Enforcement
Cases produced by enforcement and arising under Amendments Four and Five are considered in the discussion appearing under the latter amendments.
Repeal
This amendment was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment, and t.i.tles I and II of the National Prohibition Act[1] were subsequently specifically repealed by the act of August 27, 1935.[2] Federal prohibition laws effective in various Districts and Territories were repealed as follows: District of Columbia--April 5, 1933, and January 24, 1934;[3] Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands--March 2, 1934;[4] Hawaii--March 26, 1934;[5]
and Panama Ca.n.a.l Zone--June 19, 1934.[6]
Taking judicial notice of the fact that ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment was consummated on December 5, 1933, the Supreme Court held that the National Prohibition Act, insofar as it rested upon a grant of authority to Congress by Amendment XVIII thereupon became inoperative; with the result that prosecutions for violations of the National Prohibition Act, including proceedings on appeal, pending on, or begun after, the date of repeal, had to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Only final judgments of conviction rendered while the National Prohibition Act was in force remained unaffected.[7] Likewise a heavy "special excise tax," insofar as it could be construed as part of the machinery for enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment, was deemed to have become inapplicable automatically upon the latter"s repeal.[8] However, liability on a bond conditioned upon the return on the day of trial of a vessel seized for illegal transportation of liquor was held not to have been extinguished by repeal when the facts disclosed that the trial took place in 1931 and had resulted in conviction of the crew. The liability became complete upon occurrence of the breach of the express contractual condition and a civil action for recovery was viewed as unaffected by the loss of penal sanctions.[9]
Notes
[1] 41 Stat. 305.
[2] 49 Stat. 872.
[3] 48 Stat. 28, -- 12; 48 Stat. 319.
[4] 48 Stat. 361.
[5] 48 Stat. 467.
[6] 48 Stat. 1116.
[7] United States _v._ Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 222-226 (1934). _See also_ Ellerbee _v._ Aderhold, 5 F. Supp. 1022 (1934); United States ex rel. Randall _v._ United States Marshal for Eastern Dist. of New York, 143 F. (2d) 830 (1944).--The Twenty-first Amendment containing "no saving clause as to prosecutions for offenses theretofore committed,"
these holdings were rendered unavoidable by virtue of the well-established principle that after "the expiration or repeal of a law, no penalty can be enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law committed while it was in force * * *"--Yeaton _v._ United States, 5 Cr. 281, 283 (1809), quoted in United States _v._ Chambers at pages 223-224.
[8] United States _v._ Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935). The Court also took the position that even if the statute embodying this "tax" had not been "adopted to penalize [a] violations of the Amendment," but merely to ordain a penalty for violations of State liquor laws, "it ceased to be enforceable at the date of repeal"; for with the lapse of the unusual enforcement powers contained in the Eighteenth Amendment, Congress could not, without infringing upon powers reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, "impose c.u.mulative penalties above and beyond those specified by State law for infractions of * * * [a] State"s criminal code by its own citizens." Justice Cardozo, with whom Justices Brandeis and Stone were a.s.sociated, dissented on the ground that, on its face, the statute levying this "tax" was "an appropriate instrument of * * * fiscal policy * * * Cla.s.sification by Congress according to the nature of the calling affected by a tax * * * does not cease to be permissible because the line of division between callings to be favored and those to be reproved corresponds with a division between innocence and criminality under the statutes of a state."--Ibid. 294, 296, 297-298. In earlier cases it was nevertheless recognized that Congress also may tax what it forbids and that the basic tax on distilled spirits remained valid and enforceable during as well as after the life of the amendment--_See_ United States _v._ Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450, 462 (1921); United States _v._ Stafoff, 260 U.S. 477 (1923); United States _v._ Rizzo, 297 U.S. 530 (1936).
[9] United States _v._ Mack, 295 U.S. 480 (1935).
AMENDMENT 19
EQUAL SUFFRAGE
Page Origin of the amendment 1219 Validity of adoption 1219 Effect of amendment 1219
EQUAL SUFFRAGE
Amendment 19
Clause 1. The right of the citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of s.e.x.
Clause 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Origin of the Nineteenth Amendment
The adoption of this amendment is attributable in great measure to its advocacy since 1869 by certain long term supporters of women suffrage who had despaired of attaining their goal through modification of individual State laws. Agitation in behalf of women suffrage was recorded as early as the Jackson Administration, but the initial results were meager. Beginning in 1838, Kentucky did authorize women to vote in school elections, and its action was later copied by a number of other States. Kansas in 1887 even granted women unlimited rights to vote in munic.i.p.al elections. Not until 1869, however, when Wyoming, as a territory, accorded women suffrage on terms of equality with men and continued to grant such privileges after its admission as a State in 1890, did these advocates register a notable victory. Progress thereafter proved discouraging, only ten additional other States having been added to the fold as of 1914; and as a consequence sponsors of equal voting rights for women concentrated on obtaining ratification of this amendment.
Validity of Adoption
Cases relating to this question are presented and discussed under article V.
Effect of Amendment
Although owning that the Nineteenth Amendment "applies to men and women alike and by its own force supersedes inconsistent measures, whether federal or State," the Court was unable to concede that a Georgia statute levying on inhabitants of the State a poll tax payment of which is made a prerequisite for voting but exempting females who do not register for voting, in any way abridged the right of male citizens to vote on account of their s.e.x. To accept the appellant"s contention, the Court urged, would make the Nineteenth Amendment a limitation on the taxing power.[1]
Notes
[1] Breedlove _v._ Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283-284 (1937). Although other interpretive decisions of federal courts are unavailable, many State courts, taking their cue from p.r.o.nouncements of the Supreme Court as to the operative effect of the similarly phrased Fifteenth Amendment, have proclaimed that the Nineteenth Amendment did not confer upon women the right to vote but only prohibits discrimination against them in the drafting and administration of laws relating to suffrage qualifications and the conduct of elections. Like the Fifteenth Amendment, the Nineteenth Amendment, according to these State tribunals, is self-executing and by its own force and effect legally expunged the word, "male," and the masculine p.r.o.noun from State const.i.tutions and laws defining voting qualifications and the right to vote to the end that such provisions now apply to both s.e.xes.--_See_ State _v._ Mittle, 120 S.C. 526 (1922); writ of error dismissed, 260 U.S. 705 (1922); Graves _v._ Eubank, 205 Ala. 174 (1921); in re Cavellier, 159 Misc.
(N.Y.) 212; 287 N.Y.S. 739 (1936).
AMENDMENT 20
COMMENCEMENT OF THE TERMS OF THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, ETC.
Page Extension of Presidential succession 1225
COMMENCEMENT OF THE TERMS OF THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, ETC.
Amendment 20
Section 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.
Section 2. The Congress shall a.s.semble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.
Section 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.
Section 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.