the middle of the morning. On the withdrawal of Sheridan, Negley"s division found themselves surrounded by the enemy in swarms. Rousseau"s division in reserve, and Palmer"s on the left, had retired to the rear of the cedars, to form a new line. Falling back through the cedar-brakes in the rear of the division, under a concentrated fire of musketry and artillery at short range, the rebels were driven back in front and checked in the rear. Miller"s and Stanley"s brigades on reaching the woods reformed their lines, faced to the rear and fired several volleys into the enemy, then advanced over the open fields across which these brigades had just retired. In pa.s.sing through the cedars the enemy pressed so closely on the division that in some parts of Miller"s brigade the lines of the opposing armies seemed commingled. The division then reformed on the new line, as directed by Thomas, near the Nashville pike.

Early in the day, with the breaking up and retreat of the two fine divisions of McCook"s corps, the extent of the disaster to the right was forced upon Rosecrans with terrible earnestness. Realizing at once that upon him devolved the task of making such disposition of his command as would ensure the safety of his army, he immediately gave the necessary orders for the movement of the troops. Hurriedly galloping to the centre, where he found Thomas, he at once ordered Rousseau"s division-held as reserve heretofore-to be sent to the support of what was left of McCook"s line into the cedar-brakes to the right and rear of Sheridan. Rosecrans then ordered Crittenden to suspend Van Cleve"s movement across the river on the left, to cover the crossing with one brigade, and to move the other two brigades westward across the fields toward the railroad for a reserve. He also directed Wood to suspend his preparations for his crossing and for him to move at once to the new line on the right and hold Hascall in reserve. Up to this time Rosecrans had hoped that McCook, notwithstanding the disaster to the right, might stay the onset with his own troops. With the volume of stragglers and the detachments from the broken commands swarming to the rear through the cedars Rosecrans soon became satisfied that McCook was routed. He then ordered Van Cleve to be sent in to the right of Rousseau, and Wood to send Colonel Harker"s brigade farther down the Murfreesboro pike with orders to go in and attack the enemy on the right of Van Cleve. The pioneer brigade had been posted on the knoll of ground west of the Nashville pike and about four or five hundred yards in the rear of Palmer"s centre, supporting Stokes"s battery. On Negley"s division being compelled to retire, Thomas ordered him with Rousseau to form their divisions along a depression in the open ground in rear of the cedars, as a temporary line, until the artillery could be posted on the high ground near to and west of the Murfreesboro pike. Rousseau"s division, cutting its way through the enemy in falling back from the cedars, took position on this temporary line with all its batteries posted on the knoll a short distance to the rear. Here the severest engagement of this day of heavy fighting was had, almost hand to hand. At this point the new line had open ground in front of it for some four or five hundred yards. Rousseau, while his batteries were unlimbering, requested Van Cleve to move with Colonel Samuel Beatty"s brigade of his division to form on his right, check the rebel advance and drive it back. Van Cleve instantly moved his troops on the double quick and reached the desired position in good season. Upon these troops in this new line the rebels charged in dense ma.s.ses, flushed with the victory of the early morning and elate with the hope of continued success to the end. They had swept everything before them thus far, and felt that with renewed effort the successful issue of the battle was within their grasp. Emerging from the cedars with yell after yell, firing as they came, they rushed forward four lines deep in the attempt to cross the open field and drive back this new line that stood in their pathway to final victory. At once Rousseau"s division and Beatty"s brigade opened fire upon the advancing columns, while Guenther"s and Loomis"s batteries added effect to it by sending double shotted canister into their thick ranks. The rebels moved on for a time, but the fire proved too terrible and they were driven back with great slaughter. On reaching the cedars these troops were rallied by their officers, and with fresh troops as supports they advanced once more, with a determined effort to carry our position at this point. But again they were, after a more desperate struggle, driven back. Again and again they returned to the a.s.sault, in four deliberate and fiercely sustained efforts, each time to meet with a repulse. The brigade of regulars under the command of Colonel Shepherd sustained the heaviest blows of this a.s.sault. They had the efficient support of Scribner"s and John Beatty"s brigades, of Loomis"s and Guenther"s batteries, and of the pioneer brigade under Captain St. Clair Morton, with Stokes"s battery. Sheppard"s command lost in killed and wounded in this short and severe contest, 26 officers and 611 enlisted men, making a total loss of 637 out of 1,566 effectives. The centre succeeded in driving back the enemy from its front, gallantly holding its ground against overwhelming odds, while the artillery concentrating its fire on the cedar thickets on their right drove the enemy far back under cover of the woods.

While the right and centre had been thus actively engaged, the left had also borne its full share of the heavy fighting of the day. Palmer"s division was posted in line of battle with his right resting on Negley"s left. His line was formed with Cruft"s brigade on the right, connecting with Negley, and his left extending across a point of woods to the right of Hazen"s brigade, which was formed in two lines with his left resting on the Nashville pike, while Grose"s brigade was in reserve some two hundred yards to the rear, formed in two lines nearly opposite the interval between the brigades in line of battle. On the withdrawal of the troops of the left from across the river, Wood ordered Wagner with his brigade to hold his position in the woods on the left of the Murfreesboro pike at all hazards, this being an exceedingly important point, protecting our left front and flanks and securing command of the road leading to the rear. Hascall"s and Harker"s brigades were withdrawn, and the latter, under an order from Rosecrans, was moved to the right and rear. In the heavy fighting of the general movement on the right and centre, the left gradually became engaged, and with this Hascall was ordered by Wood to take position between Wagner and Hazen on Wagner"s right. With the general advance of the enemy, moving on the right of Polk"s corps as a pivot, Palmer and the two brigades of Wood"s division on the left became engaged. Cruft early in the morning had been ordered by Palmer to advance, keeping in line with Negley, the latter having sent word to Palmer that he intended to advance his division to attack the enemy. Cruft was advanced in two lines, two regiments in each line with Miller"s brigade of Negley"s division on the right and Hazen"s brigade on his left. After Cruft had advanced about a hundred yards, Palmer discovered that Negley had thrown back his right so that his line was almost perpendicular to Cruft"s and to his rear. After Cruft had driven the enemy"s skirmishers in, the rebels advanced in great force in four ranks with double lines, Chalmers in the front line with Donelson"s brigade following. This charge Cruft repulsed, inflicting severe loss on the enemy. Chalmers was so severely wounded by the bursting of a sh.e.l.l as to disqualify him for further duty on the field. Advancing once more, the rebels again attacked Cruft"s line, when a very severe engagement ensued, and after some thirty minutes" firing the enemy was again repulsed. When Negley"s division went back through the cedars, Cruft was left without support on his right and he then withdrew to the wood, the enemy following him closely and pressing him hard. While Cruft was thus engaged on the front, Palmer found that the right and centre had been driven from the first line, and that the enemy in Negley"s front was forcing his way into the open ground to his rear. He then changed Grose from front to rear, retired his new left so as to bring the rebels under the direct fire of his line, and opened on them with great effect, holding his ground until the enemy was driven back. Hazen was ordered to fall back from the advanced position he then held, and to occupy the crest of a low wooded hill between the pike and the railroad, and there resist the attack. This was about eleven o"clock, and all of Palmer"s command was engaged with the enemy-Hazen on the railroad, one or two detached regiments to the right, Cruft still farther to the right, actively engaged, while Grose to the rear was fighting heavy odds. Grose shortly after this changed to the front again, the enemy being driven back from his rear, and moved to the left to co-operate with Hazen. After aiding in the repulse of the troops that struck Cruft"s lines, Hazen with constant firing maintained his position on his left at the railroad, retiring his right to place his troops behind the embankment at that place. General Palmer had ordered Grose to co-operate with Hazen, and part of Grose"s troops reporting to him, they were placed in position on the front. Here was held what was considered by the enemy to be the key to our position, known as the "Round Forest." This was attacked by the right of Donelson"s brigade, but the attack was met with a fire that mowed down half its number, one regiment losing 207 out of 402. In another regiment the loss was 306 out of 425. Polk finding that his troops had been so severely punished that they were not able to renew the attack on the extreme left of our line, and that the new line on the right as formed by Rosecrans resisted every attack, applied for an order from Bragg directing four brigades from Breckenridge"s command to be sent to him to drive our left from its line, and especially to dislodge us from our position in the "Round Forest." These brigades were sent to him, arriving in two detachments of two brigades each. Adams and Jackson"s brigades first reported, under Breckinridge in person. Those of Preston and Palmer reported about two hours later. About two o"clock in the afternoon Adams and Jackson"s brigades a.s.sailed our left with determined energy, but after a severe contest they were compelled to yield and fall back. They were rallied by Breckenridge, but were too badly cut up to renew the attack. About four o"clock, on the arrival of the brigades of Preston and Palmer, the a.s.sault on the left was renewed and again repulsed, when the enemy withdrew and made no further attack upon that position. When this last attack was made, Rosecrans, anxious as to this vital point of his lines, hurried there with his staff to a.s.sist in the repulse. It was here that a sh.e.l.l grazing the person of Rosecrans carried off the head of his chief of staff, the lamented Garesche.

The new line formed by Rosecrans to protect his communication extended from Hazen on the Murfreesboro pike in a northwesterly direction, Hascall supporting Hazen, Rousseau filling the interval to the pioneer brigade, Negley in reserve, Van Cleve west of the pioneer brigade, McCook"s corps refused on his right and slightly to the rear on the Nashville pike, with the cavalry at and beyond Overall"s Creek. After the formation had been completed later in the afternoon, with a wild yell the enemy debouched from the cedar thickets, and forming into line, advanced as if to charge once more. At once a terrific fire of artillery and infantry opened on them, and their broken ranks went back over the fields driven in great confusion; the batteries Rosecrans had placed on the commanding ground near the railroad inflicting a heavier loss on Polk"s brigade than it had suffered in all the previous fighting of the day. This attack was in the main repulsed by Van Cleve"s division, aided by Harker"s brigade, and the cavalry under General Stanley. This was the last a.s.sault on the right and centre, and with the repulse of Breckinridge"s command on the left, the fighting for the day was over; and on the field where death had reaped such a heavy harvest, on the last day of 1862, the troops slept on their arms, waiting for what the next day might bring forth. The night was clear and cold. The armies maintained their relative positions, with some picket firing occurring during the night. Rosecrans gave orders that all the spare ammunition should be issued, and it was found that there was enough for another battle, the main question being where the battle was to be fought. During the night Rosecrans, in order to complete the new formation of his lines, withdrew the left from the advanced position it occupied, and placed it in line some two hundred and fifty yards to the rear, on more advantageous ground, the extreme left resting on Stone"s River above the lower ford and extending to the railroad. Late in the afternoon the brigades under Colonels Starkweather and Walker, that had been on duty in the rear, arrived at the front and were posted in reserve on the line of battle, the former in rear of McCook"s left, and Walker in rear of the left of Sheridan"s division near the Murfreesboro pike. On the morning of the 1st they were placed in the front line, relieving Van Cleve, who then returned to his position on the left.

The extent of the disaster on the right was appalling and seemed at one time about to envelop the entire army. As the storm of battle pa.s.sed down the line it reached Thomas, who cool, calm, and self-sustained, stood the test of one of the fiercest contests of the war. It was to him that Rosecrans first turned in the hour of disaster and in him he trusted most. The commander of the army, too, was sorely tried. He had come to win victory, but in place of it defeat seemed almost inevitable. Reforming his lines and bravely fighting, he had hurled back Bragg"s army before it had achieved any decisive success. Rosecrans knew that his losses had been extremely heavy, but those of the enemy had been still more severe. He felt that on a question of endurance his army would come out first, although the dash and onset of the rebels had at the opening been able to sweep all before them. In the face of an earnest effort on the part of some of his general officers to persuade him to fall back to Nashville and then throw up works and wait for reinforcements, Rosecrans determined to await the attack of the enemy in the positions of his lines late Wednesday afternoon. He sent for the provision trains, ordered up fresh supplies of ammunition, and decided that if Bragg should not attack before these arrived, that he himself would then resume offensive operations.

During the morning of January 1, 1863, the rebels made repeated attempts to advance on Thomas"s front in the centre, but were driven back before emerging from the woods. Crittenden was ordered to send Van Cleve"s division across the river, to occupy the position opposite the ford on his left, his right resting on high ground near the river and his left thrown forward perpendicular to it. The rebel right, under Polk, kept up a brisk skirmish fire on their front. Chalmer"s brigade was ordered to occupy the ground in front of the "Round Forest." Bragg, antic.i.p.ating an attack on his right under Breckinridge on the morning of the 1st, during the night ordered two brigades of that division to recross to the east side of the river. But none was made. About two o"clock in the afternoon the enemy showed signs of movement, by ma.s.sing large numbers of his troops on our right at the extremity of an open field a mile and a half from the Murfreesboro pike. Here the rebels formed in lines six deep, and pa.s.sed thus heavily, remained without advancing for over an hour. Gibson"s brigade and battery occupied the woods near Overall"s creek, while Negley"s was placed as support on McCook"s right. The evident design of Bragg during the day was simply to feel the lines of our army to find out if Rosecrans was retreating. Satisfied of this, he felt that while he could maintain his position he was not in condition to attack, after the heavy hammering his army had received the day before.

At daylight the next day Bragg gave orders to his corps commanders to feel our lines and ascertain Rosecrans"s position. Fire was opened from four batteries on the centre, and a demonstration of force was made by his infantry, followed by another on McCook; but at all points meeting with a heavy artillery fire, he concluded that our army still occupied the battle field in force. Bragg ordered Wharton"s and Pegram"s brigades of cavalry to cross to the right bank of Stone"s River immediately in Breckinridge"s front. Soon after this a number of his staff officers discovered for the first time that Van Cleve"s troops, sent over the day before, had quietly crossed unopposed, and had established themselves on and under cover of an eminence from which Polk"s line was commanded and enfiladed. It was an evident necessity either to withdraw Polk"s line or to dislodge Van Cleve"s. The first alternative was not to be entertained until the failure of an attempt to accomplish the latter. Polk was at once ordered to send over to Breckenridge the remaining brigades belonging to his division still with Polk, and Breckenridge, reporting to Bragg, received his orders. The attack was to be made with the four brigades of Breckinridge"s command, the cavalry protecting his right and co-operating with him. The crest of ground near the river, where Van Cleve"s division was in position, was the point against which the main attack was to be directed. This taken, Breckinridge was to bring up his artillery and establish it on the high ground, so as to enfilade our lines on the other side of the river. Polk was to open with a heavy fire on our left as Breckinridge commenced his advance. The signal for the attack was to be one gun from the centre, and four o"clock was the hour set for the firing of this gun.

Breckinridge drew up his division in two lines, the first in a narrow skirt of woods, the other some two hundred yards in rear. General Pillow, after the first day"s fighting, reporting for duty, was a.s.signed to the command of Palmer"s brigade. Pillow"s and Hanson"s brigades formed the first line, Preston"s and Adams"s brigades the second. The artillery was placed in rear of the second line, and in addition to that of his brigade, ten Napoleon guns-12-pounders-were sent to aid in the attack.

Van Cleve"s division was under the command of Colonel Samuel Beatty, with Price"s brigade on the right next to the river, Fyffe"s brigade on the left. Grider"s brigade formed Beatty"s support, while a brigade of Palmer"s division was placed in position on the extreme left to protect that flank. Drury"s battery was posted in the rear. In front of Breckinridge"s line was an open s.p.a.ce some six hundred and fifty yards in width, with a gentle ascent which it was necessary for his troops to cross before reaching our lines. Several hundred yards in the rear of the latter was the river, increasing the distance as it flowed beyond our left.

General Rosecrans had ordered Crittenden to send Beatty"s division across the river as protection to the troops on the left and centre, as from the high ground near the river the enemy, by an enfilading fire, could sweep these portions of our line. During the morning of the 2d Negley"s division was ordered from the right, and placed in position on the west bank of the river, in the rear of Beatty"s division, as reserves, being here on the left of Hazen"s and Cruft"s brigades of Palmer"s division.

As soon as Breckinridge"s command entered the open ground to his front, the artillery ma.s.sed on the west bank of the river by order of Crittenden, consisting of all the guns of the left wing, together with the batteries belonging to Negley"s division and Stoke"s battery, making 58 guns in position, opened a heavy, accurate, and destructive fire. Large numbers of the enemy fell before they reached Beatty"s infantry lines. Pressing forward without waiting to throw out a skirmish line, Breckinridge"s command swept onward, reckless of the artillery fire and that of the infantry, and struck Price"s and Grider"s brigades, broke their lines, drove them from their position on to their support in the rear, which also gave way, when the entire division retreated in broken ranks across the river, taking refuge behind the line of Negl

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