And since knowledge is a n.o.ble perfection, and through the desire for it its perfection is not lost, as is the case with the accursed riches, we must note briefly how injurious they are when possessed, and this is the third notice of their imperfection. It is possible to see that the possession of them is injurious for two reasons: one, that it is the cause of evil; the other, that it is the privation of good. It is the cause of evil, which makes the timid possessor wakeful, watchful, and suspicious or hateful.
How great is the fear of that man who knows he carries wealth about him, when walking abroad, when dwelling at home, when not only wakeful or watching, but when sleeping, not only the fear that he may lose his property, but fear for his life because he possesses these riches!
Well do the miserable merchants know, who travel through the World, that the leaves which the wind stirs on the trees cause them to tremble when they are bearing their wealth with them; and when they are without it, full of confidence they go singing and talking, and thus make their journey shorter! Therefore the Wise Man says: "If the traveller enters on his road empty, he can sing in the presence of thieves." And this Lucan desires to express in the fifth book, when he praises the safety of poverty: "O, the safe and secure liberty of the poor Life! O, narrow dwelling-places and thrift! O, not again deem riches to be of the G.o.ds! In what temples and within what palace walls could this be, that is to have no fear, in some tumult or other, of striking the hand of Caesar?"
And Lucan says this when he depicts how Caesar came by night to the little house of the fisher Amyclas to cross the Adriatic Sea. And how great is the hatred that each man bears to the possessor of riches, either through envy, or from the desire to take possession of his wealth! So true it is, that often and often, contrary to due filial piety, the son meditates the death of the father; and most great and most evident experience of this the Italians can have, both on the banks of the Po and on the banks of the Tiber. And therefore Boethius in the second chapter of his Consolations says: "Certainly Avarice makes men hateful."
Nay, their possession is privation of good, for, possessing those riches, a man does not give freely with generosity, which is a virtue, which is a perfect good, and which makes men magnificent and beloved; which does not lie in possession of those riches, but in ceasing to possess them. Wherefore Boethius in the same book says: "Then money is good when, bartered for other things, by the use of generosity one no longer possesses it." Wherefore the baseness of riches is sufficiently proved by all these remarks of his; and therefore the man with an upright desire and true knowledge never loves them; and, not loving them, he does not unite himself to them, but always desires them to be far from himself, except inasmuch as they are appointed to some necessary service; and it is a reasonable thing, since the perfect cannot be united with the imperfect. So we see that the curved line never joins the straight line, and if there be any conjunction, it is not of line to line, but of point to point. And thus it follows that the Mind which is upright in desire, and truthful in knowledge, is not disheartened at the loss of wealth: as the text a.s.serts at the end of that part. And by this the text intends to prove that riches are as a river flowing in the distance past the upright tower of Reason, or rather of n.o.bility; and that these riches cannot take n.o.bility away from him who has it. And in this manner in the present Song it is argued against riches.
CHAPTER XIV.
Having confuted the error of other men in that part wherein it was advanced in support of riches, it remains now to confute it in that part where Time is said to be a cause of n.o.bility, saying, "Descent of wealth;" and this reproof or confutation is made in that part which begins: "They will not have the vile Turn n.o.ble." And in the first place one confutes this by means of an argument taken from those men themselves who err in this way; then, to their greater confusion, this their argument is also destroyed; and it does this when it says, "It follows then from this." Finally it concludes, their error being evident, and it being therefore time to attend to the Truth; and it does this when it says, "Sound intellect reproves."
I say, then, "They will not have the vile Turn n.o.ble." Where it is to be known that the opinion of these erroneous persons is, that a man who is a peasant in the first place can never possibly be called a n.o.bleman; and the man who is the son of a peasant in like manner can never be n.o.ble; and this breaks or destroys their own argument when they say that Time is requisite to n.o.bility, adding that word "descent." For it is impossible by process of Time to come to the generation of n.o.bility in this way of theirs, which declares it to be impossible for the humble peasant to become n.o.ble by any work that he may do, or through any accident; and declares the mutation of a peasant father into a n.o.ble son to be impossible. For if the son of the peasant is also a peasant, and his son again is also a peasant, and so always, it will never be possible to discover the place where n.o.bility can begin to be established by process of Time.
And if the adversary, wishing to defend himself, should say that n.o.bility will begin at that period of Time when the low estate of the ancestors will be forgotten, I reply that this goes against themselves, for even of necessity there will be a trans.m.u.tation of peasant into n.o.ble, from one man into another, or from father to son, which is against that which they propound.
And if the adversary should defend himself pertinaciously, saying that indeed they do desire that it should be possible for this trans.m.u.tation to take place when the low estate of the ancestors pa.s.ses into oblivion, although the text takes no notice of this, it is right that the Commentary should reply to it. And therefore I reply thus: that from this which they say there follow four very great difficulties, so that it cannot possibly be a good argument. One is, that in proportion as Human Nature might become better, the slower would be the generation of n.o.bility, which is a very great inconvenience; since in proportion as a thing is honoured for its excellence, so much the more is it the cause of goodness; and n.o.bility is reckoned amongst the good. What this means is shown thus: If n.o.bility, which I understand as a good thing, should be generated by oblivion, n.o.bility would be generated in proportion to the speediness with which men might be forgotten, for so much the sooner would oblivion descend upon all. Hence, in proportion as men might be forgotten, so much the sooner would they be n.o.ble; and, on the contrary, in proportion to the length of time during which they were held in remembrance, so much the longer it would be before they could be enn.o.bled.
The second difficulty is, that in nothing apart from men would it be possible to make this distinction, that is to say, n.o.ble or Vile, which is very inconvenient; since, in each species of things we see the image of n.o.bility or of Baseness, wherefore we often call one horse n.o.ble and one vile; and one falcon n.o.ble and one vile; and one pearl n.o.ble and one vile. And that it would not be possible to make this distinction is thus proved; if the oblivion of the humble ancestors is the cause of n.o.bility, or rather the baseness of the ancestors never was, it is not possible for oblivion of them to be, since oblivion is a destruction of remembrance, and in those other animals, and in plants, and in minerals, lowness and loftiness are not observed, since in one they are natural or innate and in an equal state, and n.o.bility cannot possibly be in their generation, and likewise neither can vileness nor baseness; since one regards the one and the other as habit and privation, which are possible to occur in the same subject; and therefore in them it would not be possible for a distinction to exist between the one and the other.
And if the adversary should wish to say, that in other things n.o.bility is represented by the goodness of the thing, but in a man it is understood because there is no remembrance of his humble or base condition, one would wish to reply not with words, but with the sword, to such b.e.s.t.i.a.lity as it would be to give to other things goodness as a cause for n.o.bility, and to found the n.o.bility of men upon forgetfulness or oblivion as a first cause.
The third difficulty is, that often the person or thing generated would come before the generator, which is quite impossible; and it is possible to prove this thus: Let us suppose that Gherardo da Cammino might have been the grandson of the most vile peasant who ever drank of the Sile or of the Cagnano, and that oblivion had not yet overtaken his grandfather; who will be bold enough to say that Gherardo da Cammino was a vile man? and who will not agree with me in saying that he was n.o.ble? Certainly no one, however presumptuous he may wish to be, for he was so, and his memory will always be treasured. If oblivion had not yet overtaken his ancestor, as is proposed in opposition, so that he might be great through n.o.bility, and the n.o.bility in him might be seen so clearly, even as one does see it, then it would have been first in him before the founder of his n.o.bility could have existed; and this is impossible in the extreme.
The fourth difficulty is, that such a man, the supposed grandfather, would have been held n.o.ble after he was dead who was not n.o.ble whilst alive; and a more inconvenient thing could not be. One proves it thus: Let us suppose that in the age of Darda.n.u.s there might be a remembrance of his low ancestors, and let us suppose that in the age of Laomedon this memory might have pa.s.sed away, and that oblivion had overtaken it. According to the adverse opinion, Laomedon was n.o.ble and Darda.n.u.s was vile, each in his lifetime. We, to whom the remembrance of the ancestors of Darda.n.u.s has not come, shall we say that Darda.n.u.s living was vile, and dead a n.o.ble? And is not this contrary to the legend which says that Darda.n.u.s was the son of Jupiter (for such is the fable, which one ought not to regard whilst disputing philosophically); and yet if the adversary might wish to find support in the fable, certainly that which the fable veils destroys his arguments. And thus it is proved that the argument, which a.s.serted that oblivion is the cause of n.o.bility, is false.
CHAPTER XV.
Since, by their own argument, the Song has confuted them, and proved that Time is not requisite to n.o.bility, it proceeds immediately to confound their premisses, since of their false arguments no rust remains in the mind which is disposed towards Truth; and this it does when it says, "It follows then from this." Where it is to be known that if it is not possible for a peasant to become a n.o.ble, or for a n.o.ble son to be born of a humble father, as is advanced in their opinion, of two difficulties one must follow.
The first is, that there can be no n.o.bility; the other is, that the World may have been always full of men, so that from one alone the Human Race cannot be descended; and this it is possible to prove.
If n.o.bility is not generated afresh, and it has been stated many times that such is the basis of their opinion, the peasant man not being able to beget it in himself, or the humble father to pa.s.s it on to his son, the man always is the same as he was born; and such as the father was born, so is the son born; and so this process from one condition onwards is reached even by the first parent; for such as was the first father, that is, Adam, so must the whole Human Race be, because from him to the modern nations it will not be possible to find, according to that argument, any change whatever. Then, if Adam himself was n.o.ble, we are all n.o.ble; if he was vile, we are all vile or base; which is no other than to remove the distinction between these conditions, and thus it is to remove the conditions.
And the Song states this, which follows from what is advanced, saying, "That all are high or base." And if this is not so, then any nation is to be called n.o.ble, and any is to be called vile, of necessity.
Trans.m.u.tation from vileness into n.o.bility being thus taken away, the Human Race must be descended from different ancestors, that is, some from n.o.bles and some from vile persons, and so the Song says, "Or that in Time there never was Beginning to our race," that is to say, one beginning; it does not say beginnings. And this is most false according to the Philosopher, according to our Faith, which cannot lie, according to the Law and ancient belief of the Gentiles. For although the Philosopher does not a.s.sert the succession from one first man, yet he would have one essential being to be in all men, which cannot possibly have different origins. And Plato would have that all men depend upon one idea alone, and not on more or many, which is to give them only one beginning. And undoubtedly Aristotle would laugh very loudly if he heard of two species to be made out of the Human Race, as of horses and a.s.ses; and (may Aristotle forgive me) one might call those men a.s.ses who think in this way. For according to our Faith (which is to be preserved in its entirety) it is most false, as Solomon makes evident where he draws a distinction between men and the brute animals, for he calls men "all the sons of Adam," and this he does when he says: "Who knows if the spirits of the sons of Adam mount upwards, and if those of the beasts go downwards?" And that it is false according to the Gentiles, let the testimony of Ovid in the first chapter of his Metamorphoses prove, where he treats of the const.i.tution of the World according to the Pagan belief, or rather belief of the Gentiles, saying: "Man is born "--he did not say "Men;"
he said, "Man is born," or rather, "that the Artificer of all things made him from Divine seed, or that the new earth, but lately parted from the n.o.ble ether, retained seeds of the kindred Heaven, which, mingled with the water of the river, formed the son of j.a.phet into an image of the G.o.ds, who govern all." Where evidently he a.s.serts the first man to have been one alone; and therefore the Song says, "But that I cannot hold," that is, to the opinion that man had not one beginning; and the Song subjoins, "Nor yet if Christians they." And it says Christians, not Philosophers, or rather Gentiles, whose opinion also is adverse, because the Christian opinion is of greater force, and is the destroyer of all calumny, thanks to the supreme light of Heaven, which illuminates it.
Then when I say, "Sound intellect reproves their words As false, and turns away," I conclude this error to be confuted, and I say that it is time to open the eyes to the Truth; and this is expressed when I say, "And now I seek to tell, As it appears to me." It is now evident to sound minds that the words of those men are vain, that is, without a crumb or particle of Truth; and I say sound not without cause. Our intellect may be said to be sound or unsound. And I say intellect for the n.o.ble part of our Soul, which it is possible to designate by the common word "Mind." It may be called sound or healthy, when it is not obstructed in its action by sickness of mind or body, which is to know what things are, as Aristotle expresses it in the third chapter on the Soul.
For, owing to the sickness of the Soul, I have seen three horrible infirmities in the minds of men.
One is caused by natural vanity, for many men are so presumptuous that they believe they know everything, and, owing to this, they a.s.sert things to be facts which are not facts. Tullius especially execrates this vice in the first chapter of the Offices, and St. Thomas in his book against the Gentiles, saying: "There are many men, so presumptuous in their conceit, who believe that they can compa.s.s all things with their intellect, deeming all that appears to them to be true, and count as false that which does not appear to them." Hence it arises that they never attain to any knowledge; believing themselves to be sufficiently learned, they never inquire, they never listen; they desire to be inquired of, and when a question is put, bad enough is their reply. Of those men Solomon speaks in Proverbs: "Seest thou a man that is hasty in his words? there is more hope of a fool than of him."
Another infirmity of mind is caused by natural weakness or smallness, for many men are so vilely obstinate or stubborn that they cannot believe that it is possible either for them or for others to know things; and such men as these never of themselves seek knowledge, nor ever reason; for what other men say, they care not at all. And against these men Aristotle speaks in the first book of the Ethics, declaring those men to be insufficient or unsatisfactory hearers of Moral Philosophy. Those men always live, like beasts, a life of grossness, the despair of all learning.
The third infirmity of mind is caused by the levity of nature; for many men are of such light fancy that in all their arguments they go astray, and even when they make a syllogism and have concluded, from that conclusion they fly off into another, and it seems to them most subtle argument. They start not from any true beginning, and truly they see nothing true in their imagination. Of those men the Philosopher says that it is not right to trouble about them, or to have business with them, saying, in the first book of Physics, that against him who denies the first postulate it is not right to dispute.
And of such men as these are many idiots, who may not know their A B C, and who would wish to dispute in Geometry, in Astrology, and in the Science of Physics.
Also through sickness or defect of body, it is possible for the Mind to be unsound or sick; even as through some primal defect at birth, as with those who are born fools, or through alteration in the brain, as with the madmen. And of this mental infirmity the Law speaks when it says: "In him who makes a Will or Testament, at the time when he makes the Will or Testament, health of mind, not health of body, is required."
But to those intellects which from sickness of mind or body are not infirm, but are free, diligent, and whole in the light of Truth, I say it must be evident that the opinion of the people, which has been stated above, is vain, that is, without any value whatever, worthless.
Afterwards the Song subjoins that I thus judge them to be false and vain; and this it does when it says, "Sound intellect reproves their words As false, and turns away." And afterwards I say that it is time to demonstrate or prove the Truth; and I say that it is now right to state what kind of thing true n.o.bility is, and how it is possible to know the man in whom it exists; and I speak of this where I say:
And now I seek to tell As it appears to me, What is, whence comes, what signs attest A true n.o.bility.
CHAPTER XVI.
"The King shall rejoice in G.o.d, and all those shall be praised who swear by him, for closed is the mouth of those who speak wicked things." These words I can here propound in all truth; because each true King ought especially to love the Truth. Wherefore it is written in the Book of Wisdom, "Love the Light of Wisdom, you, who stand before, the people," and the Light of Wisdom is this same Truth. I say, then, every King shall rejoice that the most false and most injurious opinion of the wicked and deceitful men who have up to this time spoken iniquitously of n.o.bility is confuted.
It is now requisite to proceed to the discussion of the Truth according to the division made above, in the third chapter of the present treatise. This second part, then, which begins, "I say that from one root Each Virtue firstly springs," intends to describe this n.o.bility according to the Truth, and this part is divided into two: for in the first the intention is to prove what this n.o.bility is; and in the second how it is possible to recognize him in whom it dwells, and this second part begins, "Such virtue shows its good." The first part, again, has two parts; for in the first certain things are sought for which are needful in order to perceive the definition of n.o.bility; in the second, one looks for its definition, and this second part begins, "Where virtue is, there is A n.o.bleman."
That we may enter perfectly into the treatise, two things are to be considered in the first place. The one is, what is meant by this word n.o.bility, taken alone, in its simple meaning; the other is, in what path it is needful to walk in order to search out the before-named definition. I say, then, that, if we will pay attention to the common use of speech, by this word n.o.bility is understood the perfection of its own nature in each thing; wherefore it is predicated not only of the man, but also of all things; for the man calls a stone n.o.ble, a plant or tree n.o.ble, a horse n.o.ble, a falcon n.o.ble, whatever is seen to be perfect in its nature. And therefore Solomon says in Ecclesiastes, "Blessed is the land whose King is n.o.ble;" which is no other than saying, whose King is perfect according to the perfection of the mind and body; and he thus makes this evident by that which he says previously, when he writes, "Woe unto the land whose King is a child." For that is not a perfect man, and a man is a child, if not by age, yet by his disordered manners and by the evil or defect of his life, as the Philosopher teaches in the first book of the Ethics.
There are some foolish people who believe that by this word n.o.ble is meant that which is to be named and known by many men; and they say that it comes from a verb which stands for _to know_, that is, _nosco_. But this is most false, for, if this could be, those things which were most named and best known in their species would in their species be the most n.o.ble. Thus the obelisk of St. Peter would be the most n.o.ble stone in the world; and Asdente, the shoemaker of Parma, would be more n.o.ble than any one of his fellow-citizens; and Albuino della Scala would be more n.o.ble than Guido da Castello di Reggio. Each one of those things is most false, and therefore it is most false that _n.o.bile_ (n.o.ble) can come from _cognoscere_, to know. It comes from _non vile_ (not vile); wherefore _n.o.bile_ (n.o.ble) is as it were _non vile_ (not vile).
This perfection the Philosopher means in the seventh chapter of Physics, when he says: "Each thing is especially perfect when it touches and joins its own proper or relative virtue; and then it is especially perfect according to its nature. It is, then, possible to call the circle perfect when it is truly a circle, that is, when it is joined with its own proper or relative virtue, it is then complete in its nature, and it may then be called a n.o.ble circle." This is when there is a point in it which is equally distant from the circ.u.mference. That circle which has the figure of an egg loses its virtue and it is not n.o.ble, nor that circle which has the form of an almost full moon, because in that its nature is not perfect. And thus evidently it is possible to see that commonly, or in a general sense, this word n.o.bility, expresses in all things perfection of their nature, and this is that for which one seeks primarily in order to enter more clearly into the discussion of that part which it is intended to explain.
Secondly, it remains to be seen how one must proceed in order to find the definition of Human n.o.bility to which the present argument leads.
I say, then, that since in those things which are of one species, as are all men, it is not possible by essential first principles to define their highest perfection, it is necessary to know and to define that by their effects. Therefore one reads in the Gospel of St.
Matthew, when Christ speaks, "Beware of false prophets: by their fruits ye shall know them." And in a direct way the definition we seek is to be seen by the fruits, which are the moral and intellectual virtues of which this n.o.bility is the seed, as in its definition will be fully evident.
And these are those two things we must see before one can proceed to the others, as is said in the previous part of this chapter.
CHAPTER XVII.
Since those two things which it seemed needful to understand before the text could be proceeded with have been seen and understood, it now remains to proceed with the text and to explain it, and the text then begins:
I say that from one root Each Virtue firstly springs, Virtue, I mean, that Happiness To man, by action, brings
And I subjoin: