DEAR GORDON: I have studied carefully the draft of the reply to Dr. Nansen which you have prepared. In spirit and substance your letter differs so radically from the reply which I consider essential that I find it difficult to make any constructive criticism. And I shall refrain from criticizing your rhetoric.
There are two proposals in your letter, however, which are obviously unfair and will not, I am certain, be accepted by the Soviet Government.
1. The life of Russia depends upon its railroads; and your demand for control of transportation by the commission can hardly be accepted by the Soviet Government which knows that plots for the destruction of railroad bridges were hatched in the American consulate in Moscow. You are asking the Soviet Government to put its head in the lion"s mouth. It will not accept. You must moderate your phrases.
2. When you speak of the "cessation of hostilities by Russian troops," you fail to speak of hostilities by troops of the allied and a.s.sociated Governments, a number of whom, you may recall, have invaded Russia. Furthermore, your phrase does not cover Finns, Esthonians, Letts, Poles, etc. In addition, you say absolutely nothing about the withdrawal of the troops of the allied and a.s.sociated Governments from Russian territory.
And, most important, you fail to say that troops and military supplies will cease to be sent into the territory of the former Russian Empire. You thereby go a long way toward proving Trotsky"s thesis: That any armistice will simply be used by the Allies as a period in which to supply tanks, aeroplanes, gas sh.e.l.ls, liquid fire, etc., to the various antisoviet governments. As it stands, your armistice proposal is absolutely unfair, and I am sure that it will not be accepted by the Soviet Government.
Very respectfully, yours,
WILLIAM C. BULLITT.
Senator NEW. Otherwise you had no fault to find with it?
Mr. BULLITT. Yes. The morning after Col. House had told me he wished to submit this proposition to his international law experts, I came as usual to his office about 9.40, and Mr. Auchincloss was on his way to the President with his proposal, the Auchincloss-Miller proposal, as Col. House"s proposal. But I got that stopped. I went in to Col.
House, and Col. House told Mr. Auchincloss not to take it up to the President, and asked me if I could doctor up the reply of Mr.
Auchincloss and Mr. Miller to the Nansen letter so that it might possibly be acceptable to the Soviet Government. I thereupon rewrote the Auchincloss-Miller letter, but I was forced to stick very closely to the text. I was told that I could cut things out if I wished to, but to stick very closely to the text, which I did. I drew this redraft of their letter, under protest at the whole business. My redraft of their letter was finally the basis of the reply of the four to Nansen. I have both these doc.u.ments here, my reply--and the four took that reply--and with the changes----
The CHAIRMAN. What four--the successors of the ten?
Mr. BULLITT. The successors of the 10, sir, took the reply------
The CHAIRMAN. Who were the four at that moment?
Mr. BULLITT. M. Orlando, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and the President. This extremely mild proposition, which really had almost no chance of life, was, you will see, in no sense a reply to these proposals of the Soviet Government. This is my attempt to doctor up the Auchincloss-Miller proposition. In spite of every effort I could make to obtain definite action on it, the reply was made to me that this reply to the Nansen proposal would be a sufficient reply to that proposal of the Soviet Government. [Reading:]
DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in your letter of April 3 appeals to the sympathies of all peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men, women, and children lack the food and the necessities, which make life endurable.
The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a commission as you propose would offer a practical means of achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could not, either in its conception or its operation, be considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian purpose of saving life."
There are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties, owing to the existing situation in Russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. But if the existing local governments of Russia are as willing as the Governments and the peoples whom we represent to see succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no political obstacle will remain. There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply and transport, which we have mentioned, and also the problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with the advice and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The problem of transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the a.s.sistance of your own and other neutral Governments. The problem of transport in Russia and of distribution can be solved only by the people of Russia themselves, with the a.s.sistance, advice, and supervision of your commission.
Subject to such supervision, the problem of distribution should be solely under the control of the people of Russia themselves. The people in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the Belgian Relief Commission, the fullest opportunity to advise your commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community is to be relieved. In no other circ.u.mstances could it be believed that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not political, under no other conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed.
That such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within the territory of the former Russian Empire is obvious. And the cessation of hostilities would, necessarily, involve a complete suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all sorts to and within these territories. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile, and would be impossible to consider.
Under such conditions as we have outlined we believe that your plan could be successfully carried into effect, and we should be prepared to give it our full support.
REPLY OF PRESIDENT WILSON, PREMIERS CLEMENCEAU, LLOYD GEORGE, AND ORLANDO, TO DR. NANSEN, APRIL 17, 1919
DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in your letter of April 3 appeals to the sympathies of all peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men, women, and children lack the food and the necessities which make life endurable.
The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a commission as you propose would offer a practical means of achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could not, either in its conception or its operation, be considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian purpose of saving life."
There are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties, owing to the existing situation in Russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. But if the existing local governments of Russia are as willing as the Governments and people whom we represent to see succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no political obstacle will remain.
There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply, finance, and transport which we have mentioned? and also the problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with the advice and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The problem of finance would seem to us to fall upon the Russian authorities. The problem of transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the a.s.sistance of your own and other neutral governments whose interests should be as great as our own and whose losses have been far less. The problems of transport in Russia and of distribution can be solved only by the people of Russia themselves, with the a.s.sistance, advice, and supervision of your commission.
Subject to your supervision, the problem of distribution should be solely under the control of the people of Russia themselves. The people in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the Belgian Relief Commission, the fullest opportunity to advise your commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community is to be relieved. In no other circ.u.mstances could it be believed that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not political; under no other condition could it be certain that the hungry would be fed.
That such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within definitive lines in the territory of Russia is obvious. And the cessation of hostilities would, necessarily, involve a complete suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all sorts to and within Russian territory. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile and would be impossible to consider.
Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that your plan could be successfully carried into effect, and we should be prepared to give it our full support.
V.E. ORLANDO.
D. LLOYD GEORGE.
WOODROW WILSON.
G. CLEMENCEAU.
Senator KNOX. I want the reply of Auchincloss to Nansen to go into the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Let all that correspondence be printed in the record.
Senator KNOX. Dr. Nansen"s proposition, and then the reply,
(The letters referred to are inserted above.)
Mr. BULLITT. The Nansen letter was written in Mr. Hoover"s office.
Nansen made the proposition. I wrote the original of a reply to Dr.
Nansen, which I believe would have led to peace. Col. House indicated his approval of it, but wished to have it considered from the international legal standpoint, which was then done by Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller, who proposed a reply that had no resemblance to my proposal. I then objected to that as it was on its way to the President. It was not sent to the President, and I was ordered to try to doctor it up. I attempted to doctor it up and produced a doctored version which was finally made the basis of the reply, with the change of two or three words which made it even worse and even more indefinite, so that the Soviet Government could not possibly conceive it as a genuine peace proposition. It left the whole thing in the air.
Senator KNOX. We would like to have you see that these doc.u.ments to which you have just now referred are inserted in the record in the sequence in which you have named them.
Mr. BULLITT. Yes, I shall be at the service of the committee in that regard.
Senator HARDING. Lest I missed something while I was out of the room I am exceedingly curious to know why the Soviet proposal was not given favorable consideration.
Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt has stated that.
KOLCHAK"S ADVANCE CAUSES REJECTION OF PEACE PROPOSAL
Mr. BULLITT. The princ.i.p.al reason was entirely different. The fact was that just at this moment, when this proposal was under consideration, Kolchak made a 100-mile advance. There was a revolt of peasants in a district of Russia which entirely cut off supplies from the Bolshevik army operating against Kolchak. Kolchak made a 100-mile advance, and immediately the entire press of Paris was roaring and screaming on the subject, announcing that Kolchak would be in Moscow within two weeks; and therefore everyone in Paris, including, I regret to say members of the American commission, began to grow very lukewarm about peace in Russia, because they thought Kolchak would arrive in Moscow and wipe out the Soviet Government.
Senator KNOX. And the proposal which you brought back from Russia, that is the Soviet proposal, was abandoned and dropped, after this last doc.u.ment to which you have just referred.
Mr. BULLITT. Yes; it was. May I say this, that April 10 was the final date when their proposition was open. I had attempted every day and almost every night to obtain a reply to it. I finally requested the commission to send the following telegram to Tchitcherin.
I proposed to send this telegram to the American consul at Helsingfors [reading]:
APRIL 10, 1919.
AMERICAN CONSUL, Helsingfors: