[1179] United States _v._ Cla.s.sic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
[1180] 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
[1181] Pope _v._ Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
[1182] 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
[1183] 328 U.S. 549, 566 (1946). Justice Black dissented on the ground that the equal protection clause was violated.
[1184] 335 U.S. 281, 287, 288 (1948). Justice Douglas, with whom Justices Black and Murphy concurred, dissented saying that the statute lacked "the equality to which the exercise of political rights is ent.i.tled under the Fourteenth Amendment."
[1185] South _v._ Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
[1186] Dohany _v._ Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930).
[1187] Hayes _v._ Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
[1188] Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. _v._ Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931).
[1189] Lindsley _v._ Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 81, 82 (1911); _see also_ Mobile, J. & K.C.R. Co. _v._ Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910); Adams _v._ New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
[1190] Cohen _v._ Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 552 (1949).
[1191] Bowman _v._ Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30 (1880). _See also_ Duncan _v._ Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894); Ohio ex rel. Bryant _v._ Akron Metropolitan Park Dist, 281 U.S. 74 (1930).
[1192] Mallett _v._ North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589 (1901); _see also_ Bowman _v._ Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30 (1880).
[1193] Truax _v._ Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
[1194] Cochran _v._ Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942).
[1195] Bain Peanut Co. _v._ Pinson, 282 U.S. 499 (1931).
[1196] Consolidated Rendering Co. _v._ Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908).
_See also_ Hammond Packing Co. _v._ Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
[1197] Power Mfg. Co. _v._ Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927).
[1198] Kentucky Finance Corp. _v._ Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S.
544 (1923).
[1199] Fidelity Mut. Life a.s.so. _v._ Mettler, 185 U.S. 308, 325 (1902).
_See also_ Manhattan L. Ins. Co. _v._ Cohen, 234 U.S. 123 (1914).
[1200] Lowe _v._ Kansas, 163 U.S. 81 (1896).
[1201] Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. _v._ Cade, 233 U.S. 642 (1914); _see also_ Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. _v._ Harris, 234 U.S. 412 (1914).
[1202] Missouri P.R. Co. _v._ Larabee, 234 U.S. 459 (1914).
[1203] Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. _v._ Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
[1204] Gulf, C. & S.F.R. Co. _v._ Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). _See also_ Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. _v._ Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56 (1915).
[1205] 18 Stat. 336 (1875); 8 U.S.C. -- 44 (1946).
[1206] Ca.s.sell _v._ Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Hill _v._ Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942); Smith _v._ Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre _v._ Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Virginia _v._ Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
[1207] Virginia _v._ Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322, 323 (1880).
[1208] Akins _v._ Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403 (1945).
[1209] Patton _v._ Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947). _See also_ Shepherd _v._ Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
[1210] Gibson _v._ Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896).
[1211] Rawlins _v._ Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906).
[1212] 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
In an interesting footnote to his opinion, Justice Jackson a.s.serted that "it is unnecessary to decide whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment might of its own force prohibit discrimination on account of race in the selection of jurors, so that such discrimination would violate the due process clause of the same Amendment." Ibid. 284.
Earlier cases dealing with racial discrimination have indicated that the discrimination was forbidden by the equal protection clause as well as by the Civil Rights Act of 1875. _See_ cases cited to the preceding paragraph. [Transcriber"s Note: Reference is to Section "Selection of Jury", above.]
[1213] Ibid. 285.
[1214] Ibid. 270, 271.
[1215] Ibid. 291.
[1216] Ibid. 288, 289, 299, 300. Four Justices, speaking by Justice Murphy dissented, saying: "The proof here is adequate enough to demonstrate that this panel, like every discriminatorily selected "blue ribbon" panel, suffers from a const.i.tutional infirmity. That infirmity is the denial of equal protection to those who are tried by a jury drawn from a "blue ribbon" panel. Such a panel is narrower and different from that used in forming juries to try the vast majority of other accused persons. To the extent of that difference, therefore, the persons tried by "blue ribbon" juries receive unequal protection." "In addition, as ill.u.s.trated in this case, the distinction that is drawn in fact between "blue ribbon" jurors and general jurors is often of such a character as to destroy the representative nature of the "blue ribbon" panel. There is no const.i.tutional right to a jury drawn from a group of uneducated and unintelligent persons. Nor is there any right to a jury chosen solely from those at the lower end of the economic and social scale. But there is a const.i.tutional right to a jury drawn from a group which represents a cross-section of the community. And a cross-section of the community includes persons with varying degrees of training and intelligence and with varying economic and social positions. Under our Const.i.tution, the jury is not to be made the representative of the most intelligent, the most wealthy or the most successful, nor of the least intelligent, the least wealthy or the least successful. It is a democratic inst.i.tution, representative of all qualified cla.s.ses of people. * * * To the extent that a "blue ribbon" panel fails to reflect this democratic principle, it is const.i.tutionally defective."
[1217] 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884).
[1218] W.G. Rice, Esq., Jr., University of Wisconsin Law School, The Position of the American Indian in the Law of the United States, 16 Journal of Comp. Leg. 78, 80 (1934).
[1219] 39 Op. Atty. Gen. 518, 519.
[1220] 46 Stat. 26; 55 Stat. 761; 2 U.S.C.A. -- 2a (a).
[1221] Cong. Rec., 77th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 87, p. 70, January 8, 1941.
[1222] McPherson _v._ Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663 (1884).
[1223] Saunders _v._ Wilkins, 152 F. (2d) 235 (1945); certiorari denied, 328 U.S. 870 (1946); rehearing denied, 329 U.S. 825 (1946).
[1224] Saunders _v._ Wilkins, 152 F. (2d) 235, 237-238, citing Willoughby, Const.i.tution, 2d ed., pp. 626, 627.
[1225] Legislation by Congress providing for removal was necessary to give effect to the prohibition of section 3; and until removed in pursuance of such legislation, the exercise of functions by persons in office before promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment was not unlawful.