[183] But about this time important changes took place in the procedure usually adopted, which must be explained. If the chattel could be returned in specie, detinue afforded no satisfaction for damage which it might have suffered through the bailee"s neglect. /1/ The natural remedy for such damage was the action on the case. But before this could be made entirely satisfactory, there were certain difficulties to be overcome. The neglect which occasioned the damage might be a mere omission, and what was there akin to trespa.s.s in a nonfeasance to sustain the a.n.a.logy upon which trespa.s.s on the case was founded? Moreover, to charge a man for not acting, you must show that it was his duty to act. As pleadings were formerly construed, it would not have been enough to allege that the plaintiff"s goods were damaged by the defendant"s negligence. /2/ These troubles had been got over by the well-known words, super se a.s.sumpsit, which will be explained later. a.s.sumpsit did not for a long time become an independent action of contract, and the allegation was simply the inducement to an action of tort. The ground of liability was that the defendant had started upon the undertaking, so that his negligent omission, which let in the damage, could be connected with his acts as a part of his dealing with the thing. /3/ We shall find Lord Holt recognizing this original purport of a.s.sumpsit when we come to Coggs v. Bernard. Of course it was not confined to cases of bailment.
But there was another way besides this by which the defendant could be charged with a duty and made liable [184] in case, and which, although less familiar to lawyers, has a special bearing on the law of carriers in later times. If damage had been done or occasioned by the act or omission of the defendant in the pursuit of some of the more common callings, such as that of a farrier, it seems that the action could be maintained, without laying an a.s.sumpsit, on the allegation that he was a "common" farrier. /1/ The latter principle was also wholly independent of bailment. It expressed the general obligation of those exercising a public or "common" business to practise their art on demand, and show skill in it. "For," as Fitzherbert says, "it is the duty of every artificer to exercise his art rightly and truly as he ought." /2/
When it had thus been established that case would lie for damage when occasioned by the omission, as well as when caused by the act, of the defendant, there was no reason for denying it, even if the negligent custody had resulted in the destruction of the property. /3/ From this it was but a step to extend the same form of action to all cases of loss by a bailee, and so avoid the defendant"s right to wage his law. Detinue, the primitive remedy, retained that mark of primitive procedure. The last extension was made about the time of Southcote"s Case. /4/ But when the [185]
same form of action thus came to be used alike for damage or destruction by the bailee"s neglect and for loss by a wrong-doer against whom the bailee had a remedy over, a source was opened for confusion with regard to the foundation and nature of the defendant"s duty.
In truth, there were two sets of duties,--one not peculiar to bailees, arising from the a.s.sumpsit or public calling of the defendant, as just explained; the other, the ancient obligation, peculiar to them as such, of which Southcote"s Case was an example. But any obligation of a bailee might be conceived of as part of a contract of bailment, after a.s.sumpsit had become appropriated to contract, the doctrine of consideration had been developed, (both of which had happened in Lord c.o.ke"s time,) it seemed unnecessary to distinguish nicely between the two sets of duties just mentioned, provided a consideration and special promise could be alleged. Furthermore, as formerly the defendant"s public calling had the same effect as an a.s.sumpsit for the purpose of charging him in tort, it seems now to have been thought an equally good subst.i.tute for a special promise, in order to charge him in a.s.sumpsit. In Rogers v. Head, /1/ the argument was, that to charge one in a.s.sumpsit you must show either his public calling at the time of the delivery, or a special promise on sufficient consideration. This argument a.s.sumes that a bailee who received goods in the course of a public employment, [186] for instance as a common carrier, could be charged in this form of action for a breach of either of the above sets of duties, by alleging either his public calling or his reward and a special promise. It seems to have been admitted, as was repeatedly decided before and since that case, that one who was not a common carrier could have been charged for non-delivery in a special action; that is, in case as distinguished from a.s.sumpsit.
Suppose, next, that the plaintiff sued in case for a tort. As before, the breach of duty complained of might be such damage to property as had always been sued for in that form of action, or it might be a loss by theft for which detinue would formerly have been brought, and which fell on the bailee only by reason of the bailment. If the goods had been stolen, the bailee"s liability rested neither on his common calling nor on his a.s.sumpsit and his neglect, but arose from the naked facts that he had accepted a delivery and that the goods were gone, and in such cases it ought to have been enough to allege those facts in the declaration. /1/ But it was very natural that the time-honored foundations for the action on the case in its more limited application should still be laid in the pleadings, even after the scope of the action had been enlarged. We shall have to inquire, later, whether the principles of Southcote"s Case were not also extended in the opposite direction to cases not falling within it. The reasons for the rule which it laid down had lost their meaning centuries before Gawdy and Clench were born, when owners had acquired the right to sue for the wrongful taking of property in the hands [187] and the rule itself was a dry precedent likely to be followed according to the letter because the spirit had departed.
It had begun to totter when the reporter cautioned bailees to accept in such terms as to get rid of it. /1/
Accordingly, although that decision was the main authority relied on for the hundred years between it and Coggs v. Bernard whenever a peculiar responsibility was imposed upon bailees, we find that sometimes an a.s.sumpsit was laid as in the early precedents, /2/ or more frequently that the bailee was alleged to be a common bargeman, or common carrier, or the like, without much reference to the special nature of the tort in question; and that the true bearing of the allegation was sometimes lost sight of. At first, however, there were only some slight signs of confusion in the language of one or two cases, and if the duty was conceived to fall within the principle of Southcote"s Case, pleaders did not always allege the common or public calling which was held unnecessary. /3/ But they also adopted other devices from the precedents in case, or to strengthen an obligation which they did not well understand. Chief Justice Popham had sanctioned a distinction between paid and unpaid bailees, hence it was deemed prudent to lay a reward. Negligence was of course averred; and finally it became frequent to allege an obligation by the law and custom of the realm. This last deserves a little further attention.
There is no writ in the Register alleging any special obligation of common carriers by the custom of the realm. But the writ against innkeepers did lay a duly "by the [188] law and custom of England," and it was easy to adopt the phrase. The allegation did not so much imply the existence of a special principle, as state a proposition of law in the form which was then usual. There are other writs of trespa.s.s which allege a common-law duty in the same way, and others again setting forth a statutory obligation.
/1/ So "the judges were sworn to execute justice according to law and the custom of England." /2/
The duties of a common carrier, so far as the earlier evidence goes, were simply those of bailees in general, coupled with the liabilities generally attached to the exercise of a public calling. The word "common" addressed itself only to the latter point, as has been shown above. This is further ill.u.s.trated by the fact that, when the duty was thus set forth, it was not alleged as an obligation peculiar to common carriers as such, but was laid as the custom of law of common hoymen, or lightermen, &c., according to the business of the party concerned. It will be noticed that Chief Justice Holt in Coggs v. Bernard states the liability as applicable to all bailees for reward, exercising a public employment, and mentions common hoymen and masters of ships alongside of, not as embraced under, common carriers. It will also be noticed in the cases before that time, that there is no settled formula for the obligation in question, but that it is set forth in each case that the defendant was answerable for what he was said to have done or omitted in the particular instance.
/3/
[189] Returning now to the succession of the cases, Rich v.
Kneeland is the next in order (11 Jac. I., A.D. 1613). It was an action on the case (tort), against a common hoyman. In Croke"s report nothing is said of custom; but the declaration avers that the defendant was a common bargeman, that the plaintiff delivered him a portmanteau, &c. to carry, and paid him for it, and that the defendant tam negligenter custodivit, that it was taken from him by persons unknown,--like the second count in Morse v. Slue, below. The plea was demurred to, and adjudged for the plaintiff.
A writ of error being brought, it was a.s.signed that "this action lies not against a common bargeman without special promise. But all the Justices and Barons held, that it well lies as against a common carrier upon the land." If we follow this report, it seems at the first glance that importance was attributed to the common calling. But as the loss was clearly within the principle of Southcote"s Case, which required neither special promise nor common calling for its application, and which remained unquestioned law for three quarters of a century later, the court must have referred to the form of action employed (case), and not to the liability of the defendant in some form of action (detinue). The objection was that "this action lies not," not that the defendant not liable, "without special promise." Even thus narrowed, it rather countenances the notion that allegations which were necessary to charge a man for damage happening through his neglect, in the more ancient and use of this action, were also necessary in this new [190] extension of it to a different cla.s.s of wrongs. As it was now pretty clear that case would lie for a nonfeasance, the notion was mistaken, and we shall see that it was denied in subsequent decisions. /1/
According to Hobart"s report, it was alleged that the defendant was a common hoyman, to carry goods by water, for hire, &c., that by the custom of England such carriers ought to keep the goods, &c., so as they should not be lost by the default of them or their servants, &c. "And it was resolved that, though it was laid as a custom of the realm, yet indeed it is common law." This last resolution may only mean that the custom of the realm and the common law are the same thing, as had been said concerning innkeepers long before. /2/ But the law as to innkeepers, which was called the custom of the realm in the writ, had somewhat the air of a special principle extending beyond the law of bailment, inasmuch as their liability extended to goods within the inn, of which they had not the custody, and the court may have meant to make an ant.i.thesis between such a special principle and the common law or general law of bailment governing the present case.
Whatever doubts some of Croke"s language might raise, standing alone, the fact remains indisputable, that for nearly a century from Woodlife"s Case the liability of carriers for loss of goods, whether the custom of the realm or the defendant"s common calling was alleged or not, was placed upon the authority and was intended to be decided on the principle of Southcote"s Case.
[191] Symons v. Darknell 1 (4 Car. I., A.D. 1628) is precisely in point. The declaration was, that, by the common law, every lighterman ought so to manage his lighter that the goods carried therein should not perish. "And although no promise laid, it seemed to the court that the plaintiff should recover; and not alleging that defendant was common lighterman was no harm. Hyde, C. J., delivery makes the contract." This did not mean that delivery was a good consideration for a promise; but, as was laid down in Southcote"s Case, that delivery, without a special acceptance to keep only as one"s own goods, bound the bailee to keep safely, and therefore made it unnecessary to allege either an a.s.sumpsit or the defendant"s common calling. Whitlock, J.
called attention to the fact that the action was tort, not contract. "Et en cest case... Southcote"s Case fuit cite."
The same rule is stated as to bailments in general, the same year, by Sergeant Maynard arguendo in Williams v. Hide, /2/ again citing Southcote"s Case.
In Kenrig v. Eggleston /3/ (24 Car. I., A.D. 1648), "case against a country carrier for not delivering a box," &c., of which he was robbed, nothing was said about custom, nor being a common carrier, unless the above words imply that he was; but it was laid down, as in Southcote"s Case, that "it must come on the carrier"s part acceptance" if he would lessen his liability as bailee.
Nichols v. Moore /4/ (13 Car. II., A.D. 1661) was case against a "water carrier," between Hull and London, laying a delivery to him at York. It was moved in arrest of [192] judgment, that the defendant did not undertake to carry the goods from York to Hull.
"But notwithstanding this per totam curiam, the defendant shall be charged on his general receipt at York, according to Southcote"s Case."
It is fair to mention that in Matthews v. Hopkins /1/ (17 Car.
II.)the declaration was on the custom of the realm against a common carrier, and there was a motion in arrest of judgment, because there was a misrecital of the custom of the realm, and the defendant was not alleged to have been a carrier at the time of the receipt, and also because counts in trover, and in case on the custom, were joined. Judgment was arrested, it would seem on the latter ground, but the court continued: "And, although the declaration may be good without recital of the custom of the realm, as Hobart says, still it is the better way to recite it."
We now come to the great case of Morse v. Slue /2/ (23 & 24 Car.
II., A.D. 1671, 1672). This was an action against the master of a ship lying in the river Thames, for the loss of goods intrusted to him. The goods in question were taken away by robbers, and it was found that the ship had the usual guard at the time. There seem to have been two counts, one on the law and custom of England (1 Vent. 190), for masters of ships "carefully to govern, preserve, and defend goods shipped, so long as said ship should remain in the river Thames" (2 Keb. 866); "to keep safely [goods shipped to be carried from London beyond sea] without loss or subtraction, ita quodpro defectu of them they may not come to any damage" (1 Vent. 190); "to keep safely goods delivered to them to carry, dangers [193] of the sea excepted" (2 Levinz, 69; the exception last was perhaps drawn by the reporter from the usual bills of lading referred to in argument). The second count, which is usually overlooked, was a special count "on delivery and being stolen by his neglect." /1/
The case was twice argued, and all the reports agree, as far as they go, in their statements of the points insisted on.
Holt, for the plaintiff, maintained: /2/ 1. That the master receives goods generally, citing Southcote"s Case, and that in "only guardian in socage who hath the custody by law, who factor who is servant at the master"s dispose, and so cannot take care, are exempt." 2. That the master has a reward for his keeping, and is therefore a proper person to be sued. 3. That the master has a remedy over, citing the case of the Marshal of the King"s Bench.
/3/ That the mischief would be great if the master were not liable, as merchants put their trust in him, and no particular default be shown, as appears by the bill of lading, and, finally, that neglect appeared.
On the other side, it was urged that no neglect was found, and that the master was only a servant; so that, if any one was liable, the owners were. /4/ It was also suggested that, as there would have been no liability if the goods had been taken at sea, when the case would have within the admiralty law, it was absurd that a different rule should govern the beginning of the voyage from would have governed the rest of it. /5/
[194] On the second argument, it was again maintained for the plaintiff that the defendant was liable "at the common law on the general bailment," citing Southcote"s Case, and also that, by the Roman and maritime law, he was liable as a public carrier and master of a ship.
The opinion of the court was delivered by Chief Justice Hale. It was held that, the ship being within the body of the county, the admiralty law did not apply; or, according to 1 Mod. 85, note a, "the master could not avail himself of the rules of the civil law, by which masters are not chargeable pro d.a.m.no fatali"; that the master was liable to an action because he took a reward; that "he might have made a caution for himself, which he omitting and taking in the goods generally, he shall answer for what happens."
/1/ The case of Kenrig v. Eggleston /2/ seems also to have been referred to. It was further said that the master was rather an officer than a servant, and in effect received his wages from the merchant who paid freight. Finally, on the question of negligence, that it was not sufficient to have the usual number of men to guard the ship, but that it was neglect not to have enough to guard the goods, unless in case of the common enemies, citing the case of the Marshal, which it will be remembered was merely the principle of Southcote"s Case and the common law of bailment in another form. /3/
It will be observed that this case did not go on any special custom, either as to common carriers or shipmasters, but that all the arguments and the opinion of the court a.s.sumed that, if the case was to be governed by the common law, and not by the milder provisions of the civil [195] law relied on for the defence, and if the defendant could be regarded as a bailee, and not merely a servant of the owners, then the general law of bailment would apply, and the defendant would be charged, as in Southcote"s Case, "by his general acceptance."
It can hardly be supposed, however, that so enlightened a judge as Sir Matthew Hale would not have broken away the Year Books, if a case had arisen before him where property had been received as a pure favor to the plaintiff, without consideration or reward, and was taken from the defendant by robbery. Such a case was tried before Chief Justice Pemberton, and he very sensibly ruled that no action lay, declining to follow the law of Lord c.o.ke"s time to such extreme results /1/ (33 Car. II., A.D. 1681).
About the same time, the defendant"s common calling began to a.s.sume a new importance. The more important alternative allegation, the a.s.sumpsit, had the effect in the end of introducing the not intrinsically objectionable doctrine that all duties arising from a bailment are founded on contract. /2/ But this allegation, having now a special action to which it had given rise, was not much used where the action was tort, while the other averment occurs with increasing frequency. The notion was evidently gaining ground that the liability of common carriers for loss of [196] goods, whatever the cause of the loss might be, arose from a special principle peculiar to them, and not applicable to bailees in general. The confusion of independent duties which has been explained, and of which the first trace was seen in Rich v. Kneeland, was soon to become complete. /1/ Holt became Chief Justice. Three of the cases in the last note were rulings of his. In Lane v. Cotton /2/ (13 Will. III., A.D. 1701), he showed his disapproval of Southcote"s Case, and his impression that the common law of bailment was borrowed from Rome. The overthrow of Southcote"s Case and the old common law may be said to date from Coggs v. Bernard /3/ (2 Anne, A.D. 1703). Lord Holt"s famous opinion in the latter case quotes largely from the Roman law as it filtered to him through Bracton; but, whatever influence that may have had upon his general views, the point decided and the distinctions touching common carriers were of English growth.
The action did not sound in contract. The cause was for damage to the goods, and the plaintiff sued for a tort, laying an a.s.sumpsit by way of inducement to a charge of negligence, as in the days of Henry VI. The plea was not guilty. But after verdict for the plaintiff, there was a motion in arrest of judgment, "for that it was not alleged in the declaration that the defendant was a common porter, nor averred that he had anything for his pains."
Consideration was never alleged or thought of in the primitive a.s.sumpsit, but in the modern action of contract in that form [197]
it was required. Hence, it was inferred that, wherever an a.s.sumpsit was laid, even in all action of tort for damage to property, it was the allegation of a contract, and that a consideration must be shown for the undertaking, although the contrary had been decided in the reign of Queen Elizabeth. /1/ But the motion did not prevail, and judgment was given for the plaintiff. Lord Holt was well aware that the use of an a.s.sumpsit was not confined to contract. It is true that he said, "The owner"s trusting [the defendant] with the goods is a sufficient consideration to oblige him to a careful management," or to return them; but this means as distinguished from a consideration sufficient to oblige him to carry them, which he thought the defendant would not have been bound to do. He then expressly says, "This is a different case, for a.s.sumpsit does not only signify a future agreement, but, in such cases as this, it signifies an actual entry upon the thing and taking the trust upon himself"; following the earlier cases in the Year Books. /2/ This was enough for the decision, and the rule in Southcote"s Case had nothing to do with the matter. But as the duty of common carriers by reason of their calling was now supposed to extend to all kinds of losses, and the doctrine of Southcote"s Case was probably supposed to extend to many kinds of damage, it became necessary, in a general discussion, to reconcile or elect between the two principles.
The Chief Justice therefore proceeded to distinguish between [198] bailees for reward exercising a public employment, such as common carriers, common hoymen, masters of ships, &c., and other bailees; denied the rule in Southcote"s Case as to the latter; said that the principle of strict responsibility was confined to the former cla.s.s, and was applied to them on grounds of public policy, and that factors were exonerated, not because they were mere servants, as had always been laid down (among others, by himself in arguing Morse v. Slue), but because they were not within the reason of the rule.
The reader who has followed the argument so far, will hardly need to be convinced that this did not mean the adoption of the Praetor"s Edict. There is further evidence at hand if required.
In the first place, as we have seen, there was a century of precedents ending with Morse v. Slue, argued by Holt himself, in which the liability of masters of ships, hoymen, carriers, &c.
had been adjudicated. Morse v. Slue is cited and relied on, and there is no hint of dissatisfaction with the other cases. On the contrary, they furnished the examples of bailees for reward exercising a public calling. The distinction between bailees for reward and others is Chief Justice Popham"s; the latter qualification (exercising a public calling) was also English, as has partly appeared already, and as will be explained further on.
In the next place, the strict rule is not confined to nautae, caupones, and stabularii, nor even to common carriers; but is applied to all bailees for reward, exercising a public calling.
In the next place, the degree of responsibility is precisely that of bailees in general, as worked out by the previous decisions; but quite unlike and much more severe [199] than that imposed by the Roman law, as others have observed. /1/
And, finally, the exemption from liability for acts of G.o.d or the public enemy is characteristically English, as will be proved further on.
But it has been partially shown in this Lecture that the law of to-day has made the carrier"s burden heavier than it was in the time of the Year Books. Southcote"s Case, and the earlier authorities which have been cited, all refer to a loss by robbery, theft, or trespa.s.s, and hold the bailee liable, where, in theory at least, he has a remedy over. It was with reference to such cases, as has been seen, that the rule arose, although it is not improbable that it would have been applied to an unexplained loss; the writ against innkeepers reads absque subtractionie seu amissione custodire. In later times, the principle may have been extended from loss by theft to loss by destruction. In Symons v. Darknoll /2/ (4 Car. I.), already cited as decided on the authority of Southcote"s Case, the goods were spoiled, not stolen, and probably had not even perished in specie. Before this time, the old rule had become an arbitrary precedent, followed according to its form with little thought of its true intent.
The language of Coggs v. Bernard is, that "the law charges the person thus intrusted to carry goods as against all events but acts of G.o.d and the enemies of the king." This was adopted by solemn decision in Lord Mansfield"s time, and it is now settled that the common carrier "is liable for all losses which do not fall within the excepted [200] cases." /1/ That is to say, he has become an insurer to that extent, not only against the disappearance or destruction, but against all forms of damage to the goods except as excepted above.
The process by which this came to pa.s.s has been traced above, but a few words may be added here. The Year Books, even in dealing with the destruction (as distinguished from the conversion) of chattels in the hands of a bailee, always state his liability as based upon his fault, although it must be admitted that the language is used alio intuitu. /2/ A jettison, in tempest, seems to have been a good plea for a factor in the time of Edward III.; /3/ but that cannot be relied on for an a.n.a.logy. The argument from the Marshal"s case /4/ is stronger. There it appears to have been thought that burning of the prison was as good an excuse for an escape as a release by alien enemies. This must refer to an accidental fire, and would seem to imply that he was not liable in that event, if not in fault. The writs in the Register against bailees to keep or carry goods, all have the general allegation of negligence, and so do the older precedents of declarations, so far as I have observed, whether stating the custom of the realm or not. /5/ But a bailee was answerable for goods wrongfully taken from him, as an innkeeper was for goods stolen from his inn, irrespective of negligence. /6/
It is true that the Marshal"s case speaks of his negligent [201]
keeping when the prisoners were released by rebels, (although that was far less likely to result from negligence, one would think, than a fire in the prison,) and that after Lord c.o.ke"s time negligence was alleged, although the goods had been lost by wrongful taking. So the writ against innkeepers is pro defectu hujusmodi hospitatorum. In these instances, neglect only means a failure de facto to keep safely. As was said at a much later date, "everything is a negligence in a carrier or hoyman that the law does not excuse." /1/ The allegation is simply the usual allegation of actions on the case, and seems to have extended itself from the earlier declarations for damage, when case supplanted detinue and the use of the former action became universal. It can hardly have been immaterial to the case for which it was first introduced. But the short reason for disbelieving that there was any warrant in the old law for making the carrier an insurer against damage is, that there seem to be no early cases in which bailees were held to such a responsibility, and that it was not within the principle on which they were made answerable for a loss by theft.
Having traced the process by which a common carrier has been made an insurer, it only remains to say a word upon the origin of the admitted exceptions from the risk a.s.sumed. It has been seen already how loss by the public enemy came to be mentioned by Chief Justice Holt. It is the old distinction taken in the Marshal"s case that there the bailee has no remedy over.
With regard to the act of G.o.d, it was a general principle, not peculiar to carriers nor to bailees, that a duty was [202]
discharged if an act of G.o.d made it impossible of performance.
Lord c.o.ke mentions the case of jettison from a Gravesend barge, /1/ and another of a party bound to keep and maintain sea-walls from overflowing, as subject to the same limitation, /2/ and a similar statement as to contracts in general will be found in the Year Books. /3/ It is another form of the principle which has been laboriously reargued in our own day, that parties are excused from the performance of a contract which has become impossible before breach from the perishing of the thing, or from change of circ.u.mstances the continued existence of which was the foundation of the contract, provided there was no warranty and no fault on the part of the contractor. Whether the act of G.o.d has now acquired a special meaning with regard to common carriers may be left for others to consider.
It appears, from the foregoing evidence, that we cannot determine what cla.s.ses of bailees are subject to the strict responsibility imposed on common carriers by referring to the Praetor"s Edict and then consulting the lexicons under Nautoe, Caupones, or Stabularii. The question of precedent is simply to what extent the old common law of bailment still survives. We can only answer it by enumerating the decisions in which the old law is applied; and we shall find it hard to bring them together under a general principle. The rule in Southcote"s Case has been done away with for bailees in general: that is clear. But it is equally clear that it has not maintained itself, even within the limits of the public policy invented by Chief Justice [203] Holt. It is not true to-day that all bailees for reward exercising a public calling are insurers. No such doctrine is applied to grain-elevators or deposit-vaults. /1/
How Lord Holt came to distinguish between bailees for reward and others has been shown above. It is more pertinent here to notice that his further qualification, exercising a public calling, was part of a protective system which has pa.s.sed away. One adversely inclined might say that it was one of many signs that the law was administered in the interest of the upper cla.s.ses. It has been shown above that if a man was a common farrier he could be charged for negligence without an a.s.sumpsit. The same judge who threw out that intimation established in another case that he could be sued if he refused to shoe a horse on reasonable request. /2/ Common carriers and common innkeepers were liable in like case, and Lord Holt stated the principle: "If a man takes upon him a public employment, he is bound to serve the public as far as the employment extends, and for refusal an action lies."
/3/ An attempt to apply this doctrine generally at the present day would be thought monstrous. But it formed part of a consistent scheme for holding those who followed useful callings up to the mark. Another part was the liability of persons exercising a public employment for loss or damage, enhanced in cases of bailment by what remained of the rule in Southcote"s Case. The scheme has given way to more liberal notions; but the disjecta membra still move.
Lord Mansfield stated his views of public policy in terms [204]