Suppose the Sixteenth Corps, with less than 5,000 men, seeing at least three times their number in their front, should have retreated, instead of standing and fighting as it did: What would have been the result? I say that in all my experience in life, until the two forces struck and the Sixteenth Corps stood firm, I never pa.s.sed more anxious moments.
Sprague"s Brigade, of the same corps, was engaged at the same time within hearing, but on a different field,--at Decatur,--fighting and stubbornly holding that place, knowing that if he failed the trains ma.s.sed there and _en route_ from Roswell would be captured. His fight was a gallant and sometimes seemingly almost hopeless one--giving ground inch by inch, until, finally, he obtained a position that he could not be driven from, and one that protected the entire trains of the Army.
As Hardee"s attack fell upon the Sixteenth Army Corps, his left Division (Cleburn"s) lapped over and beyond Blair"s left, and swung around his left front; they poured down through the gap between the left of the Seventeenth and the right of the Sixteenth Corps, taking Blair in front, flank, and rear. Cheatham"s Corps moved out of Atlanta and attacked in Blair"s front. General Giles A. Smith commanded Blair"s left Division, his right connecting with Leggett at Bald Hill, where Leggett"s Division held the line until they connected with the Fifteenth Corps, and along this front the battle raged with great fury.
As Cleburn advanced along the open s.p.a.ce between the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps they cut off from Blair"s left and captured a portion of two Regiments of his command, and forced the Seventeenth Corps to form new lines, utilizing the old intrenchments thrown up by the enemy, fighting first on one side and then on the other, as the attack would come from Hardee in the rear or Cheatham in the front, until about 3:30 p. m., when, evidently after a lull, an extraordinary effort was made by the rebels to wipe out Giles A. Smith"s Division and capture Leggett"s Hill, the enemy approaching under cover of the woods until they were within fifty yards of Smith"s temporary position, when they pressed forward until the fight became a hand-to-hand conflict across the trenches occupied by Smith, the troops using bayonet freely and the officers their swords. This attack failed; it was no doubt timed to occur at the same time that Cheatham"s Corps attacked from the Atlanta front, which Leggett met. The brunt of Cheatham"s attack was against Leggett"s Hill, the key to the position of that portion of the Army of the Tennessee. General Giles A. Smith"s Division had to give up the works they occupied and fall into line at right angles with Leggett"s Division, Leggett"s Hill being the apex of the formation; and around this position for three-quarters of an hour more desperate fighting was done that I can describe. Up to midnight the enemy occupied one side of the works while we occupied the other, neither side giving way until Hood saw that the whole attack was a failure, when those who were on the outside of the works finally surrendered to us. Their attack at this angle was a determined and resolute one, advancing up to our breastworks on the crest of the hill, planting their flag side by side with ours, and fighting hand to hand until it grew so dark that nothing could be seen but the flash of guns from the opposite sides of the works.
The ground covered by these attacks was literally strewn with the dead of both sides. The loss of Blair"s Corps was 1,801 killed, wounded, and missing. Blair"s left struck in the rear flank, and the front gave way slowly, gradually, fighting for every inch of ground, until their left was opposite the right flank of the Sixteenth Corps; then they halted, and held the enemy, refusing to give another inch.
It would be difficult in all the annals of war to find a parallel to the fighting of the Seventeenth Corps; first from one side of its works and then from the other, one incident of which was that of Colonel Belknap, of the Union side, who, reaching over the works, seized the Colonel of the Forty-fifth Alabama, and, drawing him over the breastworks, made him a prisoner of war.
About 4 p. m. Cheatham"s Corps was ordered by Hood to again attack; they directed their a.s.sault this time to the front of the Fifteenth Corps, using the Decatur wagon-road and railway as a guide, and came forward in solid ma.s.ses, meeting no success until they slipped through to the rear of the Fifteenth Corps by a deep cut used by the railway pa.s.sing through our intrenchments.
As soon as they reached our rear, Lightburn"s Division of the Fifteenth Corps became partially panic-stricken, and fell back, giving up the intrenchments for the whole front of this Division, the enemy capturing the celebrated Degress Battery of 20-pounders and two guns in advance of our lines. The officers of Lightburn"s Division rallied it in the line of intrenchments, just in the rear of the position they had in the morning.
General Logan was then in command of the Army of the Tennessee. He rode over to my position, and I sent Mersey"s Brigade of the Second Division, under the guidance of Major Edward Jonas, my Aide-de-camp, to the aid of the Fifteenth Corps. Of the performance of that Brigade on that occasion, I quote the words of that staff officer, Major Jonas:
I conducted Mersey"s Brigade to the point where needed; arrived at the railroad, he at once deployed and charged, all men of the Fifteenth Corps at hand joining with him. Mersey"s Brigade recaptured the works and the guns. Old Colonel Mersey was slightly wounded, and his celebrated horse, "Billy," killed. By your direction I said to General Morgan L. Smith (temporarily in command of the Fifteenth Corps): "General Dodge requests that you return this Brigade at the earliest practicable moment, as there is every indication of renewed a.s.sault on our own line," and, after saying that your request would be respected, General Smith added: "Tell General Dodge that his Brigade (Mersey"s) has done magnificently, and that it shall have full credit in my report."
Afterwards one of Mersey"s officers--Captain Boyd, I think--in trying his skill as an artillerist, cracked one of the recaptured guns. At the same moment of Mersey"s attack in front, General Wood"s Division of the Fifteenth Army Corps, under the eye of General Sherman, attacked the Confederates occupying our intrenchments in flank, and Williamson"s Brigade joined Mersey"s in recapturing our line and the batteries--the Fourth Iowa Infantry taking a conspicuous part.
Colonel Mersey and many of his men whom he so gallantly led had served their time before this battle occurred, and were awaiting transportation home. Eloquent words have been written and spoken all over the land in behalf of the honor and the bravery of the soldier; but where is the word spoken or written that can say more for the soldier than the action of these men on that field? They were out of service; they had written that they were coming home, and their eyes and hearts were toward the North.
Many an anxious eye was looking for the boy who voluntarily laid down his life that day, and many a devoted father, mother or sister has had untold trouble to obtain recognition in the War Department because the soldier"s time had expired. He was mustered out; waiting to go home; and was not known on the records; but on that day he fought on three different parts of the field, without a thought except for his cause and his country.
The continuous attacks of Cheatham made no other impression on the line.
Our men were behind the intrenchments and the slaughter of the enemy was something fearful. General J. C. Brown, who commanded the Confederate Division that broke through our line, told me that after breaking through it was impossible to force his men forward; the fire on their flanks and front was so terrific that when driven out of the works one-half of his command was killed, wounded, or missing. The Confederate records sustain this, and it is a wonder that they could force their line so often up to within 100 to 300 feet of us, where our fire would drive them back in spite of the efforts of their officers, a great many of whom fell in these attacks.
I could see the terrific fighting at Leggett"s Hill, but of that along the line of the Fifteenth Corps I can only speak from the records and as told me by General John C. Brown, of the Confederate Army. The stubbornness and coolness with which they contested every inch of the ground won his admiration, and the manner and method with which the line was retaken must have been seen to be appreciated.
When darkness fell upon us the enemy had retired, except around the angle in the Seventeenth Corps, known as Leggett"s or Bald Hill. Here there was a continuous fire, desultory and at close quarters, the enemy in places occupying ground close up to our intrenchments. To relieve these men of the Seventeenth Army Corps holding this angle, who were worn out, at the request of General Blair I sent two Regiments of Mersey"s Brigade. They crawled in on their hands and knees, and swept the enemy from that front.
The whole of Hood"s Army, except Stewart"s Corps, was thrown into our rear, upon the flank and the front of the Army of the Tennessee, and after fighting from mid-day until dark were repulsed and driven back. That Army held or commanded the entire battle-field, demonstrating the fact that the Army of the Tennessee alone was able and competent to meet and defeat Hood"s entire Army. The battle fell almost entirely upon the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps and two Divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, three Brigades of the Sixteenth being absent. The attack of the enemy was made along this line some seven times, and they were seven times repulsed.
We captured eighteen stands of colors, 5,000 stands of arms, and 2,017 prisoners. We lost in killed and wounded 3,521 men and ten pieces of artillery, and over 1,800 men, mostly from Blair"s Corps, were taken prisoners. The enemy"s dead reported as buried in front of the different Corps was over 2,000, and the enemy"s total loss in killed, wounded and prisoners was 8,000.
The criticism has often been made of this battle that with two Armies idle that day, one the Army of the Ohio (two-thirds as large as the Army of the Tennessee) and the other the Army of the c.u.mberland (the largest of all Sherman"s Armies), why we did not enter Atlanta. General Sherman urged Thomas to make the attack; Thomas"s answer was that the enemy were in full force behind his intrenchments. The fact was that Stewart"s Corps was guarding that front, but General Schofield urged Sherman to allow him to throw his Army upon Cheatham"s flank, in an endeavor to roll up the Confederate line and so interpose between Atlanta and Cheatham"s Corps, which was so persistently attacking the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps from the Atlanta front. Sherman, whose anxiety had been very great, seeing how successfully we were meeting the attack, his face relaxing into a pleasant smile, said to Schofield, "Let the Army of the Tennessee fight it out this time." This flank attack of Schofield on Cheatham would have no doubt cleared our front facing the Atlanta intrenchments, but Stewart was ready with his three Divisions and the Militia to hold them.
General Sherman, in speaking of this battle, always regretted that he did not allow Schofield to attack as he suggested, and also force the fighting on Thomas"s front; but no doubt the loss of McPherson really took his attention from everything except the Army of the Tennessee.
At about 10 o"clock on the night of the 22d, the three Corps commanders of the Army of the Tennessee (one of them in command of the Army) met in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, on the line of the Decatur road, under an oak tree, and there discussed the results of the day. Blair"s men were at the time in the trenches; in some places the enemy held one side and they the other. The men of the Fifteenth Corps were still in their own line, but tired and hungry, and those of the Sixteenth were, after their hard day"s fight, busy throwing up intrenchments on the field they had held and won.
It was thought that the Army of the c.u.mberland and the Army of the Ohio, which had not been engaged that day, should send a force to relieve Blair, and Dodge, being the junior Corps commander, was dispatched by General Logan, at the requests of Generals Logan and Blair, to see General Sherman. My impression is that I met him in a tent; I have heard it said that he had his headquarters in a house. When I met him he seemed rather surprised to see me, but greeted me cordially, and spoke of the loss of McPherson. I stated to him my errand. He turned upon me and said, "Dodge, you whipped them today, didn"t you?" I said, "Yes, sir." Then he said: "Can"t you do it again tomorrow?" and I said, "Yes, sir"; bade him good-night, and went back to my command, determined never to go upon another such errand. As he explained it afterward, he wanted it said that the little Army of the Tennessee had fought the great battle that day, needing no help, no aid, and that it could be said that all alone it had whipped the whole of Hood"s Army. Therefore, he let us hold our position and our line, knowing that Hood would not dare attack us after the "thrashing" he had already received. When we consider that in this, the greatest battle of the campaign, the little Army of the Tennessee met the entire rebel Army, secretly thrust to its rear, on its flank, and upon its advance center, with its idolized commander killed in the first shock of battle, and at nightfall found the enemy"s dead and wounded on its front, we see that no disaster--no temporary rebuff--could discourage this Army.
Every man was at his post; every man doing a hero"s duty. They proved they might be wiped out but never made to run. They were invincible.
Companions, regarding so great a battle, against such odds, with such loss, the question has often been asked me--and I know it has come to the mind of all of us--why it was that this battle was never put forth ahead of many others inferior to it, but better known to the world and causing much greater comment?
The answer comes to all of us. It is apparent to us today, as it was that night. We had lost our best friend,--that superb soldier, our commander, General McPherson; his death counted so much more to us than victory that we spoke of our battle, our great success, with our loss uppermost in our minds.
[Ill.u.s.tration: MONUMENT ERECTED ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF ATLANTA
This monument was erected by the Society of the Army of the Tennessee on the spot where Major-General James B. McPherson was killed, July 22, 1864.]
LETTER TO GENERAL RAUM
CORRECTING SOME STATEMENTS IN GENERAL GREEN B. RAUM"S DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE OF ATLANTA PUBLISHED IN THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE, WASHINGTON, D. C.
SEPTEMBER 25, 1902
_My Dear General_:
Referring to my conversation with you in Washington, I will endeavor to aid you in getting at the actual facts connected with the Battle of Atlanta, as it has never yet been properly written up.
I delivered an address on September 25th, 1889, to the Army of the Tennessee on that battle, copy of which I am sending to you, and from which I think you can get a good deal of information.
I first want to call your attention to the fact that the battle commenced about fifteen minutes after 12 o"clock, and that the Sixteenth Army Corps fought a long time before the Seventeenth Corps was attacked. You can verify this statement by reading General Strong"s account of the battle, which is given in our Army of the Tennessee records, volume 11 to 13, page 242.
It was just 12 o"clock exactly when I reached Fuller"s headquarters.
Having gone to the front to select my position, Fuller asked me to stop and take luncheon, and I got down from my horse and went into his tent. I had sat down at the table when I heard skirmish firing in the rear. Fuller said it was a lot of the boys out there killing hogs. The stillness had been oppressive as we went clear to the left and front of Blair"s line to select my new position. We inquired from the pickets and found that n.o.body had seen anything of the enemy. It made an impression on us all; so the moment I heard this firing I jumped up, as if by instinct, and told Fuller to get into line, and sent a staff officer towards Sweeney; but before he hardly got out of the tent Sweeney was in line and fighting, so you can see how sudden the attack was.
In volume 11 to 13 of the Army of the Tennessee records, page 243, Strong, in his address on the Battle of Atlanta, has this to say fixing the time of the commencement of the battle, speaking of the time when an officer was sent with an order to me from McPherson:
The officer had hardly disappeared from sight, when a shot was heard to the left and rear of us, then another, followed quickly by a rattling volley of small arms, and at almost the same instant a sh.e.l.l came crashing through the tree-tops near us, followed by a rapid and incessant firing from Dodge"s Corps. At the first shots every officer sprang to his feet and called for his horse. The time, I should think, was ten or fifteen minutes past 12 o"clock.
Then after speaking of the fighting of this Division, comes this, on page 243:
After the _two_ attempts to break the Sixteenth Corps had failed, General McPherson sent me to General Blair to ascertain the condition of affairs along his line, and instructed me to say to General Giles A. Smith to hold his position; that he would order up troops to occupy the gap between the Seventeenth and Sixteenth Corps; and also saying as I left him that he would remain with his orderly where he then was (a commanding position on Dodge"s right) until I returned. I rode rapidly through the woods towards the Seventeenth Corps and found General Blair with General Giles A. Smith near the extreme left of the Fourth Division (Hall"s Brigade).
This conclusively shows that Blair was not attacked until after two attacks had been made upon me, although Hall"s report gives the attack upon Blair as at 12 o"clock, that time being before the Sixteenth Corps was attacked. Fuller gives the time of attack upon him as 12:30. By reading all of page 243 you will get a full and clear idea of time and everything. The time was also taken by my staff and record made of it, and that agrees with Strong. This only shows how far apart officers can get as to time in a great battle, and on many things, unless correct data is made of record on the spot.
On page 484, of volume 14 to 16 of Society of the Army of the Tennessee records, General Leggett says:
Both divisions of the Sixteenth Army Corps immediately became hotly engaged.... Just at this time I espied General McPherson upon the high ground in the immediate rear of General Fuller"s command, and sent Captain John B. Raymond of my staff to inquire of General McPherson the expediency of having General Giles A. Smith and myself change our line so as to face south, and at the same time I sent Captain George W. Porter to ascertain whether or not the left of General Smith and the right of General Fuller were sufficiently near together to antagonize any force seeking entrance there.... The enemy in front of the Sixteenth Corps rallied in the woods (this is after the first attack) and renewed their attack with increased vigor and bitterness.... The conflict continued for some time, with no appearance on either side of any disposition to yield the ground, when the enemy gave way, and fell back in confusion, followed by the Sixteenth Corps.... The second a.s.sault (upon the Sixteenth Corps) was simultaneous with the attack upon General Giles A. Smith"s Division, which was the left of the Seventeenth Corps.
You will note from my address that the moment I was attacked I sent an aide, and afterwards a signal officer named Sheffly (I think), who was detailed with me that day, or happened to be with me. These officers had gone to General Giles A. Smith, who commanded Blair"s left, Fourth Division, Seventeenth Corps, to get him to refuse his left and join my right. I think the first officer I sent was Captain Jonas of my staff, who returned immediately to me, and General Giles A. Smith sent me word that he would refuse. That was a long time before Cleburn"s Division got between us; but, as my paper and your article show, McPherson had sent word to Giles A. Smith without knowing the condition in his front, to hold his position, stating that he would send reinforcements to fill the gap between Fuller and himself. Of course, had McPherson been there earlier and seen what I saw, he would have had Smith"s left join my right immediately, which would have put Cleburn in front of us instead of between us. That is one of the things that occur in battle that the person on the ground knows better than the one distant. It was on the third attack on my line that the enemy struck Blair, as Strong did not go to Blair until after the repulse of the second attack. Cleburn"s force got right in behind Blair"s left and picked up that portion of his line that was refused, and swept back his force so that Blair"s left, even before Waglin of the Fifteenth Corps got there, was pretty nearly an extension of but a quarter of a mile away from Fuller"s right, and after I got through fighting I had to withdraw my entire right quite a distance to connect with Waglin and Blair, as Cleburn"s force had pressed clear beyond me and before he was halted was way in the rear of my right.
After the second attack, Cleburn, as he pressed through the gap between Fuller and Smith, forced Fuller to change front and use part of his force to protect his flank, and the Sixty-fourth Illinois in this movement captured the skirmish-line that killed McPherson, taking from them his field-gla.s.s, orders, and other papers that they had taken from McPherson"s body; and later in the day I sent these to General Sherman. See report Sixty-fourth Illinois, volume 38, part 3, War Records, page 494. Fuller"s maps, page 480, volume 38, part 3, War Records, show where Fuller fought, and where we had to intrench.
Where I stood in my line I could see the entire Confederate force, and all of my own, something that very seldom occurs, and, of course, the scene, as Blair states, was a magnificent one. I saw Fuller do a most gallant act. I sent an aide to him with instructions to charge, but before he got there Walker"s division broke the center of Fuller"s Brigade, his own regiment, the Twenty-seventh Ohio, falling back. I saw Fuller get down off his horse, grab the colors of the Twenty-seventh, rush to the front with them in his hands, and call upon his regiment to come to the colors; and they rallied and saved his front. It was but a moment later that I saw Walker, who commanded the division that was attacking Fuller, fall from his horse, and the division broke and went into the woods. The action of Fuller was very gallant, and has been painted, and I have a copy of the painting in my room.
Blair in his report has this to say of the fighting, which shows that he watched us a long time before he was attacked; and if you will read his report carefully, you will see that it bears out my statements in full:
I started to go back to my command and witnessed the fearful a.s.sault made on the Sixteenth Army Corps, and its prompt and gallant repulse by that command. It was a most fortunate circ.u.mstance for the whole army that the Sixteenth Army Corps occupied the position I have attempted to describe at the moment of attack, and although it does not belong to me to report upon the bearing and conduct of the officers and men of that Corps, still I cannot withhold my expression of admiration for the manner in which this command met and repulsed the repeated and persistent attacks of the enemy. The attack upon our flank was made by the whole of Hardee"s Corps.
I speak in my address of Mercer"s Brigade fighting on three parts of the field. Mercer, after helping to retake the Decatur-road line, camped right in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, and did not come back to me. When Logan, Blair and myself met that evening, Blair asked Logan for some help to go up to relieve troops at Bald Hill. Logan, seeing Mercer"s Brigade there, ordered me to send it up. They went up there and crawled in and relieved the men on Bald Hill. This was very late in the night, and even then fresh men coming in drove out or captured what men there were still lying on the enemy"s side of the intrenchments. Mercer never made a report of this battle. You will see by my paper that he was virtually out of the service, awaiting transportation home; but he went in with his regiment the same as though they were still in the service. He was a German, and I do not suppose he knew the importance of reporting; and as it was only a short time later that I had to leave that army, I therefore did not follow it up, and I find no report of Mercer or of the Ninth Illinois; but I think the regimental reports of the Eighty-first Ohio give all these facts. See War Records, volume 38, part 3, page 463, and report Second Brigade, Second Division Sixteenth Army Corps, volume 38, part 3, page 450.
In my address I did not go much into detail, but I have all the data of this battle compiled, and intend some day to put it in shape; but I give you enough so you can, after examining the reports of Blair and the others, make your article historically correct. Most of it is correct and well-stated, but I know you want to get the dates and movements at the left on such an occasion so full that they will stand criticism, as the Battle of Atlanta was the great battle of that campaign.