Very respectfully, your obedient servant, WM. L. CANDLER, Captain and Aide-de-Camp.
These two orders would appear to be specific enough. The first is not modified by the second to any great extent; and the primary object of both is unmistakably to interrupt, by a bold stroke, Lee"s main communications with Richmond by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad.
The point on which the two columns, spoken of in the order of April 28, were to unite, was suggested as somewhere on the Pamunkey; and the one column was to go at once about its work, while the other masked its march, and after joined it.
Under these orders, Stoneman proceeded to get the corps together,-the distance of many outlying pickets delaying him almost a day,-and finally crossed the Rappahannock by five P.M. of the 29th, a portion of his troops using Kelly"s Ford, in connection with Sloc.u.m"s column.
He then a.s.sembled his division and brigade commanders, spread his maps before them, and made them acquainted with his orders and plans.
Averell, with his own division, Davis"s brigade of Pleasonton"s division, and Tidball"s battery, was instructed to push for Culpeper Court House; while Stoneman, with Gregg"s division, Buford"s reserve brigade, and Robertson"s battery, moved on Stevensburg.
It was expected that Averell would reach Brandy Station the same night (29th), driving before him the enemy, who was in very small force in his front. And when Stoneman got well on his way, he despatched Capt. Drummond, with a squadron, from beyond Rocky Run, by crossroads, to Brandy Station, to bring intelligence of Averell"s movements. The latter had, however, not reached that place. And, learning later in the evening that he had leisurely gone into camp, close by the place where the forces had crossed, Stoneman sent him word that he must turn the enemy in his front over to him, while himself pushed on towards Richmond.
This order read as follows:-
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, April 30, 1863.
BRIG.-GEN. AVERELL, Commanding, etc.
The major-general commanding directs me to say that we have been delayed by high water, etc., and that he desires you to push the enemy as vigorously as possible, keeping him fully occupied, and, if possible, drive him in the direction of Rapidan Station. He turns the enemy over to you.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. J. ALEXANDER, a.s.sistant Adjutant-General.
And Hooker justly claims that it was an entire misinterpretation of his instructions, which were to have Averell join Stoneman"s column, so soon as he had masked the latter"s movement towards the Aquia and Richmond Railroad.
On May 3, Averell, who had done nothing but skirmish for a couple of days with a force of about one-fifth his own, and had then retired to Ely"s Ford, and gone into camp, was relieved, and Pleasonton placed in command of his division.
The pack-mules and lead-horses of Stoneman"s column were left with the main army, till the expected junction should be made by its advance south of the Rappahannock. Stoneman had with him but five or six days" rations; but he relied upon Hooker"s a.s.surance that he would be up with him before these rations were exhausted. Every officer and man, the generals and their staffs setting the example, took with them only what they could carry on their horses. Nor, despite the cold drenching rain, which fell plentifully, were any camp-fires lighted the first few nights. Stoneman seems to have been abundantly ambitious of doing his work thoroughly, and issued stirring orders to his subordinates, calling upon them for every exertion which they were capable of making.
On reaching Racc.o.o.n Ford, over the Rapidan, Stoneman found it guarded by the Confederate cavalry. He therefore sent Buford to a point six miles below, where he was able to cross, and, marching up the south bank, to uncover Racc.o.o.n Ford. The main body was then put over.
Stoneman"s column was in the saddle by two A.M. of the 31st. But it proved to be too foggy to push on: he had as yet no guides, and he was obliged to wait for daylight.
He then hurried Gregg on to Louisa Court House, which place was reached during the night of May 1, and details were speedily set to work tearing up the railroads. Buford was sent by way of the North Anna to the same point; and at ten A.M., May 2, the entire force was at Louisa.
From here a squadron was despatched towards Gordonsville, to ascertain the meaning of the movement of several trains of troops, which had pa.s.sed up from Richmond in that direction the evening previous. Parties were also sent out to Tolersville and Frederickshall Stations, to destroy whatever material could be found there. Still another destroyed Carr"s Bridge on the North Anna.
The balance of the force was set to work to break up the Virginia Central; and for a distance of eighteen miles the telegraph, stations, tanks, and cars were burned, and the rails torn up, and bent and twisted over bonfires.
The command then marched for Yanceyville, on the South Anna, and, arriving at Thompson"s Cross-roads at ten P.M. of May 2, headquarters were established at this point.
Here Stoneman seems to have become entirely oblivious of his instructions, and to have subst.i.tuted for them ideas originating in his own brain. He a.s.sembled his officers, and informed them that "we had dropped like a sh.e.l.l in that region of country, and he intended to burst it in every direction."
Instead, therefore, of pressing with his main force for some point on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, and destroying it thoroughly, as he was particularly instructed to do, that being the one great object to be achieved, he contented himself with sending Kilpatrick with the Second New-York Cavalry, and Davis with the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, to operate, the former against the railroad-bridges over the Chickahominy, and the latter at Ashland and Atlee; and also despatched Wyndham, of the First New-Jersey Cavalry, to strike Columbia, and destroy the ca.n.a.l-aqueduct over the Rivanna river, and if possible make a dash at the railroad-bridge over the Appomattox; while two regiments under Gregg were to follow down the South Anna to destroy its bridges, followed by the Fifth United-States Cavalry to see that the destruction was complete.
These parties were directed to rally on Stoneman, who was thus left with five hundred men of Buford"s reserve, or else to push through to Gloucester Point, or Yorktown, as circ.u.mstances should dictate.
In pursuance of these orders, Gregg"s column, which, on May 2, had burned the depots at Orange Court House, on May 3, moved down the South Anna, as far as the bridge where the Fredericksburg Railroad crosses the stream, and attempted to destroy it; but finding it protected by some infantry, and a couple of guns, he seems to have decided not to attack this force, and fell back upon the reserve. On the 5th, he destroyed the bridge at Yanceyville.
Kilpatrick marched some distance by daylight on the 3d, kept himself hidden through the day, marched again at nightfall, and reached Hungary Station at daylight the 4th. Here he destroyed the depot, and several miles of road, pa.s.sed the Virginia Central at Meadow"s Bridge, which he likewise burned, with all cars and material he could find in the vicinity, and camped at night in the rear of Hanover.
On the 5th, he pushed into Gloucester Point, destroying on the way a train of fifty-six wagons, and some twenty thousand bushels of corn in depots. He captured thirty prisoners, but paroled them.
Capt. Merritt with the Second United-States Cavalry, demolished a number of bridges and fords on the South Anna, and reached Ashland Station; but was unable to destroy the bridge at this place, which was guarded by an infantry force with part of a battery.
Col. Davis, on May 3, also reached Ashland, burned the trestle south of the town, and tore up the telegraph-line. He captured and destroyed some wagon-trains, containing about a hundred wagons, fired the depot and some material at Hanover, and bivouacked seven miles from Richmond. He was, however, precluded by his orders from trying to enter the capital, though he seems to have had a good opportunity for so doing.
On May 4, at Tunstall, on the York and Richmond Railroad, he met some resistance from a force of Confederate infantry with a battery; but, retracing his steps, he turned up in due season at Gloucester Point.
Col. Wyndham moved on to Columbia, where he rendered useless a large amount of stores, a number of ca.n.a.l-boats, and several bridges over the James-River ca.n.a.l. For lack of blasting-materials he was unable to destroy the aqueduct over the Rivanna river. It was solid enough to have delayed him at least forty-eight hours. The bridge over the James river to Elk Island he burned, and damaged the locks and gates of the ca.n.a.l as far as possible. He returned to Thompson"s Cross-roads the same day with W. H. Fitz Lee at his heels.
Capt. Harrison, with a part of Buford"s reserves, had, on May 4, somewhat of a skirmish with the enemy at Fleming"s Cross-roads; but without effect upon the movements of the command. And another squadron crossed sabres with the enemy at Shannon"s.
Such prisoners as were captured by any of the parties, were paroled at the time. A considerable number captured by Stoneman were sent to Richmond in one party, with word that the Union cavalry was following close upon them.
To quote Stoneman"s own reasons, the six days" rations with which he left camp, having now been consumed, (though it would seem that there had been ample opportunity to collect as much more as was necessary from the stores destroyed); Hooker not having come up as expected; vague rumors having reached him of the defeat of the Army of the Potomac; having accomplished, as he deemed, all that he was sent to do; Averell having been withdrawn, thus leaving Lee ready to attack him,-Stoneman sent Buford with six hundred and fifty picked men to the vicinity of Gordonsville, and a small party out the Bowling-Green road, and marched his main body to Orange Court House.
At noon of the 6th, he a.s.sembled his entire command at Orange Springs; thence marched to Racc.o.o.n Ford, and crossed on the 7th.
On the 8th, the command crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly"s, having to swim about twenty yards.
Leaving Buford to guard the river from the railroad to Falmouth, he then returned to camp.
During the latter part of the time occupied by these movements, the roads had been in very bad order from the heavy rains of the 5th.
Hotchkiss and Allen say, with reference to this raid: "This failure is the more surprising from the fact that Gen. Lee had but two regiments of cavalry, those under W. H. Fitz Lee, to oppose to the large force under Stoneman, consisting of ten or eleven thousand men. The whole country in rear of the Confederate Army, up to the very fortifications of Richmond, was open to the invader. Nearly all the transportation of that army was collected at Guineas depot, eighteen miles from Chancellorsville, with little or no guard, and might have been destroyed by one-fourth of Stoneman"s force."
And further:-
"Such was the condition of the railroads and the scarcity of supplies in the country, that the Confederate commander could never acc.u.mulate more than a few days" rations ahead at Fredericksburg. To have interrupted his communications for any length of time, would have imperilled his army, or forced him to retreat."
They also claim that this column seized all the property that could be of use, found in their line of march. "The citizens were in many cases entirely stripped of the necessaries of life."
Stoneman certainly misconceived his orders. These were plainly enough to throw his main body in Lee"s rear, so as substantially to cut his communications by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad. To accomplish this, he was to mask his movement by a body of troops, which should keep whatever Confederate cavalry there might be in the vicinity of Orange Court House and Gordonsvile, busy, until his main column was beyond their reach, and then should rejoin him; and to select a rallying point on the Pamunkey, so as to be near the important scene of operations. Every thing was to be subordinate to cutting the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad.
If Stoneman had properly digested his orders, and had pushed night and day for any available point on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, he might have reached it by Sunday. A thorough destruction of Lee"s line of supply and retreat, would no doubt have so decidedly affected his strength, actual and moral, as to have seriously changed the vigor of his operations against both Hooker and Sedgwick.
Stoneman barely had time, from the lateness of his date of starting, to accomplish great results before Hooker was substantially beaten; but it would appear that he could have materially contributed to lessen the disastrous nature of the defeat, if no more.
His movements were characterized by great weakness. He did not seem to understand, that safety as well as success depended upon moving with a body large enough to accomplish results. Instead of this, he sent, to perform the most important work, bodies so small as to be unable to destroy bridges, when guarded by a few companies of infantry and a couple of guns.
And the damage done appears to have all been repaired by the time the raiders got back to camp.
Hooker"s criticism in this instance is quite just: "On the 4th, the cavalry column, under Gen. Stoneman, commenced its return. One party of it, under Gen. Kilpatrick, crossed the Aquia and Richmond Railroad; and the fact that on the 5th, the cars carried the rebel wounded and our prisoners over the road to Richmond, will show to what extent the enemy"s communications had been interrupted. An examination of the instructions Gen. Stoneman received, in connection with the official report of his operations, fully sustains me in saying that no officer ever made a greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one ever accomplished less in so doing. The effect of throwing his body of cavalry in the rear of the enemy, and on his communications, at the time it was in his power to have done it, can readily be estimated. But instead, that important arm of the army became crippled to an extent which seriously embarra.s.sed me in my subsequent operations. Soon after, Gen. Stoneman applied for and obtained a sick-leave; and I requested that it might be indefinitely extended to him. It is charitable to suppose that Gens. Stoneman and Averell did not read their orders, and determined to carry on operations in conformity with their own views and inclinations."
x.x.xVI. HOOKER"S RESUME OF THE CAMPAIGN.
Nearly two years after this campaign, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker thus speaks about the general result of the movement:-