According to settled principles, the police power of a State must be held to embrace the authority not only to enact directly quarantine[396]
and health laws of every description but also to vest in munic.i.p.al subdivisions a capacity to safeguard by appropriate means public health, safety and morals. The manner in which this objective is to be accomplished is within the discretion of the State and its localities, subject only to the condition that no regulation adopted by either shall contravene the Const.i.tution or infringe any right granted or secured by that instrument.[397]
Health Measures
Protection of Water Supply.--A State may require the removal of timber refuse from the vicinity of a watershed for a munic.i.p.al water supply to prevent the spread of fire and consequent damage to such watershed.[398]
Garbage.--An ordinance for cremation of garbage and refuse at a designated place as a means for the protection of the public health is not a taking of private property without just compensation even though such garbage and refuse may have some elements of value for certain purposes.[399]
Sewers.--Compelling property owners to connect with a publicly maintained system of sewers and enforcing that duty by criminal penalties does not violate the due process clause.[400]
Food and Drugs, Etc.--"The power of the State to * * * prevent the production within its borders of impure foods, unfit for use, and such articles as would spread disease and pestilence, is well established";[401] and statutes forbidding or regulating the manufacture of oleomargarine have been upheld as a valid exercise of such power.[402] For the same reasons, statutes ordering the destruction of unsafe and unwholesome food[403], prohibiting the sale and authorizing confiscation of impure milk[404] have been sustained, notwithstanding that such articles had a value for purposes other than food. There also can be no question of the authority of the State, in the interest of public health and welfare, to forbid the sale of drugs by itinerant vendors,[405] or the sale of spectacles by an establishment not in charge of a physician or optometrist.[406] Nor is it any longer possible to doubt the validity of State regulations pertaining to the administration, sale, prescription, and use of dangerous and habit-forming drugs.[407]
Milk.--Equally valid as police power regulations are laws forbidding the sale of ice cream not containing a reasonable proportion of b.u.t.ter fat,[408] or of condensed milk made from skimmed milk rather than whole milk,[409] or of food preservatives containing boric acid.[410] Similarly, a statute which prohibits the sale of milk to which has been added any fat or oil other than milk fat, and which has, as one of its purposes, the prevention of fraud and deception in the sale of milk products, does not, when applied to "filled milk" having the taste, consistency, and appearance of whole milk products, violate the due process clause. Filled milk is inferior to whole milk in its nutritional content; and cannot be served to children as a subst.i.tute for whole milk without producing a dietary deficiency.[411] However, a statute forbidding the use of shoddy, even when sterilized, was held to be arbitrary and therefore invalid.[412]
Protection of the Public Morals
Gambling and Lotteries.--Unless effecting a clear, unmistakable infringement of rights securely by fundamental law, legislation suppressing gambling will be upheld by the Court as concededly within the police power of a State.[413] Accordingly, a State may validly make a judgment against those winning money a lien upon the property in which gambling is conducted with the owner"s knowledge and consent.[414] For the same reason, lotteries, including those operated under a legislative grant, may be forbidden, irrespective of any particular equities.[415]
Red Light Districts.--An ordinance prescribing limits in a city outside of which no woman of lewd character shall dwell does not deprive persons owning or occupying property in or adjacent to said limits of any rights protected by the Const.i.tution.[416]
Sunday Blue Laws.--The Supreme Court has uniformly recognized State laws relating to the observance of Sunday as representing a legitimate exercise of the police power. Thus, a law forbidding the keeping open of barber shops on Sunday is const.i.tutional.[417]
Intoxicating Liquor.--"* * * on account of their well-known noxious qualities and the extraordinary evils shown by experience to be consequent upon their use, a State * * * [is competent] to prohibit [absolutely the] manufacture, gift, purchase, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within its borders * * *."[418] And to implement such prohibition, a State has the power to declare that places where liquor is manufactured or kept shall be deemed common nuisances;[419]
and even to subject an innocent owner to the forfeiture of his property for the acts of a wrongdoer.[420]
Regulation of Motor Vehicles and Carriers
The highways of a State are public property, the primary and preferred use of which is for private purposes; their uses for purposes of gain may generally be prohibited by the legislature or conditioned as it sees fit.[421] In limiting the use of its highways for intrastate transportation for hire, a State reasonably may provide that carriers who have furnished adequate, responsible, and continuous service over a given route from a specified date in the past shall be ent.i.tled to licenses as a matter of right, but that the licensing of those whose service over the route began later than the date specified shall depend upon public convenience and necessity.[422] To require private contract carriers for hire to obtain a certificate of convenience and necessity, which is not granted if the service of common carriers is impaired thereby, and to fix minimum rates applicable thereto which are not less than those prescribed for common carriers is valid as a means of conserving highways;[423] but any attempt to convert private carriers into common carriers,[424] or to subject them to the burdens and regulations of common carriers, without expressly declaring them to be common carriers, is violative of due process.[425] In the absence of legislation by Congress a State may, in protection of the public safety, deny an interstate motor carrier the use of an already congested highway.[426]
In exercising its authority over its highways, on the other hand, a State is limited not merely to the raising of revenue for maintenance and reconstruction, or to regulations as to the manner in which vehicles shall be operated, but may also prevent the wear and hazards due to excessive size of vehicles and weight of load. Accordingly, a statute limiting to 7,000 pounds the net load permissible for trucks is not unreasonable.[427] No less const.i.tutional is a munic.i.p.al traffic regulation which forbids the operation in the streets of any advertising vehicle, excepting vehicles displaying business notices or advertis.e.m.e.nts of the products of the owner and not used mainly for advertising; and such regulation may be validly enforced to prevent an express company from selling advertising s.p.a.ce on the outside of its trucks. Inasmuch as it is the judgment of local authorities that such advertising affects public safety by distracting drivers and pedestrians, courts are unable to hold otherwise in the absence of evidence refuting that conclusion.[428]
Any appropriate means adopted to insure compliance and care on the part of licensees and to protect other highway users being consonant with due process, a State may also provide that one, against whom a judgment is rendered for negligent operation and who fails to pay it within a designated time, shall have his license and registration suspended for three years, unless, in the meantime, the judgment is satisfied or discharged.[429] By the same token a nonresident owner who loaned his automobile in another State, by the law of which he was immune from liability for the borrower"s negligence, and who was not in the State at the time of an accident, is not subjected to any unconst.i.tutional deprivation by a law thereof, imposing liability on the owner for the negligence of one driving the car with the owner"s permission.[430]
Compulsory automobile insurance is so plainly valid as to present no federal question.[431]
Succession to Property
When a New York Decedent Estate Law, effective after 1930, grants for the first time to a surviving spouse a right of election to take as in intestacy, and the husband, by executing in 1934 a codicil to his will drafted in 1929, made this provision operative, his widow, notwithstanding her waiver in 1922 of any right in her husband"s estate, may avail herself of such right of election. The deceased husband"s heirs cannot contend that the impairment of the widow"s waiver by subsequent legislation deprived his estate of property without due process of law. Rights of succession to property are of statutory creation. Accordingly, New York could have conditioned any further exercise of testamentary power upon the giving of right of election to the surviving spouse regardless of any waiver however formally executed.[432]
Administration of Estates.--Even after the creation of testamentary trust, a State retains the power to devise new and reasonable directions to the trustee to meet new conditions arising during its administration, especially such as the depression presented to trusts containing mortgages. Accordingly, no const.i.tutional right is violated by the retroactive application to an estate on which administration had already begun of a statute which had the effect of taking away a remainderman"s right to judicial examination of the trustee"s computation of income. Judicial rules, promulgated prior to such statute and which were more favorable to the interests of remaindermen, can be relied upon by the latter only insofar as said rules were intended to operate retroactively; for the decedent, in whose estate the remaindermen had an interest, died even before such court rules were established. If a property right in a particular rule of income allotment in salvage proceedings vested at all, it would seem to have done so at the death of the decedent or testator.[433]
Abandoned Property.--As applied to insurance policies on the lives of New York residents issued by foreign corporations for delivery in New York, where the insured persons continued to be residents and the beneficiaries were resident at the maturity date of the policies, a New York Abandoned Property Law requiring payment to the State of money owing by life insurers and remaining unclaimed for seven years does not deprive such foreign companies of property without due process. The relationship between New York and its residents who abandon claims against foreign insurance companies, and between New York and foreign insurance companies doing business therein is sufficiently close to give New York jurisdiction.[434] In Standard Oil Co. _v._ New Jersey,[435] a sharply divided Court held recently that due process is not violated by a statute escheating to the State shares of stock in a domestic corporation and unpaid dividends declared thereon, even though the last-known owners were nonresidents and the stock was issued and the dividends were held in another State. The State"s power over the debtor corporation gives it power to seize the debts or demands represented by the stock and dividends.
Vested Rights, Remedial Rights, Political Candidacy
Inasmuch as the right to become a candidate for State office is a privilege only of State citizenship, an unlawful denial of such right is not a denial of a right of "property."[436] However, an existing right of action to recover damages for an injury is property, which a legislature has no power to destroy.[437] Thus, the retroactive repeal of a provision which made directors liable for moneys embezzled by corporate officers, by preventing enforcement of a liability which already had arisen, deprived certain creditors of their property without due process of law.[438] But while a vested cause of action is property, a person has no property, in the const.i.tutional sense, in any particular form of remedy; and is guaranteed only the preservation of a substantial right to redress by any effective procedure.[439] Accordingly, a statute creating an additional remedy for enforcing stockholders" liability is not, as applied to stockholders then holding stock, violative of due process.[440] Nor is a law which lifts a statute of limitations and make possible a suit, theretofore barred, for the value of certain securities. "The Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act of State legislation void merely because it has some retrospective operation.
* * * Some rules of law probably could not be changed retroactively without hardship and oppression, * * *, certainly it cannot be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is _per se_ an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment."[441]
Man"s Best Friend
A statute providing that no dog shall be ent.i.tled to the protection of the law unless placed upon the a.s.sessment rolls, and that in a civil action for killing a dog the owner cannot recover beyond the value fixed by himself in the last a.s.sessment preceding the killing is within the police power of the State.[442]
Control of Local Units of Government
The Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive a State of the power to determine what duties may be performed by local officers, nor whether they shall be appointed or popularly elected.[443] Its power over the rights and property of cities held and used for governmental purposes was unaltered by the ratification thereof.[444] Thus, notwithstanding that it imposes liability irrespective of the power of a city to have prevented the violence, a statute requiring cities to indemnify owners of property damaged by mobs or during riots effects no unconst.i.tutional deprivation of the property of such munic.i.p.alities.[445] Likewise, a person obtaining a judgment against a munic.i.p.ality for damages resulting from a riot is not deprived of property without due process of law by an act which so limits the munic.i.p.ality"s taxing power as to prevent collection of funds adequate to pay it. As long as the judgment continues as an existing liability unconst.i.tutional deprivation is experienced.[446]
Local units of government obliged to surrender property to other units newly created out of the territory of the former cannot successfully invoke the due process clause,[447] nor may taxpayers allege any unconst.i.tutional deprivation as the result of changes in their tax burden attendant upon the consolidation of contiguous munic.i.p.alities.[448] Nor is a statute requiring counties to reimburse cities of the first cla.s.s but not other cla.s.ses for rebates allowed for prompt payment of taxes in conflict with the due process clause.[449]
TAXATION
In General
It was not contemplated that the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment would restrain or cripple the taxing power of the States.[450] Rather, the purpose of the amendment was to extend to the residents of the States the same protection against arbitrary State legislation affecting life, liberty, and property as was afforded against Congress by the Fifth Amendment.[451]
Public Purpose
Inasmuch as public moneys cannot be expended for other than public purposes, it follows that an exercise of the taxing power for merely private purposes is beyond the authority of the States.[452] Whether a use is public or private is ultimately a judicial question, however, and in the determination thereof the Court will be influenced by local conditions and by the judgments of State tribunals as to what are to be deemed public uses in any State.[453] Taxes levied for each of the following listed purposes have been held to be for a public use: city coal and fuel yard,[454] State bank, warehouse, elevator, flour-mill system, and homebuilding projects,[455] society for preventing cruelty to animals (dog license tax),[456] railroad tunnel,[457] books for school children attending private as well as public schools,[458] and relief of unemployment.[459]
Other Considerations Affecting Validity: Excessive Burden; Ratio of Amount to Benefit Received
When the power to tax exists, the extent of the burden is a matter for the discretion of the lawmakers;[460] and the Court will refrain from condemning a tax solely on the ground that it is excessive.[461] Nor can the const.i.tutionality of the power to levy taxes be made to depend upon the taxpayer"s enjoyment of any special benefit from use of the funds raised by taxation.[462]
Estate, Gift, and Inheritance Taxes
The power of testamentary disposition and the privilege of inheritance being legitimate subjects of taxation, a State may apply its inheritance tax to either the transmission, or the exercise of the legal power of transmission, of property by will or descent, or to the legal privilege of taking property by devise or descent.[463] Accordingly, an inheritance tax law, enacted after the death of a testator, but before the distribution of his estate, const.i.tutionally may be imposed on the shares of legatees, notwithstanding that under the law of the State in effect on the date of such enactment, ownership of the property pa.s.sed to the legatees upon the testator"s death.[464] Equally consistent with due process is a tax on an _inter vivos_ transfer of property by deed intended to take effect upon the death of the grantor.[465]
The due process clause places no restriction on a State as to the time at which an inheritance tax shall be levied or the property valued for purposes of such a tax; and for that reason a graduated tax on the transfer of contingent remainders, undiminished by the value of an intervening life estate but not payable until after the death of the life tenant, is valid.[466] Also, when a power of appointment has been granted by deed, transfer tax upon the exercise of the power by will is not a taking of property without due process of law, even though the instrument creating the power was executed prior to enactment of the taxing statute.[467] Likewise when a transfer tax law did not become effective until after a deed creating certain remainders had been executed, but the State court applied the tax on the theory that the vesting actually occurred after the tax law became operative, no denial of due process resulted. "* * *, the statute unquestionably might have made the tax applicable to this transfer, * * * [and the Court need]
* * * not inquire * * * into the reasoning by which * * *" the State held the statute operative.[468]
On the other hand, when remainders indisputably vest at the time of the creation of a trust and a succession tax is enacted thereafter, the imposition of said tax on the transfer of such remainder is unconst.i.tutional.[469] But where the remaindermen"s interests are contingent and do not vest until the donor"s death subsequent to the adoption of the statute, the tax is valid.[470] Another example of valid retroactive taxation is to be found in a New York statute amending a 1930 estate tax law. The amendment required inclusion in the decedent"s gross estate, for tax computation purposes, of property in respect of which the decedent exercised after 1930, by will, a nongeneral power of appointment created prior to that year. The amendment reached such transfers under powers of appointment as under the previous statute escaped taxation. In sustaining application of the amendment, the Court held that the inclusion in the gross estate of property never owned by the decedent, but appointed by her will under a limited power which could not be exercised in favor of the decedent, her creditors, or her estate, did not deny due process to those who inherited the decedent"s property, even though, because the tax rate was progressive, the net amount they inherited was less than it would have been if the appointed property had not been included in the gross estate.[471] In summation, the Court has noted that insofar as retroactive taxation of vested gifts has been voided, the justification therefor has been that "the nature or amount of the tax could not reasonably have been antic.i.p.ated by the taxpayer at the time of the particular voluntary act which the [retroactive] statute later made the taxable event * * * Taxation, * * *, of a gift which * * * [the donor] might well have refrained from making had he antic.i.p.ated the tax, * * * [is] thought to be so arbitrary * * * as to be a denial of due process."[472]
Other Types of Taxes
Income Taxes.--Any attempt by a State to measure a tax on one person"s income by reference to the income of another is contrary to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus a husband cannot be taxed on the combined total of his and his wife"s incomes as shown by separate returns, where her income is her separate property and where, by reason of the tax being graduated, its amount exceeded the sum of the taxes which would have been due had their separate incomes been separately a.s.sessed.[473] Moreover, a tax on income, unlike a gift tax, is not necessarily unconst.i.tutional, because retroactive. Taxpayers cannot complain of arbitrary action or a.s.sert surprise in the retroactive apportionment of tax burdens to income when that is done by the legislature at the first opportunity after knowledge of the nature and amount of the income is available.[474]
Franchise Taxes.--A city ordinance imposing annual license taxes on light and power companies is not violative of the due process clause merely because the city has entered the power business in compet.i.tion with such companies.[475] Nor does a munic.i.p.al charter authorizing the imposition upon a local telegraph company of a tax upon the lines of the company within its limits at the rate at which other property is taxed, but upon an arbitrary valuation per mile, deprive the company of its property without due process of law, inasmuch as the tax is a mere franchise or privilege tax.[476]