Foreclosure of a mortgage made upon process duly issued but which the sheriff falsely returned as having been duly served, and of which the owner had no notice, does not deprive said owner of property without due process of law. A purchaser of the land at the sheriff"s sale has a right to rely on such return; otherwise judicial proceedings could never be relied upon. The mortgagor must seek his remedy against the sheriff upon his bond.[738]
Notice and Hearing
Legislative Proceedings.--While due notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard to present one"s claim or defense have been declared to be two fundamental conditions almost universally prescribed in all systems of law established by civilized countries,[739] there are certain proceedings appropriate for the determination of various rights in which the enjoyment of these two privileges has not been deemed to be const.i.tutionally necessary. Thus the Const.i.tution does not require legislative a.s.semblies to discharge their functions in town meeting style; and it would be manifestly impracticable to accord every one affected by a proposed rule of conduct a voice in its adoption. Advanced notice of legislation accordingly is not essential to due process of law; nor need legislative bodies preface their enactment of legislation by first holding committee hearings thereon. It follows therefore that persons adversely affected by a specific law can never challenge its validity on the ground that they were never heard on the wisdom or justice of its provisions.[740]
Administrative Proceedings.--To what extent notice and hearing are deemed essential to due process in administrative proceedings, encompa.s.sing as they do the formulation and issuance of general regulations, the determination of the existence of conditions which have the effect of bringing such regulations into operation, and the issuance of orders of specific, limited application, entails a balancing of considerations as to the desirability of speed in law enforcement and protection of individual interests. When an administrative agency engages in a legislative function, as, for example, when, in pursuance of statutory authorization, it drafts regulations of general application affecting an unknown number of people, it need not, any more than does a legislative a.s.sembly, afford a hearing prior to promulgation. On the other hand, if a regulation, sometimes described as an order or action of an administrative body, is of limited application; that is, affects the property or interests of specific, named individuals, or a relatively small number of people readily identifiable by their relation to the property or interests affected, the question whether notice and hearing is prerequisite and, if so, whether it must precede such action, becomes a matter of greater urgency.
But while a distinction readily may be made, for example, between a regulation establishing a schedule of rates for all carriers in a State, and one designed to control the charges of only one or two specifically named carriers, the cases do not consistently sustain the withholding of advance notice and hearing in the first cla.s.s of regulations and insist upon its provision in the latter. In fact, the observation has been made that the judicial disposition to exact the protection of notice and hearing rises in direct proportion to the extent to which a regulation affects the finances of business establishments covered thereunder. Accordingly, if a regulation bears only indirectly upon income and expenses, as for example, a regulation altering insurance policy forms, less concern for such procedural protection is likely to be expressed than in the case of the formulation of a minimum wage schedule, even though the regulations involved in both ill.u.s.trations are general and not limited in operation. Moreover, if regulations, which are general in their application, may be readily subjected to judicial challenge after their promulgation, or if the parties to which they apply are affected only when they endeavor to comply in the future, advance notice and hearing is less likely to be viewed as essential to due process.[741]
As to that portion of administrative activity pertaining to the making of determinations or the issuance of orders of limited or individual application, the obligation to afford notice and hearing is reasonably clear; but controversy has been protracted on the question whether this procedural safeguard, in every instance, must be granted in advance of such activity. The most frequently litigated types of administrative action embracing the latter issue have been determinations to withhold issuance of, or to revoke, an occupational license, or to impound or destroy property believed to be dangerous to public health, morals, or safety. Apparently in recognition of the fact that few occupations today can be pursued without a license, the trend of decisions is toward sustaining a requirement of a hearing before refusal to issue a license and away from the view that inasmuch as no one is ent.i.tled as of right to engage in a specific profession, the issue of a pract.i.tioner"s license applicable thereto is in the nature of a gift as to the granting or withholding of which procedural protection is unnecessary.
Revocation, or refusal to renew a license, however, has been distinguished from issuance of a license; and where a license is construed to confer something in the nature of a property right rather than a mere privilege terminable at will, such property right, the Courts have maintained, ought not to be destroyed summarily by revocation without prior notice and hearing. Whether an occupational license is to be treated as a privilege revocable without a hearing, or as conferring a property right deserving of greater protection, depends very largely on prevailing estimates of the social desirability of a calling. Thus, if a business is susceptible of being viewed as injurious to public health, morals, safety, and convenience, as, for example, saloons, pool rooms, and dance halls, the licensee is deemed to have entered upon such line of endeavor with advance knowledge of the State"s right to withdraw his license therefor summarily. Prompt protection of the public in such instances is said to outweigh the advantages of a slower procedure, r.e.t.a.r.ded by previous notice and hearing, and to require that the person adversely affected seek his remedy from the Court via a pet.i.tion to review or to enjoin the decision of the licensing authorities.[742]
For like reasons, the owner of property about to be impounded or destroyed by officers acting in furtherance of the police power may justifiably be relegated to post mortem remedies in the form of a suit for damages against the officer effecting the seizure or destruction, or, if time permits, a bill in equity for an injunction. Thus, due process of law is not denied the custodian of food in cold storage by enforcement of a city ordinance under which such food, when unfit for human consumption, may summarily be seized, condemned, and destroyed without a preliminary hearing. "If a party cannot get his hearing in advance of the seizure and destruction he has the right to have it afterward, * * * in an action brought for the destruction of his property, and in that action those who destroyed it can only successfully defend if the jury shall find the fact of unwholesomeness as claimed by them."[743] Similarly, if the owner of liquor, possession of which has been made unlawful, can secure a hearing by inst.i.tuting injunction proceedings, he is not denied due process by the failure to grant him a hearing before seizure and destruction of his property.[744]
Indeed, even when no emergency exists, such as is provided by a conflagration or threatened epidemic, and the property in question is not intrinsically harmful, mere use in violation of a valid police power regulation has been held to justify summary destruction. Thus, in the much criticized case of Lawton _v._ Steele,[745] the destruction, without prior notice and hearing, of fishing nets set in violation of a conservation law defining them to be a nuisance was sustained on the ground that the property was not "of great value." Conceding that "it is not easy to draw the line between cases where property illegally used may be destroyed summarily and where judicial proceedings are necessary for its condemnation," the Court acknowledged that "if the property were of great value, as, for instance, if it were a vessel employed for smuggling or other illegal purposes, it would be * * * dangerous * * *
to permit * * * [an officer] to sell or destroy it as a public nuisance, * * * But where the property is of trifling value, * * * we think it is within the power of the legislature to order its summary abatement."[746]
Statutory Proceedings.--"It is not an indispensable requirement of due process that every procedure affecting the ownership or disposition of property be exclusively by judicial proceeding. Statutory proceedings affecting property rights, which, by later resort to the courts, secure to adverse parties an opportunity to be heard, suitable to the occasion, do not deny due process."[747] Thus, a procedure under which a State banking superintendent, after having taken over a closed bank and issued notices to stockholders of their a.s.sessment, may issue execution for the amounts due, subject to the right of each stockholder, by affidavit of illegality, to contest his liability for such an a.s.sessment, does not in effect authorize an execution and creation of a lien before and without any judicial proceeding. The fact that the execution is issued in the first instance by an agent of the State and not from a court, followed by personal notice and a right to take the case into court, is open to no objection. The statute authorizing this procedure is itself notice to stockholders that on becoming such they a.s.sumed the liability on which they are to be held.[748]
Judicial Proceedings.--Consistently with the due process clause, a State may not enforce a judgment against a party named in the proceedings without an opportunity to be heard at sometime before final judgment is entered.[749] As to the presentation of every available defense, however, the requirements of due process do not entail affording an opportunity to do so before entry of judgment. A hearing by an appeal may suffice. Accordingly, a surety company, objecting to the entry of a judgment against it on a supersedeas bond, without notice and an opportunity of a hearing on the issue of liability thereon, was not denied due process where the State practice provided the opportunity for such hearing by an appeal from the judgment so entered. Nor could the company found its claim of denial upon the fact that it lost this opportunity for a hearing by inadvertently pursuing the wrong procedure in the State courts.[750] On the other hand, where a State Supreme Court reversed a trial court and entered a final judgment for the defendant, a plaintiff who had never had an opportunity to introduce evidence in reb.u.t.tal to certain testimony which the trial court deemed immaterial but which the appellate court considered material, was held to have been deprived of his rights without due process of law.[751]
Sufficiency of Notice and Hearing.--Although the Supreme Court has wavered on the question whether the granting of notice in administrative proceedings, in cases in which the authorizing statute does not expressly provide therefor, will satisfy the requirements of due process,[752] in judicial proceedings it has almost consistently declared that notice must be provided as an essential part of the statutory provision and not as a mere matter of favor or grace.[753]
Also, the notice afforded must be adequate for the purpose. Thus, a Texas statute providing for service of process by giving five days"
notice was held to be an insufficient notice to a Virginian who would (at that time) have required four days" traveling to reach the place where the court was held. Nor would this insufficiency of notice on a nonresident be cured by the fact that under local practice there would be several additional days before the case would be called for trial or that the court would probably set aside a default judgment and permit a defense when the nonresident arrived.[754] On the other hand, a statute affording ten days" notice of the time for settlement of the account of a personal representative in probate proceedings is not wanting in due process of law as to a nonresident.[755] Adequacy, moreover, is no less an essential attribute of a hearing than it is of notice; and, as the preceding discussion has shown, unless a person involved in administrative as well as judicial proceedings has received a hearing that is both sufficient and fair and has been subjected to rulings amply supported by the evidence introduced thereat, he will not be considered to have been accorded due process.[756]
POWER OF STATES TO REGULATE PROCEDURE
Generally
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not control mere forms of procedure in State courts or regulate practice therein.[757] A State "is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."[758] Pursuant to such plenary power, States have regulated the manner in which rights may be enforced and wrongs remedied,[759] and, in connection therewith, have created courts and endowed them with such jurisdiction as, in the judgment of their legislatures, seemed appropriate.[760] Whether legislative action in such matters is deemed to be wise or proves efficient, whether it works a particular hardship on a particular litigant, or perpetuates or supplants ancient forms of procedure are issues which can give rise to no conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment; for the latter"s function is negative rather than affirmative and in no way obligates the States to adopt specific measures of reform.[761]
Pleading and Practice
Commencement Of Actions.--A State may impose certain conditions on the right to inst.i.tute litigation. Thus, access to the courts may be denied to persons inst.i.tuting stockholders" derivative actions unless reasonable security for the costs, and fees incurred by the corporation is first tendered. Nor is the retroactive application of this statutory requirement to actions pending at the time of its adoption violative of due process as long as no new liability for expenses incurred before enactment is imposed thereby, and the only effect thereof is to stay such proceedings until the security is furnished.[762] Moreover, when a nonresident files suit in a local court, the State, as the price of opening its tribunals to such plaintiff, may exact the condition that the former stand ready to answer all cross-actions filed and accept any _in personam_ judgments obtained by a resident defendant through service of process or appropriate pleading upon the plaintiff"s attorney of record.[763] For similar reasons, the requirements, without excluding other evidence, of a chemical a.n.a.lysis as a condition precedent to a suit to recover damages resulting to crops from allegedly deficient fertilizers is not deemed to be arbitrary or unreasonable.[764]
Pleas in Abatement.--State legislation which forbids a defendant to come into court and challenge the validity of service upon him in a personal action without thereby surrendering himself to the jurisdiction of the Court, but which does not restrain him from protecting his substantive rights against enforcement of a judgment rendered without service of process, is const.i.tutional and does not deprive him of property without due process of law. Such a defendant, if he please, may ignore the proceedings as wholly ineffective, and set up the invalidity of the judgment if and when an attempt is made to take his property thereunder. However, if he desires to contest the validity of the proceedings in the court in which it is inst.i.tuted, so as to avoid even semblance of a judgment against him, it is within the power of a State to declare that he shall do this subject to the risk of being obliged to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine the merits, if the objection raised by him as to its jurisdiction over his person shall be overruled.[765]
Defenses.--Just as the State may condition the right to inst.i.tute litigation, so may it establish its terms for the interposition of certain defenses. Thus, by statute a State validly may provide that one sued in a possessory action cannot bring an action to try t.i.tle until after judgment shall have been rendered in the possessory action, and until he shall have paid the judgment, if the decision shall have so awarded.[766] Likewise, a nonresident defendant in a suit begun by foreign attachment, even though he has no resources or credit other than the property attached, cannot successfully challenge the validity of a statute which requires him to give bail or security for the discharge of the seized property before permitting him an opportunity to appear and defend. "The condition imposed has a reasonable relation to the conversion of a proceeding _quasi in rem_ into an action _in personam_; [and] ordinarily * * * is not difficult to comply with--* * *"[767]
Amendments and Continuances.--Amendment of pleadings is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and unless a gross abuse of discretion is shown, there is no ground for reversal; accordingly, where the defense sought to be interposed is without merit, a claim that due process would be denied by rendition of a foreclosure decree without leave to file a supplementary answer is utterly without foundation.[768]
Costs, Damages, and Penalties.--What costs are allowed by law is for the court to determine; and an erroneous judgment of what the law allows does not deprive a party of his property without due process of law.[769] Nor does a statute providing for the recovery of reasonable attorney"s fees in actions on small claims subject unsuccessful defendants to any unconst.i.tutional deprivation.[770] Equally consistent with the requirements of due process is a statutory procedure whereby a prosecutor of a case is adjudged liable for costs, and committed to jail in default of payment thereof, whenever the court or jury, after according him an opportunity to present evidence of good faith, finds that he inst.i.tuted the prosecution without probable cause and from malicious motives.[771] Also, as a reasonable incentive for prompt settlement without suit of just demands of a cla.s.s admitting of special legislative treatment, such as common carriers and insurance companies together with their patrons, a State through the exercise of its police power may permit hara.s.sed litigants to recover penalties in the form of attorney"s fees or damages.[772] Similarly, to deter careless destruction of human life, a State by law may allow punitive damages to be a.s.sessed in actions against employers for deaths caused by the negligence of their employees.[773] Likewise, by virtue of its plenary power to prescribe the character of the sentence which shall be awarded against those found guilty of crime, a State may provide that a public officer embezzling public money shall, notwithstanding that he has made rest.i.tution, suffer not only imprisonment but also pay a fine equal to double the amount embezzled, which shall operate as a judgment for the use of persons whose money was embezzled. Whatever this fine be called, whether it be a penalty, or punishment, or civil judgment, it comes to the convict as the result of his crime.[774]
Statutes of Limitation
A statute of limitations does not deprive one of property without due process of law, unless, in its application to an existing right of action, it unreasonably limits the opportunity to enforce that right by suit. By the same token, a State may shorten an existing period of limitation, provided a reasonable time is allowed for bringing an action after the pa.s.sage of the statute and before the bar takes effect. What is a reasonable period, however, is dependent on the nature of the right and particular circ.u.mstances.[775]
Thus, an interval of only one year is not so unreasonable as to be wanting in due process when applied to bar actions relative to the property of an absentee in instances when the receiver for such property has not been appointed until 13 years after the former"s disappearance.[776] Likewise, when a State, by law, suddenly prohibits, unless brought within six months after its pa.s.sage, all actions to contest tax deeds which have been of record for two years, no unconst.i.tutional deprivation is effected.[777] No less valid is a statute, applicable to wild lands, which provides that when a person has been in possession under a recorded deed continuously for 20 years, and had paid taxes thereon during the same, the former owner in that interval paying nothing, no action to recover such land shall be entertained unless commenced within 20 years, or before the expiration of five years following enactment of said provision.[778] Similarly, an amendment to a workmen"s compensation act, limiting to three years the time within which a case may be reopened for readjustment of compensation on account of aggravation of a disability, does not deny due process to one who sustained his injury at a time when the statute contained no limitation. A limitation is deemed to affect the remedy only, and the period of its operation in this instance was viewed as neither arbitrary nor oppressive.[779]
Moreover, as long as no agreement of the parties is violated, a State may extend as well as shorten the time in which suits may be brought in its courts and may even entirely remove a statutory bar to the commencement of litigation. As applied to actions for personal debts, a repeal or extension of a statute of limitations effects no unconst.i.tutional deprivation of property of a debtor-defendant in whose favor such statute had already become a defense. "A right to defeat a just debt by the statute of limitation * * * [not being] a vested right," such as is protected by the Const.i.tution, accordingly no offense against the Fourteenth Amendment is committed by revival, through an extension or repeal, of an action on an implied obligation to pay a child for the use of her property,[780] or a suit to recover the purchase price of securities sold in violation of a Blue Sky Law,[781]
or a right of an employee to seek, on account of the aggravation of a former injury, an additional award out of a State administered fund.[782] However, as respects suits to recover real and personal property, when the right of action has been barred by a statute of limitations and t.i.tle as well as real ownership have become vested in the defendant, any later act removing or repealing the bar would be void as attempting an arbitrary transfer of t.i.tle.[783] Also unconst.i.tutional is the application of a local statute of limitation declaring invalid any contractual limitation of the right to sue to a period shorter than two years to an insurance contract made and to be performed outside the forum State and containing a stipulation that suit thereon must be brought within one year from the date of loss. "When the parties to a contract have expressly agreed upon a time limit on their obligation, a statute which invalidates * * * [said] agreement and directs enforcement of the contract after * * * [the agreed] time has expired * * *"
unconst.i.tutionally imposes a burden in excess of that contracted.[784]
Evidence and Presumptions
The establishment of presumptions and rules respecting the burden of proof is clearly within the domain of State governments.[785] As long as a presumption is not unreasonable and is not conclusive of the rights of the person against whom raised, it does not violate the due process clause. Legislative fiat may not take the place of fact, however, in the determination of issues involving life, liberty, or property, and a statute creating a presumption which is entirely arbitrary and which operates to deny a fair opportunity to repel it or to present facts pertinent to one"s defense is void. On the other hand, if there is a rational connection between what is proved and what is to be inferred, legislation declaring that the proof of one fact or group of facts shall const.i.tute _prima facie_ evidence of a main or ultimate fact will be sustained.[786]
On the ground that the connection between the fact proven and that presumed was not sufficient and that reasoning did not lead from one to the other, the following statutory presumptions have been voided. Thus, a statute which treated a breach of a contract to labor as _prima facie_ evidence of an intent to defraud an employer of money paid by him in advance was found to be const.i.tutionally defective because the trial court was permitted to disregard evidence rationally bearing upon fraud and to decide upon evidence pertaining to an unrelated breach of contract, with the consequence that an adequate hearing upon fraud was not afforded.[787] Also, since "inference of crime and guilt may not reasonably be drawn from mere inability [of a bank] to pay demand deposits and other debts as they mature," a statute making proof of insolvency _prima facie_ evidence of fraud on the part of bank directors was deemed wholly arbitrary.[788] Similarly, negligence by one or all the partic.i.p.ants in a grade crossing collision not being inferable from the latter occurrence, the Court voided a Georgia statute which declared that a railroad shall be liable in damages to person or property by the running of trains unless the company shall make it appear that its agents exercised ordinary diligence, the presumption in all cases being against the company, and which was construed by State courts as permitting said presumption of evidence to be weighed against opposing testimony and to prevail unless such testimony is found by a jury to be preponderant.[789] On the other hand, a South Carolina statute which raised a presumption of negligence against a railroad upon proof of failure to give prescribed warning signals was sustained because the presumption therein established gave rise merely to a temporary inference which might be reb.u.t.ted by contrary evidence and which is thereafter to be excluded in determining proximate cause.[790]
Presumptions sustained as const.i.tutionally tenable include those set out in statutes providing that when distillery apparatus is found upon the premises of an individual, such discovery shall be _prima facie_ evidence of actual knowledge of the presence of the same;[791] that the flowing, release, or escape of natural gas into the air shall const.i.tute _prima facie_ evidence of prohibited waste,[792] and that prior conviction of a felony shall be conclusive evidence of bad character justifying refusal to issue a license to practice medicine.[793] Upheld, consistently with the former, were two sections of the California alien land law; one, which specified that the taking of t.i.tle in the name of a person eligible to hold land, where the consideration is furnished by one ineligible to acquire agricultural land, shall raise a _prima facie_ presumption that the conveyance is made to evade the law;[794] and a second, which cast upon a j.a.panese defendant the burden of proving citizenship by birth after the State endeavored to prove that he belonged to a race ineligible for naturalization.[795] In contrast with the latter result, however, is a subsequent decision of the Court holding unconst.i.tutional another section of the same California law providing that when an indictment alleges alienage and ineligibility to United States citizenship of a defendant, the burden of proving citizenship or eligibility thereto shall devolve upon the defendant.[796] As a basis for distinguishing these last two decisions the Court observed that while "the decisions are manifold that within [the] limits" of fairness[797] and reason the burden of proof may be shifted to the defendant even in criminal prosecutions, nevertheless, to be justified, "the evidence held to be inculpatory * * * [must have had]
at least a sinister significance * * *, or if this at times be lacking, there must be in any event a manifest disparity in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge, * * *" Whereas, accordingly, under the terms of the section previously upheld, the defendant could prove his citizenship without trouble, and the State, if forced to disprove his claim, could be relatively helpless, the background of the accused party being known probably only to himself and close relatives, the alleged j.a.panese defendant, in the last mentioned case, would have suffered hardship and injustice if compelled to prove non-j.a.panese origin, especially since ineligibility renders criminal conduct otherwise lacking in "sinister significance" (occupation of land under lease from an American codefendant).[798] On the other hand, it was held in a recent case, that Oregon was ent.i.tled to require that one pleading insanity as a defense against a criminal charge should prove same beyond a reasonable doubt, and to make "morbid propensity" no defense.[799]
Jury Trials: Dispensing With Jury Trials
Trial by jury has not been considered essential to due process, and since the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees no particular form or method of procedure, States have been free to retain or abolish juries.[800]
Conformably to the Const.i.tution, States, in devising their own procedures, eliminated juries in proceedings to enforce liens,[801]
inquiries for contempt,[802] mandamus[803] and quo warranto actions,[804] and in eminent domain[805] and equity proceedings.[806]
States are equally free to adopt innovations respecting the selection and number of jurors. Verdicts rendered by ten out of twelve jurors may be subst.i.tuted for the requirement of a unanimous verdict,[807] and pet.i.t juries containing eight rather than the conventional twelve members may be established.[808]
DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
General
In the following pages the requirements of the due process clause of Amendment XIV in criminal cases will be dealt with in approximately the order in which questions regarding them arise in the course of a prosecution.
Indefinite Statutes: Right of Accused to Knowledge of Offense
"A statute so vague and indefinite, in form and as interpreted, * * *
[as to fail] to give fair notice of what acts will be punished, * * *, violates an accused"s rights under procedural due process * * * [A penal statute must set up] ascertainable standards of guilt. [So that] men of common intelligence * * * [are not] required to guess at * * * [its]
meaning," either as to persons within the scope of the act or as to applicable tests to ascertain guilt.[809]
Defective by these tests and therefore violative of due process is a statute providing that any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has been convicted of any crime in this or any other State, is a gangster and subject to fine or imprisonment. Pointing to specific shortcomings of this act, the Supreme Court observed that "* * * neither [at] common law, * * * nor anywhere in the language of the law is there [to be found any] definition of the word, * * * "gang"." The State courts, in adopting dictionary definitions of that term, were not to be viewed as having intended to give "gangster" a meaning broad enough to include anyone who had not been convicted of a specified crime or of disorderly conduct as set out in the statute, or to limit its meaning to the field covered by the words that they found in a dictionary ("roughs, thieves, criminals"). Application of the latter interpretation would include some obviously not within the statute and would exclude some plainly covered by it. Moreover, the expression, "known to be a member,"
is ambiguous; and not only permits a doubt as to whether actual or putative a.s.sociation is meant, but also fails to indicate what const.i.tutes membership or how one may join a gang. In conclusion, the Supreme Court declared that if on its face a challenged statute is repugnant to the due process clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be charged would not serve to validate it; for it is the statute, not the accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and warns against transgression.[810] In contrast, the Court sustained as neither too vague nor indefinite a State law which provided for commitment of a psychopathic personality by probate action akin to a lunacy proceeding, and which was construed by the State court as including those persons who, by habitual course of misconduct in s.e.xual matters, have evidenced utter lack of power to control their s.e.xual impulses and are likely to inflict injury. The underlying conditions, i.e., habitual course of misconduct in s.e.x matters and lack of power to control impulses, and likelihood of attack on others, were viewed as calling for evidence of past conduct pointing to probable consequences and as being as susceptible of proof as many of the criteria constantly applied in criminal prosecutions.[811]
Abolition of the Grand Jury
An indictment or presentment by a grand jury, as known to the common law of England, is not essential to due process of law even when applied to prosecutions for felonies. Subst.i.tution for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury of the proceeding by information, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, certifying to the probable guilt of the defendant, with the right on his part to the aid of counsel, and to the cross-examination of the witnesses produced for the prosecution is due process of law.[812] Furthermore, due process does not require that the information filed by the prosecuting attorney should have been preceded by the arrest or preliminary examination of the accused.[813] Even when an information is filed pending an investigation by the coroner, due process has not been violated.[814] But when the grand jury is retained it must be fairly const.i.tuted. Thus, in the leading case, an indictment by a grand jury in a county of Alabama in which no member of a considerable Negro population had ever been called for jury service, was held void, although the Alabama statute governing the matter did not discriminate between the two races.[815]