It is doubtful whether by daylight, and without any considerable opposition, Sedgwick could have marched the fifteen miles to Chancellorsville in the few hours allotted him. Nor is it claimed by Hooker that it was possible for Sedgwick to obey the order of ten P.M. literally; for it was issued under the supposition that Sedgwick was still on the north bank of the river. But Hooker does allege that Sedgwick took no pains to keep him informed of what he was doing; whence his incorrect a.s.sumption. To recross the river for the purpose of again crossing at Fredericksburg would have been a lame interpretation of the speedy execution of the order urged upon Sedgwick. He accordingly shifted his command, and, in a very short time after receiving the despatch, began to move by the flank on the Bowling-Green road towards Fredericksburg, Newton"s division in the advance, Howe following, while Brooks still held the bridge-head.
It was a very foggy night; which circ.u.mstance, added to the fact that Sedgwick was, in common with all our generals, only imperfectly familiar with the lay of the land, and that the enemy, active and well-informed, enveloped him with a curtain of light troops, to hara.s.s his movement in whatever direction, materially contributed to the delay which ensued.
And Sedgwick appears to have encountered Early"s pickets, and to have done some skirmishing with the head of his column, immediately after pa.s.sing west of Franklin"s Crossing, which, moreover, gave rise to some picket-firing all along the line, as far as Deep Run, where Bartlett confronted the enemy. As the outskirts of the town were entered, four regiments of Wheaton"s and Shaler"s brigades were sent forward against the rifle-pits of the enemy, and a gallant a.s.sault was made by them. But it was repulsed, with some loss, by the Confederates, who, as on Dec. 13, patiently lay behind the stone wall and rifle-pits, and reserved their fire until our column was within twenty yards. Then the regiments behind the stone wall, followed by the guns and infantry on the heights, opened a fire equally sudden and heavy, and drove our columns back upon the main body. The a.s.sault had been resolute, as the casualties testify, "one regiment alone losing sixty-four men in as many seconds" (Wheaton); but the darkness, and uncertainty of our officers with regard to the position, made its failure almost a foregone conclusion. This was about daylight. "The force displayed by the enemy was sufficient to show that the intrenchments could not be carried except at great cost." (Sedgwick.)
The officer by whom the order to Sedgwick had been sent, Capt. Raderitzchin, had not been regularly appointed in orders, but was merely a volunteer aide-de-camp on Gen. Hooker"s staff.
Shortly after he had been despatched, Gen. Warren requested leave himself to carry a duplicate of the order to Sedgwick, (Capt. Raderitzchin being "a rather inexperienced, headlong young man,") for Warren feared the "bad effect such an impossible order would have on Gen. Sedgwick and his commanders, when delivered by him." And, knowing Warren to be more familiar with the country than any other available officer, Hooker detached him on this duty, with instructions again to impress upon Sedgwick the urgent nature of the orders. Warren, with an aide, left headquarters about midnight, and reached Sedgwick before dawn.
As daylight approached, Warren thought he could see that only two field-pieces were on Marye"s heights, and that no infantry was holding the rifle-pits to our right of it. But the stone-wall breastworks were held in sufficient force, as was demonstrated by the repulse of the early a.s.sault of Shaler and Wheaton.
And Warren was somewhat in error. Barksdale, who occupied Fredericksburg, had been closely scanning these movements of Sedgwick"s. He had some fourteen hundred men under his command. Six field-pieces were placed near the Marye house. Several full batteries were on Lee"s hill, and near Howison"s. And, so soon as Fredericksburg was occupied by our forces, Early sent Hays to re-enforce Barksdale; one regiment of his brigade remaining on Barksdale"s right, and the balance proceeding to Stansbury"s.
For, at daylight on Sunday, Early had received word from Barksdale, whose lines at Fredericksburg were nearly two miles in length, that the Union forces had thrown a bridge across the river opposite the Lacy house; and immediately despatched his most available brigade to sustain him.
Early"s line, however, was thin. Our own was quite two and a half miles in length, with some twenty-two thousand men; and Early"s eighty-five hundred overlapped both our flanks. But his position sufficiently counterbalanced this inequality. Moreover his artillery was well protected, while the Union batteries were quite without cover, and in Gibbon"s attempted advance, his guns suffered considerable damage.
Brooks"s division was still on the left of the Federal line, near the bridge-heads. Howe occupied the centre, opposite the forces on the heights, to our left of Hazel Run. Newton held the right as far as the Telegraph road in Fredericksburg.
Gibbon"s division had been ordered by b.u.t.terfield to cross to Fredericksburg, and second Sedgwick"s movement on the right. Gibbon states that he was delayed by the opposition of the enemy to his laying the bridge opposite the Lacy house, but this was not considerable. He appears to have used reasonable diligence, though he did not get his bridge thrown until daylight. Then he may have been somewhat tardy in getting his twenty-five hundred men across. And, by the time he got his bridge thrown, Sedgwick had possession of the town.
It was seven A.M. when Gibbon had crossed the river with his division, and filed into position on Sedgwick"s right. Gibbon had meanwhile reported in person to Sedgwick, who ordered him to attempt to turn the enemy"s left at Marye"s, while Howe should open a similar movement on his right at Hazel Run. Gens. Warren and Gibbon at once rode forward to make a reconnoissance, but could discover no particular force of the enemy in our front. Just here are two ca.n.a.ls skirting the slope of the hill, and parallel to the river, which supply power to the factories in the town. The generals pa.s.sed the first ca.n.a.l, and found the bridge across it intact. The planks of the second ca.n.a.l-bridge had been removed, but the structure itself was still sound.
Gibbon at once ordered these planks to be replaced from the nearest houses. But, before this order could be carried out, Warren states that he saw the enemy marching his infantry into the breastworks on the hill, followed by a battery. This was Hays, coming to Barksdale"s relief. But the breastworks contained a fair complement before.
Gibbon"s attempt was rendered nugatory by the bridge over the second ca.n.a.l being commanded from the heights, the guns on which opened upon our columns with shrapnel, while the gunners were completely protected by their epaulements. And a further attempt by Gibbon to cross the ca.n.a.l by the bridge near Falmouth, was antic.i.p.ated by the enemy extending his line to our right.
Gen. Warren states that Gen. Gibbon "made a very considerable demonstration, and acted very handsomely with the small force he had,-not more than two thousand men. But so much time was taken, that the enemy got more troops in front of him than he could master."
Gen. Howe had been simultaneously directed to move on the left of Hazel Run, and turn the enemy"s right; but he found the works in his front beset, and the character of the stream between him and Newton precluded any movement of his division to the right.
By the time, then, that Sedgwick had full possession of the town, and Gibbon and Howe had returned from their abortive attempt to turn the enemy"s flanks, the sun was some two hours high. As the works could not be captured by surprise, Sedgwick was reduced to the alternative of a.s.saulting them in regular form.
It is not improbable that an earlier attack by Gibbon on Marye"s heights, might have carried them with little loss, and with so much less expense of time that Sedgwick could have pushed beyond Salem Church, without being seriously impeded by troops sent against him by Gen. Lee.
And, as the allegation of all-but criminal delay on the part of Gen. Sedgwick is one of the cardinal points of Hooker"s self-defence on the score of this campaign, we must examine this charge carefully.
Sedgwick a.s.serts with truth, that all despatches to him a.s.sumed that he had but a handful of men in his front, and that the conclusions as to what he could accomplish, were founded upon utterly mistaken premises. Himself was well aware that the enemy extended beyond both his right and left, and the corps knew by experience the nature of the intrenchments on the heights.
Moreover, what had misled b.u.t.terfield into supposing, and informing Sedgwick, as he did, that the Fredericksburg heights had been abandoned, was a balloon observation of Early"s march to join Lee under the mistaken orders above alluded to. The enemy was found to be alert wherever Sedgwick tapped him, and his familiarity with every inch of the ground enabled him to magnify his own forces, and make every man tell; while Sedgwick was groping his way through the darkness, knowing his enemy"s ability to lure him into an ambuscade, and taking his precautions accordingly.
XXVII. SEDGWICK"S a.s.sAULT.
Now, when Sedgwick had concluded upon a general a.s.sault, he can scarcely be blamed for over-caution in his preparations for it. Four months before, a mere handful of the enemy had successfully held these defences against half the Army of the Potomac; and an attack without careful dispositions seemed to be mere waste of life. It would appear to be almost supererogatory to defend Sedgwick against reasonable time consumed in these precautions.
There had been a more or less continuous artillery-fire, during the entire morning, from our batteries stationed on either side of the river. This was now redoubled to prepare for the a.s.sault. Newton"s batteries concentrated their fire on the stone wall, until our troops had neared it, when they directed it upon the crest beyond; while like action was effected to sustain Howe.
Instructions were issued to the latter, who at once proceeded to form three storming columns under Gen. Neill, Col. Grant, and Col. Seaver, and supported them by the fire of his division artillery.
Sedgwick at the same time ordered out from Newton"s division two other columns, one under Col. Spear, consisting of two regiments, supported by two more under Gen. Shaler, and one under Col. Johns of equal size, to move on the plank road, and to the right of it, flanked by a line under Col. Burnham, with four regiments, on the left of the plank road. This line advanced manfully at a double-quick against the rifle-pits, neither halting nor firing a shot, despite the heavy fire they encountered, until they had driven the enemy from their lower line of works, while the columns pressed boldly forward to the crest, and carried the works in their rear. All the guns and many prisoners were captured. This was a mettlesome a.s.sault, and as successful as it was brief and determined.
Howe"s columns, in whose front the Confederate skirmishers occupied the railroad-cutting and embankment, while Hays and two regiments of Barksdale were on Lee"s and adjacent hills, as soon as the firing on his right was heard, moved to the a.s.sault with the bayonet; Neill and Grant pressing straight for Cemetery hill, which, though warmly received, they carried without any check. They then faced to the right, and, with Seaver sustaining their left, carried the works on Marye"s heights, capturing guns and prisoners wholesale.
A stand was subsequently attempted by the Confederates on several successive crests, but without avail.
The loss of the Sixth Corps in the a.s.sault on the Fredericksburg heights was not far from a thousand men, including Cols. Spear and Johns, commanding two of the storming columns.
The a.s.sault of Howe falls in no wise behind the one made by Newton. The speedy success of both stands out in curious contrast to the deadly work of Dec. 13. "So rapid had been the final movement on Marye"s hill, that Hays and Wilc.o.x, to whom application had been made for succor, had not time to march troops from Taylor"s and Stansbury"s to Barksdale"s aid." (Hotchkiss and Allan.)
The Confederates were now cut in two: Wilc.o.x and Hays were left north of the plank road, but Hays retreated round the head of Sedgwick"s column, and rejoined Early. Wilc.o.x, who, on hearing of Sedgwick"s manoeuvres Sunday morning, had hurried with a portion of his force to Barksdale"s a.s.sistance at Taylor"s, but had arrived too late to partic.i.p.ate in the action, on ascertaining Sedgwick"s purpose, retired slowly down the plank road, and skirmished with the latter"s head of column. And he made so determined a stand near Guest"s, that considerable time was consumed in brushing it away before Sedgwick could hold on his course.
Early appears to deem the carrying of the Fredericksburg heights to require an excuse on his part. He says in his report about our preliminary a.s.saults: "All his efforts to attack the left of my line were thwarted, and one attack on Marye"s hill was repulsed. The enemy, however, sent a flag of truce to Col. Griffin, of the Eighteenth Mississippi Regiment, who occupied the works at the foot of Marye"s hill with his own and the Twenty-first Mississippi Regiment, which was received by him imperfectly; and it had barely returned before heavy columns were advanced against the position, and the trenches were carried, and the hill taken." "After this the artillery on Lee"s hill, and the rest of Barksdale"s infantry, with one of Hays"s regiments, fell back on the Telegraph road; Hays with the remainder being compelled to fall back upon the plank road as he was on the left." Later, "a line was formed across the Telegraph road, at c.o.x"s house, about two miles back of Lee"s hill."
Barksdale says, "With several batteries under the command of Gen. Pendleton, and a single brigade of infantry, I had a front of not less than three miles to defend, extending from Taylor"s hill on the left, to the foot of the hills in the rear of the Howison house."
Gen. Wilc.o.x, he goes on to state, from Banks"s Ford, had come up with three regiments as far as Taylor"s, and Gen. Hays was also in that vicinity; but "the distance from town to the points a.s.sailed was so short, the attack so suddenly made, and the difficulty of removing troops from one part of the line to another was so great, that it was utterly impossible for either Gen. Wilc.o.x or Gen. Hays to reach the scene of action in time to afford any a.s.sistance whatever. It will then be seen that Marye"s hill was defended by but one small regiment, three companies, and four pieces of artillery."
Barksdale further states that, "upon the pretext of taking care of their wounded, the enemy asked a flag of truce, after the second a.s.sault at Marye"s hill, which was granted by Col. Griffin; and thus the weakness of our force at that point was discovered."
The bulk of Early"s division was holding the heights from Hazel Run to Hamilton"s Crossing; and the sudden a.s.sault on the Confederate positions at Marye"s, and the hills to the west, gave him no opportunity of sustaining his forces there. But it is not established that any unfair use was made of the flag of truce mentioned by Barksdale.
The loss in this a.s.sault seems heavy, when the small force of Confederates is considered. The artillery could not do much damage, inasmuch as the guns could not be sufficiently depressed, but the infantry fire was very telling; and, as already stated, both colonels commanding the a.s.saulting columns on the right were among the casualties.
The enemy"s line being thus cut in twain, sundering those at Banks"s Ford and on the left of the Confederate line from Early at Hamilton"s Crossing, it would now have been easy for Sedgwick to have dispersed Early"s forces, and to have destroyed the depots at the latter place. But orders precluded anything but an immediate advance.
The question whether Sedgwick could have complied with his instructions, so as to reach Hooker in season to relieve him from a part of Lee"s pressure on Sunday morning, is answered by determining whether it was feasible to carry the Fredericksburg heights before or at daylight. If this could have been done, it is not unreasonable to a.s.sume that he could have left a rear-guard, to occupy Early"s attention and forestall attacks on his marching column, and have reached, with the bulk of his corps, the vicinity of Chancellorsville by the time the Federals were hardest pressed, say ten A.M., and most needed a diversion in their favor.
Not that Hooker"s salvation in any measure depended on Sedgwick"s so doing. Hooker had the power in his own hand, if he would only use it. But it should be determined whether Hooker had any legitimate ground for fault-finding.
Putting aside the question of time, Sedgwick"s whole manoeuvre is good enough. It was as well executed as any work done in this campaign, and would have given abundant satisfaction had not so much more been required of him. But, remembering that time was of the essence of his orders, it may be as well to quote the criticism of Warren-
"It takes some men just as long to clear away a little force as it does a large one. It depends entirely upon the man, how long a certain force will stop him."
"The enemy had left about one division, perhaps ten thousand or twelve thousand men, at Fredericksburg, to watch him. They established a kind of picket-line around his division, so that he could not move any thing without their knowing it. Just as soon as Gen. Sedgwick began to move, a little random fire began, and that was kept up till daylight. At daylight, the head of Gen. Sedgwick"s troops had got into Fredericksburg. I think some little attempt had been made to move forward a skirmish-line, but that had been repulsed. The enemy had considerable artillery in position."
"My opinion was, that, under the circ.u.mstances, the most vigorous effort possible ought to have been made, without regard to circ.u.mstances, because the order was peremptory." But this statement is qualified, when, in his examination before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, to a question as to whether, in his opinion, Gen. Sedgwick"s vigorous and energetic attempt to comply with Hooker"s order would have led to a different result of the battle, Warren answered: "Yes, sir! and I will go further, and say that I think there might have been more fighting done at the other end of the line. I do not believe that if Gen. Sedgwick had done all he could, and there had not been harder fighting on the other end of the line, we would have succeeded."
If, at eleven P.M., when Sedgwick received the order, he had immediately marched, regardless of what was in his front, straight through the town, and up the heights beyond, paying no heed whatever to the darkness of the night, but pushing on his men as best he might, it is not improbable that he could have gained the farther side of this obstacle by daylight. But is it not also probable that his corps would have been in questionable condition for either a march or a fight? It would be extravagant to expect that the organization of the corps could be preserved in any kind of form, however slight the opposition. And, as daylight came on, the troops would have scarcely been in condition to offer brilliant resistance to the attack, which Early, fully apprised of all their movements, would have been in position to make upon their flank and rear.
Keeping in view all the facts,-that Sedgwick was on unknown ground, with an enemy in his front, familiar with every inch of it and with Sedgwick"s every movement; that he had intrenchments to carry where a few months before one man had been more than a match for ten; that the night was dark and foggy; and that he was taken unawares by this order,-it seems that to expect him to carry the heights before daylight, savors of exorbitance.
But it may fairly be acknowledged, that more delay can be discovered in some of the operations of this night and morning, than the most rigorous construction of the orders would warrant. After the repulse of Wheaton and Shaler, a heavier column should at once have been thrown against the works. Nor ought it to have taken so long, under the stringency of the instructions, to ascertain that Gibbon would be stopped by the ca.n.a.l, and Howe by Hazel Run; or perhaps to organize the a.s.saulting columns, after ascertaining that these flank attacks were fruitless.
All this, however, in no wise whatsoever shifts any part of the responsibility for the loss of this campaign, from Hooker"s to Sedgwick"s shoulders. The order of ten P.M. was ill-calculated and impracticable. Hooker had no business to count on Sedgwick"s corps as an element in his problem of Sunday at Chancellorsville.