[77]
LECTURE III. -- TORTS.--TRESPa.s.s AND NEGLIGENCE.
The object of the next two Lectures is to discover whether there is any common ground at the bottom of all liability in tort, and if so, what that ground is. Supposing the attempt to succeed, it will reveal the general principle of civil liability at common law. The liabilities incurred by way of contract are more or less expressly fixed by the agreement of the parties concerned, but those arising from a tort are independent of any previous consent of the wrong-doer to bear the loss occasioned by his act. If A fails to pay a certain sum on a certain day, or to deliver a lecture on a certain night, after having made a binding promise to do so, the damages which he has to pay are recovered in accordance with his consent that some or all of the harms which may be caused by his failure shall fall upon him. But when A a.s.saults or slanders his neighbor, or converts his neighbor"s property, he does a harm which he has never consented to bear, and if the law makes him pay for it, the reason for doing so must be found in some general view of the conduct which every one may fairly expect and demand from every other, whether that other has agreed to it or not.
Such a general view is very hard to find. The law did not begin with a theory. It has never worked one out. The point from which it started and that at which I shall [78] try to show that it has arrived, are on different planes. In the progress from one to the other, it is to be expected that its course should not be straight and its direction not always visible. All that can be done is to point out a tendency, and to justify it. The tendency, which is our main concern, is a matter of fact to be gathered from the cases. But the difficulty of showing it is much enhanced by the circ.u.mstance that, until lately, the substantive law has been approached only through the categories of the forms of action. Discussions of legislative principle have been darkened by arguments on the limits between trespa.s.s and case, or on the scope of a general issue. In place of a theory of tort, we have a theory of trespa.s.s. And even within that narrower limit, precedents of the time of the a.s.size and jurata have been applied without a thought of their connection with a long forgotten procedure.
Since the ancient forms of action have disappeared, a broader treatment of the subject ought to be possible. Ignorance is the best of law reformers. People are glad to discuss a question on general principles, when they have forgotten the special knowledge necessary for technical reasoning. But the present willingness to generalize is founded on more than merely negative grounds. The philosophical habit of the day, the frequency of legislation, and the ease with which the law may be changed to meet the opinions and wishes of the public, all make it natural and unavoidable that judges as well as others should openly discuss the legislative principles upon which their decisions must always rest in the end, and should base their judgments upon broad considerations of policy to which the traditions of the bench would hardly have tolerated a reference fifty years ago.
[79] The business of the law of torts is to fix the dividing lines between those cases in which a man is liable for harm which he has done, and those in which he is not. But it cannot enable him to predict with certainty whether a given act under given circ.u.mstances will make him liable, because an act will rarely have that effect unless followed by damage, and for the most part, if not always, the consequences of an act are not known, but only guessed at as more or less probable. All the rules that the law can lay down beforehand are rules for determining the conduct which will be followed by liability if it is followed by harm--that is, the conduct which a man pursues at his peril. The only guide for the future to be drawn from a decision against a defendant in an action of tort is that similar acts, under circ.u.mstances which cannot be distinguished except by the result from those of the defendant, are done at the peril of the actor; that if he escapes liability, it is simply because by good fortune no harm comes of his conduct in the particular event.
If, therefore, there is any common ground for all liability in tort, we shall best find it by eliminating the event as it actually turns out, and by considering only the principles on which the peril of his conduct is thrown upon the actor. We are to ask what are the elements, on the defendant"s side, which must all be present before liability is possible, and the presence of which will commonly make him liable if damage follows.
The law of torts abounds in moral phraseology. It has much to say of wrongs, of malice, fraud, intent, and negligence. Hence it may naturally be supposed that the risk of a man"s conduct is thrown upon him as the result of some moral short-coming. But while this notion has been [80] entertained, the extreme opposite will be found to have been a far more popular opinion;--I mean the notion that a man is answerable for all the consequences of his acts, or, in other words, that he acts at his peril always, and wholly irrespective of the state of his consciousness upon the matter.
To test the former opinion it would be natural to take up successively the several words, such as negligence and intent, which in the language of morals designate various well-understood states of mind, and to show their significance in the law. To test the latter, it would perhaps be more convenient to consider it under the head of the several forms of action. So many of our authorities are decisions under one or another of these forms, that it will not be safe to neglect them, at least in the first instance; and a compromise between the two modes of approaching the subject may be reached by beginning with the action of trespa.s.s and the notion of negligence together, leaving wrongs which are defined as intentional for the next Lecture.
Trespa.s.s lies for unintentional, as well as for intended wrongs.
Any wrongful and direct application of force is redressed by that action. It therefore affords a fair field for a discussion of the general principles of liability for unintentional wrongs at common law. For it can hardly be supposed that a man"s responsibility for the consequences of his acts varies as the remedy happens to fall on one side or the other of the penumbra which separates trespa.s.s from the action on the case. And the greater part of the law of torts will be found under one or the other of those two heads.
It might be hastily a.s.sumed that the action on the case [81] is founded on the defendant"s negligence. But if that be so, the same doctrine must prevail in trespa.s.s. It might be a.s.sumed that trespa.s.s is founded on the defendant"s having caused damage by his act, without regard to negligence. But if that be true, the law must apply the same criterion to other wrongs differing from trespa.s.s only in some technical point; as, for instance, that the property damaged was in the defendant"s possession. Neither of the above a.s.sumptions, however, can be hastily permitted. It might very well be argued that the action on the case adopts the severe rule just suggested for trespa.s.s, except when the action is founded on a contract. Negligence, it might be said, had nothing to do with the common-law liability for a nuisance, and it might be added that, where negligence was a ground of liability, a special duty had to be founded in the defendant"s super se a.s.sumpsit, or public calling. /1/ On the other hand, we shall see what can be said for the proposition, that even in trespa.s.s there must at least be negligence. But whichever argument prevails for the one form of action must prevail for the other. The discussion may therefore be shortened on its technical side, by confining it to trespa.s.s so far as may be practicable without excluding light to be got from other parts of the law.
As has just been hinted, there are two theories of the common-law liability for unintentional harm. Both of them seem to receive the implied a.s.sent of popular textbooks, and neither of them is wanting in plausibility and the semblance of authority.
The first is that of Austin, which is essentially the theory of a criminalist. According to him, the characteristic [82] feature of law, properly so called, is a sanction or detriment threatened and imposed by the sovereign for disobedience to the sovereign"s commands. As the greater part of the law only makes a man civilly answerable for breaking it, Austin is compelled to regard the liability to an action as a sanction, or, in other words, as a penalty for disobedience. It follows from this, according to the prevailing views of penal law, that such liability ought only to be based upon personal fault; and Austin accepts that conclusion, with its corollaries, one of which is that negligence means a state of the party"s mind. /1/ These doctrines will be referred to later, so far as necessary.
The other theory is directly opposed to the foregoing. It seems to be adopted by some of the greatest common law authorities, and requires serious discussion before it can be set aside in favor of any third opinion which may be maintained. According to this view, broadly stated, under the common law a man acts at his peril. It may be held as a sort of set-off, that he is never liable for omissions except in consequence of some duty voluntarily undertaken. But the whole and sufficient ground for such liabilities as he does incur outside the last cla.s.s is supposed to be that he has voluntarily acted, and that damage has ensued. If the act was voluntary, it is totally immaterial that the detriment which followed from it was neither intended nor due to the negligence of the actor.
In order to do justice to this way of looking at the subject, we must remember that the abolition of the common-law forms of pleading has not changed the rules of substantive law. Hence, although pleaders now generally [83] allege intent or negligence, anything which would formerly have been sufficient to charge a defendant in trespa.s.s is still sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the ancient form of action and declaration has disappeared.
In the first place, it is said, consider generally the protection given by the law to property, both within and outside the limits of the last-named action. If a man crosses his neighbor"s boundary by however innocent a mistake, or if his cattle escape into his neighbor"s field, he is said to be liable in trespa.s.s quare clausum fregit. If an auctioneer in the most perfect good faith, and in the regular course of his business, sells goods sent to his rooms for the purpose of being sold, he may be compelled to pay their full value if a third person turns out to be the owner, although he has paid over the proceeds, and has no means of obtaining indemnity.
Now suppose that, instead of a dealing with the plaintiff"s property, the case is that force has proceeded directly from the defendant"s body to the plaintiff"s body, it is urged that, as the law cannot be less careful of the persons than of the property of its subjects, the only defences possible are similar to those which would have been open to an alleged trespa.s.s on land. You may show that there was no trespa.s.s by showing that the defendant did no act; as where he was thrown from his horse upon the plaintiff, or where a third person took his hand and struck the plaintiff with it. In such cases the defendant"s body is file pa.s.sive instrument of an external force, and the bodily motion relied on by the plaintiff is not his act at all. So you may show a justification or excuse in the conduct of the plaintiff himself. But if no such excuse is shown, and the defendant has voluntarily acted, he must answer [84] for the consequences, however little intended and however unforeseen. If, for instance, being a.s.saulted by a third person, the defendant lifted his stick and accidentally hit the plaintiff, who was standing behind him, according to this view he is liable, irrespective of any negligence toward the party injured.
The arguments for the doctrine under consideration are, for the most part, drawn from precedent, but it is sometimes supposed to be defensible as theoretically sound. Every man, it is said, has an absolute right to his person, and so forth, free from detriment at the hands of his neighbors. In the cases put, the plaintiff has done nothing; the defendant, on the other hand, has chosen to act. As between the two, the party whose voluntary conduct has caused the damage should suffer, rather than one who has had no share in producing it.
We have more difficult matter to deal with when we turn to the pleadings and precedents in trespa.s.s. The declaration says nothing of negligence, and it is clear that the damage need not have been intended. The words vi et armis and contra pacere, which might seem to imply intent, are supposed to have been inserted merely to give jurisdiction to the king"s court.
Glanvill says it belongs to the sheriff, in case of neglect on the part of lords of franchise, to take cognizance of melees, blows, and even wounds, unless the accuser add a charge of breach of the king"s peace (nisi accusator adjiciat de pace Domini Regis infracta). /1/ Reeves observes, "In this distinction between the sheriff"s jurisdiction and that of the king, we see the reason of the allegation in modern indictments and writs, vi et amis, of "the king"s crown and dignity," "the king"s [85] peace," and "the peace,"--this last expression being sufficient, after the peace of the sheriff had ceased to be distinguished as a separate jurisdiction." /1/
Again, it might be said that, if the defendant"s intent or neglect was essential to his liability, the absence of both would deprive his act of the character of a trespa.s.s, and ought therefore to be admissible under the general issue. But it is perfectly well settled at common law that "Not guilty" only denies the act. /2/
Next comes the argument from authority. I will begin with an early and important case. /3/ It was trespa.s.s quare clausum. The defendant pleaded that he owned adjoining land, upon which was a thorn hedge; that he cut the thorns, and that they, against his will (ipso invito), fell on the plaintiff"s land, and the defendant went quickly upon the same, and took them, which was the trespa.s.s complained of. And on demurrer judgment was given for the plaintiff. The plaintiff"s counsel put cases which have been often repeated. One of them, Fairfax, said: "There is a diversity between an act resulting in a felony, and one resulting in a trespa.s.s.... If one is cutting trees, and the boughs fall on a man and wound him, in this case he shall have an action of trespa.s.s, &c., and also, sir, if one is shooting at b.u.t.ts, and his bow shakes in his hands, and kills a man, ipso invito, it is no felony, as has been said, [86] &c.; but if he wounds one by shooting, he shall have a good action of trespa.s.s against him, and yet the shooting was lawful, &c., and the wrong which the other receives was against his will, &c.; and so here, &c."
Brian, another counsel, states the whole doctrine, and uses equally familiar ill.u.s.trations. "When one does a thing, he is bound to do it in such a way that by his act no prejudice or damage shall be done to &c. As if I am building a house, and when the timber is being put up a piece of timber falls on my neighbor"s house and breaks his house, he shall have a good action, &c.; and yet the raising of the house was lawful, and the timber fell, me invito, &c. And so if one a.s.saults me and I cannot escape, and I in self-defence lift my stick to strike him, and in lifting it hit a man who is behind me, in this case he shall have an action against me, yet my raising my stick was lawful in self-defence, and I hit him, me invito, &c.; and so here, &C."
"Littleton, J. to the same intent, and if a man is damaged he ought to be recompensed.... If your cattle come on my land and eat my gra.s.s, notwithstanding you come freshly and drive them out, you ought to make amends for what your cattle have done, be it more or less.... And, sir, if this should be law that he might enter and take the thorns, for the same reason, if he cut a large tree, he might come with his wagons and horses to carry the trees off, which is not reason, for perhaps he has corn or other crops growing, &c., and no more here, for the law is all one in great things and small.... Choke, C. J. to the same intent, for when the princ.i.p.al thing was not lawful, that which depends upon it was not lawful; for when he cut the thorns and they fell on my land, [87] this falling was not lawful, and therefore his coming to take them out was not lawful. As to what was said about their falling in ipso invito, that is no plea, but he ought to show that he could not do it in any other way, or that he did all that was in his power to keep them out."
Forty years later, /1/ the Year Books report Rede, J. as adopting the argument of Fairfax in the last case. In trespa.s.s, he says, "the intent cannot be construed; but in felony it shall be. As when a man shoots at b.u.t.ts and kills a man, it is not felony et il ser come n"avoit l"entent de luy tuer; and so of a tiler on a house who with a stone kills a man unwittingly, it is not felony.
/2/ But when a man shoots at the b.u.t.ts and wounds a man, though it is against his will, he shall be called a trespa.s.ser against his intent."
There is a series of later shooting cases, Weaver v. Ward, /3/ d.i.c.kenson v. Watson, /4/ and Underwood v. Hewson, /5/ followed by the Court of Appeals of New York in Castle v. Duryee, /6/ in which defences to the effect that the damage was done accidentally and by misfortune, and against the will of the defendant, were held insufficient.
In the reign of Queen Elizabeth it was held that where a man with a gun at the door of his house shot at a fowl, and thereby set fire to his own house and to the house of his neighbor, he was liable in an action on the case generally, the declaration not being on the custom of the realm, [88] "viz. for negligently keeping his fire." "For the injury is the same, although this mischance was not by a common negligence, but by misadventure."
/1/
The above-mentioned instances of the stick and shooting at b.u.t.ts became standard ill.u.s.trations; they are repeated by Sir Thomas Raymond, in Bessey v. Olliot, /2/ by Sir William Blackstone, in the famous squib case, /3/ and by other judges, and have become familiar through the textbooks. Sir T. Raymond, in the above case, also repeats the thought and almost the words of Littleton, J., which have been quoted, and says further: "In all civil acts the law doth not so much regard the intent of the actor, as the loss and damage of the party suffering." Sir William Blackstone also adopts a phrase from d.i.c.kenson v. Watson, just cited: "Nothing but inevitable necessity" is a justification. So Lord Ellenborough, in Leame v. Bray: /4/ "If the injury were received from the personal act of another, it was deemed sufficient to make it trespa.s.s"; or, according to the more frequently quoted language of Grose, J., in the same case: "Looking into all the cases from the Year Book in the 21 H. VII. down to the latest decision on the subject, I find the principle to be, that if the injury be done by the act of the party himself at the time, or he be the immediate cause of it, though it happen accidentally or by misfortune, yet he is answerable in trespa.s.s." Further citations are deemed unnecessary.
In spite, however, of all the arguments which may be [89] urged for the rule that a man acts at his peril, it has been rejected by very eminent courts, even under the old forms of action. In view of this fact, and of the further circ.u.mstance that, since the old forms have been abolished, the allegation of negligence has spread from the action on the case to all ordinary declarations in tort which do not allege intent, probably many lawyers would be surprised that any one should think it worth while to go into the present discussion. Such is the natural impression to be derived from daily practice. But even if the doctrine under consideration had no longer any followers, which is not the case, it would be well to have something more than daily practice to sustain our views upon so fundamental a question; as it seems to me at least, the true principle is far from being articulately grasped by all who are interested in it, and can only be arrived at after a careful a.n.a.lysis of what has been thought hitherto. It might be thought enough to cite the decisions opposed to the rule of absolute responsibility, and to show that such a rule is inconsistent with admitted doctrines and sound policy. But we may go further with profit, and inquire whether there are not strong grounds for thinking that the common law has never known such a rule, unless in that period of dry precedent which is so often to be found midway between a creative epoch and a period of solvent philosophical reaction.
Conciliating the attention of those who, contrary to most modern pract.i.tioners, still adhere to the strict doctrine, by reminding them once more that there are weighty decisions to be cited adverse to it, and that, if they have involved an innovation, the fact that it has been made by such magistrates as Chief Justice Shaw goes far to prove that the change was politic, I [90] think I may a.s.sert that a little reflection will show that it was required not only by policy, but by consistency. I will begin with the latter.
The same reasoning which would make a man answerable in trespa.s.s for all damage to another by force directly resulting from his own act, irrespective of negligence or intent, would make him answerable in case for the like damage similarly resulting from the act of his servant, in the course of the latter"s employment.
The discussions of the company"s negligence in many railway cases would therefore be wholly out of place, for although, to be sure, there is a contract which would make the company liable for negligence, that contract cannot be taken to diminish any liability which would otherwise exist for a trespa.s.s on the part of its employees.
More than this, the same reasoning would make a defendant responsible for all damage, however remote, of which his act could be called the cause. So long, at least, as only physical or irresponsible agencies, however unforeseen, co-operated with the act complained of to produce the result, the argument which would resolve the case of accidentally striking the plaintiff, when lifting a stick in necessary self-defence, adversely to the defendant, would require a decision against him in every case where his act was a factor in the result complained of. The distinction between a direct application of force, and causing damage indirectly, or as a more remote consequence of one"s act, although it may determine whether the form of action should be trespa.s.s or case, does not touch the theory of responsibility, if that theory be that a man acts at his peril.
[91] As was said at the outset, if the strict liability is to be maintained at all, it must be maintained throughout. A principle cannot be stated which would retain the strict liability in trespa.s.s while abandoning it in case. It cannot be said that trespa.s.s is for acts alone, and case for consequences of those acts. All actions of trespa.s.s are for consequences of acts, not for the acts themselves. And some actions of trespa.s.s are for consequences more remote from the defendant"s act than in other instances where the remedy would be case.
An act is always a voluntary muscular contraction, and nothing else. The chain of physical sequences which it sets in motion or directs to the plaintiff"s harm is no part of it, and very generally a long train of such sequences intervenes. An example or two will make this extremely clear.
When a man commits an a.s.sault and battery with a pistol, his only act is to contract the muscles of his arm and forefinger in a certain way, but it is the delight of elementary writers to point out what a vast series of physical changes must take place before the harm is done. Suppose that, instead of firing a pistol, he takes up a hose which is discharging water on the sidewalk, and directs it at the plaintiff, he does not even set in motion the physical causes which must co-operate with his act to make a battery. Not only natural causes, but a living being, may intervene between the act and its effect. Gibbons v. Pepper, /1/ which decided that there was no battery when a man"s horse was frightened by accident or a third person and ran away with him, and ran over the plaintiff, takes the distinction that, if the rider by spurring is the cause of [92] the accident, then he is guilty. In Scott v. Shepherd, /1/ already mentioned, trespa.s.s was maintained against one who had thrown a squib into a crowd, where it was tossed from hand to hand in self-defence until it burst and injured the plaintiff. Here even human agencies were a part of the chain between the defendant"s act and the result, although they were treated as more or less nearly automatic, in order to arrive at the decision.
Now I repeat, that, if principle requires us to charge a man in trespa.s.s when his act has brought force to bear on another through a comparatively short train of intervening causes, in spite of his having used all possible care, it requires the same liability, however numerous and unexpected the events between the act and the result. If running a man down is a trespa.s.s when the accident can be referred to the rider"s act of spurring, why is it not a tort in every case, as was argued in Vincent v.
Stinehour, /2/ seeing that it can always be referred more remotely to his act of mounting and taking the horse out?
Why is a man not responsible for the consequences of an act innocent in its direct and obvious effects, when those consequences would not have followed but for the intervention of a series of extraordinary, although natural, events? The reason is, that, if the intervening events are of such a kind that no foresight could have been expected to look out for them, the defendant is not to blame for having failed to do so. It seems to be admitted by the English judges that, even on the question whether the acts of leaving dry tr.i.m.m.i.n.gs in hot weather by the side of a railroad, and then sending an engine over the track, are [93] negligent,--that is, are a ground of liability,--the consequences which might reasonably be antic.i.p.ated are material.
/1/ Yet these are acts which, under the circ.u.mstances, can hardly be called innocent in their natural and obvious effects. The same doctrine has been applied to acts in violation of statute which could not reasonably have been expected to lead to the result complained of. /2/
But there is no difference in principle between the case where a natural cause or physical factor intervenes after the act in some way not to be foreseen, and turns what seemed innocent to harm, and the case where such a cause or factor intervenes, unknown, at the time; as, for the matter of that, it did in the English cases cited. If a man is excused in the one case because he is not to blame, he must be in the other. The difference taken in Gibbons v. Pepper, cited above, is not between results which are and those which are not the consequences of the defendant"s acts: it is between consequences which he was bound as a reasonable man to contemplate, and those which he was not. Hard spurring is just so much more likely to lead to harm than merely riding a horse in the street, that the court thought that the defendant would be bound to look out for the consequences of the one, while it would not hold him liable for those resulting merely from the other; [94] because the possibility of being run away with when riding quietly, though familiar, is comparatively slight. If, however, the horse had been unruly, and had been taken into a frequented place for the purpose of being broken, the owner might have been liable, because "it was his fault to bring a wild horse into a place where mischief might probably be done."
To return to the example of the accidental blow with a stick lifted in self-defence, there is no difference between hitting a person standing in one"s rear and hitting one who was pushed by a horse within range of the stick just as it was lifted, provided that it was not possible, under the circ.u.mstances, in the one case to have known, in the other to have antic.i.p.ated, the proximity. In either case there is wanting the only element which distinguishes voluntary acts from spasmodic muscular contractions as a ground of liability. In neither of them, that is to say, has there been an opportunity of choice with reference to the consequence complained of,--a chance to guard against the result which has come to pa.s.s. A choice which entails a concealed consequence is as to that consequence no choice.
The general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where it falls, and this principle is not affected by the fact that a human being is the instrument of misfortune. But relatively to a given human being anything is accident which he could not fairly have been expected to contemplate as possible, and therefore to avoid. In the language of the late Chief Justice Nelson of New York: "No case or principle can be found, or if found can be maintained, subjecting an individual to liability for [95] an act done without fault on his part.... All the cases concede that an injury arising from inevitable accident, or, which in law or reason is the same thing, from an act that ordinary human care and foresight are unable to guard against, is but the misfortune of the sufferer, and lays no foundation for legal responsibility." /1/ If this were not so, any act would be sufficient, however remote, which set in motion or opened the door for a series of physical sequences ending in damage; such as riding the horse, in the case of the runaway, or even coming to a place where one is seized with a fit and strikes the plaintiff in an unconscious spasm. Nay, why need the defendant have acted at all, and why is it not enough that his existence has been at the expense of the plaintiff? The requirement of an act is the requirement that the defendant should have made a choice. But the only possible purpose of introducing this moral element is to make the power of avoiding the evil complained of a condition of liability. There is no such power where the evil cannot be foreseen. /2/ Here we reach the argument from policy, and I shall accordingly postpone for a moment the discussion of trespa.s.ses upon land, and of conversions, and will take up the liability for cattle separately at a later stage.
A man need not, it is true, do this or that act, the term act implies a choice,--but he must act somehow. Furthermore, the public generally profits by individual activity. As action cannot be avoided, and tends to the public good, there is obviously no policy in throwing the hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon the actor. [96] The state might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance company against accidents, and distribute the burden of its citizens" mishaps among all its members. There might be a pension for paralytics, and state aid for those who suffered in person or estate from tempest or wild beasts. As between individuals it might adopt the mutual insurance principle pro tanto, and divide damages when both were in fault, as in the rustic.u.m judicium of the admiralty, or it might throw all loss upon the actor irrespective of fault. The state does none of these things, however, and the prevailing view is that its c.u.mbrous and expensive machinery ought not to be set in motion unless some clear benefit is to be derived from disturbing the status quo. State interference is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be a good. Universal insurance, if desired, can be better and more cheaply accomplished by private enterprise. The undertaking to redistribute losses simply on the ground that they resulted from the defendant"s act would not only be open to these objections, but, as it is hoped the preceding discussion has shown, to the still graver one of offending the sense of justice. Unless my act is of a nature to threaten others, unless under the circ.u.mstances a prudent man would have foreseen the possibility of harm, it is no more justifiable to make me indemnify my neighbor against the consequences, than to make me do the same thing if I had fallen upon him in a fit, or to compel me to insure him against lightning.
I must now recur to the conclusions drawn from innocent trespa.s.ses upon land, and conversions, and the supposed a.n.a.logy of those cases to trespa.s.ses against the person, lest the law concerning the latter should be supposed to lie between two antinomies, each necessitating with equal cogency an opposite conclusion to the other.
[97] Take first the case of trespa.s.s upon land attended by actual damage. When a man goes upon his neighbor"s land, thinking it is his own, he intends the very act or consequence complained of. He means to intermeddle with a certain thing in a certain way, and it is just that intended intermeddling for which he is sued. /1/ Whereas, if he accidentally hits a stranger as he lifts his staff in self defence, the fact, which is the gist of the action,--namely, the contact between the staff and his neighbor"s head,--was not intended, and could not have been foreseen. It might be answered, to be sure, that it is not for intermeddling with property, but for intermeddling with the plaintiff"s property, that a man is sued; and that in the supposed cases, just as much as in that of the accidental blow, the defendant is ignorant of one of the facts making up the total environment, and which must be present to make his action wrong. He is ignorant, that is to say, that the true owner either has or claims any interest in the property in question, and therefore he does not intend a wrongful act, because he does not mean to deal with his neighbor"s property. But the answer to this is, that he does intend to do the damage complained of. One who diminishes the value of property by intentional damage knows it belongs to somebody. If he thinks it belongs to himself, he expects whatever harm he may do to come out of his own pocket. It would be odd if he were to get rid of the burden by discovering that it belonged to his neighbor. It is a very different thing to say that he who intentionally does harm must bear the loss, from saying that one from whose acts harm follows accidentally, as [98] a consequence which could not have been foreseen, must bear it.
Next, suppose the act complained of is an exercise of dominion over the plaintiff"s property, such as a merely technical trespa.s.s or a conversion. If the defendant thought that the property belonged to himself, there seems to be no abstract injustice in requiring him to know the limits of his own t.i.tles, or, if he thought that it belonged to another, in holding him bound to get proof of t.i.tle before acting. Consider, too, what the defendant"s liability amounts to, if the act, whether an entry upon land or a conversion of chattels, has been unattended by damage to the property, and the thing has come back to the hands of the true owner. The sum recovered is merely nominal, and the payment is nothing more than a formal acknowledgment of the owner"s t.i.tle; which, considering the effect of prescription and statutes of limitation upon repeated acts of dominion, is no more than right. /1/ All semblance of injustice disappears when the defendant is allowed to avoid the costs of an action by tender or otherwise.
But suppose the property has not come back to the hands of the true owner. If the thing remains in the hands of the defendant, it is clearly right that he should surrender it. And if instead of the thing itself he holds the proceeds of a sale, it is as reasonable to make him pay over its value in trover or a.s.sumpsit as it would have been to compel a surrender of the thing. But the question whether the defendant has subsequently paid over the proceeds of the sale of a chattel to a third person, cannot affect the rights of the true owner of the [99] chattel. In the supposed case of an auctioneer, for instance, if he had paid the true owner, it would have been an answer to his bailor"s claim.
If he has paid his bailor instead, he has paid one whom he was not bound to pay, and no general principle requires that this should be held to divest the plaintiff"s right.
Another consideration affecting the argument that the law as to trespa.s.ses upon property establishes a general principle, is that the defendant"s knowledge or ignorance of the plaintiff"s t.i.tle is likely to lie wholly in his own breast, and therefore hardly admits of satisfactory proof. Indeed, in many cases it cannot have been open to evidence at all at the time when the law was settled, before parties were permitted to testify. Accordingly, in Basely v. Clarkson, /1/ where the defence set up to an action of trespa.s.s quare clausum was that the defendant in mowing his own land involuntarily and by mistake mowed down some of the plaintiff"s gra.s.s, the plaintiff had judgment on demurrer. "For it appears the fact was voluntary, and his intention and knowledge are not traversable; they can"t be known."