This division is at once thrown across the pike on the first crest below Fairview, west of Chancellorsville. The artillery of the Eleventh Corps is in part re-a.s.sembled. Capt. Best, chief of artillery of the Twelfth Corps, has already trained his guns upon the advancing Confederate columns, to protect the new line. But Berry is almost alone. Hays"s brigade of the Second Corps, on his right, is his only support. The Excelsior brigade is rapidly pushed into the woods, north of the plank road; the Fourth Excelsior and the First Ma.s.sachusetts south. Carr"s brigade is kept in second line, one hundred and fifty yards in the rear. The men, with the instinctive pride of self-reliance, move up with the steadiness of veterans on drill, regardless of the stream of fugitives breaking through their intervals.
The flight of the Eleventh Corps has stampeded part of the Third Corps artillery. But it is re-a.s.sembled in short order, and at once thrown into service. Capt. Best manages by seven P.M. to get thirty-four guns into line on the crest, well served. Himself is omnipresent. Dimick"s and Winslow"s batteries under Osborn, Berry"s chief of artillery, join this line on the hill, leaving a section of Dimick on the road. And such part of the disjecta membra of the Eleventh Corps as retains semblance of organization is gathered in support of the guns. Capt. Best has begun to fire solid shot over the heads of Berry"s men into the woods beyond; and, as Gen. Lee says, the Confederate advance is checked in front of this crest by the vigorous opposition encountered.
Hurried orders are despatched to Geary to withdraw his attack, and re-occupy his breastworks. This he straightway accomplishes. Similar orders are carried to Williams. But, before the latter can retrace his steps, Jackson"s columns have reached the right of his late position. Anderson also advances against him; so that Williams is obliged to move cautiously by his left, and change front when he arrives where his line had lately joined Geary"s and, being unable to take up his old post, he goes into position, and prolongs Berry, south of the pike. It is long after dark before he ascertains his bearings, and succeeds in ma.s.sing his division where it is needed.
Anxious as Jackson is to press on,-"Give me one hour more of daylight, and I will have United-States Ford!" cries he,-he finds that he must re-establish order in his scattered forces before he can launch this night attack upon our newly formed but stubbornly maintained lines.
Nor is the darkness the most potent influence toward this end. Illy as Sickles"s advance has resulted thus far, it is now a sovereign element in the salvation of the Army of the Potomac. His force at the Furnace, Birney, Whipple, Barlow, and Pleasonton, amounts to fifteen thousand men, and over forty guns. None of these officers are the men to stand about idle. No sooner has Sickles been persuaded by a second courier,-the first he would not credit,-that the Eleventh Corps has been destroyed, and that Jackson is in his rear, than he comprehends that now, indeed, the time has come to batter Jackson"s flank. He orders his column to the right about, and moves up with all speed to the clearing, where Pleasonton has held his cavalry, near Birney"s old front.
Howard, upon being attacked, had sent hurriedly for a cavalry regiment. Pleasonton, having received orders to send him one, instructed Major Huey, commanding the Eighth Pennsylvania Cavalry, to march to Dowdall"s and report to Howard. Huey set out by the wood road which leads through Hazel Grove into the plank road. From the testimony of the persons chiefly concerned it would appear that, at the time this order was given by Pleasonton to Huey, there was at Hazel Grove, where the cavalry regiments were drawn up, no sign whatever of the disaster to Howard. There were no fugitives nor any confusion. Nor does the evidence show that Pleasonton ordered any charge on the enemy: it rather shows that Huey was not directed to go at urgent speed. And he must have been very deliberate in his movement, for by the time the cavalry had reached the vicinity of the plank road, Jackson had demolished the Eleventh Corps, and had advanced so far that the head of this cavalry column, marching by twos, suddenly came upon the Confederate lines. The officers in the lead at once gave the order to charge, and right gallantly did these intrepid hors.e.m.e.n ride down into the seething ma.s.s of exultant Confederate infantry. The shock was n.o.bly given and home, but was, of course, in the woods and against such odds, of no great effect. Thirty men and three officers, including Major Keenan, were killed. Only one Confederate report-Iverson"s-mentions this charge. Its effect was local only.
Three batteries of Whipple"s division had remained in the Hazel Grove clearing while the infantry had advanced towards the Furnace. When the rout of the Eleventh Corps became clear, these eighteen guns were ordered in battery, facing about north-west, by their commander, Capt. Huntington, and kept up a heavy fire upon the woods through which Jackson was pushing his way. Pleasonton, for his part, trained Martin"s horse-battery in the same direction. Other guns were later added to these, and all expended a good deal of ammunition on the enemy"s lines. But there was no fighting at Hazel Grove rising to the distinction of a battle. The importance given to it by Sickles and Pleasonton is not borne out by the facts. There was no Federal loss, to speak of; nor do the Confederate reports make any comment upon this phase of the battle. They probably supposed these guns to be an extension of the line of batteries at Fairview. As such they were, without question, of no inconsiderable use.
Meanwhile Birney, sending word to Barlow that they run danger of being cut off, and detailing the Twentieth Indiana and Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers as rearguard, rejoins Sickles and Pleasonton in the clearing, and both move up to sustain his flank.
So soon as Jackson"s guns gave Lee the intimation of his a.s.sault, the latter advanced upon the Union line with sufficient vigor to prevent Hooker from sending re-enforcements to his right. The attack was sharp; and a general inclination to the left was ordered, to connect with Jackson"s right as the latter brought his columns nearer. "These orders were well executed, our troops advancing up to the enemy"s intrenchments, while several batteries played with good effect upon his lines until prevented by increasing darkness." (Lee.)
McLaws reports: "My orders were to hold my position, not to engage seriously, but to press strongly so soon as it was discovered that Gen. Jackson had attacked... when I ordered an advance along the whole line to engage with the skirmishers, which were largely re-enforced, and to threaten, but not attack seriously; in doing which Gen. Wofford became so seriously engaged, that I directed him to withdraw, which was done in good order, his men in good spirits, after driving the enemy to their intrenchments."
The movement of Anderson towards the left made a gap of considerable distance in the Confederate line "but the skirmishers of Gen. Semmes, the entire Tenth Georgia, were perfectly reliable, and kept the enemy to his intrenchments."
These accounts vary in no wise from those of the Union generals, who held their positions in front of both Anderson and McLaws, and kept inside their field-works.
Meade, whose line on the left of the army was not disturbed, sent Sykes"s division, so soon as the Eleventh Corps rout became known to him, to the junction of the roads to Ely"s and United-States Fords, to hold that point at all hazards, and form a new right flank. This was done with Sykes"s accustomed energy. Nor was he reached by Jackson"s line, and before morning Reynolds fell in upon his right.
XIX. THE MIDNIGHT ATTACK.
When his troops had been summarily brought to a standstill by Berry"s firm ranks and the heavy artillery fire, Jackson determined to withdraw his first and second lines to Dowdall"s clearing to reform, and ordered A. P. Hill forward to relieve them.
While this manoeuvre, rendered extremely difficult by the nature of the woods in which the fighting had been done, but which Hooker was in no condition to interfere with, was in progress, Sickles and Pleasonton, whose position was considerably compromised, sought measures to re-establish communication with the headquarters of the army.
Sickles despatched Col. Hart, with a cavalry escort, to Hooker, bearing a detailed statement of his situation. This officer experienced no little difficulty in reaching Chancellorsville. The roads being in possession of the enemy, he was forced to make his way through the woods and ravines. But after the lapse of a number of hours he succeeded in his mission, and brought back word to hold on to the position gained. Sickles had so advised, and had, moreover, requested permission to make a night attack, to recover some guns, caissons, and Whipple"s ammunition-train, which had been left in the woods in Sickles"s front, and to enable him to join his right to Sloc.u.m"s new line, thrown out in prolongation of Berry.
It will be observed that Sickles was now facing northerly, and that his rear had no obstacle on which to rest, so as to save him from the attack of Lee, had the latter been aware of the weakness of his position.
In view of this fact, a move was made somewhat to his right, where a crest was occupied near Hazel Grove. Here, says Pleasonton, "with the support of Gen. Sickles"s corps we could have defeated the whole rebel army." It was clearly a strong position; for it is thus referred to by Stuart, after our troops had been next day withdrawn: "As the sun lifted the mist that shrouded the field, it was discovered that the ridge on the extreme right was a fine position for concentrating artillery. I immediately ordered thirty pieces to that point. The effect of this fire upon the enemy"s batteries was superb." Its possession by the Confederates did, in fact, notably contribute to the loss of the new lines at Chancellorsville in Sunday morning"s action.
From this position, at precisely midnight, Sickles made a determined onslaught upon the Confederate right. It was clear, full moonlight, and operations could be almost as well conducted as during the daytime, in these woods.
Birney stationed Ward in the first line, and Hays in the second, one hundred yards in the rear. The regiments moved by the right of companies, with pieces uncapped, and strict orders to rely solely upon the bayonet. On the road from the Furnace north, parallel to which the columns moved, the Fortieth New York, Seventeenth Maine, and Sixty-Third Pennsylvania Volunteers pushed in, in columns of companies at full distance.
Berry had been notified to sustain this attack by a movement forward from his lines, if it should strike him as advisable.
The attack was made with consummate gallantry. Sickles states that he drove the enemy back to our original lines, enabling us for the moment to re-occupy the Eleventh Corps rifle-pits, and to re-capture several pieces of artillery, despite the fire of some twenty Confederate guns which had been ma.s.sed at Dowdall"s.
Thus attacked in flank, though the Confederate right had been refused at the time of Pleasonton"s fight, and still remained so, Hill"s line replied by a front movement of his left on Berry, without being able, however, to break the latter"s line.
Sloc.u.m states that he was not aware that this advance was to be made by Sickles across his front. Imagining it to be a movement by the enemy on Williams, he ordered fire to be opened on all troops that appeared, and fears "that our losses must have been severe from our own fire." Williams, however, does not think so much damage was done, and alleges that he himself understood what the movement was, without, however, quoting the source of his information.
The Confederate reports state that this attack was met and repulsed by the Eighteenth, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-third North-Carolina regiments, with small difficulty or loss.
It is, however, probable that these as much underrate the vigor and effect of the attack, as Sickles may overstate it. It is not impossible that some portion of the Eleventh Corps position was actually reached by these columns. The road down which the movement was made strikes the plank road but a short distance east of the position of Buschbeck"s line. This ground was not held in force by Jackson"s corps at the moment, and it was not difficult for Sickles to possess himself temporarily of some portion of that position. But it must have been a momentary occupation.
Birney retired to Hazel Grove after this sally, having recovered part of Whipple"s train, and one or two guns.
There can be found in the Confederate and Union reports alike, numerous statements which are not sustained by other testimony. As a sample, Gen. Lane of A. P. Hill"s division states that a Lieut. Emack and four men captured an entire Pennsylvania regiment, under Lieut.-Col. Smith. The nearest approach to this is found in the capture of Col. Mathews and two hundred men of the One Hundred and Twenty-Eighth Pennsylvania, while Williams was moving by his left to regain his old ground. But it is highly probable that it required more than five men to effect the capture.
A wise rebuke of careless statements in official reports is found in the following indors.e.m.e.nts on a report made of the operations of the One Hundred and Fourteenth Pennsylvania:-
In forwarding this report, which I do merely as a matter of duty, it is inc.u.mbent upon me to say that it is a complete romance from beginning to end. Col. Collis has had his attention called to these errors, but has refused to correct them.
CHAS. K. GRAHAM, Brigadier General.
HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION THIRD CORPS, May 17, 1863.
This paper is forwarded with attention called to Brig.-Gen. Graham"s indors.e.m.e.nt. The officer is under arrest on charges of misbehavior before the enemy.
D. B. BIRNEY, Brigadier General commanding Division.
XX. STONEWALL JACKSON.
It is probable that the wounding of Jackson at this juncture was the most effectual cause of the Confederate check on Sat.u.r.day night. It occurred just after Jackson had concluded to withdraw his first and second lines to Dowdall"s, there to re-form, and was making dispositions to move up A. P. Hill to relieve them. Orders had been issued to the troops not to fire unless at Union cavalry appearing in their front. Jackson, with some staff-officers and orderlies, had ridden out beyond his lines, as was his wont, to reconnoitre. On his return he was fired at by his own men, being mistaken in the gloom for a Federal scout. Endeavoring to enter at another place, a similar error was made, this time killing some of the party, and wounding Jackson in several places. He was carried to the rear. A few days after, he died of pneumonia brought on by his injury, which aggravated a cold he was suffering from at the time.
A. P. Hill was wounded somewhat later that night.
After the disabling of these two officers, Stuart was sent for, and promptly a.s.sumed command. With Col. Alexander, chief artillery officer present for duty, (Gen. Crutchfield being wounded,) he spent the night rectifying the Confederate lines, and selecting positions for his batteries. It had been Jackson"s plan to push forward at night, to secure the speediest results of his victory. But Stuart, after the attacks upon his right by Sickles and Pleasonton, and having in view the disorganized condition of his troops, thought wise to defer a general a.s.sault until daylight. Having submitted the facts to Jackson, and received word from this officer to use his own discretion in the matter, he decided to afford his troops a few hours of rest. They were accordingly halted in line, and lay upon their arms, an ample force of skirmishers thrown out in front.
No better place than this will be found in which to say a few words about the remarkable man who planned and led this movement about Hooker"s flank,-a manoeuvre which must have been condemned as foolhardy if unsuccessful, but whose triumph wove a final wreath to crown his dying brows.
Thomas J. Jackson entered West Point a poor boy, essentially a son of the people. He was a cla.s.smate of McClellan, Foster, Reno, Stoneman, Couch, Gibbon, and many other noted soldiers, as well those arrayed against as those serving beside him. His standing in his cla.s.s was far from high; and such as he had was obtained by hard, persistent work, and not by apparent ability. He was known as a simple, honest, unaffected fellow, rough, and the reverse of social; but he commanded his companions sincere respect by his rugged honesty, the while his uncouth bearing earned him many a jeer.
He was graduated in 1846, and went to Mexico as second lieutenant of the First United-States Artillery. He was promoted to be first lieutenant "for gallant and meritorious services at Vera Cruz." Twice mentioned in Scott"s reports, and repeatedly referred to by Worth and Pillow for gallantry while with Magruder"s battery, he emerged from that eventful campaign with fair fame and abundant training.
We find him shortly afterwards professor at the Virginia Military Inst.i.tute of Lexington. Here he was known as a rigid Presbyterian, and a "fatalist," if it be fatalism to believe that "what will be will be,"-Jackson"s constant motto.
Tall, gaunt, awkward, grave, brief, and business-like in all he did, Jackson pa.s.sed for odd, "queer,"-insane almost, he was thought by some,-rather than a man of uncommon reserve power.
It was only when on parade, or when teaching artillery practice, that he brightened up; and then scarcely to lose his uncouth habit, but only to show by the light in his eye, and his wrapt attention in his work, where lay his happiest tendencies.
His history during the war is too well known to need to be more than briefly referred to. He was made colonel of volunteers, and sent to Harper"s Ferry in May, 1861, and shortly after promoted to a brigade. He accompanied Joe Johnston in his retreat down the valley. At Bull Run, where his brigade was one of the earliest in the war to use the bayonet, he earned his soubriquet of "Stonewall" at the lips of Gen. Bee. But in the mouths of his soldiers his pet name was "Old Jack," and the term was a talisman which never failed to inflame the heart of every man who bore arms under his banner.
Jackson possessed that peculiar magnetism which stirs the blood of soldiers to boiling-point. Few leaders have ever equalled him in his control of troops. His men had no questions to ask when "Old Jack" led the way. They believed in him as did he in his star; and the impossible only arrested the vigor of their onset, or put a term to their arduous marches.