"One man killed a rebel by striking him with the b.u.t.t of his gun, which he broke; but, being unwilling to stop his work, he loaded and fired three times before he could get a better gun; the first time not being cautious, the rebound of his gun badly cut his lip.
"When the troops were in the ditch, three rebels came to one man, and ordered him to surrender. His gun being loaded, he shot one and bayoneted another; and, forgetting he could bayonet the third, he turned the b.u.t.t of his gun, and knocked him down."
General Sturgis was severely criticised by the press immediately after the affair. Historians since the war have followed up these criticisms.
He has been accused of incompetency, rashness and drunkenness, none of which it is the purpose of this volume to endorse. Possibly his reports furnish a sufficient explanation for the disaster, which it is hoped they do, inasmuch as he is not charged with either treason or cowardice.
[_General Sturgis" Report, No. 1._]
"HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, COLLIERSVILLE, TENN., June 12, 1864.
"GENERAL:--I have the honor to report that we met the enemy in position and in heavy force about 10 A. M. on the 10th instant at Brice"s Cross-Roads on the Ripley and Fulton road and about six miles northwest of Guntown, Miss. A severe battle ensued which lasted until about 4 P. M., when I regret to say my lines were compelled to give way before the overwhelming numbers by which they were a.s.sailed at every point. To fall back at this point was more than ordinarily difficult as there was a narrow valley in our rear through which ran a small creek crossed by a single narrow bridge.
The road was almost impa.s.sable by reason of the heavy rains which had fallen for the previous ten days and the consequence was that the road soon became jammed by the artillery and ordnance wagons. This gradually led to confusion and disorder.
"In a few minutes, however, I succeeded in establishing two colored regiments in line of battle in a wood on this side of the little valley. These troops stood their ground well and checked the enemy for a time. The check, however, was only temporary and this line in turn gave way. My troops were seized with a panic and became absolutely uncontrollable. One and a half miles in rear by dint of great exertion and with pistol in hand, I again succeeded in checking up the flying column and placing it in line of battle.
"This line checked the enemy for ten or fifteen minutes only, when it again gave way and my whole army became literally an uncontrollable mob. Nothing now remained to do but allow the retreat to continue and endeavor to force it gradually into some kind of shape. The night was exceedingly dark, the roads almost impa.s.sable and the hope of saving my artillery and wagons altogether futile, so I ordered the artillery and wagons to be destroyed. The latter were burned and the former dismantled and spiked, that is all but six pieces which we succeeded in bringing off in safety. By 7 A.
M. next morning we reached Ripley (nineteen miles). Here we re-organized and got into very respectable shape. The retreat was continued, pressed rapidly by the enemy. Our ammunition soon gave out, this the enemy soon discovered and pressed the harder. Our only hope now lay in continuing the retreat which we did to this place, where we arrived about 7 o"clock this morning.
"My losses in material of war was severe, being 16 guns and some 130 wagons. The horses of the artillery and mules of the train we brought away. As my troops became very greatly scattered and are constantly coming in in small parties, I am unable to estimate my loss in killed and wounded. I fear, however, it will prove severe, probably ten or twelve hundred. While the battle lasted it was well contested and I think the enemy"s loss in killed and wounded will not fall short of our own.
"This, general, is a painful record, and yet it was the result of a series of unfortunate circ.u.mstances over which human ingenuity could have no control.
"The unprecedented rains so delayed our march across a desert country that the enemy had ample time to acc.u.mulate an overwhelming force in our front, and kept us so long in an exhausted region as to so starve and weaken our animals that they were unable to extricate the wagons and artillery from the mud.
"So far as I know every one did his duty well, and while they fought no troops ever fought better. The colored troops deserve great credit for the manner in which they stood to their work.
"This is a hasty and rather incoherent outline of our operations, but I will forward a more minute account as soon as the official reports can be received from division commanders.
"I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"S. D. STURGIS,
"_Brig.-Gen. Commanding._
"To Maj.-Gen. C. C. WASHBURN, Commanding District W. Tenn."
An extract from a letter from Colonel Arthur T. Reeve, who commanded the 55th Colored Infantry in this fight, reads:
"Our (the Federal) command having been moved up on double-quick--a distance of about five miles--immediately before their arrival on the field and the consequent fact that this arm of our force went into the engagement very seriously blown, in fact, very nearly exhausted by heat and fatigue, with their ranks very much drawn out, were whipped in detail and overwhelmed by the very brilliant and vigorous a.s.saults of your forces. When the engagement first began I was at the rear of the Federal column, in command of the train guard, and hence pa.s.sed over the ground on the way to the battle-field after the balance of the army had pa.s.sed, and am able to speak advisedly of the extreme exhaustion of the infantry, as I pa.s.sed large numbers entirely prostrated by heat and fatigue, who did not reach the field of battle and must have fallen into your hands after the engagement."
[_General Sturgis" Report, No. 2._]
"MEMPHIS, TENN., June 24, 1864.
"Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the expedition which marched from near La Fayette, Tenn., under my command on the 2nd instant. This expedition was organized and fitted out under the supervision of the major general commanding the District of West Tennessee and I a.s.sumed command of it on the morning of the 2nd of June, near the town of La Fayette, Tenn., in pursuance of Special Orders, No. 38, dated Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, Memphis, May 31, 1864, and which were received by me on the 1st inst. The strength of the command in round numbers was about 8,000 men," (which included the following Phalanx regiments: 59th Regt., 61st Regt., 68th Regt., Battery I, 2nd Artillery, (Light,) 2 pieces.)
"My supply train, carrying rations for 18 days, consisted of 181 wagons, which with the regimental wagons made up a train of some 250 wagons. My instructions were substantially as follows, viz: To proceed to Corinth, Mississippi by way of Salem and Ruckersville, capture any force that might be there, then proceed south, destroying the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Tupelo and Okolona and as far as possible towards Macon and Columbus with a portion of my force, thence to Grenada and back to Memphis. A discretion was allowed me as to the details of the movement where circ.u.mstances might arise which could not have been antic.i.p.ated in my instructions. Owing to some misunderstanding on the part of the quartermaster, as to the point on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at which some forage was to have been deposited from the cars, there was some little delay occasioned in getting the column in motion.
"The following incidents of the march are taken from the journal kept from day to day by one of my staff, Capt. W. C.
Rawolle, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G.:
""Wednesday, June 1st.--Expedition started from Memphis and White"s Station toward La Fayette.
""Thursday, June 2nd.--The general and staff left Memphis on the 5 o"clock A. M. train and established headquarters at Leaks" House, near La Fayette, and a.s.sumed command. Cavalry moved to the intersection of State line and Early Grove roads, six miles from La Fayette. It rained at intervals all day and part of the night.
""Friday, June 3rd.--Ordered the cavalry to move to within three four miles of Salem. Infantry marched to Lamar, 18 miles from La Fayette. Owing to the heavy rains during the day and the bad condition of the roads and bridges, the train could only move to within four miles of Lamar, and did not get into park until 11 o"clock P. M., the colored brigade remaining with the train as a guard.
""Sat.u.r.day, June 4th.--Informed General Grierson that the infantry and train under the most favorable circ.u.mstances could only make a few miles beyond Salem and to regulate his march accordingly. Train arrived at Lamar about noon, issued rations to the infantry and rested the animals. It rained heavily until 1 o"clock P. M., making the roads almost impa.s.sable. Moved headquarters to the Widow Spright"s house, two miles west of Salem, and Colonel Hoge"s brigade of infantry to Robinson"s house, four miles from Salem.
""Sunday, June 5th.--Infantry and train started at half past four o"clock A. M., and joined the cavalry, two miles east of Salem. At 10 o"clock A. M., issued rations to the cavalry and fed the forage collected by them. Infantry remained in camp during the day; cavalry moved to the intersection of the LaGrange and Ripley and the Salem and Ruckersville roads. Col. Joseph Karge, 2nd New Jersey, with 400 men, started at 6 P. M., with instructions to move via Ripley to Rienzi, to destroy the railroad; to proceed north, destroy bridge over Tusc.u.mbia and to join General Grierson at Ruckersville. Heavy showers during the afternoon.
""Monday, June 6th.--Infantry and train moved at 4 o"clock A. M., on the Ruckersville road. Commenced raining at 5 A.
M., and continued at intervals all day. Progress very slow, marched 13 miles and made headquarters at Widow Childers, at intersection of the Saulsbury and Ripley and the Ruckersville and Salem roads. Cavalry moved to Ruckersville.
The advance guard of the infantry encountered a small party of rebels about noon and chased them towards Ripley on La Grange and Ripley roads.
""Tuesday, June 7th.--Upon information received from General Grierson that there was no enemy near Corinth, directed him to move toward Ellistown, on direct road from Ripley, and instruct Colonel Karge to join him by way of Blackland or Carrollsville. Infantry moved to Ripley and cavalry encamped on New Albany road two miles south. Encountered a small party of rebels near Widow Childers and drove them toward Ripley. In Ripley, met an advance of the enemy and drove them on New Albany road. Cavalry encountered about a regiment of rebel cavalry on that road and drove them south.
Several showers during the afternoon, and the roads very bad.
"Wednesday, June 8th.--Received information at 4 o"clock A.
M. that Colonel Karge was on an island in the Hatchie River and sent him 500 men and two howitzers as re-inforcements.
Winslow"s brigade of cavalry moved 6 miles on the Fulton Road. Infantry and train moved five miles on same road.
Colonel Waring"s brigade remained in Ripley awaiting return of Colonel Karge, who joined him at 5 o"clock P. M., having swam the Hatchie River. Rained hard during the night.
""Thursday, June 9th.--Sent back to Memphis 400 sick and wounded men and 41 wagons. Cavalry and infantry moved to Stubbs", fourteen miles from Ripley; issued five days"
rations (at previous camp.) Rained two hours in the evening.
""Friday, June 10th.--Encountered the enemy at Brice"s Cross-Roads, 23 miles from Ripley and six miles from Guntown."
"At Ripley it became a serious question in my mind as to whether or not I should proceed any farther. The rain still fell in torrents; the artillery and wagons were literally mired down, and the starved and exhausted animals could with difficulty drag them along. Under these circ.u.mstances, I called together my division commanders and placed before them my views of our condition. At this interview, one brigade commander and two members of my staff were, incidentally, present also. I called their attention to the great delay we had undergone on account of the continuous rain and consequent bad condition of the roads; the exhausted condition of our animals; the great probability that the enemy would avail himself of the time thus afforded him to concentrate an overwhelming force against us in the vicinity of Tupelo and the utter hopelessness of saving our train or artillery in case of defeat, on account of the narrowness and general bad condition of the roads and the impossibility of procuring supplies of forage for the animals; all agreed with me in the probable consequences of defeat. Some thought our only safety lay in retracing our steps and abandoning the expedition. It was urged, however, (and with some propriety, too,) that inasmuch as I had abandoned a similar expedition only a few weeks before and given as my reasons for so doing, the "utter and entire dest.i.tution of the country," and that in the face of this we were again sent through the same country, it would be ruinous on all sides to return again without first meeting the enemy. Moreover, from all the information General Washburn had acquired, there _could be no considerable_ force in our front and all my own information led to the same conclusion. To be sure my information was exceedingly meagre and unsatisfactory and had I returned I would have been totally unable to present any facts to justify my cause, or to show why the expedition might not have been successfully carried forward. All I could have presented would have been my conjectures as to what the enemy would naturally do under the circ.u.mstances and these would have availed but little against the idea that the enemy was scattered and had no considerable force in our front.
"Under these circ.u.mstances, and with a sad forboding of the consequences, I determined to move forward; keeping my force as compact as possible and ready for action at all times; hoping that we might succeed, and feeling that if we did not, yet our losses might at most be insignificant in comparison with the great benefits which might accrue to General Sherman by the depletion of Johnson"s army to so large an extent.
"On the evening of the 8th, one day beyond Ripley, I a.s.sembled the commanders of infantry brigades at the headquarters of Colonel McMillen, and cautioned them as to the necessity of enforcing rigid discipline in their camps; keeping their troops always in hand and ready to act on a moment"s notice. That it was impossible to gain any accurate or reliable information of the enemy, and that it behooved us to move and act constantly as though in his presence.
That we were now where we might encounter him at any moment, and that we must under no circ.u.mstances allow ourselves to be surprised. On the morning of the 10th, the cavalry marched at half-past 5 o"clock and the infantry at seven, thus allowing the infantry to follow immediately in rear of the cavalry as it would take the cavalry a full hour and a half to clear their camp. The habitual order of march was as follows, viz: Cavalry with its artillery in advance; infantry with its artillery; next, and lastly, the supply train, guarded by the rear brigade with one of its regiments at the head, one near the middle and one with a section of artillery in the rear. A company of pioneers preceded the infantry for the purpose of repairing the roads, building bridges, &c., &c.
"On this morning, I had preceded the head of the infantry column and arrived at a point some five miles from camp, when I found an unusually bad place in the road and one that would require considerable time and labor to render practicable. While halted here to await the head of the column, I received a message from General Grierson that he had encountered a portion of the enemy"s cavalry. In a few minutes more I received another message from him, saying the enemy numbered some 600 and were on the Baldwyn road. That he was himself at Brice"s Cross-Roads and that his position was a good one and he would hold it. He was then directed to leave 600 or 700 men at the cross-roads, to precede the infantry on its arrival, on its march towards Guntown, and with the remainder of his forces to drive the enemy toward Baldwyn and there rejoin the main body by way of the line of the railroad, as I did not intend being drawn from my main purpose. Colonel McMillen arrived at this time and I rode forward toward the cross-roads. Before proceeding far, however, I sent a staff officer back directing Colonel McMillen to move up his advance brigade as rapidly as possible without distressing his troops. When I reached the cross-roads, found nearly all the cavalry engaged and the battle growing warm, but no artillery had yet opened on either side. We had four pieces of artillery at the cross-roads, but they had not been placed in position, owing to the dense woods on all sides and the apparent impossibility of using them to advantage. Finding, however, that our troops were being hotly pressed, I ordered one section to open on the enemy"s reserves. The enemy"s artillery soon replied, and with great accuracy, every sh.e.l.l bursting over and in the immediate vicinity of our guns.
"Frequent calls were now made for re-enforcements, but until the infantry should arrive, I had none to give. Colonel Winslow, 4th Iowa Cavalry, commanding a brigade and occupying a position on the Guntown road a little in advance of the cross-roads, was especially clamorous to be relieved and permitted to carry his brigade to the rear. Fearing that Colonel Winslow might abandon his position without authority, and knowing the importance of the cross-roads to us, I directed him in case he should be overpowered, to fall back slowly toward the cross-roads, thus contracting his line and strengthening his position. I was especially anxious on this point because through some misunderstanding, that I am yet unable to explain, the cavalry had been withdrawn without my knowledge from the left, and I was compelled to occupy the line, temporarily, with my escort, consisting of about 100 of the 19th Penn. Cavalry. This handful of troops under the gallant Lieut.-Colonel Hess, behaved very handsomely and held the line until the arrival of the infantry. About half-past 1 p. m. the infantry began to arrive. Col. Hodge"s brigade was the first to reach the field and was placed in position by Colonel McMillen, when the enemy was driven a little. General Grierson now requested authority to withdraw the entire cavalry as it was exhausted and well nigh out of ammunition. This I authorized as soon as sufficient infantry was in position to permit it and he was directed to reorganize his command in the rear and hold it ready to operate on the flanks. In the mean time I had ordered a section of artillery to be placed in position on a knoll near the little bridge, some three or four hundred yards in the rear, for the purpose of opposing any attempt of the enemy to turn our left. I now went to this point to see that my orders had been executed and also to give directions for the management and protection of the wagon-train. I found the section properly posted and supported by the 72nd Ohio Infantry, with two companies thrown forward as skirmishers, and the whole under the superintendence of that excellent officer, Colonel Wilkins, of the 9th Minn. While here, the head of the wagon train, which had been reported still a mile and a half in rear, arrived. It was immediately ordered into an open field near where the cavalry were reorganizing, there to be turned round and carried farther toward the rear. The pressure on the right of the line was now becoming very great and General Grierson was directed to send a portion of his cavalry to that point. At this time I received a message from Colonel Hodge that he was satisfied that the movement on the right was a feint and that the real attack was being made on the left. Another section of artillery was now placed in position a little to the rear of Colonel Wilkins, but bearing on the left of our main line, and a portion of the cavalry was thrown out as skirmishers. The cavalry which had been sent to the extreme right began now to give way, and at the same time the enemy began to appear in force in rear of the extreme left, while Colonel McMillen required re-enforcements in the centre. _I now endeavored to get hold of the colored brigade which formed the guard to the train.
While traversing the short distance to where the head of that brigade should be found, the main line began to give way at various points; order soon gave way to confusion and confusion to panic. I sent an aid to Col. McMillen informing him that I was unable to render him any additional a.s.sistance, and that he must do all in his power with what he had to hold his position until I could form a line to protect his retreat. On reaching the head of the supply train, Lieut.-Colonel Hess was directed to place in position in a wood the first regiment of colored troops I could find.
This was done, and it is due to those troops to say here that they stood their ground well and rendered valuable aid to Colonel McMillen_, who was soon after compelled to withdraw from his original line and take up new positions in rear. It was now 5 o"clock P. M. For seven hours, these gallant officers and men had held their ground against overwhelming numbers, but at last overpowered and exhausted they were compelled to abandon not only the field, but many of their gallant comrades who had fallen to the mercy of the enemy. Everywhere the army now drifted toward the rear and was soon altogether beyond control. I requested General Grierson to accompany me and to aid in checking the fleeing column and establishing a new line. By dint of entreaty and force and the aid of several officers, whom I called to my a.s.sistance, with pistols in their hands we at length succeeded in checking some 1200 or 1500 and establishing them in a line of which Colonel Wilkins, 9th Minnesota, was placed in command. About this time it was reported to me that Col. McMillen was driving the enemy. I placed but little faith in this report, yet disseminated it freely for the good effect it might produce upon the troops. In a few minutes, however, the gallant Colonel McMillen, sad and disheartened, arrived himself, and reported his lines broken and in confusion. The new line under Colonel Wilkins also gave way soon after and it was now impossible to exercise any further control. The road became crowded and jammed with troops; the wagons and artillery sinking into the deep mud became inextricable and added to the general confusion which now prevailed. No power could now check or control the panic-stricken ma.s.s as it swept toward the rear, led off by Colonel Winslow at the head of his brigade of cavalry, and who never halted until he had reached Stubbs", ten miles in rear. This was the greater pity as his brigade was nearly, if not entirely, intact, and might have offered considerable resistance to the advancing foe. About 10 o"clock P. M., I reached Stubbs" in person, where I found Colonel Winslow and his brigade. I then informed him that his was the only organized body of men I had been able to find, and directed him to add to his own every possible force he could rally, as they pa.s.sed, and take charge of the rear, remaining in position until all should have pa.s.sed. I also informed him that on account of the extreme darkness of the night and the wretched condition of the road, I had little hope of saving anything more than the troops, and directed him therefore to destroy all wagons and artillery which he might find blocking up the road and preventing the pa.s.sage of the men.
In this way about 200 wagons and 14 pieces of artillery were lost, many of the wagons being burned and the artillery spiked and otherwise mutilated; the mules and horses were brought away. By 7 o"clock A. M., of the 11th, we had reorganized at Ripley, and the army presented quite a respectable appearance, and would have been able to accomplish an orderly retreat from that point but for the unfortunate circ.u.mstances that the cartridge boxes were well nigh exhausted. At 7 o"clock the column was again put in motion on the Salem road, the cavalry in advance, followed by the infantry. The enemy pressed heavily on the rear, and there was now nothing left but to keep in motion so as to prevent the banking up of the rear, and to pa.s.s all cross-roads before the enemy could reach them, as the command was in no condition to offer determined resistance, whether attacked in the front or the rear. At 8 o"clock a.
m. on the 12th, the column reached Colliersville, worn out and exhausted by the fatigues of fighting and marching for two days and two nights without rest and without eating.
About noon of the same day a train arrived from Memphis, bringing some 2,000 infantry, commanded by Colonel Wolf, and supplies for my suffering men, and I determined to remain here until next day for the purpose of resting and affording protection to many who had dropped by the wayside, through fatigue and other causes. Learning, however, toward evening, that the commander at White"s Station had information of a large force of the enemy approaching that place from the southeast, and knowing that my men were in no condition to offer serious resistance to an enemy presenting himself across my line of march, I informed the general commanding the district, by telegraph, that I deemed it prudent to continue my march to White"s Station. Accordingly, at 9 p.
m., the column marched again, and arrived at White"s Station at daylight next morning. This report having already become more circ.u.mstantial than was antic.i.p.ated, I have purposely omitted the details of our march from Ripley to White"s Station, as they would extend it to a tiresome length, but would respectfully refer you for these to the sub-reports herewith enclosed. Casualties are as follows:
"Killed, 223, wounded, 394; missing, 1623; total, 2240. That our loss was great, is true; yet that it was not much greater is due in an eminent degree to the personal exertions of that model soldier, Col. W. L. McMillen, of the 95th Ohio Infantry, who commanded the infantry, and to the able commanders under him.
"The strength of the enemy is variously estimated by my most intelligent officers at from 15,000 to 20,000 men. A very intelligent sergeant who was captured and remained five days in the hands of the enemy, reports the number of the enemy actually engaged, to have been 12,000, and that two divisions of infantry were held in reserve. It may appear strange that so large a force of the enemy could be in our vicinity and we be ignorant of the fact, but the surprise will exist only in the minds of those who are not familiar with the difficulty, (I may even say impossibility) of acquiring reliable information in the heart of the enemy"s country. Our movements and numbers are always known to the enemy, because every woman and child is one of them, but we, as everybody knows who has had any experience in this war, can only learn the movements of the enemy and his numbers by actually fighting for the information; and in that case the knowledge often comes too late.