This language suggests that it would be sufficient to explain the law of trespa.s.s upon property historically, without attempting to justify it. For it seems to be admitted that if the defendant"s mistake could be proved it might be material. /2/ It will be noticed, further, that any general argument from the law of trespa.s.s upon laud to that governing trespa.s.s against the person is shown to be misleading by the law as to cattle. The owner is bound at his peril [100] to keep them off his neighbor"s premises, but he is not bound at his peril in all cases to keep them from his neighbor"s person.
The objections to such a decision as supposed in the case of an auctioneer do not rest on the general theory of liability, but spring altogether from the special exigencies of commerce. It does not become unjust to hold a person liable for unauthorized intermeddling with another"s property, until there arises the practical necessity for rapid dealing. But where this practical necessity exists, it is not surprising to find, and we do find, a different tendency in the law. The absolute protection of property, however natural to a primitive community more occupied in production than in exchange, is hardly consistent with the requirements of modern business. Even when the rules which we have been considering were established, the traffic of the public markets was governed by more liberal principles. On the continent of Europe it was long ago decided that the policy of protecting t.i.tles must yield to the policy of protecting trade. Casaregis held that the general principle nemo plus juris in alium transferre potest quam ipse habet must give way in mercantile transactions to possession vaut t.i.tre. /1/ In later times, as markets overt have lost their importance, the Factors" Acts and their successive amendments have tended more and more in the direction of adopting the Continental doctrine.
I must preface the argument from precedent with a reference to what has been said already in the first Lecture about early forms of liability, and especially about [101] the appeals. It was there shown that the appeals de pace et plagis and of mayhem became the action of trespa.s.s, and that those appeals and the early actions of trespa.s.s were always, so far as appears, for intentional wrongs. /1/
The contra pacem in the writ of trespa.s.s was no doubt inserted to lay a foundation for the king"s writ; but there seems to be no reason to attribute a similar purpose to vi et armis, or c.u.m vi sua, as it was often put. Glanvill says that wounds are within the sheriff"s jurisdiction, unless the appellor adds a charge of breach of the king"s peace. /2/ Yet the wounds are given vi et armis as much in the one case as in the other. Bracton says that the lesser wrongs described by him belong to the king"s jurisdiction, "because they are sometimes against the peace of our lord the king," /3/ while, as has been observed, they were supposed to be always committed intentionally. It might even perhaps be inferred that the allegation contra pacem was originally material, and it will be remembered that trespa.s.ses formerly involved the liability to pay a fine to the king. /4/
If it be true that trespa.s.s was originally confined to intentional wrongs, it is hardly necessary to consider the argument drawn from the scope of the general issue. In form it was a mitigation of the strict denial de verbo in verb.u.m of the ancient procedure, to which the inquest given by the king"s writ was unknown. /5/ The strict form seems to have lasted in England some time after the trial of the issue by recognition was introduced. /6/ When [102] a recognition was granted, the inquest was, of course, only competent to speak to the facts, as has been said above. /1/ When the general issue was introduced, trespa.s.s was still confined to intentional wrongs.
We may now take up the authorities. It will be remembered that the earlier precedents are of a date when the a.s.size and jurata had not given place to the modern jury. These bodies spoke from their own knowledge to an issue defined by the writ, or to certain familiar questions of fact arising in the trial of a cause, but did not hear the whole case upon evidence adduced.
Their function was more limited than that which has been gained by the jury, and it naturally happened that, when they had declared what the defendant had done, the judges laid down the standard by which those acts were to be measured without their a.s.sistance. Hence the question in the Year Books is not a loose or general inquiry of the jury whether they think the alleged trespa.s.ser was negligent on such facts as they may find, but a well-defined issue of law, to be determined by the court, whether certain acts set forth upon the record are a ground of liability.
It is possible that the judges may have dealt pretty strictly with defendants, and it is quite easy to pa.s.s from the premise that defendants have been held trespa.s.sers for a variety of acts, without mention of neglect, to the conclusion that any act by which another was damaged will make the actor chargeable. But a more exact scrutiny of the early books will show that liability in general, then as later, was [103] founded on the opinion of the tribunal that the defendant ought to have acted otherwise, or, in other words, that he was to blame.
Returning first to the case of the thorns in the Year Book, /1/ it will be seen that the falling of the thorns into the plaintiff"s close, although a result not wished by the defendant, was in no other sense against his will. When he cut the thorns, he did an act which obviously and necessarily would have that consequence, and he must be taken to have foreseen and not to have prevented it. Choke, C. J. says, "As to what was said about their falling in, ipso invito, that is no plea, but he ought to show that he could not do it in any other way, or that he did all in his power to keep them out"; and both the judges put the unlawfulness of the entry upon the plaintiff"s land as a consequence of the unlawfulness of dropping the thorns there.
Choke admits that, if the thorns or a tree had been blown over upon the plaintiff"s land, the defendant might have entered to get them. Chief Justice Crew says of this case, in Millen v.
Fawdry, /2/ that the opinion was that "trespa.s.s lies, because he did not plead that he did his best endeavor to hinder their falling there; yet this was a hard case." The statements of law by counsel in argument may be left on one side, although Brian is quoted and mistaken for one of the judges by Sir William Blackstone, in Scott v. Shepherd.
The princ.i.p.al authorities are the shooting cases, and, as shooting is an extra-hazardous act, it would not be surprising if it should be held that men do it at their peril in public places. The liability has been put on the general ground of fault, however, wherever the line of necessary [104] precaution may be drawn. In Weaver v. Ward, /1/ the defendant set up that the plaintiff and he were skirmishing in a trainband, and that when discharging his piece he wounded the plaintiff by accident and misfortune, and against his own will. On demurrer, the court says that "no man shall be excused of a trespa.s.s,... except it may be judged utterly without his fault. As if a man by force take my hand and strike you, or if here the defendant had said, that the plaintiff ran cross his piece when it was discharging, or had set forth the case with the circ.u.mstances so as it had appeared to the court that it had been inevitable, and that the defendant had committed no negligence to give occasion to the hurt." The later cases simply follow Weaver v. Ward.
The quotations which were made above in favor of the strict doctrine from Sir T. Raymond, in Bessey v. Olliot, and from Sir William Blackstone, in Scott v. Shepherd, are both taken from dissenting opinions. In the latter case it is pretty clear that the majority of the court considered that to repel personal danger by instantaneously tossing away a squib thrown by another upon one"s stall was not a trespa.s.s, although a new motion was thereby imparted to the squib, and the plaintiff"s eye was put out in consequence. The last case cited above, in stating the arguments for absolute responsibility, was Leame v. Bray. /2/ The question under discussion was whether the action (for running down the plaintiff) should not have been case rather than trespa.s.s, the defendant founding his objection to trespa.s.s on the ground that the injury happened through his neglect, but was not done wilfully. There was therefore no question of absolute responsibility for one"s acts [105] before the court, as negligence was admitted; and the language used is all directed simply to the proposition that the damage need not have been done intentionally.
In Wakeman v. Robinson, /1/another runaway case, there was evidence that the defendant pulled the wrong rein, and that he ought to have kept a straight course. The jury were instructed that, if the injury was occasioned by an immediate act of the defendant, it was immaterial whether the act was wilful or accidental. On motion for a new trial, Dallas, C. J. said, "If the accident happened entirely without default on the part of the defendant, or blame imputable to him, the action does not lie ....The accident was clearly occasioned by the default of the defendant. The weight of evidence was all that way. I am now called upon to grant a new trial, contrary to the justice of the case, upon the ground, that the jury were not called on to consider whether the accident was unavoidable, or occasioned by the fault of the defendant. There can be no doubt that the learned judge who presided would have taken the opinion of the jury on that ground, if he had been requested so to do." This language may have been inapposite under the defendant"s plea (the general issue), but the pleadings were not adverted to, and the doctrine is believed to be sound.
In America there have been several decisions to the point. In Brown v. Kendall, /2/ Chief Justice Shaw settled the question for Ma.s.sachusetts. That was trespa.s.s for a.s.sault and battery, and it appeared that the defendant, while trying to separate two fighting dogs, had raised his stick over his shoulder in the act of striking, and had accidentally hit the plaintiff in the eye, inflicting upon him a [106] severe injury. The case was stronger for the plaintiff than if the defendant had been acting in self-defence; but the court held that, although the defendant was bound by no duty to separate the dogs, yet, if he was doing a lawful act, he was not liable unless he was wanting in the care which men of ordinary prudence would use under the circ.u.mstances, and that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove the want of such care.
In such a matter no authority is more deserving of respect than that of Chief Justice Shaw, for the strength of that great judge lay in an accurate appreciation of the requirements of the community whose officer he was. Some, indeed many, English judges could be named who have surpa.s.sed him in accurate technical knowledge, but few have lived who were his equals in their understanding of the grounds of public policy to which all laws must ultimately be referred. It was this which made him, in the language of the late Judge Curtis, the greatest magistrate which this country has produced.
Brown v. Kendall has been followed in Connecticut, /1/ in a case where a man fired a pistol, in lawful self-defence as he alleged, and hit a bystander. The court was strongly of opinion that the defendant was not answerable on the general principles of trespa.s.s, unless there was a failure to use such care as was practicable under the circ.u.mstances. The foundation of liability in trespa.s.s as well as case was said to be negligence. The Supreme Court of the United States has given the sanction of its approval to the same doctrine. /2/ The language of Harvey v.
Dunlop /3/ has been [107] quoted, and there is a case in Vermont which tends in the same direction. /1/
Supposing it now to be conceded that the general notion upon which liability to an action is founded is fault or blameworthiness in some sense, the question arises, whether it is so in the sense of personal moral shortcoming, as would practically result from Austin"s teaching. The language of Rede, J., which has been quoted from the Year Book, gives a sufficient answer. "In trespa.s.s the intent" (we may say more broadly, the defendant"s state of mind) "cannot be construed." Suppose that a defendant were allowed to testify that, before acting, he considered carefully what would be the conduct of a prudent man under the circ.u.mstances, and, having formed the best judgment he could, acted accordingly. If the story was believed, it would be conclusive against the defendant"s negligence judged by a moral standard which would take his personal characteristics into account. But supposing any such evidence to have got before the jury, it is very clear that the court would say, Gentlemen, the question is not whether the defendant thought his conduct was that of a prudent man, but whether you think it was. /2/
Some middle point must be found between the horns of this dilemma.
[108 The standards of the law are standards of general application. The law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, intellect, and education which make the internal character of a given act so different in different men. It does not attempt to see men as G.o.d sees them, for more than one sufficient reason. In the first place, the impossibility of nicely measuring a man"s powers and limitations is far clearer than that of ascertaining his knowledge of law, which has been thought to account for what is called the presumption that every man knows the law. But a more satisfactory explanation is, that, when men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general welfare. If, for instance, a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they sprang from guilty neglect. His neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper peril, to come up to their standard, and the courts which they establish decline to take his personal equation into account.
The rule that the law does, in general, determine liability by blameworthiness, is subject to the limitation that minute differences of character are not allowed for. The law considers, in other words, what would be blameworthy in the average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines liability by that. If we fall below the level in those gifts, it is our misfortune; so much as that we must have at our peril, for the reasons just given. But he who is intelligent and prudent does not act at his peril, in theory of law. On the contrary, it is [109] only when he fails to exercise the foresight of which he is capable, or exercises it with evil intent, that he is answerable for the consequences.
There are exceptions to the principle that every man is presumed to possess ordinary capacity to avoid harm to his neighbors, which ill.u.s.trate the rule, and also the moral basis of liability in general. When a man has a distinct defect of such a nature that all can recognize it as making certain precautions impossible, he will not be held answerable for not taking them. A blind man is not required to see at his peril; and although he is, no doubt, bound to consider his infirmity in regulating his actions, yet if he properly finds himself in a certain situation, the neglect of precautions requiring eyesight would not prevent his recovering for an injury to himself, and, it may be presumed, would not make him liable for injuring another. So it is held that, in cases where he is the plaintiff, an infant of very tender years is only bound to take the precautions of which an infant is capable; the same principle may be cautiously applied where he is defendant. /1/ Insanity is a more difficult matter to deal with, and no general rule can be laid down about it. There is no doubt that in many cases a man may be insane, and yet perfectly capable of taking the precautions, and of being influenced by the motives, which the circ.u.mstances demand. But if insanity of a p.r.o.nounced type exists, manifestly incapacitating the sufferer from complying with the rule which he has broken, good sense would require it to be admitted as an excuse.
Taking the qualification last established in connection with the general proposition previously laid down, it will [110] now be a.s.sumed that, on the one hand, the law presumes or requires a man to possess ordinary capacity to avoid harming his neighbors, unless a clear and manifest incapacity be shown; but that, on the other, it does not in general hold him liable for unintentional injury, unless, possessing such capacity, he might and ought to have foreseen the danger, or, in other words, unless a man of ordinary intelligence and forethought would have been to blame for acting as he did. The next question is, whether this vague test is all that the law has to say upon the matter, and the same question in another form, by whom this test is to be applied.
Notwithstanding the fact that the grounds of legal liability are moral to the extent above explained, it must be borne in mind that law only works within the sphere of the senses. If the external phenomena, the manifest acts and omissions, are such as it requires, it is wholly indifferent to the internal phenomena of conscience. A man may have as bad a heart as he chooses, if his conduct is within the rules. In other words, the standards of the law are external standards, and, however much it may take moral considerations into account, it does so only for the purpose of drawing a line between such bodily motions and rests as it permits, and such as it does not. What the law really forbids, and the only thing it forbids, is the act on the wrong side of the line, be that act blameworthy or otherwise.
Again, any legal standard must, in theory, be one which would apply to all men, not specially excepted, under the same circ.u.mstances. It is not intended that the public force should fall upon an individual accidentally, or at the whim of any body of men. The standard, that is, [111] must be fixed. In practice, no doubt, one man may have to pay and another may escape, according to the different feelings of different juries. But this merely shows that the law does not perfectly accomplish its ends.
The theory or intention of the law is not that the feeling of approbation or blame which a particular twelve may entertain should be the criterion. They are supposed to leave their idiosyncrasies on one side, and to represent the feeling of the community. The ideal average prudent man, whose equivalent the jury is taken to be in many cases, and whose culpability or innocence is the supposed test, is a constant, and his conduct under given circ.u.mstances is theoretically always the same.
Finally, any legal standard must, in theory, be capable of being known. When a man has to pay damages, he is supposed to have broken the law, and he is further supposed to have known what the law was.
If, now, the ordinary liabilities in tort arise from failure to comply with fixed and uniform standards of external conduct, which every man is presumed and required to know, it is obvious that it ought to be possible, sooner or later, to formulate these standards at least to some extent, and that to do so must at last be the business of the court. It is equally clear that the featureless generality, that the defendant was bound to use such care as a prudent man would do under the circ.u.mstances, ought to be continually giving place to the specific one, that he was bound to use this or that precaution under these or those circ.u.mstances. The standard which the defendant was bound to come up to was a standard of specific acts or omissions, with reference to the specific circ.u.mstances in which he found himself. If in the whole department of [112] unintentional wrongs the courts arrived at no further utterance than the question of negligence, and left every case, without rudder or compa.s.s, to the jury, they would simply confess their inability to state a very large part of the law which they required the defendant to know, and would a.s.sert, by implication, that nothing could be learned by experience. But neither courts nor legislatures have ever stopped at that point.
From the time of Alfred to the present day, statutes and decisions have busied themselves with defining the precautions to be taken in certain familiar cases; that is, with subst.i.tuting for the vague test of the care exercised by a prudent man, a precise one of specific acts or omissions. The fundamental thought is still the same, that the way prescribed is that in which prudent men are in the habit of acting, or else is one laid down for cases where prudent men might otherwise be in doubt.
It will be observed that the existence of the external tests of liability which will be mentioned, while it ill.u.s.trates the tendency of the law of tort to become more and more concrete by judicial decision and by statute, does not interfere with the general doctrine maintained as to the grounds of liability. The argument of this Lecture, although opposed to the doctrine that a man acts or exerts force at his peril, is by no means opposed to the doctrine that he does certain particular acts at his peril.
It is the coa.r.s.eness, not the nature, of the standard which is objected to. If, when the question of the defendant"s negligence is left to a jury, negligence does not mean the actual state of the defendant"s mind, but a failure to act as a prudent man of average intelligence would have done, he is required to conform to an objective standard at his [113] peril, even in that case.
When a more exact and specific rule has been arrived at, he must obey that rule at his peril to the same extent. But, further, if the law is wholly a standard of external conduct, a man must always comply with that standard at his peril.
Some examples of the process of specification will be useful. In LL. Alfred, 36, /1/ providing for the case of a man"s staking himself on a spear carried by another, we read, "Let this (liability) be if the point be three fingers higher than the hindmost part of the shaft; if they be both on a level,... be that without danger."
The rule of the road and the sailing rules adopted by Congress from England are modern examples of such statutes. By the former rule, the question has been narrowed from the vague one, Was the party negligent? to the precise one, Was he on the right or left of the road? To avoid a possible misconception, it may be observed that, of course, this question does not necessarily and under all circ.u.mstances decide that of liability; a plaintiff may have been on the wrong side of the road, as he may have been negligent, and yet the conduct of the defendant may have been unjustifiable, and a ground of liability. /2/ So, no doubt, a defendant could justify or excuse being on the wrong side, under some circ.u.mstances. The difference between alleging that a defendant was on the wrong side of the road, and that he was negligent, is the difference between an allegation of facts requiring to be excused by a counter allegation of further facts to prevent their being a ground of liability, and an allegation which involves a conclusion of law, and denies in advance the existence of an [114] excuse. Whether the former allegation ought not to be enough, and whether the establishment of the fact ought not to shift the burden of proof, are questions which belong to the theory of pleading and evidence, and could be answered either way consistently with a.n.a.logy. I should have no difficulty in saying that the allegation of facts which are ordinarily a ground of liability, and which would be so unless excused, ought to be sufficient. But the forms of the law, especially the forms of pleading, do not change with every change of its substance, and a prudent lawyer would use the broader and safer phrase.
The same course of specification which has been ill.u.s.trated from the statute-book ought also to be taking place in the growth of judicial decisions. That this should happen is in accordance with the past history of the law. It has been suggested already that in the days of the a.s.size and jurata the court decided whether the facts const.i.tuted a ground of liability in all ordinary cases. A question of negligence might, no doubt, have gone to the jury. Common sense and common knowledge are as often sufficient to determine whether proper care has been taken of an animal, as they are to say whether A or B owns it. The cases which first arose were not of a kind to suggest a.n.a.lysis, and negligence was used as a proximately simple element for a long time before the need or possibility of a.n.a.lysis was felt. Still, when an issue of this sort is found, the dispute is rather what the acts or omissions of the defendant were than on the standard of conduct.
/1/ The [115] distinction between the functions of court and jury does not come in question until the parties differ as to the standard of conduct. Negligence, like ownership, is a complex conception. Just as the latter imports the existence of certain facts, and also the consequence (protection against all the world) which the law attaches to those facts; the former imports the existence of certain facts (conduct) and also the consequence (liability) which the law attaches to those facts. In most cases the question is upon the facts, and it is only occasionally that one arises on the consequence.
It will have been noticed how the judges pa.s.s on the defendant"s acts (on grounds of fault and public policy) in the case of the thorns, and that in Weaver v. Ward /1/it is said that the facts const.i.tuting an excuse, and showing that the defendant was free from negligence, should have been spread upon the record, in order that the court might judge. A similar requirement was laid down with regard to the defence of probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution. /2/ And to this day the question of probable cause is always pa.s.sed on by the court. Later evidence will be found in what follows.
There is, however, an important consideration, which has not yet been adverted to. It is undoubtedly possible that those who have the making of the law should deem it wise to put the mark higher in some cases than the point established by common practice at which blameworthiness begins. For instance, in Morris v. Platt, /2/ the court, while declaring in the strongest terms that, in general, [116] negligence is the foundation of liability for accidental trespa.s.ses, nevertheless hints that, if a decision of the point were necessary, it might hold a defendant to a stricter rule where the damage was caused by a pistol, in view of the danger to the public of the growing habit of carrying deadly weapons. Again, it might well seem that to enter a man"s house for the purpose of carrying a present, or inquiring after his health when he was ill, was a harmless and rather praiseworthy act, although crossing the owner"s boundary was intentional. It is not supposed that an action would lie at the present day for such a cause, unless the defendant had been forbidden the house.
Yet in the time of Henry VIII. it was said to be actionable if without license, "for then under that color my enemy might be in my house and kill me." /1/ There is a clear case where public policy establishes a standard of overt acts without regard to fault in any sense. In like manner, policy established exceptions to the general prohibition against entering another"s premises, as in the instance put by Chief Justice Choke in the Year Book, of a tree being blown over upon them, or when the highway became impa.s.sable, or for the purpose of keeping the peace. /2/
Another example may perhaps be found in the shape which has been given in modern times to the liability for animals, and in the derivative principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, /3/ that when a person brings on his lands, and collects and keeps there, anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, he must keep it in at his peril; and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the [117] damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. Cases of this sort do not stand on the notion that it is wrong to keep cattle, or to have a reservoir of water, as might have been thought with more plausibility when fierce and useless animals only were in question. /1/ It may even be very much for the public good that the dangerous acc.u.mulation should be made (a consideration which might influence the decision in some instances, and differently in different jurisdictions); but as there is a limit to the nicety of inquiry which is possible in a trial, it may be considered that the safest way to secure care is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what precautions shall be taken. The liability for trespa.s.ses of cattle seems to lie on the boundary line between rules based on policy irrespective of fault, and requirements intended to formulate the conduct of a prudent man.
It has been shown in the first Lecture how this liability for cattle arose in the early law, and how far the influence of early notions might be traced in the law of today, Subject to what is there said, it is evident that the early discussions turn on the general consideration whether the owner is or is not to blame.
/2/ But they do not stop there: they go on to take practical distinctions, based on common experience. Thus, when the defendant chased sheep out of his land with a dog, and as soon as the sheep were out called in his dog, but the dog pursued them into adjoining land, the chasing of the sheep beyond the defendant"s line was held no trespa.s.s, because "the nature of a dog is such that he cannot be ruled suddenly." /3/
[118] It was lawful in ploughing to turn the horses on adjoining land, and if while so turning the beasts took a mouthful of gra.s.s, or subverted the soil with the plough, against the will of the driver, he had a good justification, because the law will recognize that a man cannot at every instant govern his cattle as he will. /1/ So it was said that, if a man be driving cattle through a town, and one of them goes into another man"s house, and he follows him, trespa.s.s does not lie for this. /2/ So it was said by Doderidge, J., in the same case, that if deer come into my land out of the forest, and I chase them with dogs, it is excuse enough for me to wind my horn to recall the dogs, because by this the warden of the forest has notice that a deer is being chased. /3/
The very case of Mason v. Keeling, /4/ which is referred to in the first Lecture for its echo of primitive notions, shows that the working rules of the law had long been founded on good sense.
With regard to animals not then treated as property, which in the main were the wilder animals, the law was settled that, "if they are of a tame nature, there must be notice of the ill quality; and the law takes notice, that a dog is not of a fierce nature, but rather the contrary." /5/ If the animals "are such as are naturally [119] mischievous in their kind, he shall answer for hurt done by them, without any notice." /1/ The latter principle has been applied to the case of a bear, /2/ and amply accounts for the liability of the owner of such animals as horses and oxen in respect of trespa.s.ses upon land, although, as has been seen, it was at one time thought to stand upon his ownership. It is said to be the universal nature of cattle to stray, and, when straying in cultivated land, to do damage by trampling down and eating the crops, whereas a dog does no harm. It is also said to be usual and easy to restrain them. /3/ If, as has been suggested, the historical origin of the rule was different, it does not matter.
Following the same line of thought, the owner of cattle is not held absolutely answerable for all damage which they may do the person. According to Lord Holt in the alcove opinion, these animals, "which are not so familiar to mankind" as dogs, "the owner ought to confine, and take all reasonable caution that they do no mischief.... But... if the owner puts a horse or an ox to gra.s.s in his field, which is adjoining to the highway, and the horse or the ox breaks the hedge and runs into the highway, and kicks or gores some pa.s.senger, an action will not lie against the owner; otherwise, if he had notice that they had done such a thing before."
[120] Perhaps the most striking authority for the position that the judge"s duties are not at an end when the question of negligence is reached, is shown by the discussions concerning the law of bailment. Consider the judgment in Coggs v. Bernard, /1/ the treatises of Sir William Jones and Story, and the chapter of Kent upon the subject. They are so many attempts to state the duty of the bailee specifically, according to the nature of the bailment and of the object bailed. Those attempts, to be sure, were not successful, partly because they were attempts to engraft upon the native stock a branch of the Roman law which was too large to survive the process, but more especially because the distinctions attempted were purely qualitative, and were therefore useless when dealing with a jury. /2/ To instruct a jury that they must find the defendant guilty of gross negligence before he can be charged, is open to the reproach that for such a body the word "gross" is only a vituperative epithet. But it would not be so with a judge sitting in admiralty without a jury.
The Roman law and the Supreme Court of the United States agree that the word means something. /3/ Successful or not, it is enough for the present argument that the attempt has been made.
The principles of substantive law which have been established by the courts are believed to have been somewhat obscured by having presented themselves oftenest in the form of rulings upon the sufficiency of evidence. When a judge rules that there is no evidence of negligence, he does something more than is embraced in an ordinary ruling that there is no evidence of a fact. He rules that [121] acts or omissions proved or in question do not const.i.tute a ground of legal liability, and in this way the law is gradually enriching itself from daily life, as it should.
Thus, in Crafton v. Metropolitan Railway Co., /1/ the plaintiff slipped on the defendant"s stairs and was severely hurt. The cause of his slipping was that the bra.s.s nosing of the stairs had been worn smooth by travel over it, and a builder testified that in his opinion the staircase was unsafe by reason of this circ.u.mstance and the absence of a hand-rail. There was nothing to contradict this except that great numbers of persons had pa.s.sed over the stairs and that no accident had happened there, and the plaintiff had a verdict. The court set the verdict aside, and ordered a nonsuit. The ruling was in form that there was no evidence of negligence to go to the jury; but this was obviously equivalent to saying, and did in fact mean, that the railroad company had done all that it was bound to do in maintaining such a staircase as was proved by the plaintiff. A hundred other equally concrete instances will be found in the text-books.
On the other hand, if the court should rule that certain acts or omissions coupled with damage were conclusive evidence of negligence unless explained, it would, in substance and in truth, rule that such acts or omissions were a ground of liability, /2/ or prevented a recovery, as the case might be. Thus it is said to be actionable negligence to let a house for a dwelling knowing it to be so infected with small-pox as to be dangerous to health, and concealing the knowledge. /3/ To explain the acts or omissions in such a [122] case would be to prove different conduct from that ruled upon, or to show that they were not, juridically speaking, the cause of the damage complained of. The ruling a.s.sumes, for the purposes of the ruling, that the facts in evidence are all the facts.
The cases which have raised difficulties needing explanation are those in which the court has ruled that there was prima facie evidence of negligence, or some evidence of negligence to go to the jury.
Many have noticed the confusion of thought implied in speaking of such cases as presenting mixed questions of law and fact. No doubt, as has been said above, the averment that the defendant has been guilty of negligence is a complex one: first, that he has done or omitted certain things; second, that his alleged conduct does not come up to the legal standard. And so long as the controversy is simply on the first half, the whole complex averment is plain matter for the jury without special instructions, just as a question of ownership would be where the only dispute was as to the fact upon which the legal conclusion was founded. /1/ But when a controversy arises on the second half, the question whether the court or the jury ought to judge of the defendant"s conduct is wholly unaffected by the accident, whether there is or is not also a dispute as to what that conduct was. If there is such a dispute, it is entirely possible to give a series of hypothetical instructions adapted to every state of facts which it is open to the jury to find. If there is no such dispute, the court may still take their opinion as to the standard. The problem is [123] to explain the relative functions of court and jury with regard to the latter.
When a case arises in which the standard of conduct, pure and simple, is submitted to the jury, the explanation is plain. It is that the court, not entertaining any clear views of public policy applicable to the matter, derives the rule to be applied from daily experience, as it has been agreed that the great body of the law of tort has been derived. But the court further feels that it is not itself possessed of sufficient practical experience to lay down the rule intelligently. It conceives that twelve men taken from the practical part of the community can aid its judgment. /1/ Therefore it aids its conscience by taking the opinion of the jury.
But supposing a state of facts often repeated in practice, is it to be imagined that the court is to go on leaving the standard to the jury forever? Is it not manifest, on the contrary, that if the jury is, on the whole, as fair a tribunal as it is represented to be, the lesson which can be got from that source will be learned? Either the court will find that the fair teaching of experience is that the conduct complained of usually is or is not blameworthy, and therefore, unless explained, is or is not a ground of liability; or it will find the jury oscillating to and fro, and will see the necessity of making up its mind for itself. There is no reason why any other such question should not be settled, as well as that of liability for stairs with smooth strips of bra.s.s upon their edges. The exceptions would mainly be found where the standard was rapidly changing, as, for instance, in some questions of medical treatment. /2/
[124] If this be the proper conclusion in plain cases, further consequences ensue. Facts do not often exactly repeat themselves in practice; but cases with comparatively small variations from each other do. A judge who has long sat at nisi prius ought gradually to acquire a fund of experience which enables him to represent the common sense of the community in ordinary instances far better than an average jury. He should be able to lead and to instruct them in detail, even where he thinks it desirable, on the whole, to take their opinion. Furthermore, the sphere in which he is able to rule without taking their opinion at all should be continually growing.