SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS BY THE PRESIDENT
_See_ Article I, Section 9, clause 2, pp. 312-315.
PREVENTIVE MARTIAL LAW
The question of executive power in the presence of civil disorder is dealt with in modern terms in Moyer _v._ Peabody,[406] decided in 1909, to which the Debs Case,[407] decided in 1895, may be regarded as an addendum. Moyer, a labor leader, brought suit against Peabody, for having ordered his arrest during a labor dispute which occurred while Peabody was governor of Colorado. Speaking for a unanimous Court, one Justice being absent, Justice Holmes said: "Of course the plaintiff"s position is that he has been deprived of his liberty without due process of law. But it is familiar that what is due process of law depends on circ.u.mstances. It varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation. * * * The facts that we are to a.s.sume are that a state of insurrection existed and that the Governor, without sufficient reason but in good faith, in the course of putting the insurrection down held the plaintiff until he thought that he safely could release him. * * *
In such a situation we must a.s.sume that he had a right under the state const.i.tution and laws to call out troops, as was held by the Supreme Court of the State. * * * That means that he shall make the ordinary use of the soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons who resist and, of course, that he may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but are by way of precaution to prevent the exercise of hostile power. So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the Governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office on the ground that he had not reasonable ground for his belief. * * * When it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the subst.i.tution of executive process for judicial process."[408]
THE DEBS CASE
The Debs case of 1895 arose out of a railway strike which had caused the President to dispatch troops to Chicago the previous year. Coincidently with this move, the United States district attorney stationed there, acting upon orders from Washington, obtained an injunction from the United States circuit court forbidding the strike on account of its interference with the mails and with interstate commerce. The question before the Supreme Court was whether this injunction, for violation of which Debs has been jailed for contempt of court, had been granted with jurisdiction. Conceding, in effect, that there was no statutory warrant for the injunction, the Court nevertheless validated it on the ground that the Government was ent.i.tled thus to protect its property in the mails, and on a much broader ground which is stated in the following pa.s.sage of Justice Brewer"s opinion for the Court: "Every government, entrusted, by the very terms of its being, with powers and duties to be exercised and discharged for the general welfare, has a right to apply to its own courts for any proper a.s.sistance in the exercise of the one and the discharge of the other. * * * While it is not the province of the Government to interfere in any mere matter of private controversy between individuals, or to use its granted powers to enforce the rights of one against another, yet, whenever the wrongs complained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in respect of matters which by the Const.i.tution are entrusted to the care of the Nation and concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all the citizens of securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that the Government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts, or prevent it from taking measures therein to fully discharge those const.i.tutional duties."[409]
STATUS OF THE DEBS CASE TODAY
The restrictions imposed by the Norris-LaGuardia Act[410] on the issuance of injunctions by the federal courts in cases "involving or growing out of any labor dispute" later cast a shadow of doubt over the Debs case, which was deepened, if anything, by the Court"s decision in 1947, in United States _v._ United Mine Workers.[411] But such doubts have been since dispelled by the Taft-Hartley Act, which provides that whenever in his opinion a threatened or actual strike or lockout affecting the whole or a substantial part of an industry engaged in interstate commerce will, "if permitted to occur or continue, imperil the national health or safety," the President may appoint a board of inquiry and, upon its so finding, "may direct the Attorney General to pet.i.tion any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties to enjoin such strike or lockout or the continuing thereof * * *," and the Court shall have jurisdiction to do so, provided it shares the President"s view of the situation.[412] Administration and labor critics of the act did not challenge the const.i.tutionality of this provision. They questioned its necessity in view of the President"s "inherent powers" in the face of emergency.[413]
THE PRESIDENT"S DUTY IN CASES OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE STATES
_See_ Art. IV, sec. 4, p. 705.
THE PRESIDENT AS EXECUTIVE OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
Ill.u.s.trative of the President"s duty to discharge the responsibilities of the United States at International Law with a view to avoiding difficulties with other governments, was the action of President Wilson in closing the Marconi Wireless Station at Siasconset, Ma.s.sachusetts on the outbreak of the European War in 1914, the company having refused a.s.surance that it would comply with naval censorship regulations.
Justifying this drastic invasion of private rights, Attorney General Gregory said: "The President of the United States is at the head of one of the three great coordinate departments of the Government. He is Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy. * * * If the President is of the opinion that the relations of this country with foreign nations are, or are likely to be, endangered by action deemed by him inconsistent with a due neutrality, it is his right and duty to protect such relations; and in doing so, in the absence of any statutory restrictions, he may act through such executive office or department as appears best adapted to effectuate the desired end. * * * I do not hesitate, in view of the extraordinary conditions existing, to advise that the President, through the Secretary of the Navy or any appropriate department, close down, or take charge of and operate, the plant * * *, should he deem it necessary in securing obedience to his proclamation of neutrality."[414]
PROTECTION OF AMERICAN RIGHTS OF PERSON AND PROPERTY ABROAD
The right of the President to use force in vindication of American rights of person and property abroad was demonstrated in 1854 by the bombardment of Greytown, Nicaragua by Lieutenant Hollins of the U.S.S.
Cyane, in default of reparation from the local authorities for an attack by a mob on the United States consul at that place. Upon his return to the United States Hollins was sued in a federal court by one Durand for the value of certain property which was alleged to have been destroyed in the bombardment. His defense was based upon the orders of the President and Secretary of the Navy, and was sustained by Justice Nelson, then on circuit, in the following words: "As the Executive head of the nation, the President is made the only legitimate organ of the General Government, to open and carry on correspondence or negotiations with foreign nations, in matters concerning the interests of the country or of its citizens. It is to him, also, the citizens abroad must look for protection of person and of property, and for the faithful execution of the laws existing and intended for their protection. For this purpose, the whole Executive power of the country is placed in his hands, under the Const.i.tution, and the laws pa.s.sed in pursuance thereof; and different Departments of government have been organized, through which this power may be most conveniently executed, whether by negotiation or by force--a Department of State and a Department of the Navy.
"Now, as it respects the interposition of the Executive abroad, for the protection of the lives or property of the citizen, the duty must, of necessity, rest in the discretion of the President. Acts of lawless violence, or of threatened violence to the citizen or his property, cannot be antic.i.p.ated and provided for; and the protection, to be effectual or of any avail, may, not unfrequently, require the most prompt and decided action. Under our system of Government, the citizen abroad is as much ent.i.tled to protection as the citizen at home. The great object and duty of Government is the protection of the lives, liberty, and property of the people composing it, whether abroad or at home; and any Government failing in the accomplishment of the object, or the performance of the duty, is not worth preserving."[415]
PRESIDENTIAL WORLD POLICING
In his little volume on World Policing and the Const.i.tution[416] Mr.
James Grafton Rogers lists 149 episodes similar to the Greytown affair, stretching between the undeclared war with France in 1798 and Pearl Harbor. While inviting some pruning, the list demonstrates beyond peradventure the existence in the President, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, of power to judge whether a situation requires the use of available forces to protect American rights of person and property outside the United States and to take action in harmony with his decision. Such employment of the forces have, it is true, been usually justifiable acts of self defense rather than acts of war, but the countries where they occurred were ent.i.tled to treat them as acts of war nevertheless, although they have generally been too feeble to a.s.sert their prerogative in this respect, and have sometimes actually chosen to turn the other cheek. Thus when in 1900 President McKinley, without consulting Congress, contributed a sizable contingent to the joint forces that went to the relief of the foreign legations in Peking, the Chinese Imperial Government agreed that this action had not const.i.tuted war.[417]
The Atlantic Pact
Article V of the Atlantic Pact builds on such precedents. The novel feature is its enlarged conception of defensible American interests abroad. In the words of the published abstract of the Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on the Pact, "Article 5 records what is a fact, namely, that an armed attack within the meaning of the treaty would in the present-day world const.i.tute an attack upon the entire community comprising the parties to the treaty, including the United States. Accordingly, the President and the Congress, each within their sphere of a.s.signed const.i.tutional responsibilities, would be expected to take all action necessary and appropriate to protect the United States against the consequences and dangers of an armed attack committed against any party to the treaty."[418] But from the very nature of things, the discharge of this obligation against overt force will ordinarily rest with the President in the first instance, just as has the discharge in the past of the like obligation in the protection of American rights abroad. Furthermore, in the discharge of this obligation the President will ordinarily be required to use force and perform acts of war. Such is the verdict of history, a verdict which was foreseen more or less definitely by the framers themselves.[419]
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION IN THE DOMAIN OF CONGRESS: THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE
Facts[420]
To avert a nation-wide strike of steel workers which he believed would jeopardize the national defense, President Truman, on April 8th, 1952, issued Executive Order 10340[421] directing the Secretary of Commerce to seize and operate most of the steel mills of the country. The Order cited no specific statutory authorization, but invoked generally the powers vested in the President by the Const.i.tution and laws of the United States. Secretary Sawyer forthwith issued an order seizing the mills and directing their presidents to operate them as operating managers for the United States in accordance with his regulations and directions. The President promptly reported these events to Congress, conceding Congress"s power to supersede his Order; but Congress failed to do anything about the matter either then or a fortnight later, when the President again brought up the subject in a special message.[422] It had in fact provided other methods of dealing with such situations, in the elaboration of which it had declined repeatedly to authorize governmental seizures of property to settle labor disputes. The steel companies sued the Secretary in a federal district court, praying for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, which the court of appeals stayed.[423] On certiorari to the court of appeals, the district court"s order was affirmed by the Supreme Court by a vote of six justices to three.
Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, and Burton formally concurred. Justice Clark expressly limited his concurrence to the judgment of the Court.
All these Justices presented what are termed "concurring" opinions. The Chief Justice, speaking for himself and Justices Reed and Minton, presented a dissenting opinion.
The Doctrine of the Opinion of the Court
The chief points urged in the Black opinion are the following: There was no statute which expressly or impliedly authorized the President to take possession of the property involved. On the contrary, in its consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress refused to authorize governmental seizures of property as a method of preventing work stoppages and settling labor disputes. Authority to issue such an order in the circ.u.mstances of the case was not deducible from the aggregate of the President"s executive powers under Article II of the Const.i.tution; nor was the Order maintainable as an exercise of the President"s powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The power sought to be exercised was the lawmaking power, which the Const.i.tution vests in the Congress alone. Even if it were true that other Presidents have taken possession of private business enterprises without congressional authority in order to settle labor disputes, Congress was not thereby divested of its exclusive const.i.tutional authority to make the laws necessary and proper to carry out all powers vested by the Const.i.tution "in the Government of the United States, or any Department or Officer thereof."[424]
The Factual Record
The pivotal proposition of the opinion is, in brief, that inasmuch as Congress could have ordered the seizure of the steel mills, the President had no power to do so without prior congressional authorization. To support this position no proof is offered in the way of past opinion, and the following extract from Justice Clark"s opinion presents a formidable challenge to it: "One of this Court"s first p.r.o.nouncements upon the powers of the President under the Const.i.tution was made by Mr. Chief Justice John Marshall some one hundred and fifty years ago. In Little _v._ Barreme,[425] he used this characteristically clear language in discussing the power of the President to instruct the seizure of the _Flying Fish_, a vessel bound from a French port: "It is by no means clear that the president of the United States whose high duty it is to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," and who is commander in chief of the armies and navies of the United States, might not, without any special authority for that purpose, in the then existing state of things, have empowered the officers commanding the armed vessels of the United States, to seize and send into port for adjudication, American vessels which were forfeited by being engaged in this illicit commerce. But when it is observed that [an act of Congress]
gives a special authority to seize on the high seas, and limits that authority to the seizure of vessels bound or sailing to a French port, the legislature seems to have prescribed that the manner in which this law shall be carried into execution, was to exclude a seizure of any vessel not bound to a French port." Accordingly, a unanimous Court held that the President"s instructions had been issued without authority and that they could not "legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a plain trespa.s.s." I know of no subsequent holding of this Court to the contrary."[426]
Another field which the President and Congress have each occupied at different times is extradition. In 1799 President Adams, in order to execute the extradition provisions of the Jay Treaty, issued a warrant for the arrest of one Jonathan Robbins. As Chief Justice Vinson recites in his opinion: "This action was challenged in Congress on the ground that no specific statute prescribed the method to be used in executing the treaty. John Marshall, then a member of the House of Representatives, in the course of his successful defense of the President"s action, said: "Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode, and Congress may devolve on others the whole execution of the contract; but, till this be done, it seems the duty of the Executive department to execute the contract by any means it possesses.""[427] In 1848 Congress enacted a statute governing this subject which confers upon the courts, both State and Federal, the duty of handling extradition cases.[428]
The first Neutrality Proclamation was issued by President Washington in 1793 without congressional authorization.[429] The following year Congress enacted the first neutrality statute,[430] and since then proclamations of neutrality have been based on an act of Congress governing the matter. The President may, in the absence of legislation by Congress, control the landing of foreign cables in the United States and the pa.s.sage of foreign troops through American territory, and has done so repeatedly.[431] Likewise, until Congress acts, he may govern conquered territory[432] and, "in the absence of attempts by Congress to limit his power," may set up military commissions in territory occupied by the armed forces of the United States.[433] He may determine, in a way to bind the courts, whether a treaty is still in force as law of the land, although again the final power in the field rests with Congress.[434] One of the President"s most ordinary powers and duties is that of ordering the prosecution of supposed offenders against the laws of the United States. Yet Congress may do the same thing.[435] On September 22, 1862, President Lincoln issued a proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus throughout the Union in certain cla.s.ses of cases. By an act pa.s.sed March 3, 1863, Congress ratified this action of the President and at the same time brought the whole subject of military arrests in the United States under legal control.[436] Conversely, when President Wilson failed in March 1917 to obtain Congress"s consent to his arming American merchant vessels with defensive arms, he went ahead and did it anyway, "fortified not only by the known sentiments of the majority in Congress but also by the advice of his Secretary of State and Attorney General."[437]
On the specific matter of property seizures, Justice Frankfurter"s concurring opinion in the Youngstown Case is accompanied by appendices containing a synoptic a.n.a.lysis of legislation authorizing seizures of industrial property and also a summary of seizures of industrial plants and facilities by Presidents without definite statutory warrant.
Eighteen such statutes are listed, all but the first of which were enacted between 1916 and 1951. Of presidential seizures unsupported by reference to specific statutory authorization, he lists eight as occurring during World War I. To justify these it was deemed sufficient to refer to "the Const.i.tution and laws" generally. For the World War II period he lists eleven seizures in justification of which no statutory authority was cited. The first of these was the seizure of the North American Aviation, Inc., of Englewood, California. In support of this action Attorney General Jackson, as Chief Justice Vinson points out in his dissenting opinion, "vigorously proclaimed that the President had the moral duty to keep this nation"s defense effort a "going concern.""[438] Said the then Attorney General, "The Presidential proclamation rests upon the aggregate of the Presidential powers derived from the Const.i.tution itself and from statutes enacted by the Congress.
The Const.i.tution lays upon the President the duty "to take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Among the laws which he is required to find means to execute are those which direct him to equip an enlarged army, to provide for a strengthened navy, to protect Government property, to protect those who are engaged in carrying out the business of the Government, and to carry out the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act. For the faithful execution of such laws the President has back of him not only each general law-enforcement power conferred by the various acts of Congress but the aggregate of all such laws plus that wide discretion as to method vested in him by the Const.i.tution for the purpose of executing the laws."[439] In the War Labor Disputes Act of June 25, 1943,[440] such seizures were put on a statutory basis. As the Chief Justice points out, the purpose of this measure, as stated by its sponsor, was not to augment presidential power but to "let the country know that the Congress is squarely behind the President."[441]
In United States _v._ Pewee Coal Company, Inc.[442] the Court had before it the claim of a coal mine operator whose property was seized by the President without statutory authorization, "to avert a nation-wide strike of miners." The company brought an action in the Court of Claims to recover under the Fifth Amendment for the total operating losses sustained during the period in which this property was operated by the United States. The Court awarded judgment for $2,241.46 and the Supreme Court sustained this judgment, a result which implied the validity of the seizure.[443] Said Justice Reed, in his concurring opinion of the case: "The relatively new technique of temporary taking by eminent domain is a most useful administrative device: many properties, such as laundries, or coal mines, or railroads, may be subjected to public operation only for a short time to meet war or emergency needs, and can then be returned to their owners." The implications of United States _v._ Pewee Coal Company, Inc.,[444] clearly sustained the Government in Youngstown, a.s.suming that Congress had not acted in the latter case. And one instance of seizure by executive order Justice Frankfurter fails to mention. This was the seizure by President Wilson in the late summer of 1914, following the outbreak of war in Europe, of the Marconi Wireless Station at Siasconset when the Company refused a.s.surance that it would comply with naval censorship regulations. Attorney General Gregory"s justification of this action at the time was quoted on an earlier page.[445]
The doctrine dictated by the above considerations as regards the exercise of executive power in the field of legislative power was well stated by Mr. John W. Davis, princ.i.p.al counsel on the present occasion for the steel companies, in a brief which he filed nearly forty years ago as Solicitor General, in defense of the action of the President in withdrawing certain lands from public entry although his doing so was at the time contrary to express statute. "Ours," the brief reads, "is a self-sufficient Government within its sphere. (Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 395; in re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 578.) "Its means are adequate to its ends" (McCulloch _v._ Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 424), and it is rational to a.s.sume that its active forces will be found equal in most things to the emergencies that confront it. While perfect flexibility is not to be expected in a Government of divided powers, and while division of power is one of the princ.i.p.al features of the Const.i.tution, it is the plain duty of those who are called upon to draw the dividing lines to ascertain the essential, recognize the practical, and avoid a slavish formalism which can only serve to ossify the Government and reduce its efficiency without any compensating good. The function of making laws is peculiar to Congress, and the Executive can not exercise that function to any degree. But this is not to say that all of the _subjects_ concerning which laws might be made are perforce removed from the possibility of Executive influence. The Executive may act upon things and upon men in many relations which have not, though they might have, been actually regulated by Congress. In other words, just as there are fields which are peculiar to Congress and fields which are peculiar to the Executive, so there are fields which are common to both, in the sense that the Executive may move within them until they shall have been occupied by legislative action. These are not the fields of legislative prerogative, but fields within which the lawmaking power may enter and dominate whenever it chooses. This situation results from the fact that the President is the active agent, not of Congress, but of the Nation. As such he performs the duties which the Const.i.tution lays upon him immediately, and as such, also, he executes the laws and regulations adopted by Congress. He is the agent of the people of the United States, deriving all his powers from them and responsible directly to them. In no sense is he the agent of Congress. He obeys and executes the laws of Congress, not because Congress is enthroned in authority over him, but because the Const.i.tution directs him to do so. Therefore it follows that in ways short of making laws or disobeying them, the Executive may be under a grave const.i.tutional duty to act for the national protection in situations not covered by the acts of Congress, and in which, even, it may not be said that his action is the direct expression of any particular one of the independent powers which are granted to him specifically by the Const.i.tution. Instances wherein the President has felt and fulfilled such a duty have not been rare in our history, though, being for the public benefit and approved by all, his acts have seldom been challenged in the courts."[446]
Concurring Opinions
Justice Frankfurter begins the material part of his opinion with the statement: "We must * * * put to one side consideration of what powers the President would have had if there had been no legislation whatever bearing on the authority a.s.serted by the seizure, or if the seizure had been only for a short, explicitly temporary period, to be terminated automatically unless Congressional approval were given."[447] He then enters upon a review of the proceedings of Congress which attended the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, and concludes that "Congress has expressed its will to withhold this power [of seizure] from the President as though it had said so in so many words."[448]
Justice Douglas"s contribution consists in the argument that: "The branch of government that has the power to pay compensation for a seizure is the only one able to authorize a seizure or make lawful one that the President has effected. That seems to me to be the necessary result of the condemnation provision in the Fifth Amendment."[449] This contention overlooks such cases as Mitch.e.l.l _v._ Harmony;[450] United States _v._ Russell;[451] Portsmouth Harbor Land and Hotel Co. _v._ United States;[452] and United States _v._ Pewee Coal Co.;[453] in all of which a right of compensation was recognized to exist in consequence of damage to property which resulted from acts stemming ultimately from const.i.tutional powers of the President. In United States _v._ Pink,[454]
Justice Douglas quotes with approval the following words from the Federalist,[455] "all const.i.tutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial branch, have as much validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature." If this is so as to treaty obligations, then all the more must it be true of obligations which are based directly on the Const.i.tution.[456]
Justice Jackson"s opinion contains little that is of direct pertinence to the const.i.tutional issue. Important, however, is his contention, which, seems to align him with Justice Frankfurter, that Congress had "not left seizure of private property an open field but has covered it by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure"; from which he concludes that "* * * we can sustain the President only by holding that seizure of such strike-bound industries is within his domain and beyond control by Congress."[457] The opinion concludes: "In view of the ease, expedition and safety with which Congress can grant and has granted large emergency powers, certainly ample to embrace this crisis, I am quite unimpressed with the argument that we should affirm possession of them without statute. Such power either has no beginning or it has no end. If it exists, it need submit to no legal restraint. I am not alarmed that it would plunge us straightway into dictatorship, but it is at least a step in that wrong direction. * * * But I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems. A crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges Congress. If not good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that "The tools belong to the man who can use them." We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers."[458]
Justice Burton, referring to the Taft-Hartley Act, says: "* * * the most significant feature of that Act is its omission of authority to seize,"
citing debate on the measure.[459] "In the case before us, Congress authorized a procedure which the President declined to follow."[460]
Justice Clark bases his position directly upon Chief Justice Marshall"s opinion in Little _v._ Barreme.[461] He says: "I conclude that where Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the President, he must follow these procedures in meeting the crisis; * * * I cannot sustain the seizure in question because here, as in Little _v._ Barreme, Congress had prescribed methods to be followed by the President in meeting the emergency at hand."[462]
His reference is to the Taft-Hartley Act. At the same time he endorses the view, "taught me not only by the decision of Chief Justice Marshall in Little _v._ Barreme, but also by a score of other p.r.o.nouncements of distinguished members of this bench," that "the Const.i.tution does grant to the President extensive authority in times of grave and imperative national emergency."[463]
Dissenting Opinion