And, when French returned to these lines, he fell in on Griffin"s left.
About noon of Sunday, then, the patient and in no wise discouraged Union Army lay as described, while in its front stood the weary Army of Northern Virginia, with ranks thinned and leaders gone, but with the pride of success, hardly fought for and n.o.bly earned, to reward it for all the dangers and hardships of the past few days.
Gen. Lee, having got his forces into a pa.s.sable state of re-organization, began to reconnoitre the Federal position, with a view to another a.s.sault upon it. It was his belief that one more hearty effort would drive Hooker across the river; and he was ready to make it, at whatever cost. But, while engaged in the preparation for such an attempt, he received news from Fredericksburg which caused him to look anxiously in that direction.
XXV. SUNDAY"S MISCARRIAGE.
The operations of Sunday morning, in common with many of our battles, furnish scarcely more than a narrative of isolated combats, having more or less remote or immediate effect upon each other.
The difficulty of the ground over which our armies were constantly called upon to manoeuvre explains "why the numerous b.l.o.o.d.y battles fought between the armies of the Union and of the secessionists should have been so indecisive. A proper understanding of the country, too, will help to relieve the Americans from the charge, so frequently made at home and abroad, of want of generalship in handling troops in battle,-battles that had to be fought out hand to hand in forests, where artillery and cavalry could play no part; where the troops could not be seen by those controlling their movements; where the echoes and reverberations of sound from tree to tree were enough to appall the strongest hearts engaged, and yet the noise would often be scarcely heard beyond the immediate scene of strife. Thus the generals on either side, shut out from sight and from hearing, had to trust to the unyielding bravery of their men till couriers from the different parts of the field, often extending for miles, brought word which way the conflict was resulting, before sending the needed support. We should not wonder that such battles often terminated from the mutual exhaustion of both contending forces, but rather, that, in all these struggles of Americans against Americans, no panic on either side gave victory to the other, like that which the French under Moreau gained over the Austrians in the Black Forest." (Warren.)
The Confederates had their general plan of action, viz., to drive their opponents from the Chancellor House, in order to re-unite their right and left wings, and to obtain possession of the direct road to Fredericksburg, where lay Early and Barksdale. To accomplish this end, they attacked the centre of Hooker"s army,-the right centre particularly,-which blocked their way towards both objects.
It had been no difficult task to divine their purpose. Indeed, it is abundantly shown that Hooker understood it, in his testimony already quoted. But, if he needed evidence of the enemy"s plans, he had acquired full knowledge, shortly after dawn, that the bulk of Stuart"s corps was still confronting Sickles and Williams, where they had fought the evening before; and that Anderson and McLaws had not materially changed their position in front of Geary and Hanc.o.c.k. He could have ascertained, by an early morning reconnoissance, (indeed, his corps-commanders did so on their own responsibility,) that there was no enemy whatsoever confronting his right and left flanks, where three corps, the First, Fifth, and Eleventh, lay chafing with eagerness to engage the foe. And the obvious thing to do was to leave a curtain of troops to hold these flanks, which were protected by almost insuperable natural obstacles, as well as formidable intrenchments, and hold the superfluous troops well in hand, as a central reserve, in the vicinity of headquarters, to be launched against the attacking columns of the enemy, wherever occasion demanded.
Hooker still had in line at Chancellorsville, counting out his losses of Sat.u.r.day, over eighty-five thousand men. Lee had not exceeding half the number. But every musket borne by the Army of Northern Virginia was put to good use; every round of ammunition was made to tell its story. On the other hand, of the effective of the Army of the Potomac, barely a quarter was fought au fond, while at least one-half the force for duty was given no opportunity to burn a cartridge, to aid in checking the onset of the elated champions of the South.
Almost any course would have been preferable to Hooker"s inertness. There was a variety of opportune diversions to make. Reynolds, with his fresh and eager corps, held the new right, protected in his front by Hunting Run. It would have been easy at any time to project a strong column from his front, and take Stuart"s line of battle in reverse. Indeed, a short march of three miles by the Ely"s Ford, Haden"s Ford, and Greenwood Gold Mines roads, none of which were held by the enemy, would have enabled Reynolds to strike Stuart in rear of his left flank, or seize Dowdall"s clearing by a coup de main, and absolutely negative all Stuart"s efforts in front of Fairview. Or an advance through the forest would have accomplished the same end. To be sure, the ground was difficult, and cut up by many brooks and ravines; but such ground had been, in this campaign, no obstacle to the Confederates. Nor would it have been to Reynolds, had he been given orders to execute such a manoeuvre. Gen. Doubleday states in his testimony: "The action raged with the greatest fury near us on our left." "I thought that the simple advance of our corps would take the enemy in flank, and would be very beneficial in its results. Gen. Reynolds once or twice contemplated making this advance on his own responsibility. Col. Stone made a reconnoissance, showing it to be practicable."
The same thing applies to the Eleventh and portions of the Fifth Corps on the left. A heavy column could have been despatched by the Mine and River roads to attack McLaws"s right flank. Barely three miles would have sufficed, over good roads, to bring such a column into operating distance of McLaws. It may be said that the Eleventh Corps was not fit for such work, after its defeat of Sat.u.r.day night. But testimony is abundant to show that the corps was fully able to do good service early on Sunday morning, and eager to wipe off the stain with which its flight from Dowdall"s had blotted its new and cherished colors. But, if Hooker was apprehensive of trusting these men so soon again, he could scarcely deem them incapable of holding the intrenchments; and this left Meade available for the work proposed.
Instead, then, of relying upon the material ready to his hand, Hooker conceived that his salvation lay in the efforts of his flying wing under Sedgwick, some fifteen miles away. He fain would call on Hercules instead of putting his own shoulder to the wheel. His calculations were that Sedgwick, whom he supposed to be at Franklin"s and Pollock"s crossings, three or four miles below Fredericksburg, could mobilize his corps, pa.s.s the river, capture the heights, where in December a few Southern brigades had held the entire Army of the Potomac at bay, march a dozen miles, and fall upon Lee"s rear, all in the brief s.p.a.ce of four or five hours. And it was this plan he chose to put into execution, deeming others equal to the performance of impossibilities, while himself could not compa.s.s the easiest problems under his own eye.
To measure the work thus cut out for Sedgwick, by the rule of the performances of the wing immediately commanded by Gen. Hooker, would be but fair. But Sedgwick"s execution of his orders must stand on its own merits. And his movements are fully detailed elsewhere.
An excuse often urged in palliation of Hooker"s sluggishness, is that he was on Sunday morning severely disabled. Hooker was standing, between nine and ten A.M., on the porch of the Chancellor House, listening to the heavy firing at the Fairview crest, when a sh.e.l.l struck and dislodged one of the pillars beside him, which toppled over, struck and stunned him; and he was doubtless for a couple of hours incapacitated for work.
But the accident was of no great moment. Hooker does not appear to have entirely turned over the command to Couch, his superior corps-commander, but to have merely used him as his mouthpiece, retaining the general direction of affairs himself.
And this furnishes no real apology. Hooker"s thorough inability to grasp the situation, and handle the conditions arising from the responsibility of so large a command, dates from Thursday noon, or at latest Friday morning. And from this time his enervation was steadily on the increase. For the defeat of the Army of the Potomac in Sunday morning"s conflict was already a settled fact, when Hooker failed at early dawn so to dispose his forces as to sustain Sickles and Williams if over-matched, or to broach some counter-manoeuvre to draw the enemy"s attention to his own safety.
It is an ungracious task to heap so much blame upon any one man. But the odium of this defeat has for years been borne by those who are guiltless of the outcome of the campaign of Chancellorsville; and the prime source of this fallacy has been Hooker"s ever-ready self-exculpation by misinterpreted facts and unwarranted conclusions, while his subordinates have held their peace. And this is not alone for the purpose of vindicating the fair fame of the Army of the Potomac and its corps-commanders, but truth calls for no less. And it is desired to reiterate what has already been said,-that it is in all appreciation of Hooker"s splendid qualities as a lieutenant, that his inactivity in this campaign is dwelt upon. No testimony need be given to sustain Hooker"s courage: no man ever showed more. No better general ever commanded an army corps in our service: this is abundantly vouched for. But Hooker could not lead an hundred thousand men; and, unlike his predecessor, he was unable to confess it. Perhaps he did not own it to himself. Certainly his every explanation of this campaign involved the shifting of the onus of his defeat to the shoulders of his subordinates,-princ.i.p.ally Howard and Sedgwick. And the fullest estimation of Hooker"s brilliant conduct on other fields, is in no wise incompatible with the freest censure for the disasters of this unhappy week. For truth awards praise and blame with equal hand; and truth in this case does ample justice to the brave old army, ample justice to Hooker"s n.o.ble aides.
The plan summarized by Warren probably reflected accurately the intentions of his chief, as conceived in his tent on Sat.u.r.day night. It was self-evident that Anderson and McLaws could be readily held in check, so long as Jackson"s corps was kept sundered from them. Indeed, they would have necessarily remained on the defensive so long as isolated. Instead, then, of leaving the Third Corps, and one division of the Twelfth, to confront Jackson"s magnificent infantry, had Hooker withdrawn an entire additional corps, (he could have taken two,) and thrown these troops in heavy ma.s.ses at dawn on Stuart, while Birney retained Hazel Grove, and employed his artillery upon the enemy"s flank; even the dauntless men, whose victories had so often caused them to deem themselves invincible, must have been crushed by the blows inflicted.
But there is nothing at all, on this day, in the remotest degree resembling tactical combination. And, long before the resistance of our brave troops had ceased, all chances of successful parrying of Lee"s skilful thrusts had pa.s.sed away.
Hooker"s testimony is to the effect that he was merely lighting on Sunday morning to retain possession of the road by which Sedgwick was to join him, and that his retiring to the lines at Bullock"s was predetermined.
The following extract from the records of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, ill.u.s.trates both this statement, and Hooker"s method of exculpating himself by crimination of subordinates. "Question to Gen. Hooker.-Then I understand you to say, that, not hearing from Gen. Sedgwick by eleven o"clock, you withdrew your troops from the position they held at the time you ordered Gen. Sedgwick to join you.
"Answer.-Yes, sir; not wishing to hold it longer at the disadvantage I was under. I may add here, that there is a vast difference in corps-commanders, and that it is the commander that gives tone and character to his corps. Some of our corps-commanders, and also officers of other rank, appear to be unwilling to go into a fight."
But, apart from the innuendo, all this bears the stamp of an after-thought. If an army was ever driven from its position by fair fighting, our troops were driven from Chancellorsville. And it would seem, that, if there was any reasonable doubt on Sat.u.r.day night that the Army of the Potomac could hold its own next day, it would have been wiser to have at once withdrawn to the new lines, while waiting for the arrival of Sedgwick. For here the position was almost una.s.sailable, and the troops better ma.s.sed; and, if Lee had made an unsuccessful a.s.sault, Hooker would have been in better condition to make a sortie upon the arrival of the Sixth Corps in his vicinity, than after the b.l.o.o.d.y and disheartening work at Fairview.
Still the inactivity of Hooker, when Sedgwick did eventually arrive within serviceable distance, is so entire a puzzle to the student of this campaign, that speculation upon what he did then actually a.s.sume as facts, or how he might have acted under any other given conditions, becomes almost fruitless.
XXVI. SEDGWICK"S CHANGE OF ORDERS.
Let us return to the Sixth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, where operations now demanded Lee"s undivided skill. This was properly the left wing of the army, which, under Sedgwick, had made the demonstration below Fredericksburg, to enable the right wing, under Hooker, to cross the river above, and establish itself at Chancellorsville. It had consisted of three corps; but, so soon as the demonstration had effected its purpose, it will be remembered that Hooker withdrew from Sedgwick"s command both the First and Third Corps, leaving him with his own, the Sixth, to guard the crossings of the river; while Gibbon"s division of the Second Corps did provost duty at the camp at Falmouth, and held itself in readiness to move in any direction at a moment"s notice.
From this time on, the Sixth Corps may be more properly considered as a detached command, than as the left wing of the Army of the Potomac.
And, beyond some demonstrations in aid of Hooker"s manoeuvring, Sedgwick had been called on to perform no actual service up to the evening of May 2.
On May 1, a demonstration in support of Hooker"s advance from Chancellorsville had been ordered, and speedily countermanded, on account of the despatch having reached Sedgwick later than the hour set for his advance.
On the forenoon of May 2, Hooker had given Sedgwick discretionary instructions to attack the enemy in his front, "if an opportunity presents itself with a reasonable expectation of success."
Then came the despatch of 4.10 P.M., May 2, already quoted, and received by Sedgwick just before dark:-
"The general commanding directs that Gen. Sedgwick cross the river as soon as indications will permit; capture Fredericksburg with every thing in it, and vigorously pursue the enemy. We know the enemy is flying, trying to save his trains: two of Sickles"s divisions are among them."
This despatch was immediately followed by another: "The major-general commanding directs you to pursue the enemy by the Bowling-Green road."
In pursuance of these and previous orders, Sedgwick transferred the balance of the Sixth Corps to the south side of the Rappahannock, one division being already there to guard the bridge-head. Sedgwick"s orders of May 1 contemplated the removal of the pontoons before his advance on the Bowling-Green road, as he would be able to leave no sufficient force to guard them. But these orders were received so late as daylight on the 2d; and the withdrawal of the bridges could not well be accomplished in the full view of the enemy, without prematurely developing our plans.
The order to pursue by the Bowling-Green road having been again repeated, Sedgwick put his command under arms, advanced his lines, and forced the enemy-Early"s right-from that road and back into the woods. This was late in the evening of Sat.u.r.day.
On the same night, after the crushing of the Eleventh Corps, we have seen how Hooker came to the conclusion that he could utilize Sedgwick in his operations at Chancellorsville. He accordingly sent him the following order, first by telegraph through Gen. b.u.t.terfield, at the same time by an aide-de-camp, and later by Gen. Warren:-
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, May 2, 1863, 9 P.M.
GEN. b.u.t.tERFIELD, The major-general commanding directs that Gen. Sedgwick crosses the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg on the receipt of this order, and at once take up his line of march on the Chancellorsville road until you connect with us, and he will attack and destroy any force he may fall in with on the road. He will leave all his trains behind, except the pack-train of small ammunition, and march to be in our vicinity at daylight. He will probably fall upon the rear of the forces commanded by Gen. Lee, and between us we will use him up. Send word to Gen. Gibbon to take possession of Fredericksburg. Be sure not to fail. Deliver this by your swiftest messenger. Send word that it is delivered to Gen. Sedgwick.
J. H. VAN ALEN, Brigadier-General and Aide-de-Camp.
(Copy sent Gen. Sedgwick ten P.M.) At eleven P.M., when this order of ten o"clock was received, Sedgwick had his troops placed, and his dispositions taken, to carry out the orders to pursue, on the Bowling-Green road, an enemy indicated to him as in rapid retreat from Hooker"s front; and was actually in bivouac along that road, while a strong picket-line was still engaged skirmishing with the force in his front. By this time the vanguard of his columns had proceeded a distance variously given as from one to three miles below the bridges in this direction; probably near the Bernard House, not much beyond Deep Creek.
It is to be presumed that the aide who bore the despatch, and reached Sedgwick later than the telegram, gave some verbal explanation of this sudden change of Hooker"s purpose; but the order itself was of a nature to excite considerable surprise, if not to create a feeling of uncertainty.
Sedgwick changed his dispositions as speedily as possible, and sent out his orders to his subordinates within fifteen minutes after receipt of Hooker"s despatch; but it was considerably after midnight before he could actually get his command faced about, and start the new head of column toward Fredericksburg.
Knowing the town to be occupied by the Confederates, Sedgwick was obliged to proceed with reasonable caution the five or six miles which separated his command from Fredericksburg. And the enemy appears to have been sufficiently on the alert to take immediate measures to check his progress as effectually as it could with the troops at hand.
Fredericksburg and the heights beyond were held by Early"s division and Barksdale"s brigade, with an adequate supply of artillery,-in all some eighty-five hundred men. Sedgwick speaks, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, as if he understood at this time that Early controlled a force as large as his own; but he had been advised by b.u.t.terfield that the force was judged to be much smaller than it actually was.
In his report, Early does not mention Sedgwick"s advance on the Bowling-Green road, nor is it probable that Sedgwick had done more than to advance a strong skirmish-line beyond his column in that direction. Early"s line lay, in fact, upon the heights back of the road, his right at Hamilton"s Crossing, and with no considerable force on the road itself. So that Sedgwick"s advance was skirmishing with scouting-parties, sent out to impede his march.
Early had received general instructions from Lee, in case Sedgwick should remove from his front, to leave a small force to hold the position, and proceed up the river to join the forces at Chancellorsville. About eleven A.M. on the 2d, this order was repeated, but by error in delivery (says Lee) made unconditional. Early, therefore, left Hays and one regiment of Barksdale at Fredericksburg, and, sending part of Pendleton"s artillery to the rear, at once began to move his command along the plank road to join his chief.
As this manoeuvre was in progress, his attention was called to the early movements of Sedgwick, and, sending to Lee information on this point, he received in reply a correction of the misdelivered order. He therefore about-faced, and returned to his position at a rapid gait.