That is the message you bring back, Mr. Bullitt. It is your duty to deliver it. It is mine to enforce it by my conception of the situation as it stands in Russia and Europe to-day.
It seems to me that we are on the verge of war, a new war, a terrible war--the long-predicted cla.s.s war--all over Europe.
The peace commission, busy with the settlement of the old war, may not see the new one, or may not measure aright the imminent danger of it. Germany is going over, Hungary has gone, Austria is coming into the economic revolutionary stage. The propaganda for it is old and strong in all countries: Italy, France, Spain, Belgium, Norway, Sweden--you know. All men know this propaganda. But that is in the rear. Look at the front.
Russia is the center of it. Germany, Austria, Hungary are the wings of the potential war front of--Bolshevism.
And Russia, the center, has made a proposition to you for peace, for a separate peace; made it officially; made it after thought; made it proudly, not in fear, but in pitiful sympathy with its suffering people and for the sake of a vision of the future in which it verily believes. They are practical men--those that made it. You met them. We talked with them. We measured their power. They are all idealists, but they are idealists sobered by the responsibility of power. Sentiment has pa.s.sed out of them into work--hard work. They said they could give one year more of starvation to the revolution, but they said it practically, and they prefer to compromise and make peace. I believe that, if we take their offer, there will be such an outcry of rage and disappointment from the Left Socialists of Germany, Italy, France, and the world, that Lenin and Trotsky will be astonished. The Red Revolution--the cla.s.s war--will be broken, and evolution will have its chance once more in the rest of Europe. And you and I know that the men we met in Moscow see this thus, and that they believe the peace conference will not, can not, see it, but will go on to make war and so bring on the European revolution.
But your duty, our duty, is to point out this opportunity, and to vouch for the strength and the will and the character of Lenin and the commissaires of Russia to make and keep the compact they have outlined to you. Well, this is the briefest way in which I can express my full faith:
Kautsky has gone to Moscow. He has gone late; he has gone after we were there. He will find, as we found, a careful, thoughtful, deliberate group of men in power; in too much power; unremovable and controlling a state of monopoly, which is political, social, economic, financial; which controls or directs all the activities, all the fears, all the hopes, all the aspirations of a great people. Kautsky will speak to revolutionary Russia for revolutionary Germany, and for a revolutionary Europe. There will be an appeal in that; there will be a strong appeal in that to the revolutionary Russian commissaires. But, if I am any judge of character, Lenin and his commissaires will stand by their offer to us until Paris has answered, or until the time set for the answer--April 10--shall have pa.s.sed. Then, and not until then, will Kautsky receive an answer to his appeal for--whatever it is the Germans are asking.
It is not enough that you have delivered your message and made it a part of the record of the peace conference. I think it is your duty to ask the fixed attention of your chiefs upon it for a moment, and to get from them the courtesy of a clear, direct reply to Russia before April 10.
REPORTS OF CAPT. W.W. PETt.i.t
(The reports of Capt. Pett.i.t are here printed in full, as follows:)
REPORTS OF CAPT, W.W. PETt.i.t
I left Petrograd on March 31. During the past three weeks I have crossed the Finnish border six times and have been approximately two weeks in Petrograd. I have met Tchitcherin, Litvinov, and most of the important personages in the communist government of Petrograd (including Bill Shatov, chief of police).
Briefly, my opinion of the Russian situation is as follows: In Petrograd I presume the present communist government has a majority of the working-men behind it, but probably less than half of the total population are members of the communist party. However, my conclusions are based on conversations with not only communists, but also many opponents of the communist government, members of the aristocracy, business men, and foreigners, and I am persuaded that a large majority of the population of Petrograd if given a choice between the present government and the two alternatives, revolution or foreign intervention, would without hesitation take the present government. Foreign intervention would unite the population in opposition and would tend to greatly emphasize the present nationalist spirit. Revolution would result in chaos. (There is nowhere a group of Russians in whom the people I have talked with have confidence. Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenvitch, Trepov, the despicable hordes of Russian emigrees who haunt the Grand Hotel, Stockholm; the Socithans House, Helsingfors; the offices of the peace commission in Paris, and squabble among themselves as to how the Russian situation shall be solved; all equally fail to find many supporters in Petrograd.) Those with whom I have talked recognize that revolution, did it succeed in developing a strong government, would result in a white terror comparable with that of Finland. In Finland our consul has a record of 12,500 executions in some 50 districts, out of something like 500 districts, by the White Guard. In Petrograd I have been repeatedly a.s.sured that the total Red executions in Petrograd and Moscow and other cities was at a maximum 3,200.
It may seem somewhat inconsistent for the Russian bourgeoisie to oppose allied intervention and at the same time fail to give whole-hearted support to the present government. They justify this att.i.tude on the grounds that when the two great problems of food and peace are solved the whole population can turn itself to a.s.sisting the present regime in developing a stable efficient government. They point to the numerous changes which have already been introduced by the present communist government, to the acknowledgment that mistakes have been made to the ease of securing introduction of constructive ideas under the present regime. All these facts have persuaded many of the thinking people with whom I have talked to look to the present government in possibly a somewhat modified form as the salvation of Russia.
At present the situation is bad. Russia is straining every nerve to raise an army to oppose the encircling White Guards. That the army is efficient is demonstrated by the present location of Soviet forces who have contended with the Russian White Guard supported by enormous sums of money, munitions, and even soldiers from the Allies. Naturally, transportation is inefficient; it was horrible in the last year of the Czar"s regime. Absolute separation from the rest of the world, combined with the chaotic conditions which Russia has pa.s.sed through since the 1917 revolution, plus the sabotage, which until recently was quite general among the intelligent cla.s.ses, including engineers, has resulted in a decrease in rolling stock. The transportation of the enormous army which has been raised limits the number of cars which can be used for food. The cutting off of Siberia, Finland, the Baltic Provinces, and until recently the Ukraine, made it necessary to establish new lines of food transportation. Consequently there has been great suffering in Petrograd. Of the population of a million, 200,000 are reported by the board of health to be ill, 100,000 seriously ill in hospitals or at home, and another 100,000 with swollen limbs still able to go to the food kitchens.
However, the reports of people dying in the streets are not true. Whatever food exists is fairly well distributed and there are food kitchens where anyone can get a fairly good dinner for 3.50 rubles.
For money one can still obtain many of the luxuries of life.
The children, some 50,000 of whom have been provided with homes, are splendidly taken care of, and except for the absence of milk have little to complain of. In the public schools free lunches are given the children, and one sees in the faces of the younger generation little of the suffering which some of the older people have undergone and are undergoing. Food conditions have improved recently, due to the suspension of pa.s.senger traffic and the retaking of the Ukraine, where food is plentiful. From 60 to 100 carloads of food have arrived in Petrograd each day since February 18.
Perhaps it is futile to add that my solution of the Russian problem is some sort of recognition of the present government, with the establishment of economic relations and the sending of every possible a.s.sistance to the people. I have been treated in a wonderful manner by the communist representatives, though they know that I am no socialist and though I have admitted to the leaders that my civilian clothing is a disguise. They have the warmest affection for America, believe in President Wilson, and are certain that we are coming to their a.s.sistance, and, together with our engineers, our food, our school-teachers, and our supplies, they are going to develop in Russia a government which will emphasize the rights of the common people as no other government has. I am so convinced of the necessity for us taking a step immediately to end the suffering of this wonderful people that I should be willing to stake all I have in converting ninety out of every hundred American business men whom I could take to Petrograd for two weeks.
It is needless for me to tell you that most of the stories that have come from Russia regarding atrocities, horrors, immorality, are manufactured in Viborg, Helsingfors, or Stockholm. The horrible ma.s.sacres planned for last November were first learned of in Petrograd from the Helsingfors papers. That anybody could even for a moment believe in the nationalization of women seems impossible to anyone in Petrograd. To-day Petrograd is an orderly city--probably the only city of the world of its size without police. Bill Shatov, chief of police, and I were at the opera the other night to hear Chaliapine sing in Boris Gudonov. He excused himself early because he said there had been a robbery the previous night, in which a man had lost 5,000 rubles, that this was the first robbery in several weeks, and that he had an idea who had done it, and was going to get the men that night. I feel personally that Petrograd is safer than Paris.
At night there are automobiles, sleighs, and people on the streets at 12 o"clock to a much greater extent than was true in Paris when I left five weeks ago.
Most wonderful of all, the great crowd of prost.i.tutes has disappeared. I have seen not a disreputable woman since I went to Petrograd, and foreigners who have been there for the last three months report the same. The policy of the present government has resulted in eliminating throughout Russia, I am told, this horrible outgrowth of modern civilization.
Begging has decreased. I have asked to be taken to the poorest parts of the city to see how the people in the slums live, and both the communists and bourgeoisie have held up their hands and said, "But you fail to understand there are no such places." There is poverty, but it is scattered and exists among those of the former poor or of the former rich who have been unable to adapt themselves to the conditions which require everyone to do something.
Terrorism has ended. For months there have been no executions, I am told, and certainly people go to the theater and church and out on the streets as much as they would in any city of the world.
(Certain memoranda referred to in the hearing relating to the work of Capt. Pett.i.t in Russia are here printed in full as follows:)
MEMORANDUM
From: W.W. Pett.i.t To: Ammission, Paris.
(Attention of Mr. Bullitt.)
1. _Mr. Pett.i.t"s recent movements_.--On March 18 I left Helsingfors for Petrograd and remained there until March 28 when I left for Helsingfors, at which place I received a cable ordering me to report immediately to Paris. On the 29th I left again for Petrograd to secure some baggage I had left. On the 21st I left Petrograd for Helsingfors. On April 1st I left Helsingfors for Stockholm and in Stockholm I find a telegram asking me to wait until I receive further orders.
2. _Optimism of present government_.--On the night of the 30th and the afternoon of the 31st I had several hours with Schklovsky, Tchitcherin"s personal representative in Petrograd. He was disappointed to think I was to return to Paris, but felt certain that inasmuch as the orders recalling me had been sent before Mr. Bullitt"s arrival, there was every possibility of my being returned to Petrograd. He was most optimistic about the future and felt that the Allies must soon take some definite stand regarding Russia, and that the result of the Paris negotiations would almost surely be favorable to the Soviet Government. He said that the present war conditions and the limited transportation facilities, with the shortage of food resulting therefrom, had handicapped his government enormously, and that everyone hopes that soon the action of the allied powers will permit the establishment of normal relations in Russia.
3. _Radios in re Bullitt_.--He has received at least three radio communications from the American press in which Mr.
Bullitt"s activities have been mentioned and this has tended to encourage him. The last cablegram stated that Mr. Bullitt was preparing a statement regarding conditions in Russia which the press antic.i.p.ated would go far toward dispelling ignorance and misinformation regarding conditions in Moscow and Petrograd.
4. _Hungarian situation_.--The Hungarian situation has also gone far toward encouraging the present Government. Hungary has proposed a mutual offensive and defensive alliance with Russia. The fact that the Soviet Government has been inst.i.tuted in Hungary without bloodshed up to the present, and with little opposition on the part of the people, has also encouraged Schklovsky. He stated that the action of the Allies in sending troops against Hungary was to be regretted because of the bloodshed which would probably result.
However, he thought in the long run that the Allies would find it a suicidal policy to try to suppress the Hungarian revolution by force.
5. _The Ukraine situation_.--The soviet troops have taken almost the entire Ukraine and this with the food supplies which it will provide have strengthened the Soviet Government. A friend who has recently returned from Peltava, Ekaterinoslav, Kiev, and other southern cities, states that food is abundant and cheap. The Soviet Government believes that the French and Greek troops are withdrawing from Odessa and going to Sebastopol. They antic.i.p.ate taking Odessa within the next few days.
6. _Esthonian situation_.--At least twice within the last two weeks Esthonia has sent word to the Soviet Government that it desired peace. The following four points have been emphasized by the Esthonians: (i) That peace must come immediately; (2) that the offer must come from the Soviet Government; (3) that a fair offer will be accepted by the Esthonians immediately without consultation with France or England, who are supporting them; (4) that free access to Esthonian harbors and free use of Esthonian railroads will be a.s.sured the Soviet Government.
7. _The Lithuanian situation_.--It is fairly well understood that the Lithuanian Government that is fighting the Bolsheviks is not going to allow itself to be made a tool by the French and British Governments to invade Russian territory. The Lithuanian Government is desirous of securing possession of Lithuanian territory, but beyond that it is understood it will not go.
8. _The Finnish situation_.--The Soviet Government is in close touch with the Finnish situation and has little fear of an invasion of Russia from that direction. The Finnish Army is without question a third Red; probably a half Red; possibly two-thirds Red. There is even reported to be a tendency on a part of certain of the White Guards to oppose intervention in Russia. One of the Finnish regiments in Esthonia has returned to Finland, and it is supposed that it will a.s.sist the proposed revolution of the Finns in East Karelia against the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government has sent a committee to Helsingfors to arrange economic relations with Finland, and it is said that this committee carries threats of reprisals on the part of the Soviet Government against the Finns in Petrograd unless the treaty is negotiated. It is said in Petrograd that some of the Finns have already left Petrograd in antic.i.p.ation that the Finnish Government will not be permitted to make any arrangement with the Soviet Government because of the att.i.tude of certain of the allied representatives in Helsingfors.
9. _Improvement in food conditions_.--The suspension of pa.s.senger traffic from March 18 to April 10 has resulted in the Government bringing to Petrograd 60 to 100 cars of food each day, and one sees large quant.i.ties of food being transported about the city.
At Easter time it is hoped to be able to give 3 pounds of white bread to the population of Petrograd. There also seems to be a larger supply of food for private purchase in the city. Mr.
Shiskin has recently been able to buy 3 geese, a sucking pig, 2 splendid legs of veal, and roasts of beef at from 40 to 50 rubles a pound, which, considering the value of the ruble, is much less than it sounds. Shiskin has also been able recently to get eggs, milk, honey, and b.u.t.ter, together with potatoes, carrots, and cabbage. My bill for food for 11 days with Mr. Shiskin was about 1,300 rubles.
10. _Order in Petrograd_.--About three weeks ago there were several strikes in factories in Petrograd and Lenin came to talk to the strikers. Apparently the matter was settled satisfactorily and the workers were given the same bread rations that the soldiers receive. At the Putilov works some 400 men struck and part of them were dismissed. Both Shatov and the director of factories said that there were no executions, though the population the next morning reported 80 workers shot and that afternoon the rumor had increased the number to 400. There is practically no robbery in the city. Shatov left the opera the other night early because he told me the previous night a man had lost 5,000 rubles and it was such an exceptional thing to have a robbery that he was going out personally to investigate the matter, having some idea as to who was responsible.
11. _Currency plans_.--Zorin tells me that the Soviet Government has or had printed a new issue of currency which it is proposed to exchange for the old currency within the next three months. The details of the plan have not been completed but he thinks that an exchange of ruble for ruble will be made up to 3,000; an additional 2,000 will be placed on deposit in the government bank. That beyond 5,000 only a small percentage will be allowed to any one, and that a limit of possibly 15,000 will be placed beyond which no rubles will be exchanged. Then the plan is, after a certain period to declare the old ruble valueless. Zorin feels that as a result of this plan the new ruble will have some value and that the present situation in the country in which the farmer has so much paper that he refuses to sell any longer for money, will be relieved. This exchange would be followed later on by the issue of still other currency the entire purpose being the more equal distribution of wealth and the gradual approach to elimination of currency.
12. _Concessions_.--It is a.s.serted that the northern railway concession has been signed and Amundsen tells me that all negotiations were accomplished without the payment of a single cent of tea money, probably the first instance of the absence of graft in such negotiations in the history of Russia. He says that Trepov, through his agent Borisov, at Moscow, was the greatest opponent of the Norwegian interests. Trepov was formerly minister of ways and communications and is reported to have been refused a similar concession under the Czar"s government. Amundsen claims that Trepov has made every effort to secure this concession from the Soviet Government. I am attaching a statement regarding a concession which is supposed to have been granted to the lumber interests. There are rumors that other concessions have been granted.
13. _Y.M.C.A._--Recently the Y.M.C.A. secretary arrived in Petrograd, claiming to have come without authorization from his superiors. He has been staying at the emba.s.sy but recently went to Moscow at the invitation of Tchitcherin.
Schklovsky tells me that the American has plans for the establishment of the Y.M.C.A. in Russia which he wanted to put before the Moscow government. Schklovsky doubted that it would be feasible to organize in Russia at present a branch of the International a.s.sociation unless some rather fundamental modifications were made in their policy.
14. _Treadwell_.--I have twice asked Schklovsky to secure information regarding Treadwell, and he a.s.sures me that he has taken the matter up with Moscow, but that apparently they have had no news from Tashkent as yet. He promised to let me know as soon as anything was heard.
15. _Att.i.tude toward United States_.--The degree of confidence which the Russians and the soviet officials show toward our Government is to me a matter of surprise, considering our activities during the past 18 months. There seems to be no question in the minds of the officials in Petrograd whom I have met that we are going to give them an opportunity to develop a more stable form of government, and they apparently look upon President Wilson as one who is going to decide the question on its merits without being influenced by the enormous pressure of the Russian emigres and the French Government. Doubtless part of this att.i.tude is due to the favorable impression created by Mr. Bullitt, but much of it must be the result of information which they have secured from the press. At the present moment the United States has the opportunity of demonstrating to the Russian people its friendship and cementing the bonds which already exist. Russia believes in us, and a little a.s.sistance to Russia in its present crisis will result in putting the United States in a position in Russia which can never be overthrown by Germany or any other power.
16. _Social work_.--I have recently sent a cable from Helsingfors regarding health and sanitary conditions in Petrograd, a copy of which I am attaching. I have spent the past two weeks visiting schools and the children"s home in Petrograd. There are 30,000 children for whom homes have been provided in the past nine months, and preparations are being made to house 10,000 more. Homes of emigres are being taken over and groups of 40 children placed in them under the care of able instructors; where the children are old enough they go to school during the daytime. A beautiful home life has been developed. The children are well fed and well clothed, and there is a minimum of sickness among them.
At the present time, when so much disease exists in Petrograd, and when there is so much starvation, the healthy appearance of these thousands of children, together with the well-fed condition of children who are not in inst.i.tutions, but are receiving free meals in schools, is a demonstration of the social spirit behind much of the activities of the present government. I shall send later a more detailed statement of some of the interesting things I have learned about this phase of the activities of the new regime.
17. _Conclusion_.--In this rather hastily dictated memorandum which Mr. Francis is going to take tonight to Paris I have tried to point out some of the things that have interested me in Petrograd. Naturally I have emphasized the brighter side, for the vast amount of absolutely false news manufactured in Helsingfors and Stockholm and sent out through the world seems to me to necessitate the emphasizing of some of the more hopeful features of the present government. Naturally the character of the Russian people has not changed to any great extent in 18 months, and there is doubtless corruption, and there is certainly inefficiency and ignorance and a hopeless failure to grasp the new principles motivating the government on the part of many of the people. A people subjected to the treatment which Russians have had during the last 200 years can not in one generation be expected to change very greatly, but personally I feel the present government has made a vast improvement on the government of the Czar as I knew it in 1916-17. Without doubt the majority of the people in Petrograd are opposed to allied intervention or revolution and wish the present government to be given a fair chance to work out the salvation of Russia. One of the most hopeful symptoms of the present government is its willingness to acknowledge mistakes when they are demonstrated and to adopt new ideas which are worth while. Personally I am heart and soul for some action on the part of the United States Government which will show our sincere intention to permit the Russian people to solve their own problems with what a.s.sistance they may require from us. STOCKHOLM, April 4 1919.
SOCIAL WORK IN PETROGRAD