Man"s values control his subconscious emotional mechanism that functions like a computer adding up his desires, his experiences, his fulfillments and frustrations-like a sensitive guardian watching and constantly a.s.sessing his relationship to reality. The key question which this computer is programmed to answer, is: What is possible to me?...
Man"s emotional mechanism works as the barometer of the efficacy or impotence of his actions.
["Our Cultural Value-Deprivation," TO, April 1966, 3.]
[Objectivism rejects the Freudian) theory of a dynamic unconscious-i.e., the unconscious as a mystic ent.i.ty, with a will and purpose of its own unknown to the conscious mind, like an inborn demon that continually raises h.e.l.l. Strictly speaking, Objectivism does not subscribe to the idea of an unconscious at all. We use the term "subconscious" instead-and that is simply a name for the content of your mind that you are not focused on at any given moment. It is simply a repository for past information or conclusions that you were once conscious of in some form, but that are now stored beneath the threshold of consciousness. There is nothing in the subconscious besides what you acquired by conscious means. The subconscious does perform automatically certain important integrations (sometimes these are correct, sometimes not), but the conscious mind is always able to know what these are (and to correct them, if necessary). The subconscious has no purposes or values of its own, and it does not engage in diabolical manipulations behind the scenes. In that sense, it is certainly not "dynamic."
[Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture series (1976), question period, Lecture 12.]
See also AUTOMATIZATION; CONSCIOUSNESS; CONTEXT; EMOTIONS; FREE WILL; FREUD; INTEGRATION (MENTAL); INTROSPECTION; LOGIC; PHILOSOPHY; PSYCHO-EPISTEMOLO(;Y; "PSYCHOLOGIZING"; PSYCHOLOGY; SENSE of LIFE; VALUES.
Subject (in Art). Two distinct, but interrelated, elements of a work of art are the crucial means of projecting its sense of life: the subject and the style-what an artist chooses to present and how he presents it.
The subject of an art work expresses a view of man"s existence, while the style expresses a view of man"s consciousness. The subject reveals an artist"s metaphysics, the style reveals his psycho-epistemology.
The choice of subject declares what aspects of existence the artist regards as important-as worthy of being re-created and contemplated. He may choose to present heroic figures, as exponents of man"s nature -or he may choose statistical composites of the average, the undistinguished, the mediocre-or he may choose crawling specimens of depravity. He may present the triumph of heroes, in fact or in spirit (Victor Hugo), or their struggle (Michelangelo), or their defeat (Shakespeare). He may present the folks next door: next door to palaces (Tolstoy), or to drugstores (Sinclair Lewis), or to kitchens (Vermeer), or to sewers (Zola). He may present monsters as objects of moral denunciation (Dostoevsky), or as objects of terror (Goya)-or he may demand sympathy for his monsters, and thus crawl outside the limits of the realm of values, including esthetic ones.
Whatever the case may be, it is the subject (qualified by the theme) that projects an art work"s view of man"s place in the universe.
["Art and Sense of Life," RM, 50; pb 40.]
The subject is not the only attribute of art, but it is the fundamental one, it is the end to which all the others are the means. In most esthetic theories, however, the end-the subject-is omitted from consideration. and only the means are regarded as esthetically relevant. Such theories set up a false dic hotomy and claim that a slob portrayed by the technical means of a genius is preferable to a G.o.ddess portrayed by the technique of an amateur. I hold that both are esthetically offensive; but while the second is merely esthetic incompetence, the first is an esthetic crime.
There is no dichotomy, no necessary conflict between ends and means. The end does not justify the means-neither in ethics nor in esthetics. And neither do the means justify the end: there is no esthetic justification for the spectacle of Remhrandt"s great artistic skill employed to portray a side of beef.
That particular painting may be taken as a symbol of everything I am opposed to in art and in literature. At the age of seven, I could not understand why anyone would wish to paint or to admire pictures of dead fish, garbage cans or fat peasant women with triple chins. Today, I understand the psychological causes of such esthetic phenomena-and the more I understand, the more I oppose them.
In art. and in literature, the end and the means, or the subject and the style, must be worthy of each other.
That which is not worth contemplating in life, is not worth re-creating in art.
Misery, disease, disaster, evil, all the negatives of human existence, are proper subjects of study in life, for the purpose of understanding and correcting them-but are not proper subjects of contemplation for contemplation"s sake. In art, and in literature, these negatives are worth re-creating only in relation to some positive, as a foil, as a contrast, as a means of stressing the positive-but not as an end in themselves.
["The Goal of My Writing," RM, 166; pb 166.]
See also ART; LITERATURE; METAPHYSICS; PAINTING; PSYCHO EPISTEMOLOGY; SCULPTURE; SENSE OF LIFE; STYLE.
Subjectivism.
In Metaphysics and Epistemology Subjectivism is the belief that reality is not a firm absolute, but a fluid, plastic, indeterminate realm which can be altered, in whole or in part, by the consciousness of the perceiver-i.e., by his feelings, wishes or whims. It is the doctrine which holds that man-an ent.i.ty of a specific nature, dealing with a universe of a specific nature-can, somehow, live, act and achieve his goals apart from and/or in contradiction to the facts of reality, i.e., apart from and/or in contradiction to his own nature and the nature of the universe. (This is the "mixed," moderate or middle-of-the-road version of subjectivism. Pure or "extreme" subjectivism does not recognize the concept of ident.i.ty, i.e., the fact that man or the universe or anything possesses a specific nature.) ["Who Is the Final Authority in Ethics?" TON, Feb. 1965, 7.]
The subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional.
["Art and Moral Treason," RM, 148; pb 150.]
In metaphysics, "subjectivism" is the view that reality (the "object") is dependent on human consciousness (the "subject"). In epistemology, as a result, subjectivists hold that a man need not concern himself with the facts of reality; instead, to arrive at knowledge or truth, he need merely turn his attention inward, consulting the appropriate contents of consciousness, the ones with the power to make reality conform to their dictates. According to the most widespread form of subjectivism, the elements which possess this power are feelings.
In essence, subjectivism is the doctrine that feelings are the creator of facts, and therefore men"s primary tool of cognition. If men feel it, declares the subjectivist, that makes it so.
The alternative to subjectivism is the advocacy of objectivity-an att.i.tude which rests on the view that reality exists independent of human consciousness; that the role of the subject is not to create the object, but to perceive it; and that knowledge of reality can be acquired only by directing one"s attention outward to the facts.
[Leonard Peikoff, OP, 58; pb 62.]
The subjectivist denies that there is any such thing as "the truth" on a given question, the truth which corresponds to the facts. On his view, truth varies from consciousness to consciousness as the processes or contents of consciousness vary; the same statement may be true for one consciousness (or one type of consciousness) and false for another. The virtually infallible sign of the subjectivist is his refusal to say, of a statement he accepts: "It is true"; instead, he says: "It is true-for me (or for us)." There is no truth, only truth relative to an individual or a group -truth for me. for you, for him, for her, for us, for them.
[Leonard Peikoff, "n.a.z.ism and Subjectivism," TO, Jan. 1971,9.]
Your teachers, the mystics of both schools, have reversed causality in their consciousness, then strive to reverse it in existence. They take their emotions as a cause, and their mind as a pa.s.sive effect. They make their emotions their tool for perceiving reality. They hold their desires as an irreducible primary, as a fact superseding all facts. An honest man does not desire until he has identified the object of his desire. He says: "It is, therefore I want it." They say: "I want it, therefore it is."
They want to cheat the axiom of existence and consciousness, they want their consciousness to be an instrument not of perceiving but of creating existence, and existence to be not the object but the subject of their consciousness-they want to be that G.o.d they created in their image and likeness, who creates a universe out of a void by means of an arbitrary whim. But reality is not to be cheated. What they achieve is the opposite of their desire. They want an omnipotent power over existence ; instead, they lose the power of their consciousness. By refusing to know, they condemn themselves to the horror of a perpetual unknown.
[GS, FNI, 187; pb 150.]
There are two different kinds of subjectivism, distinguished by their answers to the question: whose consciousness creates reality? Kant rejected the older of these two, which was the view that each man"s feelings create a private universe for him. Instead, Kant ushered in the era of social subjectivism-the view that it is not the consciousness of individuals, but of groups, that creates reality. In Kant"s system, mankind as a whole is the decisive group; what creates the phenomenal world is not the idiosyncrasies of particular individuals, but the mental structure common to all men.
Later philosophers accepted Kant"s fundamental approach, but carried it a step further. If, many claimed, the mind"s structure is a brute given, which cannot be explained-as Kant had said-then there is no reason why all men should have the same mental structure. There is no reason why mankind should not be splintered into competing groups, each defined by its own distinctive type of consciousness, each vying with the others to capture and control reality.
The first world movement thus to pluralize the Kantian position was Marxism, which propounded a social subjectivism in terms of competing economic cla.s.ses. On this issue, as on many others, the n.a.z.is follow the Marxists, but subst.i.tute race for cla.s.s.
[Leonard Peikoff, OP, 59; ph 63.]
In Ethics Today, as in the past, most philosophers agree that the ultimate standard of ethics is whim (they call it "arbitrary postulate" or "subjective choice" or "emotional commitment")-and the battle is only over the question of whose whim: one"s own or society"s or the dictator"s or G.o.d"s. Whatever else they may disagree about, today"s moralists agree that ethics is a subjective issue and that the three things barred from its field are: reason-mind-reat.i.ty.
If you wonder why the world is now collapsing to a lower and ever lower rung of h.e.l.l, this is the reason.
If you want to save civilization, it is this premise of modern ethics-and of all ethical history-that you must challenge.
["The Objectivist Ethics," VOS, 4; pb 15.]
There are, in essence, three schools of thought on the nature of the good: the intrinsic, the subjective, and the objective.
["What Is Capitalism?" CUI, 21.]
The subjectivist theory holds that the good bears no relation to the facts of reality, that it is the product of a man"s consciousness, created by his feelings, desires, "intuitions," or whims, and that it is merely an "arbitrary postulate" or an "emotional commitment."
The intrinsic theory holds that the good resides in some sort of reality, independent of man"s consciousness; the subjectivist theory holds that the good resides in man"s consciousness, independent of reality.
[Ibid.]
Ethical subjectivism, which holds that a desire or a whim is an irreducible moral primary, that every man is ent.i.tled to any desire he might feel like a.s.serting, that all desires have equal moral validity, and that the only way men can get along together is by giving in to anything and "compromising" with anyone. It is not hard to see who would profit and who would lose by such a doctrine.
["Doesn"t Life Require Compromise?" VOS, 86; pb 69.]
The subjectivist theory of ethics is, strictly speaking, not a theory, but a negation of ethics. And more: it is a negation of reality, a negation not merely of man"s existence, but of all existence. Only the concept of a fluid, plastic, indeterminate, Herac.l.i.tean universe could permit anyone to think or to preach that man needs no objective principles of action-that reality gives him a blank check on values-that anything he cares to pick as the good or the evil, will do-that a man"s whim is a valid moral standard, and that the only question is how to get away with it. The existential monument to this theory is the present state of our culture.
[""The Objectivist Ethics," VOS, 34; ph 34.]
In Esthetics A work of art is a specific ent.i.ty which possesses a specific nature. If it does not, it is not a work of art. If it is merely a material object, it belongs to some category of material objects-and if it does not belong to any particular category, it belongs to the one reserved for such phenomena : junk.
"Something made by an artist" is not a definition of art. A heard and a vacant stare are not the defining characteristics of an artist.
"Something in a frame hung on a wall" is not a definition of painting.
"Something with a number of pages in a binding" is not a definition of literature.
"Something piled together" is not a definition of sculpture.
"Something made of sounds produced by anything" is not a definition of music.
"Something glued on a flat surface" is not a definition of any art. There is no art that uses glue as a medium. Blades of gra.s.s glued on a sheet of paper to represent gra.s.s might he good occupational therapy for r.e.t.a.r.ded children-though I doubt it-but it is not art.
"Because I felt like it" is not a definition or validation of anything.
There is no place for whim in any human activity-if it is to be regarded as human. There is no place for the unknowable, the unintelligible, the undefinable, the non-objective in any human product.
["Art and Cognition," RM. pb 78.]
See also AMORALISM; ANARCHISM; ARBITRARY; ART; AXIOMS; CAUSALITY; CONSCIOUSNESS; EXISTENCE; G.o.d; IDENt.i.tY; EMOTIONS; INTRINSIC THEORY of VALUES; KANT, IMMANUEL; "LIBERTARIANS"; MODERN ART; MORALITY; OBJECTIVE THEORY of VALUES; OBJECTIVISM; OBJECTIVITY; PRAGMATISM; PRIMACY of EXISTENCE vs. PRIMACY of CONSCIOUSNESS; PRIOR CERTAINTY of CONSCIOUSNESS; REASON; SKEPTICISM; WHIMS/WHIM-WORSHIP.
Subjectivism (Psychological). Do not confuse [amoralism] with psychological subjectivism. A psychological subjectivist is unable fully to identify his values or to prove their objective validity, but he may be profoundly consistent and loyal to them in practice (though with terrible psycho-epistemological difficulty). The amoralist does not hold subjective values; he does not hold any values.
["Selfishness Without a Self," PWNI, 57; pb 47.]
See also AMORALISM; PSYCHO-EPISTEMOLOGY; PSYCHOLOGY.
Suffering. Suffering as such is not a value; only man"s fight against suffering, is. If you choose to help a man who suffers, do it only on the ground of his virtues, of his fight to recover, of his rational record, or of the fact that he suffers unjustly; then your action is still a trade, and his virtue is the payment for your help. But to help a man who has no virtues, to help him on the ground of his suffering as such, to accept his faults, his need, as a claim-is to accept the mortgage of a zero on your values.
[GS, FNI, 226; pb 180.]
See also ALTRUISM; BENEVOLENT UNIVERSE PREMISE; COMPa.s.sION; EMOTIONS; HAPPINESS; MALEVOLENT UNIVERSE PREMISE; MERCY; PLEASURE and PAIN; VIRTUE.
Supernaturalism. What is meant by "the supernatural"? Supposedly, a realm that transcends nature. What is nature? Nature is existence -the sum of that which is. It is usually called "nature" when we think of it as a system of interconnected, interacting ent.i.ties governed by law. So "nature" really means the universe of ent.i.ties acting and interacting in accordance with their ident.i.ties. What, then, is "super-nature"? Something beyond the universe, beyond ent.i.ties, beyond ident.i.ty. It would have to be: a form of existence beyond existence-a kind of ent.i.ty beyond anything man knows about ent.i.ties-a something which contradicts everything man knows about the ident.i.ty of that which is. In short, a contradiction of every metaphysical essential.
[Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture series (1976), Lecture 2.]
They claim that they perceive a mode of being superior to your existence on this earth. The mystics of spirit call it "another dimension," which consists of denying dimensions. The mystics of muscle call it "the future," which consists of denying the present. To exist is to possess ident.i.ty. What ident.i.ty are they able to give to their superior realm? They keep telling you what it is not, but never tell you what it is. All their identifications consist of negating: G.o.d is that which no human mind can know, they say-and proceed to demand that you consider it knowledge-G.o.d is non-man, heaven is non-earth, soul is non-body, virtue is non-profit, A is non-A, perception is non-sensory, knowledge is non-reason. Their definitions are not acts of defining, but of wiping out.
[GS, FNI, 184; pb 148.]
There is no way to prove a "super-existence" by inference from existence ; supernaturalism can be accepted only on faith.
[Leonard Peikoff, "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture series (1976), Lecture 2.]
See also ATHEISM; CAUSALITY; DEFINITIONS; EXISTENCE; FAITH; G.o.d; IDENt.i.tY; METAPHYSICS; MIRACLES; MYSTICISM; NATURE; REASON.
T.
Tabula Rasa. Since man has no automatic knowledge, he can have no automatic values; since he has no innate ideas, he can have no innate value judgments.
Man is born with an emotional mechanism, just as he is born with a cognitive mechanism; but, at birth, both are "tabula rasa." It is man"s cognitive faculty, his mind, that determines the content of both.
["The Objectivist Ethics," VOS, 23; pb 28.]
At birth, a child"s mind is tabula rasa; he has the potential of awareness-the mechanism of a human consciousness-but no content. Speaking metaphorically, he has a camera with an extremely sensitive, unexposed film (his conscious mind), and an extremely complex computer waiting to be programmed (his subconscious). Both are blank. He knows nothing of the external world. He faces an immense chaos which he must learn to perceive by means of the complex mechanism which he must learn to operate.
If, in any two years of adult life, men could learn as much as an infant learns in his first two years, they would have the capacity of genius. To focus his eyes (which is not an innate, but an acquired skill), to perceive the things around him by integrating his sensations into percepts (which is not an innate, but an acquired skill), to coordinate his muscles for the task of crawling, then standing upright, then walking-and, ultimately, to grasp the process of concept-formation and learn to speak-these are some of an infant"s tasks and achievements whose magnitude is not equaled by most men in the rest of their lives.
[""The Comprachicos," NL, 190.]
No one is born with any kind of "talent" and, therefore, every skill has to be acquired. Writers are made, not born. To be exact, writers are self-made.
["Foreword," WTL, v.]
See also ARISTOTLE; CONSCIOUSNESS; HIERARCHY of KNOWLEDGE; "INSTINCT"; PERCEPTION; RATIONALISM vs. EMPIRICISM; VALUES.
Tactfulness. Do not confuse appeas.e.m.e.nt with tactfulness or generosity. Appeas.e.m.e.nt is not consideration for the feelings of others, it is consideration for and compliance with the unjust, irrational and evil feelings of others. It is a policy of exempting the emotions of others from moral judgment, and of willingness to sacrifice innocent, virtuous victims to the evil malice of such emotions.
Tactfulness is consideration extended only to rational feelings. A tactful man does not stress his success or happiness in the presence of those who have suffered failure, loss or unhappiness; not because he suspects them of envy, but because he realizes that the contrast can revive and sharpen their pain. He does not stress his virtues in anyone"s presence: he takes for granted that they are recognized.
["The Age of Envy," NL, 160.]
See also APPEAs.e.m.e.nT; COMPROMISE; JUSTICE.
Taxation. In a fully free society, taxation-or, to be exact, payment for governmental services-would be voLuntary. Since the proper services of a government-the police, the armed forces, the law courts-are demonstrably needed by individual citizens and affect their interests directly, the citizens would (and should) be willing to pay for such services, as they pay for insurance.
The question of how to implement the principle of voluntary government financing-how to determine the best means of applying it in practice-is a very complex one and belongs to the field of the philosophy of law. The task of political philosophy is only to establish the nature of the principle and to demonstrate that it is practicable. The choice of a specific method of implementation is more than premature today-since the principle will be practicable only in a fully free society, a society whose government has been const.i.tutionally reduced to its proper, basic functions.
["Government Financing in a Free Society," VOS, 157; pb 116.]
Any program of voluntary government financing has to be regarded as a goal for a distant future.
What the advocates of a fully free society have to know, at present, is only the principle by which that goal can be achieved.
The principle of voluntary government financing rests on the following premises: that the government is not the owner of the citizens" income and, therefore, cannot hold a blank check on that income-that the nature of the proper governmental services must be const.i.tutionally defined and delimited, leaving the government no power to enlarge the scope of its services at its own arbitrary discretion. Consequently, the principle of voluntary government financing regards the government as the servant, not the ruler, of the citizens-as an agent who must be paid for his services, not as a benefactor whose services are gratuitous, who dispenses something for nothing.
[Ibid., 160; pb 118.]
In view of what they hear from the experts, the people cannot be blamed for their ignorance and their helpless confusion. If an average housewife struggles with her incomprehensibly shrinking budget and sees a tyc.o.o.n in a resplendent limousine, she might well think that just one of his diamond cuff links would solve all her problems. She has no way of knowing that if all the personal luxuries of all the tyc.o.o.ns were expropriated, it would not feed her family-and millions of other, similar families-for one week; and that the entire country would starve on the first morning of the week to follow.... How would she know it, if all the voices she hears are telling her that we must soak the rich?
No one tells her that higher taxes imposed on the rich (and the semi-rich) will not come out of their consumption expenditures, but out of their investment capital (i.e., their savings); that such taxes will mean less investment, i.e., less production, fewer jobs, higher prices for scarcer goods; and that by the time the rich have to lower their standard of living, hers will be gone, along with her savings and her husband"s job-and no power in the world (no economic power) will be able to revive the dead industries (there will be no such power left).
["The Inverted Moral Priorities," ARL,, III, 21, 3.]
See also CAPITALISM; DEFICIT FINANCING; FREEDOM; GOVERN MENT; INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS; INFLATION; INVESTMENT; PHYSICAL FORCE; PROPERTY RIGHTS; "REDISTRIBUTION" of WEALTH; SAVINGS.
Technology. Technology is an applied science, i.e., it translates the discoveries of theoretical science into practical application to man"s life. As such, technology is not the first step in the development of a given body of knowledge, but the last; it is not the most difficult step, but it is the ultimate step, the implicit purpose, of man"s quest for knowledge.
["Apollo 11," TO, Sept. 1969, 9.]