His campaign in the valley against Fremont and Shields requires no praise. And his movement about McClellan"s flank at Mechanicsville, and his still more sterling manoeuvre in Pope"s campaign, need only to be called to mind.
In the field he was patient, hard-working, careless of self, and full of forethought for his men; though no one could call for and get from troops such excessive work, on the march or in action. No one could ask them to forego rations, rest, often the barest necessaries of life, and yet cheerfully yield him their utmost efforts, as could "Old Jack."
He habitually rode an old sorrel horse, leaning forward in a most unmilitary seat, and wore a sun-browned cap, dingy gray uniform, and a stock, into which he would settle his chin in a queer way, as he moved along with abstracted look. He paid little heed to camp comforts, and slept on the march, or by s.n.a.t.c.hes under trees, as he might find occasion; often begging a cup of bean-coffee and a bit of hard bread from his men, as he pa.s.sed them in their bivouacs, He was too uncertain in his movements, and careless of self, for any of his military family to be able to look after his physical welfare. In fact, a cold occasioned by lending his cloak to one of his staff, a night or two before Chancellorsville, was the primary cause of the pneumonia, which, setting in upon his exhausting wounds, terminated his life.
Jackson was himself a bad disciplinarian. Nor had he even average powers of organization. He was in the field quite careless of the minutiae of drill. But he had a singularly happy faculty for choosing men to do his work for him. He was a very close calculator of all his movements. He worked out his manoeuvres to the barest mathematical chances, and insisted upon the unerring execution of what he prescribed; and above all be believed in mystery. Of his entire command, he alone knew what work he had cut out for his corps to do. And this was carried so far that it is said the men were often forbidden to ask the names of the places through which they marched. "Mystery," said Jackson, "mystery is the secret of success in war, as in all transactions of human life."
Jackson was a professing member of the Presbyterian Church, and what is known as a praying man. By this is meant, that, while he never intentionally paraded or obtruded upon his a.s.sociates his belief in the practical and immediate effect of prayer, he made no effort to hide his faith or practice from the eyes of the world. In action, while the whole man was wrought up to the culminating pitch of enthusiasm, and while every fibre of his mind and heart was strained towards the achievement of his purpose, his hand would often be instinctively raised upwards; and those who knew him best, believed this to be a sign that his trust in the help of a Higher Power was ever present.
Jackson was remarkable as a fighter. In this he stands with but one or two peers. Few men in the world"s history have ever got so great results from armed men as he was able to do. But to judge rightly of his actual military strength is not so easy as to award this praise. Unless a general has commanded large armies, it is difficult to judge of how far he may be found wanting if tried in that balance. In the detached commands which he enjoyed, in the Valley and elsewhere, his strategic ability was marked: but these commands were always more or less limited; and, unlike Lee or Johnston, Jackson did not live long enough to rise to the command of a large army upon an extended and independent field of operations.
In Gen. Lee, Jackson reposed an implicit faith. "He is the only man I would follow blindfold," said Jackson. And Lee"s confidence in his lieutenant"s ability to carry out any scheme he set his hand to, was equally p.r.o.nounced. Honestly, though with too much modesty, did Lee say: "Could I have directed events, I should have chosen, for the good of the country, to have been disabled in your stead."
But, illy as Lee could spare Jackson, less still could the Army of Northern Virginia spare Robert E. Lee, the greatest in adversity of the soldiers of our civil war. Still, after Jackson"s death, it is certain that Lee found no one who could attempt the bold manoeuvres on the field of battle, or the hazardous strategic marches, which have illumined the name of Jackson to all posterity.
It is not improbable that had Jackson lived, and risen to larger commands, he would have been found equal to the full exigencies of the situation. Whatever he was called upon to do, under limited but independent scope, seems to testify to the fact that he was far from having reached his limit. Whatever he did was thoroughly done; and he never appears to have been taxed to the term of his powers, in any operation which he undertook.
Honesty, singleness of purpose, true courage, rare ability, suffice to account for Jackson"s military success. But those alone who have served under his eye know to what depths that rarer, stranger power of his has sounded them: they only can testify to the full measure of the strength of Stonewall Jackson.
XXI. THE POSITION AT FAIRVIEW.
Gen. Hooker"s testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War comprises almost every thing which has been officially put forth by him with reference to this campaign. It therefore stands in lieu of a report of operations, and it may be profitable to continue to quote from it to some extent. His alleged intention of withdrawing from Chancellorsville is thus explained. After setting forth that on the demolition of the Eleventh Corps, the previous evening, he threw Berry into the gap to arrest Jackson, "and if possible to seize, and at all hazards hold, the high ground abandoned by that corps," he says:-
"Gen. Berry, after going perhaps three-quarters of a mile, reported that the enemy was already in possession of the ground commanding my position, and that he had been compelled to establish his line in the valley on the Chancellorsville side of that high ground. As soon as this was communicated to me, I directed Gens. Warren and Comstock to trace out a new line which I pointed out to them on the map, and to do it that night, as I would not be able to hold the one I then occupied after the enemy should renew the attack the next morning."
"The position" at Dowdall"s "was the most commanding one in the vicinity. In the possession of the enemy it would enable him with his artillery to enfilade the lines held by the Twelfth and Second Corps." "To wrest this position from the enemy after his batteries were established upon it, would have required slender columns of infantry, which he could destroy as fast as they were thrown upon it." Slender columns of infantry were at this time among Hooker"s pet ideas.
"Every disposition was made of our forces to hold our line as long as practicable, for the purpose of being in readiness to co-operate with the movement which had been ordered to be made on our left."
"The attack was renewed by the enemy about seven o"clock in the morning, and was bravely resisted by the limited number of troops I could bring into action until eleven o"clock, when orders were given for the army to establish itself on the new line. This it did in good order. The position I abandoned was one that I had held at a disadvantage; and I kept the troops on it as long as I did, only for the purpose of enabling me to hear of the approach of the force under Gen. Sedgwick." Thus much Hooker.
The position of both armies shortly after daybreak was substantially that to which the operation of Sat.u.r.day had led.
The crest at Fairview was crowned by eight batteries of the Third and Twelfth Corps, supported by Whipple"s Second brigade (Bowman"s), in front to the left, forming, as it were, a third line of infantry.
In advance of the artillery some five hundred yards, (a good half-mile from the Chancellor House,) lay the Federal line of battle, on a crest less high than Fairview, but still commanding the tangled woods in its front to a limited distance, and with lower ground in its rear, deepening to a ravine on the south of the plank road. Berry"s division held this line north of the plank road, occupying the ground it had fought over since dusk of the evening before. Supporting it somewhat later was Whipple"s First brigade (Franklin"s). Berdan"s sharpshooters formed a movable skirmish-line; while another, and heavier, was thrown out by Berry from his own troops.
A section of Dimick"s battery was trained down the road.
Williams"s division of the Twelfth Corps was to the south of the plank road, both he and Berry substantially in one line, and perpendicular to it; while Mott"s brigade was ma.s.sed in rear of Williams"s right.
Near Williams"s left flank, but almost at right angles to it, came Geary"s division, in the same intrenched line he had defended the day before; and on his left again, the Second Corps, which had not materially changed its position since Friday.
The angle thus formed by Geary and Williams, looked out towards cleared fields, and rising ground, surmounted by some farm-buildings on a high crest, about six hundred yards from Fairview.
At this farm, called Hazel Grove, during the night, and until just before daybreak, holding a position which could have been utilized as an almost impregnable point d"appui, and which, so long as it was held, practically prevented, in the approaching battle, a junction of Lee"s severed wings, had lain Birney"s and Whipple"s divisions. This point they had occupied, (as already described,) late the evening before, after Sickles and Pleasonton had finished their brush with Jackson"s right brigades. But Hooker was blind to the fact that the possession of this height would enable either himself or his enemy to enfilade the other"s lines; and before daybreak the entire force was ordered to move back to Chancellorsville. In order to do this, the intervening swamp had to be bridged, and the troops handled with extreme care. When all but Graham had been withdrawn, a smart attack was made upon his brigade by Archer of Hill"s command, who charged up and captured the Hazel Grove height; but it was with no serious Federal loss, except a gun and caisson stalled in the swamp. Sickles drew in his line by the right, and was directed to place his two divisions so as to strengthen the new line at Fairview.
Reynolds"s corps had arrived the evening before, and, after somewhat blind instructions, had been placed along the east of Hunting Run, from the Rapidan to the junction of Ely"s and United-States Ford roads, in a location where the least advantage could be gained from his fresh and eager troops, and where, in fact, the corps was not called into action at all, restless however Reynolds may have been under his enforced inactivity.
The Eleventh Corps had gone to the extreme left, where it had relieved Meade; Sykes was already formed on Reynolds"s left, (having rapidly moved to the cross roads at dusk on Sat.u.r.day;) while Meade with the rest of his corps, so soon as Howard had relieved him, went into position to support this entire line on the extreme right of the Army of the Potomac. Thus three strong army corps henceforth disappear from effective usefulness in the campaign.
The Confederate position opposite Fairview had been entirely rectified during the night to prepare for the expected contest. The division of A. P. Hill was now in the front line, perpendicular to the road, Archer on the extreme right, and McGowan, Lane, Pender, and Thomas, extending towards the left; the two latter on the north of the road. Heth was in reserve, behind Lane and Pender. Archer and McGowan were half refused from the general line at daylight, so as to face, and if possible drive Sickles from Hazel Grove. Archer was taking measures with a view to forcing a connection with Anderson; while the latter sent Perry by the Catharpen road, and Posey direct, towards the Furnace, with like purpose.
Colston was drawn up in second line with Trimble"s division; while Rodes, who had led the van in the attack on Howard of last evening, now made the third. The artillery of the corps was disposed mainly on the right of the line, occupying, shortly after daylight, the Hazel-Grove crest, and at Melzi Chancellor"s, in the clearing, where the Eleventh Corps had met its disaster.
There was thus opposed to the Federal right centre, (Berry"s, Whipple"s, and Birney"s divisions of the Third Corps, and Williams"s of the Twelfth,) consisting of about twenty-two thousand men, the whole of Jackson"s corps, now reduced to about the same effective; while Anderson, on the left of the plank road, feeling out towards the Furnace, and McLaws on the right, with seventeen thousand men between them, confronted our left centre, consisting of Geary of the Twelfth, and Hanc.o.c.k of the Second Corps, numbering not much above twelve thousand for duty.
Owing to Hooker"s ill-fitting dispositions, and lack of ability to concentrate, the fight of Sunday morning was thus narrowed to a contest in which the Federals were outnumbered, with the prestige of Confederate success to offset our intrenchments.
The right and left wings proper of the Union army comprised the bulk and freshest part of the forces, having opposite to them no enemy whatever, unless a couple of cavalry regiments scouting on the Mine and River roads.
Gen. Warren, who was much in Hooker"s confidence, thus explains his understanding of the situation Sat.u.r.day night: "The position of the Third Corps and our cavalry on the right flank of Jackson"s cavalry" (? corps), "cut off, it seemed, all direct communication with Gen. Lee"s right. No thought of retreating during the night was entertained on our side; and, unless the enemy did, the next day promised a decisive battle. By our leaving sufficient force in front of the right wing of the enemy to hold our breastworks, the whole of the rest of our force was to be thrown upon his left at dawn of day, with every prospect of annihilating it. To render this success more complete, Gen. Sedgwick, with the Sixth Corps, (about twenty thousand strong,) was to leave his position in front of the enemy"s lines at Fredericksburg, and fall upon Gen. Lee"s rear at daylight."
This summarizes an excellent plan, weak only in the fact that it was impracticable to expect Sedgwick to gain Lee"s rear by daylight. The balance was well enough, and, vigorously carried out, could, even if una.s.sisted by Sedgwick, scarcely fail of success.
To examine into its manner of execution.
XXII. THE FIGHT AT FAIRVIEW.
At the earliest dawn, while Rodes was issuing rations to his men, who had been many hours without food, the indefatigable Stuart gave orders for a slight advance of his right, to reduce the angle of refusal or Archer and McGowan; for at this moment it was ascertained that Sickles was being withdrawn from Hazel Grove. By some error, Stuart"s order was interpreted as a command for the antic.i.p.ated general attack, and the advancing columns soon provoked the fire of the expectant Federals.
Seeing that the men were ready for their work, rations or no rations, Stuart wisely refrained from recalling them; and Berry and Williams betimes felt the shock of the strong line of A. P. Hill, which Alexander seconded by opening with his artillery in full action. The Confederates forged ahead with the watchword, "Charge, and remember Jackson!" And this appeal was one to nerve all hearts to the desperate task before them.
Hotchkiss thus describes the field of operations of this morning: "The first line of works occupied by the Federal troops had been thrown up in the night, and was very formidable. The engineer division of the Union Army consisted of near four thousand men, and these had been unremittingly engaged in its construction. A vast number of trees had been felled, and formed into a heavy rampart, all approach to which was rendered extremely difficult by an abattis of limbs and brushwood. On the south side of the road this line is situated upon a ridge, on the Chancellorsville side of Lewis Creek, one of the numerous head-waters of the Mattapony. It is intersected by the smaller branches of this creek, and the ravines in which they run. These ravines extended behind the Federal lines, almost to the plank road, and afforded excellent positions for successive stands. In the morning, Sickles extended to the west of the creek, and held the elevated plateau at Hazel Grove. This is the most commanding point, except Fairview, in the vicinity. On the north of the plank road, the ground is more level. The line thus crossed several small branches, the origin of some small tributaries of the Rappahannock, but the ravines on that side are not considerable. From the ridge occupied by the first line, the ground falls away to the east, until the valley of another branch of Lewis Creek is reached. The depression here is considerable, and gives an abrupt slope to the Fairview hill, which rises directly from it on the eastern side. From the first line of the creek, extends on both sides of the road a dense forest. From the latter point to Fairview heights, and to Chancellorsville, on the south side of the road, the country is cleared. This clearing is bounded on the south by a drain, which runs from near Chancellorsville, between Fairview and the works occupied by Sloc.u.m. It extends some distance on the north of the road.
"Behind the front line of works, there were some defences in the valley near the creek, not const.i.tuting a connecting line, however; and these in turn were succeeded by the second main line of works, which covered the Fairview heights, and were more strongly constructed even than the first."
It was at just the time of Rodes"s a.s.sault, that Birney had received orders to withdraw from his cardinal position at the angle made by Geary and Williams, and to form as a second and third line near the plank road, a duty there was an abundance of troops to fill. He retired, and ployed into brigade columns by regiments, immediately beyond the crest of Fairview hill. Here, placing batteries in position, he sh.e.l.led the field from which he had just withdrawn. This crest, however, Archer speedily occupied; and on its summit Stuart, with better foresight than Hooker, posted some thirty guns under Walker, which enfiladed our lines with murderous effect during the remainder of the combat of Sunday, and contributed largely to our defeat.
The attack of the Confederates was made, "as Jackson usually did, in heavy columns" (Sickles), and was vigorous and effective. According to their own accounts, the onset was met with equal cheerful gallantry. While Archer occupied Hazel Grove, McGowan and Lane a.s.saulted the works held by Williams, carried them with an impetuous rush, and pushed our troops well back. This rapid success was largely owing to a serious breach made in the Union line by the decampment of the Third Maryland Volunteers, a full regiment of Knipe"s brigade, which held the right of Williams"s division on the plank road. The regiment was composed of new men, no match for Jackson"s veterans. They stood as well as raw troops can, in the face of such an onslaught; but after a loss of about a hundred men, they yielded ground, and were too green to rally. Into the gap thus made, quickly poured a stream of Lane"s men, thus taking both Berry"s and Williams"s lines in reverse. The Second Brigade was compelled to change front to meet this new attack: Mott was instantly thrown forward to fill the interval; and after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle he regained the lost ground, and captured eight stands of colors and about a thousand prisoners. This separated Archer from the main line, and took in their turn McGowan and Lane in reverse, precipitately driving them back, and enabling our columns to regain the ground lost by the fierceness of the Confederate inroad. This sally in reverse likewise carried back Lane and Heth, the entire corps having suffered severely from the excellent service of the Federal guns. But the effect on Williams"s division of this alternating gain and loss, had been to cause it to waver; while having for an instant captured our works, was encouragement to our foes.
On the north of the road, Pender and Thomas had at first won equal fortune against Berry"s works, but their success had been equally short-lived. For the falling-back of Jackson"s right, and the cheering of the Union line as its fire advanced in hot pursuit, gave at the same moment notice to the Confederate left that it was compromised, and to our own brave boys the news of their comrades" fortune. Pender and Thomas were slowly but surely forced back, under a withering fire, beyond the breastworks they had won. A second time did these veterans rally for the charge, and a second time did they penetrate a part of our defences; only, however, to be taken in flank again by Berry"s right brigade, and tumbled back to their starting-point. But their onset had shown so great determination, that Ward was despatched to sustain Berry"s right, lest he should be eventually over-matched.
The Federal line on the north of the plank road had thus doggedly resisted the most determined attacks of Jackson"s men, and had lost no ground. And so hard pressed indeed was Pender by gallant Berry"s legions, that Colquitt"s brigade was sent to his relief. Pender"s men had early expended all their ammunition, word whereof was sent to Stuart, but merely to evoke renewal of that stubborn officer"s orders to hold their ground with the bayonet, and at all hazards. And such orders as these were wont to be obeyed by these hardened warriors.
The three Confederate lines of attack had soon, as on yesternight, become one, as each pushed forward to sustain the other. The enemy "pressed forward in crowds rather than in any regular formation" (Sickles); but the momentum of these splendid troops was well-nigh irresistible. Nichols"s brigade of Trimble"s division, and Iverson"s and Rodes"s of Rodes"s division, pressed forward to sustain the first line on the north of the road, and repel the flank attack, constantly renewed by Berry. Another advance of the entire line was ordered. Rodes led his old brigade in person. The Confederates seemed determined, for Jackson"s sake, to carry and hold the works which they had twice gained, and out of which they had been twice driven; for, with "Old Jack" at their head, they had never shown a sterner front.
Now came the most grievous loss of this morning"s conflict. Gallant Berry, the life of his division, always in the hottest of the fire, reckless of safety, had fallen mortally wounded, before Ward"s brigade could reach his line. Gen. Revere a.s.sumed command, and, almost before the renewal of the Confederate attack, "heedless of their murmurs," says Sickles"s report, "shamefully led to the rear the whole of the Second Brigade, and portions of two others, thus subjecting these proud soldiers, for the first time, to the humiliation of being marched to the rear while their comrades were under fire. Gen. Revere was promptly recalled with his troops, and at once relieved of command." Revere certainly gives no satisfactory explanation of his conduct; but he appears to have marched over to the vicinity of French of the Second Corps, upon the White House clearing, and reported to him with a large portion of his troops. Revere was subsequently courtmartialled for this misbehavior, and was sentenced to dismissal; but the sentence was revoked by the President, and he was allowed to resign.
Col. Stevens was speedily put in command in Revere"s stead; but he, too, soon fell, leaving the gallant division without a leader, nearly half of its number off the field, and the remainder decimated by the b.l.o.o.d.y contest of the past four hours. Moreover, Gen. Hays, whose brigade of French"s division had been detached in support of Berry, where it had done most gallant work, was at the same time wounded and captured by the enemy.