The weather from the time of leaving Port Tampa continued fine until the fleet entered the pa.s.sage between the western coast of Hayti and the eastern end of Cuba, known as the Windward Pa.s.sage, when the breeze freshened and a rough sea began, continuing more or less up to the time of landing. Rounding this eastern coast of Cuba the fleet headed its course westerly and on the morning of the 20th was able to determine its position as being off Guantanamo Bay, about fifty miles east of Santiago. Here, eight days before, the first battle on Cuban soil, in which four American marines were killed, had been fought.
About noon on the same day, the fleet came to a halt off Santiago harbor, or a little to the west of the entrance to it, and Admiral Sampson came on board. He and General Shafter soon after went ash.o.r.e to consult the Cuban General, Garcia, who was known to be in that vicinity with about 4,000 well armed troops.
The voyage over, and the men having been crowded together on shipboard for nearly two weeks, it was now expedient to get them on sh.o.r.e as soon as possible. But it was necessary to find out beforehand what defences were along the coast, and what forces of the enemy were likely to be encountered in landing. The fleet lay off from the sh.o.r.e about a mile, and it was no small undertaking to convey the 17,000 men on board with all their arms and equipments to the sh.o.r.e in small boats over a rough sea, especially should the landing be disputed. It was to arrange for the landing and also to map out a general plan of campaign that the three great leaders, Shafter, Sampson and Garcia met at Aserradores on the afternoon of June 20th as the American fleet stood guard over the harbor of Santiago.
General Garcia was already aware of the coming of the fleet, having received a message from Major-General Miles two weeks previous. The letter of General Miles ran as follows:
Headquarters of the Army, In the Field, Tampa, Fla., June 2, 1898.
Dear General:--I am very glad to have received your officers, General Enrique Collazo and Lieut.-Col. Carlos Hernandez, the latter of whom returns to-night with our best wishes for your success.
It would be a very great a.s.sistance if you could have as large a force as possible in the vicinity of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, and communicate any information by signals which Colonel Hernandez will explain to you either to our navy or to our army on its arrival, which we hope will be before many days.
It would also a.s.sist us very much if you could drive in and hara.s.s any Spanish troops near or in Santiago de Cuba, threatening or attacking them at all points, and preventing, by every means, any possible re-enforcement coming to that garrison. While this is being done, and before the arrival of our army, if you can seize and hold any commanding position to the east or west of Santiago de Cuba, or both, that would be advantageous for the use of our artillery, it will be exceedingly gratifying to us."
To this General Garcia replied that he would "take measures at once to carry out your (Miles") recommendation, but concentration of forces will require some time. Roads bad and Cubans scattered. Will march without delay." Admiral Sampson also cabled the Secretary of the Navy that Garcia "regards his (Miles") wishes and suggestions as orders, and immediately will take measures to concentrate forces at the points indicated, but he is unable to do so as early as desired on account of his expedition at Banes Port, Cuba, but will march without delay. All of his subordinates are ordered to a.s.sist to disembark the United States troops and to place themselves under orders." It was in compliance with these requests that General Garcia had the five thousand troops so near Santiago at the time he welcomed Shafter and Sampson to his camp, as mentioned above, and there is every necessary evidence that these Cuban troops took part in the fight about Santiago. Says General Miles of Garcia: "He had troops in the rear as well as on both sides of the garrison at Santiago before the arrival of our troops."
It was agreed that the force of five hundred men under General Castillo, posted near Daiquiri, should be increased to 1,000, and should be prepared to make an attack upon the rear of the Spanish garrison at Daiquiri on the morning of the 22nd, at which time the debarkation would begin. General Rabi with about 500 men was also to attack Cabanas at the same time, in the same manner, the transports and war vessels so manoeuvring as to give the impression that a landing was to be made at that place. While these attacks in the rear were distracting the garrisons, the navy, by order of Admiral Sampson, was to start up a vigorous bombardment of all the villages along the coast, thus clearing the sh.o.r.e for the landing of the army. Thus did the conference unite the hands of Americans and Cubans in the fight against Spain on Cuban soil, and each was pledged to the other by the expressions of good will. Having accomplished its work the important conference closed, Admiral Sampson and General Shafter to return to their ships, and General Garcia to carry out the part of the work a.s.signed to him, which he did with fidelity and success.[15]
According to orders published on the 20th, General Lawton"s Division, known as the Second Division, Fifth Army Corps, was to disembark first. This Division contained the three following Brigades: The First, General Ludlow"s, composed of the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry (regulars) and the Second Ma.s.sachusetts Volunteer Infantry; the Second Brigade, General Miles", composed of the Fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry (regulars); the Third Brigade, General Chaffee"s, containing the Seventh, Twelfth and Seventeenth Infantry (regulars). Next to follow was General Bates" Brigade, which was to act as reserve to Lawton"s Division. This Brigade consisted of the Third and Twentieth Infantry (regulars) and one squadron of the Second Cavalry, the only mounted troops in Shafter"s army. The cavalry, however, were not to disembark with the Brigade, but were to be the last troops to leave the transports. After Bates" Brigade, was to follow Wheeler"s Dismounted Cavalry Division, containing the two following Brigades: The First, composed of the Third, Sixth and Ninth Cavalry (regulars); the Second, composed of the First and Tenth Cavalry (regulars) and the First Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders). To follow the Cavalry Division was to come the First Division, General Kent"s, containing the following troops: The First Brigade, General Hawkins", consisting of the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry (regulars) and the Seventy-first New York Volunteer Infantry; the Second Brigade, General Pearson"s, consisting of the Second, Tenth and Twenty-first Infantry (regulars); the Third Brigade, Colonel Wikoffs, made up of the Ninth, Thirteenth and Twenty-fourth Infantry (regulars). Then, lastly, was to depart the squadron of mounted cavalry.
Thus prepared, both on board the ships and on sh.o.r.e, the morning of the 22nd dawned to witness the beginning of mighty operations. The war vessels, drawn up in proper order, early began to hurl shot and sh.e.l.l upon the towns, forts, blockhouses and clumps of trees that could be discovered along the sh.o.r.e. The cannonading lasted between two and three hours and was furious throughout. Meanwhile General Lawton"s Division began the work of going ash.o.r.e. The sea was rough and the pa.s.sage to the sh.o.r.e was made in small boats furnished from the transports and from the naval vessels, towed by steam launches belonging to the navy. The larger of the boats were capable of carrying ten or twelve men each, while the smaller ones could carry but six or seven. During the pa.s.sage to the sh.o.r.e several of the men who had escaped thus far, were taken with seasickness, greatly to the amus.e.m.e.nt of their more hardy companions. The landing was made at a pier which had been used formerly as a railroad pier, but was now abandoned and somewhat dilapidated. To get from the boats to the pier in this rough sea was the most perilous part of the whole trip from Tampa to Cuba. As the boats would rise on the waves almost level with the landing place it was necessary to leap quickly from the boat to the sh.o.r.e. In this way two cavalrymen of the Tenth lost their lives, falling into the sea with their equipments on and sinking before help could reach them. Some of the boats were rowed ash.o.r.e and made a landing on the beach some distance from the pier. By this method some men of the Twenty-fifth tried to be the first to land, but failed, that regiment landing, however, in the first body of troops to go ash.o.r.e, and being the second in order, in the invasion of the island.
By night of the 22nd more than one-third of the troops were on sh.o.r.e, and by the evening of the 24th the whole army was disembarked according to the program announced at the beginning, the squadron of cavalry coming in at the close of the march to the sh.o.r.e.
The only national movement on our part deserving to be brought into comparison with the expedition against the Spanish power in Cuba, is that of fifty years earlier, when General Scott sailed at the head of the army of invasion against Mexico. Some of the occurrences of that expedition, especially connected with its landing, should be carefully studied, and if the reports which have reached the public concerning it are truthful, we would do well to consider how far the methods then in use could be applied now. Scribner"s recent history, published just before the outbreak of the Spanish War, tells the story of that expedition, so far as it tells it at all, in the following sentence: "On the 7th of March, the fleet with Scott"s army came to anchor a few miles south of Vera Cruz, and two days later he landed his whole force--nearly twelve thousand men--by means of surf-boats." A writer in a recent number of _The Army and Navy Journal_ says General Worth"s Division of 4,500 men were landed in one hour, and the whole force was landed in six hours, without accident or confusion. In the prosecution of that unholy war, which lasted about a year, nearly three thousand men were lost in battle and about as many more by disease, peace being finally made by the cession of territory on the part of Mexico, the United States paying in return much more than the territory was worth. The twenty millions paid to Texas probably in great part went into the coffers of the patriots who occupied that region, some of whom had not been known as desirable citizens in the parts from which they came, and had manifested their patriotism by leaving their country for their country"s good. The fifteen millions handed over to Mexico looks like a contribution to a conscience fund, and an atonement offered for an a.s.sault without provocation. The country gained Arizona, New Mexico, California and finally Texas, but it lost six thousand good men, the cost of the war, and all told, in negotiations, about thirty million dollars, besides. However, it is not always profitable to look up the harvests of war. There are always two--the harvest of gain, and the harvest of loss. Death and debt are reapers, as well as are honor and extent of territory.
The feelings of the six thousand American troops who landed on Cuban soil on June 22nd, 1898, may well be imagined. Although they felt the effects of the confinement to which they had been subjected while on shipboard, there was very little sickness among them. Again possessed of the free use of their limbs they swarmed the beach and open s.p.a.ce near the landing, making themselves at home, and confronting the difficulties and perils that lay before them with a courage born of national pride. Before them were the mountains with their almost impa.s.sable roads, the jungles filled with poisonous plants and the terrible p.r.i.c.kly underbrush and pointed gra.s.s, in which skulked the land crab and various reptiles whose bite or sting was dangerous; twenty miles of this inhospitable country lay between them and Santiago, their true objective. And somewhere on the road to that city they knew they were destined to meet a well-trained foe, skilled in all the arts of modern warfare, who would contest their advance. The prospect, however, did not unnerve them, although they could well conjecture that all who landed would not re-embark. Some in that six thousand were destined never again to set foot on shipboard. Out of the Twenty-fifth Infantry and the Tenth Cavalry men were to fall both before Spanish bullets and disease ere these organizations should a.s.semble to return to their native sh.o.r.es. These thoughts did not prevent the men from taking advantage of what nature had to offer them.
"We landed in rowboats, amid, and after the cessation of the bombardment of the little hamlet and coast by the men-of-war and battle-ships," writes a brave soldier of the Twenty-fifth Infantry, and adds immediately: "We then helped ourselves to cocoanuts which we found in abundance near the landing." Ordinarily this statement, so trivial and apparently unimportant, would not merit repet.i.tion, but in its connection here it is significant as showing the immediate tendency of the men to resort to the fruits of the country, despite all warnings to the contrary. The two weeks" experience on board the transports had made the finding of cocoanuts an event to be noted, and the dry pulp and strongly flavored milk of this tropical fruit became extremely grateful to the palate, even if not altogether safe for the stomach. If ripe, however, the cocoanut could scarcely be more ungenial to many, than the raw, canned tomatoes upon which they had in part subsisted during the voyage. It is to be added that this report of the finding of the cocoanuts is not the report of an old soldier, but of a young and intelligent, first enlistment man.
Lawton"s Division soon after landing, was ordered to move forward in the direction of Santiago, on the road leading past Siboney. A staff officer, writing of that movement, says: "General Lawton, with his Division, in obedience to this order, pushed forward from Daiquiri about five miles, when night overtook him and he bivouacked on the road." An old soldier of the Twenty-fifth, writing me from the hospital in Tampa, Florida, July 22nd, says of the same event: "After the regiment landed we marched about four and a half miles through the mountains; then we made camp." The old soldier says nothing of cocoanuts, but makes his statement with as much accuracy as possible, and with no waste of words. The novice describing the same thing says: "A short distance ahead (from the sh.o.r.e) we bivouacked for the night.
We were soon lying in dreamland, so far from friends and home, indeed, on a distant, distant sh.o.r.e." These two extracts show at once the difference between the soldier produced by years of trial and training on our plains, and the soldier who but yesterday was a civilian. With the one the march is a short distance; with the other it is about four and a half miles; one reports that they "made camp," the other talks of dreamland, friend, home and distant sh.o.r.e; one expresses his feelings, the other shows control of feeling and reserve in expression.
That first night on Cuban soil, the night following June 22nd, was one without events, but one of great concern to the commanders on sh.o.r.e and on the fleet. The work of disembarking had gone on successfully, and already about six thousand men were on sh.o.r.e. Nearly the whole of Lawton"s Division, with Bates" independent brigade, were bivouacked, as we have seen, about five miles from Daiquiri, exactly where the railroad crosses the wagon road leading to Siboney. General Wheeler"s troops--one brigade--were encamped on the open ground near the landing, the remainder of his division being still on the transports.
The Twenty-fifth Infantry was with Lawton; the Tenth Cavalry was ash.o.r.e with Wheeler"s troops. A detachment of the Twenty-fifth was put on outpost duty on that night of their landing, and five miles within Cuban territory they tramped their solitary beats, establishing and guarding the majestic authority of the United States.
Lawton"s orders were to seize and hold the town of Siboney at which place Kent"s Division, containing the Twenty-fourth, was to land. It was then intended that the whole army should advance as rapidly as would be consistent with supplying the men with rations toward Santiago. Siboney was to be the base of supplies, and from this point ammunition and food were to be conveyed to the front by wagons and pack trains. General Shafter also intended that Lawton with his division should lead the advance upon Santiago, but circ.u.mstances beyond his control brought about a different result. On the morning of the 23rd Lawton"s division was in motion early, and before half-past ten o"clock he was able to report that the Spaniards had evacuated Siboney and were in full retreat, pursued by a body of Cubans under direction of General Castillo; that the town was in his hands, and he had also captured one locomotive and nearly one hundred cars loaded with coal.
General Young"s brigade of General Wheeler"s cavalry division, got on sh.o.r.e on the afternoon of the 23rd and after landing received verbal orders to move out with three days" rations "to a good camping place between Juraguacito and Siboney, on the road leading to Santiago de Cuba." In obedience to these orders, at 4.30 in the afternoon Young with the Rough Riders and a squadron from each of the First and Tenth Regular Cavalry moved from the bivouack near the landing and arrived at Siboney at about 7 o"clock. When General Young arrived at Siboney he had with him the Rough Riders, the other troops having been delayed by the crowded condition of the trail and the difficulty of following after nightfall. Although these troops are always spoken of as cavalry, the reader must not forget that they were dismounted and in marching and fighting were the same as infantry.
General Young on arriving at Siboney reported to General Wheeler, who had preceded him to the same place. The statements of the several commanders here appear somewhat conflicting, although not inexplicable. General Lawton says: "Yesterday afternoon, late, General Wheeler and staff arrived and established his headquarters within the limits of my command. Saw him after dark. Late last night Colonel Wood"s regiment of dismounted cavalry (Rough Riders) pa.s.sed through my camp at Division Headquarters, and later General Young, with some of the dismounted Cavalry, and early this morning others of the dismounted cavalry." Wheeler says that "in obedience to instructions from the Major-General Commanding," given to him in person, he proceeded, on June 23rd, to Siboney, but does not say at what hour. He says he "rode out to the front and found that the enemy had halted and established themselves at a point about three miles from Siboney." He then informs us that "at 8 o"clock on that evening of the 23rd General Young reached Siboney with eight troops of Colonel Wood"s regiment (A, B, D, E, F, G, K and L), 500 strong; Troops A, B, G and K, of the First Cavalry, in all 244, and Troops A, B, E and I, of the Tenth Cavalry, in all 220 men, making a total force of 964 men, which included nearly all of my command which had disembarked. These troops had marched from Daiquiri, 11 miles. With the a.s.sistance of General Castillo a rough map of the country was prepared and the position of the enemy fully explained, and I determined to make an attack."
Lieutenant Miley says that the whole brigade of Wheeler"s troops arrived in Siboney about dark and were occupying the same ground as General Lawton ("In Cuba With Shafter," p. 76.) General Young says that after reporting to General Wheeler he "asked and obtained from General Wheeler authority to make a reconnoisance in force" for the purpose of obtaining "positive information * * * as to the position and movements of the enemy in front."
The distance from Daiquiri to Siboney was but eleven miles, and as the troops left the former place at 4.30 it is probable that they were all bivouacked near Siboney before 9 o"clock, as they were all together, according to General Wheeler"s report, at 5.45 on the morning of the 24th. General Young having discovered that there were two roads or trails leading from Siboney northward toward the town of Sevilla determined to make his reconnoisance by both these trails. He directed Colonel Wood to move by the western trail and to keep a careful lookout and to attack any Spaniards he might encounter, being careful to join his right in the event of an engagement, with the left of the column advancing by the eastern trail. Colonel Wood"s column was the left column and was composed of the Rough Riders only. The column marching by the eastern trail was composed of the First and Tenth Cavalry (regulars) and was under the command of General Young. It was the intention of General Young by this column to gain the enemy"s left, and thus attack in front and left. As early as 7.20 a.m. Captain Mills discovered the enemy exactly as had been described by General Castillo. When this was done word was sent to Colonel Wood, who was making his way to the front over a more difficult route than the one by which General Young"s column had marched. A delay was therefore made on the part of General Young in order that the attack should begin on both flanks at the same time. During this delay General Wheeler arrived and was informed of the plans and dispositions for the attack, and after examining the position gave his approval of what had been done, whereupon General Young ordered the attack. General Wheeler in speaking of the same event says: "General Young and myself examined the position of the enemy. The lines were deployed and I directed him to open fire with the Hotchkiss gun. The enemy replied and the firing immediately became general." There can be no question as to the planning of this fight nor as to the direction of the American force in the fight so far as any general direction was possible. Colonel Wood directed one column and General Young another, while the plan of the attack undoubtedly originated with General Young. General Wheeler conveys as much when he says: "General Young deserves special commendation for his cool deliberate and skillful management." General Young, if only the commander of the right column consisting of two squadrons of regular cavalry, had not as large a command, nor as difficult and important a one as had Colonel Wood, and hence is not deserving of special commendation except upon the general ground that he had supervision over the whole battle. This position is taken by General Shafter in his report, who though admitting the presence of the Division Commander, credits the battle to General Young, the commander of the brigade. The reconnoissance in force for which Young had obtained authority from General Wheeler on the night of the 23rd had developed into a battle, and the plan had evolved itself from the facts discovered. This plan General Wheeler approved, but in no such way as to take the credit from its originator; and it is doubtless with reference both to the plan and the execution that he bestows on General Young the mead of praise. This statement of fact does not in the least detract from either the importance or the praiseworthiness of the part played by Colonel Wood. Both he and the officers and men commanded by him received both from General Young and from the division commander the most generous praise. The advance of Wood"s column was made with great difficulty owing to the nature of the ground, and according to General Young"s belief, he was in the rear when at 7.20 in the morning Captain Mills discovered the enemy, and a Cuban guide was dispatched to warn Wood, and a delay made to allow time for him to come up. Colonel Wood, on the other hand, claims to have discovered the enemy at 7.10 and to have begun action almost immediately, so that it turned out as Young had planned, and "the attack of both wings was simultaneous." The Spaniards were posted on a range of high hills in the form of a "V," the opening being toward Siboney, from which direction the attack came.
From Colonel Wood"s report it appears that soon after the firing began he found it necessary to deploy five troops to the right, and left, leaving three troops in reserve. The enemy"s lines being still beyond his, both on the right and on the left, he hastily deployed two more troops, which made the lines now about equal in length. The firing was now "exceedingly heavy," and much of it at short range, but on account of the thick underbrush it was not very effective; "comparatively few of our men were injured." Captain Cap.r.o.n at this time received his mortal wound and the firing became so terrific that the last remaining troop of the reserve was absorbed by the firing line, and the whole regiment ordered to advance very slowly. The Spanish line yielded and the advance soon showed that in falling back the enemy had taken a new position, about three hundred yards in front of the advancing regiment. Their lines extended from 800 to 1,000 yards, and the firing from their front was "exceedingly heavy" and effective. A "good many men" were wounded, "and several officers," says Colonel Wood"s report. Still the advance was kept up, and the Spanish line was steadily forced back. "We now began," says Colonel Wood, "to get a heavy fire from a ridge on our right, which enfiladed our line." The reader can at once see that although the Rough Riders were advancing heroically, they were now in a very serious situation, with an exceedingly heavy and effective fire striking them in front, and a heavy, enfilading fire raking them from the right. Their whole strength was on the line, and these two fires must have reduced their effectiveness with great rapidity had it kept up, the Spaniards having their range and firing by well-directed volleys. It was for the regiment a moment of the utmost peril. Had they been alone they must have perished.
It was from this perilous situation of Colonel Wood"s command that one of the most popular stories of the war originated, a story that contained some truth, but which was often told in such a way as to cause irritation, and in some instances it was so exaggerated or mutilated in the telling as to be simply ridiculous. On the day after the battle the story was told in Lawton"s camp according to the testimony of an intelligent soldier of the Twenty-fifth Infantry. His words are: "The next day about noon we heard that the Tenth Cavalry had met the enemy and that the Tenth Cavalry had rescued the Rough Riders. We congratulated ourselves that although not of the same branch of service, we were of the same color, and that to the eye of the enemy we, troopers and footmen, all looked alike." According to artists and cheap newspaper stories this rescuing occurred again and again. A picture is extensively advertized as "an actual and authoritative presentation of this regiment (the Tenth Cavalry) as it partic.i.p.ated in that great struggle, and their heroic rescue of the Rough Riders on that memorable _July_ day." This especial rescuing took place on _San Juan Hill_. The editor of a religious paper declares that it was the _Twenty-fifth Infantry_ that rescued the Rough Riders and that it was done at _El Caney_![16]
Before we go any farther let us see just what the Tenth Cavalry did do in this fight. That their action was highly meritorious admits of no doubt, and the laurels they won were never allowed to fade during the whole campaign. General Wheeler speaks of them with the First Cavalry.
He says: "I was immediately with the troops of the First and Tenth Regular Cavalry, dismounted, and personally noticed their brave and good conduct." There were four troops of the Tenth engaged, composing the First Squadron of that regiment, under command of Major Norval.
Troop A was commanded by Captain W.H. Beck, who was specially commended by General Wheeler for good conduct. Second Lieutenant F.R.
McCoy was Captain Beck"s a.s.sistant. This troop moved over to the left, receiving the fire of the enemy, but making no response, the distance being too great for effective carbine firing. This troop reached Colonel Wood"s right and made the line continuous so that there was now a force in front of that ridge where the Spaniards were securely entrenched and from which they were pouring their enfilading fire upon Colonel Wood"s line. Troop A, although coming into the line, did not fire. Their presence, however, gave the Rough Riders the a.s.surance that their flank was saved. Troop E was commanded by Captain C.G.
Ayres with Second Lieutenant George Vidmar. This troop was placed by General Young in support of Captain Watson"s two Hotchkiss guns, and also of the troops in their front. The troop was under fire one hour and a quarter, during which they were in plain view of the Spaniards, who also had their exact range. One man was killed and one wounded.
Their courage, coolness and discipline in this trying hour and a quarter were of the very highest order. The troop commander says: "Their coolness and fine discipline were superb." This troop did not fire a shot. Thus one-half of the squadron moved to its positions and held them without being able to do any damage to the enemy, as they were carrying out to the letter their instructions, which were to fire only when they could see the enemy. Troop B was commanded by Captain J.W. Watson with H.O. Willard as Second Lieutenant. A detachment of this troop was placed in charge of four Hotchkiss mountain guns. This detachment opened fire upon the enemy, using the ammunition sparingly, as they had but fifty rounds with them. Twenty-two shots were fired, apparently with effect. The remainder of the troop under Lieutenant Williard was ordered to move out to the extreme right, which would place it beyond the line of the First Cavalry, thus bringing that regiment between Troop A of the Tenth, which connected it with the Rough Riders and Troop B, which was to be on its extreme right.
Lieutenant Williard"s report of this movement is as follows:
"I ordered the troop forward at once, telling them to take advantage of all cover available. In the meantime the volleys from the Spanish were coming in quite frequently and striking the ground on all sides near where we were. I found it very difficult to move the men forward after having found cover, and ran back to a portion of the troop near an old brick wall, and ordered them forward at once. They then made a dash forward, and in doing so three or four men were wounded, Private Russell severely. Who the others were I do not know. We encountered a severe fire directly after this move forward; and Private Wheeler was wounded in the left leg. There was a wire fence on our right, and such thick underbrush that we were unable to get through right there, so had to follow along the fence for some distance before being able to penetrate. Finally, was able to get the greater proportion of my men through, and about this time I met Lieutenants Fleming and Miller, Tenth Cavalry, moving through the thicket at my left. I there heard the order pa.s.sed on "not to fire ahead," as there was danger of firing into our own forces. In the meantime there was shouting from the First Cavalry in our front, "Don"t fire on us in rear."
My troop had not fired a shot to my knowledge, nor the knowledge of any non-commissioned officers in the troop.
About this time I found I was unable to keep the troop deployed, as they would huddle up behind one rock or tree, so I gave all sergeants orders to move out on the extreme right and to keep in touch with those on their left. Then, with a squad of about five men, I moved to the right front, and was unfortunate enough to lose the troop, i.e., I could see nothing of them except the men with me.
"But as I had given explicit instructions to my sergeant, in case I was lost from them, to continue to advance until halted by some one in authority, I moved ahead myself, hoping to find them later on. In making a rush forward three men of my squad were lost from me in some way. I still had two men with me, Privates Combs and Jackson, and in the next advance made I picked up a First Cavalry sergeant who had fallen out from exhaustion. After a terrific climb up the ridge in front of me, and a very regular though ineffective fire from the enemy kept up until we were about sixty yards from the summit of hill, we reached the advance line of the First United States Cavalry, under command of Captain Wainwright. I then reported to him for orders, and moved forward when he next advanced. The firing had ceased, and no more shots were fired, to my knowledge, after this time.
With the First Cavalry, Troop G, we followed along the right of the ridge and came down to the right front, encountering no opposition or fire from the enemy, but finding the enemy"s breastworks in confusion, ammunition and articles of clothing scattered around; also one dead Spaniard and two Mauser rifles. At the foot of the ridge we met some of the First Volunteer Cavalry, and being utterly exhausted, I was obliged to lie down. Soon after, Captain Mills, adjutant-general of Second Brigade, Cavalry Division, came up to where I was and placed me in command of Troop K, First United States Cavalry, whose officers were wounded. I then marched them forward on the road to where General Wheeler was sitting, and received orders from Colonel Wood, First Volunteer Cavalry, to remain until further orders and make no further advance. Directly afterwards, learning the action was over, I reported back to General Young, and received orders to remain camped with the First Cavalry Squadron, where the action had closed. In the meantime, I should have stated that I found the princ.i.p.al part of my troop and collected them and left them under the first sergeant, when I went back to receive orders. So far as I know, and to the best of my knowledge, the men of my troop acted with the greatest bravery, advancing on an enemy who could not be seen, and subjected to a severe and heavy fire at each step, which was only rendered ineffective to a great degree by the poor marksmanship of the enemy, as many times we were in sight of them (I discovered this by observation after the engagement) while we could see nothing. We were also subjected to a severe reverse fire from the hills in our right rear, several men being wounded by this fire.
Throughout the fight the men acted with exceptional coolness, in my judgment. The casualties were: Privates Russell, Braxton and Morris, severely wounded; Privates F.A.
Miller, Grice, Wheeler and Gaines, slightly wounded, i.e., less severely. None killed.
Very respectfully,
HENRY O. WILLIARD.
June 24, 1898.
Troop B, Tenth Cavalry, during action near La Guasima, Second Lieutenant, Tenth United States Cavalry, Commanding.
Troop I of the Tenth Cavalry was commanded by First Lieutenant R.J.
Fleming with Second Lieutenant A.M. Miller. This troop moved to the right and wedged in between B Troop and the right of the First Cavalry. Lieutenant Fleming discovered the enemy posted on the high ridge immediately in front of his troop, and also extending to his right, in front of B Troop. Moving his troop a little to the right so as to secure room to advance without coming in contact with the First Cavalry, he then directed his course straight toward the hill on which he had located the enemy. The advance was made with great caution, the men seeking cover wherever possible, and dashing across the open s.p.a.ces at full run. Thus they moved until the base of the steep part of the hill was reached. This was found very difficult of ascent, not only because of the rugged steepness, but also on account of the underbrush, and the sharp-leaved gra.s.s, the cacti and Spanish bayonet, that grow on all these hillsides. Paths had to be cut through these p.r.i.c.kly obstructions with knives and sabres. Consequently the advance up that hill, though free from peril, was very slow and trying. Twice during the advance the men obtained a view of their enemies and were permitted to fire. The instructions were rigidly adhered to: No firing only at the visible foe. Lieutenant Fleming says: "Owing to the underbrush it was impossible for me to see but a very few men at a time, but as they all arrived on the crest about the time I did, or shortly after, they certainly advanced steadily." He says: "The entire troop behaved with great coolness and obeyed every order." Farrier Sherman Harris, Wagoner John Boland and Private Elsie Jones especially distinguished themselves for coolness and gallantry. The aggressive work of the Tenth Cavalry, therefore, appears to have been done by Troops B and I, a detachment of the former troop serving the Hotchkiss gun battery. Troop I was commanded by Lieutenant Fleming and by him conducted to the front, although he admits that in their advance up the slope of the hill he could see but very few of the men at a time, and declares that their advance was certainly steady, because all arrived at the crest of the hill simultaneously or nearly so.
Lieutenant Fleming does not show that his troop of excellent men were in any sense _peculiarly_ dependent upon their white officers as some have a.s.serted. They advanced steadily, just as the regulars always do, advanced noiselessly and without any reckless firing, and reached the crest of the hill in order, although he could not see them as they were making their advance. They kept their line despite all the obstructions. Lieutenant Fleming also says that in moving to his position he pa.s.sed Troop B, which then "inclined to the right, and during the remainder of the action was on my right." Troop B, therefore, went through about the same experience as Troop I, and being on the extreme right of the line may have been more directly in front of that foe which Fleming says was in his front and to the right. Why did not the officer who directed or led B Troop in its advance upon the enemy report the action of his troop as vividly and generously as did Lieutenant Fleming the men of Troop I? With not the slightest reflection upon the gallant officer, he himself has the manliness to say he was so unfortunate as to lose the troop. The troop, however, did not become demoralized, but went into action under command of its First Sergeant, _John Buck,[17] and remained on Lieutenant Fleming"s right during the action_. It has been proven more than once that should the commissioned officers of a company or troop of colored regulars be killed or incapacitated, the non-commissioned officers can carry on the fight. Speaking of this same regiment it is equally true that at San Juan the officers of Troops D and G were all shot and the commands of these troops fell to their First Sergeants, the first to Sergeant William H. Given, the second to Sergeant Saint Foster, and it is generally understood that these two men were appointed Lieutenants of Volunteers because of their success in handling their troops in battle.
The entire attacking force at this end of the line, if we count only those engaged in actual firing, consisted of two troops of the Tenth Cavalry and two of the First Cavalry--four troops--while to the left the entire eight troops were on the firing line. The action of the troops of the First Cavalry was quite similar to that of the troops of the Tenth Cavalry, and equally deserving of commendation. Of them all General Young says:
"The ground over which the right column advanced was a ma.s.s of jungle growth, with wire fences, not to be seen until encountered, and precipitous heights as the ridge was approached. It was impossible for the troops to keep in touch along the front, and they could only judge of the enemy from the sound and direction of his fire. However, had it not been for this dense jungle, the attack would not have been made against an overwhelming force in such a position.
Headway was so difficult that advance and support became merged and moved forward under a continuous volley firing, supplemented by that of two rapid-fire guns. Return firing by my force was only made as here and there a small clear spot gave a sight of the enemy. The fire discipline of these particular troops was almost perfect. The ammunition expended by the two squadrons engaged in an incessant advance for one hour and fifteen minutes averaged less than ten rounds per man. The fine quality of these troops is also shown by the fact that there was not a single straggler, and in not one instance was an attempt made by any soldier to fall out in the advance to a.s.sist the wounded or carry back the dead. The fighting on the left flank was equally creditable and was remarkable, and I believe unprecedented, in volunter troops so quickly raised, armed and equipped."
The five hundred men of Colonel Wood"s regiment were stretched over a s.p.a.ce of 800 to 1,000 yards, and were entirely without support or reserve, and appear to have advanced to a point where this very strong force on the right swept a good part of their line both with rifle fire and the fire of their two machine guns. Men and officers were falling under both the front and flank fire of the enemy, and had not the squadrons of the First and Tenth made their successful a.s.sault upon that ridge, which, according to General Wood"s report, was "very strongly held," the situation of the Rough Riders would have been extreme. Because this successful a.s.sault was partic.i.p.ated in by the Tenth Cavalry the story arose that the Rough Riders were rescued by that regiment. The fair statement would be: That the Regular Cavalry, consisting of a squadron of the First and a squadron of the Tenth, made their advance on the right at the precise moment to deliver the Rough Riders from a fire that threatened their annihilation. The marksmanship and coolness of the men of the Tenth have been specially commented upon and their fire was described as very effective, but the same remarks could be made of the men of the First, who fought side by side with them. It is probable that the volunteers advanced more rapidly than did the regulars, using more ammunition, and manifesting a very high degree of courage and enthusiasm as well as deliberation; but the regulars reached their objective at the proper time to turn the battle"s tide. Each advancing column was worthy to be companion to the other.
General Wheeler said the fire was very hot for about an hour, and "at 8.30 sent a courier to General Lawton informing him that he was engaged with a larger force of the enemy than was antic.i.p.ated, and asked that his force be sent forward on the Sevilla road as quickly as possible." ("In Cuba With Shafter," p. 83.) General Lawton, however, with the true instinct of a soldier had already sent orders to General Chaffee to move forward with the First Brigade. The Second Brigade was also in readiness to move and the men of the Twenty-fifth were expecting to go forward to take a position on the right and if possible a little to the rear of the Spanish entrenchments in order to cut off their retreat. The rapid movements of the cavalry division, however, rendered this unnecessary, and the routing of the foe gave to the Americans an open country and cleared the field for the advance on Santiago. The first battle had been fought, and the Americans had been victorious, but not without cost. Sixteen men had been killed and fifty-two wounded. In Colonel Wood"s regiment eight had been killed and thirty-four wounded; in the First Cavalry, seven killed and eight wounded; in the Tenth Cavalry, one killed and ten wounded. The percentage of losses to the whole strength of the several organizations engaged was as follows: Rough Riders, over 8 per cent.; First Cavalry, over 6 per cent.; Tenth Cavalry, 5 per cent. But if we take those on the firing line as the base the rate per cent. of losses among the regulars would be doubled, while that of the volunteers would remain the same.
The strength of the enemy in this battle is given in the Spanish official reports, according to Lieutenant Miley, at about five hundred, and their losses are put at nine killed and twenty-seven wounded. At the time of the fight it was supposed to be much larger.
General Young"s report places the estimates at 2,000, and adds "that it has since been learned from Spanish sources to have been 2,500. The Cuban military authorities claim the Spanish strength was 4,000."
These figures are doubtless too high. The force overtaken at Las Guasimas was the same force that evacuated Siboney at the approach of Lawton and the force with which the Cubans had fought on the morning of the 23rd. It may have consisted solely of the garrison from Siboney, although it is more probable that it included also those from Daiquiri and Jutici, as it is quite certain that all these troops proceeded toward Santiago over the same road. The force at Siboney had been given by the Cubans at 600, at Daiquiri at 300, and at Jutici at 150. If these had concentrated and the figures were correct, the Spanish force at Guasimas was upwards of 1,000. If, however, it was the force from Siboney alone, it was about as the Spanish official report gives it. On this latter basis, however, the losses are out of proportion, for while the attacking party lost a little less than 7 per cent. of its entire strength in killed and wounded, the losses of the entrenched, defending party, were even a little greater, or over 7 per cent. of its strength. It is, therefore, probable that the Spanish force was greater than officially reported and included the troops from the other posts as well as those from Siboney. The engagement was cla.s.sed by General Shafter as unimportant, although its effect upon our army was inspiring. It did not cut off the retreat of the Spanish force, and the men who faced our army at Guasimas met them again in the trenches before Santiago. General Shafter desired to advance with his whole force, and cautioned strongly against any further forward movement until the troops were well in hand. The two battles between the Cubans and Spaniards, fought on the 23rd, in which the Cubans had sixteen men wounded and two killed, were engagements of some consequence, although we have no reports of them. There is no evidence that the Cubans took part in the battle of Guasimas, although they arrived on the grounds immediately after the firing ceased.
The story thus far told is, as the reader cannot fail to see, directly from official records, and the conclusions arrived at are those which result naturally from the facts as therein detailed. Not one word is quoted from any but military men--actors in the affair. We may now go briefly over the same ground, giving the views and conclusions of able civilian correspondents who followed the army to see what was done, and who were trained observers and skilled writers.
How have these able war journalists told the story of Las Guasimas?
To quote from Stephen Bonsal in substance, not in words, is to contradict what General Shafter says officially in one particular, but in no such way as to discredit the General, or to weaken Bonsal. It is not a case of bringing two universal, antagonistic propositions face to face, but a case where two men of different training look upon an action from different standpoints and through different field-gla.s.ses.
General Shafter says of the collision of the Rough Riders with the Spanish force: "There was no ambush as reported." As a military man, he says there was no more concealment on the part of the Spanish force than what an attacking party should expect, no more than what is usual in modern warfare, hence he does not regard it as an ambush, and does not officially take notice of any surprise or unexpected encounter on the part of his force. To do so would be to reflect, however slightly, upon the professional skill of the commander of the left column.
General Shafter thus says officially in a manly way: "There was no ambush." Beyond this his duty does not call him to go, and he halts his expressions exactly at this line, maintaining in his att.i.tude all the attributes of the true soldier, placing himself beyond criticism by thus securing from attack the character of his subordinate.
Mr. Bonsal is a writer and author, accustomed to view actions in the broader light of popular judgment, entirely free from professional bias, and having no cla.s.s-feeling or obligations to serve. His pen is not official; his statements are not from the military standpoint; not influenced in any way by considerations of personal weal or woe with respect to others or himself. He says that one troop of the Rough Riders, Troop L, commanded by Captain Cap.r.o.n, was leading the advance of the regiment, and was in solid formation and within twenty-five yards of its scouting line when it received the enemy"s fire. This troop was so far in the advance that it took the other troops of the regiment more than a half hour to get up to it. The writer speaks of the advance of that troop as having been made "in the fool-hardy formation of a solid column along a narrow trail, which brought them, in the way I have described, within point-blank range of the Spanish rifles, and within the un.o.bstructed sweep of their machine guns." He sums up as follows: "And if it is to be ambushed when you receive the enemy"s fire perhaps a quarter of an hour before it was expected, and when the troop was in a formation, and the only one in which, in view of the nature of the ground it was possible to advance quickly, then most certainly L Troop of the Rough Riders was ambushed by the Spaniards on the morning of June 24th."