Just Compensation
"When * * * [the] power [of eminent domain] is exercised it can only be done by giving the party whose property is taken or whose use and enjoyment of such property is interfered with, full and adequate compensation, not excessive or exorbitant, but just compensation."[651]
However, "there must be something more than an ordinary honest mistake of law in the proceedings for compensation before a party can make out that the State has deprived him of his property unconst.i.tutionally."[652] Unless, by its rulings of law, the State court prevented a complainant from obtaining substantially any compensation, its findings as to the amount of damages will not be overturned on appeal, even though as a consequence of error therein the property owner received less than he ought.[653] Accordingly, when a State court, expressly recognizing a right of recovery for any substantial damage, found that none had been shown by the proof, its award of only $1 as nominal damages was held to present no question for review.[654] "All that is essential is that in some appropriate way, before some properly const.i.tuted tribunal, inquiry shall be made as to the amount of compensation, and when this has been provided there is that due process of law which is required by the Federal Const.i.tution."[655]
"The general rule is that compensation "is to be estimated by reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business and wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future," * * * [but] "mere possible or imaginary uses, or the speculative schemes of its proprietor, are to be excluded.""[656] Damages are measured by the loss to the owner, not by the gain to the taker;[657] and attorneys" fees and expenses are not embraced therein.[658] "When the public faith and credit are pledged to a reasonably prompt ascertainment and payment, and there is adequate provision for enforcing the pledge, * * * the requirement of just compensation is satisfied."[659]
Uncompensated Takings
"It is well settled that "neither a natural person nor a corporation can claim damages on account of being compelled to render obedience to a police regulation designed to secure the common welfare." * * *
Uncompensated obedience to a regulation enacted for the public safety under the police power of the State is not a taking or damaging without just compensation of private property, * * *"[660] Thus, the flooding of lands consequent upon private construction of a dam under authority of legislation enacted to subserve the drainage of lowlands was not a taking which required compensation to be made, especially since such flooding could have been prevented by raising the height of dikes around the lands. "The rule to be gathered from these cases is that where there is a practical destruction, or material impairment of the value of plaintiff"s lands, there is a taking, which demands compensation, but otherwise where, as in this case, plaintiff is merely put to some extra expense in warding off the consequences of the overflow."[661]
Similarly, when a city, by condemnation proceedings, sought to open a street across the tracks of a railroad, it was not obligated to pay the expenses that the railroad would incur in planking the crossing, constructing gates, and posting gatemen at the crossing. The railway was presumed to have "laid its tracks subject to the condition necessarily implied that their use could be so regulated by competent authority as to insure the public safety."[662] Also, one who leased oyster beds in Hampton Roads from Virginia for $1 per acre under guaranty of an "absolute right" to use and occupy them was held to have acquired such rights subject to the superior power of Virginia to authorize Newport News to discharge its sewage into the sea; and, hence could not successfully contend that the resulting pollution of his oysters const.i.tuted an uncompensated taking without due process of law.[663]
Consequential Damages
"Acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of the due process clause."[664] Accordingly, consequential damages to ab.u.t.ting property caused by an obstruction in a street resulting from the authorization of a railroad to erect tracks, sheds, and fences over a portion thereof have been held to effect no unconst.i.tutional deprivation of property.[665] Likewise, the erection over a street of an elevated viaduct, intended for general public travel and not devoted to the exclusive use of a private transportation corporation, has been declared to be a legitimate street improvement equivalent to a change in grade; and, as in the case of a change of grade, the owner of land ab.u.t.ting on the street has been refused damages for impairment of access to his land and the lessening of the circulation of light and air over it.[666]
Limits to the Above Rule.--There are limits however, to the amount of destruction or impairment of the enjoyment or value of private property which public authorities or citizens acting in their behalf may occasion without the necessity of paying compensation therefor. Thus, in upholding zoning regulations limiting the height of buildings which may be constructed in a designated zone, the Court has warned that similar regulations, if unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory, may be held to deprive an owner of the profitable use of his property and hence to amount to a taking sufficient to require compensation to be paid for such invasion of property rights.[667] Similarly, in voiding a statute forbidding mining of coal under private dwellings or streets or cities in places where such right to mine has been reserved in a conveyance, Justice Holmes, speaking for his a.s.sociates, declared if a regulation restricting the use of private property goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking for which compensation must be made. "Some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation, and must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, * * *
One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. * * * The damage [here] is not common or public. * * *
The extent of the taking is great. It purports to abolish what is recognized in Pennsylvania as an estate in land."[668]
Due Process in Eminent Domain
(1) Notice.--If the owner of property sought to be condemned is a nonresident, personal notice is not requisite and service may be effected by publication.[669] In fact, "it has been uniformly held that statutes providing for * * * condemnation of land may adopt a procedure summary in character, and that notice of such proceedings may be indirect, provided only that the period of notice of the initiation of proceedings and the method of giving it are reasonably adapted to the nature of the proceedings and their subject matter." Insofar as reasonable notice is deemed to be essential, that requirement was declared to have been satisfied by a statute providing that notice of initiation of proceedings for establishment of a county road be published on three successive weeks in three successive issues of a paper published in the county, and that all meetings of the county condemning agency be public and published in a county newspaper.[670]
(2) Hearing.--The necessity and expediency of a taking being legislative questions irrespective of who may be charged with their decision, a hearing thereon need not be afforded;[671] but the mode of determining the compensation payable to an owner must be such as to furnish him with an opportunity to be heard. Among several admissible modes is that of causing the amount to be a.s.sessed by viewers, or by a jury, generally without a hearing, but subject to the right of the owner to appeal for a judicial review thereof at which a trial on the evidence may be had. Through such an appeal the owner obtains the hearing to which he is ent.i.tled;[672] and the fact that after having been adequately notified of the determination by the condemning authorities, the former must exercise his right of appeal within a limited period thereafter, such as 30 days, has been held not so arbitrary as to deprive him of property without due process of law.[673] Nor is there any "denial of due process in making the findings of fact by the triers of fact, whether commissioners or a jury, final as to such facts [that is, conclusive as to the mere value of the property], and leaving open to the courts simply the inquiry as to whether there was any erroneous basis adopted by the triers in their appraisal, * * *"[674]
(3) Occupation in Advance of Condemnation.--Due process does require that condemnation precede occupation by the condemning authority so long as the opportunity for a hearing as to the value of the land is guaranteed during the condemnation proceedings. Where the statute contains an adequate provision for a.s.sured payment of compensation without unreasonable delay, the taking may precede compensation.[675]
DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
Some General Criteria
What is due process of law depends on the circ.u.mstances.[676] It varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation. By due process of law is meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case, and just to the parties affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary mode prescribed by law; it must be adapted to the end to be attained; and whenever necessary to the protection of the parties, it must give them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment sought. Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law.[677]
Ancient Usage and Uniformity.--What is due process of law may be ascertained in part by an examination of those settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the common and statute law of England before the emigration of our ancestors, and shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. If it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in this country, a process of law which is not otherwise forbidden may be taken to be due process of law. In other words, the antiquity of a procedure is a fact of weight in its behalf. However, it does not follow that a procedure settled in English law at the time of the emigration and brought to this country and practiced by our ancestors is, or remains, an essential element of due process of law. If that were so, the procedure of the first half of the seventeenth century would be fastened upon American jurisprudence like a strait jacket, only to be unloosed by const.i.tutional amendment.
Fortunately, the States are not tied down by any provision of the Const.i.tution to the practice and procedure which existed at the common law, but may avail themselves of the wisdom gathered by the experience of the country to make changes deemed to be necessary.[678]
Equality.--If due process is to be secured, the laws must operate alike upon all, and not subject the individual to the arbitrary exercise of governmental power unrestrained by established principles of private rights and distributive justice. Where a litigant has the benefit of a full and fair trial in the State courts, and his rights are measured, not by laws made to affect him individually, but by general provisions of law applicable to all those in like condition, he is not deprived of property without due process of law, even if he can be regarded as deprived of his property by an adverse result.[679]
Due Process and Judicial Process.--Due process of law does not always mean a proceeding in court.[680] Proceedings to raise revenue by levying and collecting taxes are not necessarily judicial, neither are administrative and executive proceedings, yet their validity is not thereby impaired.[681] Moreover, the due process clause has been interpreted as not requiring that the judgment of an expert commission be supplanted by the independent view of judges based on the conflicting testimony, prophecies, and impressions of expert witnesses when judicially reviewing a formula of a State regulatory commission for limiting daily production in an oil field and for proration among the several well owners.[682]
Nor does the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit a State from conferring upon nonjudicial bodies certain functions that may be called judicial, or from delegating to a court powers that are legislative in nature. For example, State statutes vesting in a parole board certain judicial functions,[683] or conferring discretionary power upon administrative boards to grant or withhold permission to carry on a trade,[684] or vesting in a probate court authority to appoint park commissioners and establish park districts[685] are not in conflict with the due process clause and present no federal question. Whether legislative, executive, and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether they should in some particulars be merged is for the determination of the State.[686]
Jurisdiction
In General.--Jurisdiction may be defined as the power to create legal interests; but if a State attempts to exercise such power with respect to persons or things beyond its borders, its action is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment and is void within as well as without its territorial limits. The foundation of jurisdiction is therefore physical power capable of being exerted over persons through _in personam_ actions and over things, generally through actions _in rem_.[687] In proceedings _in personam_ to determine liability of a defendant, no property having been subjected by such litigation to the control of the Court, jurisdiction over the defendant"s person is a condition prerequisite to the rendering of any effective decree.[688]
That condition is fulfilled; that is, a State is deemed capable of exerting jurisdiction over an individual if he is physically present within the territory of the State, if he is domiciled in the State although temporarily absent therefrom, or if he has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction over him. In actions _in rem_, however, a State validly may proceed to settle controversies with regard to rights or claims against property within its borders, notwithstanding that control of the defendant is never obtained. Accordingly, by reason of its inherent authority over t.i.tles to land within its territorial confines, a State may proceed through its courts to judgment respecting the ownership of such property, even though it lacks the const.i.tutional competence to reach claimants of t.i.tle who reside beyond its borders.[689] By the same token, probate[690] and garnishment or foreign attachment[691] proceedings, being in the nature of _in rem_ actions for the disposition of property, may be prosecuted to conclusion without requirement of the presence of all parties in interest.[692]
How Perfected: By Voluntary Appearance or Service of Process.--It is not enough, however, that a State be potentially capable of exercising control over persons and property. Before a State legitimately can exercise such power to alter private interests, its jurisdiction must be perfected by the employment of an appropriate mode of serving process deemed effective to acquaint all parties of the inst.i.tution of proceedings calculated to affect their rights; for the interest of no one const.i.tutionally may be impaired by a decree resulting from litigation concerning which he was afforded neither notice nor an opportunity to partic.i.p.ate.[693] Voluntary appearance, on the other hand, may enable a State not only to obtain jurisdiction over a person who was otherwise beyond the reach of its process; but also, as in the case of a person who was within the scope of its jurisdiction, to dispense with the necessity of personal service. When a party voluntarily appears in a cause and actively conducts his defense, he cannot thereafter claim that he was denied due process merely because he was not served with process when the original action was commenced.[694]
Service of Process in Actions in Personam: Individuals, Resident and Nonresident.--The proposition being well established that no person can be deprived of property rights by a decree in a case in which he neither appeared, nor was served or effectively made a party, it follows, by way of ill.u.s.tration that to subject property of individual citizens of a munic.i.p.ality, by a summary proceeding in equity, to the payment of an unsatisfied judgment against the munic.i.p.ality would be a denial of due process of law.[695] Similarly, in a suit against a local partnership, in which the resident partner was duly served with process and the nonresident partner was served only with notice, a judgment thus obtained is binding upon the firm and the resident partner, but is not a personal judgment against the nonresident and cannot be enforced by execution against his individual property.[696] That the nonresident partner should have been so protected is attributable to the fact the process of a court of one State cannot run into another and summon a party there domiciled to respond to proceedings against him, when neither his person nor his property is within the jurisdiction of the Court rendering the judgment.[697] In the case of a resident, however, absence alone will not defeat the processes of courts in the State of his domicile; for domicile is deemed to be sufficient to keep him within reach of the State courts for purposes of a personal judgment, whether obtained by means of appropriate, subst.i.tuted service, or by actual personal service on the resident at a point outside the State.
Amenability to such suit even during sojourns outside is viewed as an "incident of domicile."[698] However, if the defendant, although technically domiciled therein, has left the State with no intention to return, service by publication; that is, by advertis.e.m.e.nt in a local newspaper, as compared to a summons left at his last and usual place of abode where his family continued to reside, is inadequate inasmuch as it is not reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and opportunity to be heard.[699]
In the case of nonresident individuals who are domiciled elsewhere, jurisdiction in certain instances may be perfected by requiring such persons, as a condition to entering the State, to designate local agents to accept service of process. Although a State does not have the power to exclude individuals until such formal appointment of an agent has been made,[700] it may, for example, declare that the use of its highways by a nonresident is the equivalent of the appointment of the State Registrar as agent for receipt of process in suits growing out of motor vehicle accidents. However, a statute designating a State official as the proper person to receive service of process in such litigation must, to be valid, contain a provision making it reasonably probable that a notice of such service will be communicated to the person sued.
If the statute imposed "either on the plaintiff himself, or upon the official" designated to accept process "or some other, the duty of communicating by mail or otherwise with the defendant" this requirement is met; but if the act exacts no more than service of process on the local agent, it is unconst.i.tutional, notwithstanding that the defendant may have been personally served in his own State. Not having been directed by the statute, such personal service cannot supply const.i.tutional validity to the act or to service under it.[701]
Suits _in Personam_.--Restating the const.i.tutional principles currently applicable for determining whether individuals, resident and nonresident, are suable in _in personam_ actions, the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. _v._ Washington,[702] recently declared that: "Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgments _in personam_ is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant"s person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. * * * But now * * *, due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment _in personam_, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.""
Suability of Foreign Corporations.--Until the enunciation in 1945 in International Shoe Co. _v._ Washington[703] of a "fair play and substantial justice" doctrine, the exact scope of which cannot yet be ascertained, the suability of foreign corporations had been determined by utilization of the "presence" doctrine. Defined in terms no less abstract than its alleged successor and capable therefore of acquiring meaning only in cases of specific application, the "presence" doctrine was stated by Justice Brandeis as follows: "In the absence of consent, a foreign corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability only if it is doing business within the State in such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there".[704] In a variety of cases the Court has considered the measure of "presence" sufficient to confer jurisdiction and a representative sample of the cla.s.ses thereof is set forth below.
With rare exceptions,[705] even continuous activity of some sort by a foreign corporation within a State did not in the past suffice to render it amenable to suits therein unrelated to that activity. Without the protection of such a rule, it was maintained, foreign corporations would be exposed to the manifest hardship and inconvenience of defending in any State in which they happen to be carrying on business suits for torts wherever committed and claims on contracts wherever made. Thus, an Indiana insurance corporation, engaging, without formal admission, in the business of selling life insurance in Pennsylvania, was held not to be subject in the latter State to a suit filed by a Pennsylvania resident upon an insurance policy executed and delivered in Indiana.[706] Similarly, a Virginia railway corporation, doing business in New Orleans, was declared not to be within the jurisdiction of Louisiana for the purposes of a negligence action inst.i.tuted against it by a Louisiana citizen and based upon injuries suffered in Alabama.[707]
Also, an Iowa railway company soliciting freight and pa.s.senger business in Philadelphia through a local agent was viewed as exempt therein from suit brought by a Pennsylvania resident to recover damages for personal injuries sustained on one of the carrier"s trains in Colorado.[708] On the other hand, when a Missouri statute, accepted by a foreign insurance company and requiring it to designate the State superintendent of insurance as its agent for service of process, was construed by Missouri courts to apply to suits on contracts executed outside Missouri, with the result that the company had to defend in Missouri a suit on a policy issued in Colorado and covering property therein, the Court was unable to discern any denial of due process. The company was deemed to have consented to such interpretation when it complied with the statute.[709]
Moreover, even when the cause of action arose in the forum State and suit was inst.i.tuted by a corporation chartered therein, a foreign company retailing clothing in Oklahoma was held immune from service of process on its president when the latter visited New York on one of his periodic trips there for the purchase of merchandise. Notwithstanding that such business trips were made at regular intervals, the Oklahoma corporation was considered not to be doing business in New York "in such manner and to such extent as to warrant the inference that it was present there," especially in view of its having never applied for a license to do business in New York or consented to suit being brought against it there, or established therein an office or appointed a resident agent.[710]
Nor would the mere presence within its territorial limits of an agent, officer, or stockholder, upon whom service might readily be had, be effective without more to enable a State to acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. Consequently, service of process on the president of a foreign corporation in a State where he was temporarily and casually present and where the corporation did no business and had no property was fruitless.[711] Likewise, service on a New York director of a Virginia corporation was not sufficient to bring the corporation into the New York courts when, at the time of service, the corporation was not doing business in New York, and the director was not there officially representing the corporation in its business.[712] On occasion, an officer of a corporation may temporarily be in a State or even temporarily reside therein; but if he is not there for the purpose of transacting business for the corporation, or vested with authority by the corporation to transact business in such State, his presence affords no basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over such nonresident employer, and any decree resulting from service upon such officer is violative of due process.[713] However, a foreign insurance corporation which had ceased to sell insurance in Tennessee but which had sent a special agent there to adjust a loss under a policy previously issued in that State could not, it was held, const.i.tutionally object when a judgment on that claim was obtained by service on that agent.[714]
Inasmuch as a State need not permit a foreign corporation to do domestic business within its borders, it may condition entry upon acceptance by the corporation of service of process upon its agents or upon a person to be designated by the corporation or, failing such designation, upon a State officer designated by law.[715] Service on a State officer, however, is no more effective than service upon an agent in the employ of a foreign corporation when, as has already been noted, such corporation is not subject to the jurisdiction of the State; that is, has not engaged in activities sufficient to render it "present" within the State, or is subjected to a cause of action unrelated to such activities and originating beyond the forum State. Thus, a foreign insurance company which, after revocation of its entry license, continued to collect premiums on policies formerly issued to citizens of the forum State was in fact continuing to do business in that State sufficiently to render service on it through the insurance commissioner adequate to bind it as defendant in a suit by a citizen of said State on a policy therein issued to him.[716] Furthermore, a foreign corporation which, after leaving a State and subsequently dissolving, failed to obey a statutory requirement of that State that it maintain therein a resident agent until the period of limitations shall have run, or, in default thereof, that it consent to service on it through the Secretary of State, could not complain of any denial of due process because that statute did not oblige the Secretary of State to notify it of the pendency of an action. The burden was on the corporation to make such arrangement for notice as was thought desirable.[717]
To what extent these aforementioned holdings have been undermined by the recent opinion in International Shoe Co. _v._ Washington[718] cannot yet be determined. In the latter case, a foreign corporation, which had not been issued a license to do business in Washington, but which systematically and continuously employed a force of salesmen, residents thereof, to canva.s.s for orders therein, was held suable in Washington for unpaid unemployment compensation contributions in respect to such salesmen. Service of the notice of a.s.sessment personally upon one of its local sales solicitors plus the forwarding of a copy thereof by registered mail to the corporation"s princ.i.p.al office in Missouri was deemed sufficient to apprize the corporation of the proceeding.
To reach this conclusion the Court not only overturned prior holdings to the effect that mere solicitation of patronage does not const.i.tute doing of business in a State sufficient to subject a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction thereof,[719] but also rejected the "presence" test as begging "the question to be decided. * * * The terms "present" or "presence,"" according to Chief Justice Stone, "are used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation"s agent within the State which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. * * * Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the State of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system * * *, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there; [and] * * * that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notices of fair play and substantial justice" * * * An "estimate of the inconveniences"
which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its "home"
or princ.i.p.al place of business is relevant in this connection."[720] As to the scope of application to be accorded this "fair play and substantial justice" doctrine, the Court, at least verbally, conceded that "* * * so far as * * * [corporate] obligations arise out of or are connected with activities within the State, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue."[721] Read literally, these statements coupled with the terms of the new doctrine may conceivably lead to a reversal of former decisions which: (1) nullified the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum State over actions arising outside said State and brought by a resident plaintiff against a foreign corporation doing business therein without having been legally admitted and without having consented to service of process on a resident agent; and (2) exempted a foreign corporation, which has been licensed by the forum State to do business therein and has consented to the appointment of a local agent to accept process, from suit on an action not arising in the forum State and not related to activities pursued therein.
By an extended application of the logic of the last mentioned case, a majority of the Court, in Travelers Health a.s.sn. _v._ Virginia[722]
ruled that, notwithstanding that it solicited business in Virginia solely through recommendations of existing members and was represented therein by no agents whatsoever, a foreign mail order insurance company had through its policies developed such contacts and ties with Virginia residents that the State, by forwarding notice to the company by registered mail only, could inst.i.tute enforcement proceedings under its Blue Sky Law leading to a decree ordering cessation of business pending compliance with that act. The due process clause was declared not to "forbid a State to protect its citizens from such injustice" of having to file suits on their claims at a far distant home office of such company, especially in view of the fact that such suits could be more conveniently tried in Virginia where claims of loss could be investigated.[723]
Service of Process
Actions in Rem--Proceedings Against Land.--For the purpose of determining the extent of a nonresident"s t.i.tle to real estate within its limits, a State may provide any reasonable means of imparting notice.[724] Precluded from going beyond its boundaries and serving nonresident owners personally, States in such cases of necessity have had recourse to constructive notice or service by publications. This they have been able to do because of their inherent authority over t.i.tles to lands within their borders. Owners, nonresident as well as resident, are charged with knowledge of laws affecting demands of the State pertinent to property and of the manner in which such demands may be enforced.[725] Accordingly, only so long as the property affected has been brought under control of the Court, will a judgment obtained thereto without personal notice to a nonresident defendant be effective.
Insofar as jurisdiction is thus required over a nonresident, it does not extend beyond the property involved.[726] Consistently with such principles, San Francisco, after the earthquake of 1906, had destroyed nearly all records, permitted t.i.tles to be reestablished by parties in possession by posting summons on the property, serving them on known claimants, and publishing them against unknown claimants in newspapers for two weeks.[727]
Actions in Rem--Attachment Proceedings.--In fulfillment of the protection which a State owes to its citizens, it may exercise its jurisdiction over real and personal property situated within its borders belonging to a nonresident and permit an appropriation of the same in attachment proceedings to satisfy a debt owed by the nonresident to one of its citizens or to settle a claim for damages founded upon a wrong inflicted on the citizen by the nonresident. Being neither present within the State nor domiciled therein, the nonresident defendant cannot be served personally; and consequently any judgment in money obtained against him would be void and could not thereafter be satisfied either by execution on the nonresident"s property subsequently found within the State or by suit and execution thereon in another State. In such instances, the citizen-plaintiff may recover, if at all, only by an _in rem_ proceeding involving a levy of a writ of attachment on the local property of the defendant, of which proceeding the nonresident need be notified merely by publication of a notice within the forum State.
However, any judgment rendered in such proceedings can have no consequence beyond the property attached. If the attached property be insufficient to pay the claim, the plaintiff cannot thereafter sue on such judgment to collect an unpaid balance; and if property owned by the defendant cannot be found within the State, the attachment proceedings are, of course, summarily concluded.[728]
Actions in Rem--Corporations, Estates, Trusts, Etc.--Probate administration, being in the nature of a proceeding _in rem_, is one to which all the world is charged with notice.[729] Thus, in a proceeding against an estate involving a suit against an administratrix to foreclose a mortgage executed by the decedent, the heir, notwithstanding that the suit presents an adverse claim the disposition of which may be destructive of his t.i.tle to land deriving from the decedent, may properly be represented by the administratrix and is not ent.i.tled to personal notification or summons.[730] For like reasons, a statutory proceeding whereunder a special administrator, having charge of an estate pending a contest as to the validity of the will, is empowered to have a final settlement of his accounts without notice to the distributees, is not violative of due process. The executor, or administrator c.t.a., has an opportunity to contest the final settlement of the special administrator before giving the latter an acquittance; and since the former represents all claiming under the will, it cannot be said the absence of notice to the distributees of the settlement deprives them of their rights without due process of law.[731]
In litigation to determine succession to property by proceedings in escheat, due process is afforded by personal service of summons upon all known claimants and constructive notice by publication to all claimants who are unknown.[732] Whether a proceeding by the State to compel a bank to turn over to it unclaimed deposits in _quasi in rem_ or strictly _in rem_, the essentials of jurisdiction over the deposit are that there be a seizure of the _res_ at the commencement of the suit and reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard. These requirements are met by personal service on the bank and publication of summons to depositors and of notice to all other claimants. The fact that no affidavit of impracticability of personal service on claimants is required before publication of such notices does not render the latter unreasonable inasmuch as they are used only in cases where the depositor is not known to the bank officers to be alive.[733] Similarly, a Kentucky statute requiring banks to turn over to the State deposits long inactive is not violative of due process where, although the deposits are taken over upon published notice only, without any judicial decree of actual abandonment, they are to be held by the State for the depositor until such determination and for five years thereafter.[734] However, a procedure is at least partly defective whereby a bank managing a common trust fund in favor of nonresident as well as resident beneficiaries may, by a pet.i.tion, the only notice of which is by publication in a local paper, obtain a judicial settlement of accounts which is conclusive on all having an interest in the common fund or in any partic.i.p.ating trust. Such notice by publication is sufficient as to beneficiaries whose interests or addresses are unknown to the bank, since there are no other more practicable means of giving them notice; but is inadequate as a basis for adjudication depriving of substantial rights persons whose whereabouts are known, inasmuch as it is feasible to make serious efforts to notify them at least by mail to their addresses on record with said bank.[735] On the other hand, failure to make any provision for notice to majority stockholders of a suit by dissenting shareholders, under a statute which provided that, on a sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of corporate a.s.sets, a dissenting shareholder shall have the right, after six months, to be paid the amount demanded, if the corporation makes no counter offer or does not abandon the sale, does not deny due process; for the majority stockholders are sufficiently represented by the corporation.[736]
Actions in Rem--Divorce Proceedings.--The jurisdictional requirements for rendering a valid decree in divorce proceedings are considered under the full faith and credit clause. _See_ pp. 662-670.
Misnomer of Defendant--False Return, Etc.--An unattainable standard of accuracy is not imposed by the due process clause. If a defendant within the jurisdiction is served personally with process in which his name is misspelled, he cannot safely ignore it on account of the misnomer. If he fails to appear and plead the misnomer in abatement, the judgment binds him. In a published notice intended to reach absent or nonresident defendants, where the name is a princ.i.p.al means of identifying the person concerned, somewhat different considerations obtain. The general rule, in case of constructive service of process by publication, tends to strictness. However, published notice to "Albert Guilfuss, a.s.signee," in a suit to part.i.tion land, was adequate to render a judgment binding on "Albert B. Geilfuss, a.s.signee," the latter not having appeared.[737]