The result of this is that MacA. fired off a cable demanding that Willoughby be added to the Albatross list. Then he made a point of mentioning to me that he understands how critical it is that Magic not be compromised, and the necessity for keeping the Albatross list as short as possible. The implication I took was that he really would be happier if Willoughby were kept off the list and rather hoped that I would pa.s.s this on to you.
I"m not sure what his motive is (motives are), but I don"t think they have anything to do with making sure Magic isn"t compromised. Quite possibly, MacA. regards the Albatross list as a prerogative of the emperor, not to be shared with the lesser n.o.bility. He may also be hoping that if you ( "Those b.a.s.t.a.r.ds in Washington" ) refuse to add Willoughby to the Albatross list, it will ensure that Willoughby hates you as much as the emperor himself does.
Personally, I hope that Willoughby is added to the list. It would certainly improve my relationship with him and make my life here in the palace a little easier. But that"s not a recommendation. Magic is so important that I refuse to recommend anything that might pose any risk whatever that would compromise it.
Tangentially, I do not receive copies of Magic messages reaching here. I don"t have any place to store them, for one thing. I don"t even have an office, much less a secretary with the appropriate security clearances to log cla.s.sified material in and out. There are four people here (in addition to MacA. and me) on the Albatross list. They are all Army Signal Corps people: the Chief of Cryptographic Services, a captain; and two cryptographers, both sergeants. There is also a Lieutenant Hon, a Korean (U.S. citizen, MIT "38) who speaks fluent j.a.panese. He is often able to make subtle changes in interpretation of the translations made at Pearl.
When a Magic comes in, the captain calls me. I go to the crypto room and read it there. Lieutenant Hon hand-carries the Magics to MacA., together with his interpretation of any portion of them that differs from what we get from Pearl. MacA. stops whatever else he is doing and reads them-or, I should say, commits them to his really incredible memory. The paper itself is then returned to the crypto safe. Only twice to my knowledge has MacA. ever sent for one of them to look at again.
On the subject of the Albatross/Magic list: I would like permission to make Major Ed Banning privy to Magic messages. He has managed to establish himself with the Australian Coast.w.a.tchers. He speaks j.a.panese, and has, I think, an insight into the way the j.a.panese military think. I have the feeling that with input both from the Australians and the Magic intercepts, he could come up with a.n.a.lyses that might elude other people-of whom I"m certainly one. He already knows a good deal about Albatross/Magic, and I can"t see where my giving him access to the intercepts themselves increases the risk of compromising Magic much-if at all. I would appreciate a radio reply to this: "yes" or "no" would suffice.
Finally, turning to the Battle of Midway: We had been getting some rather strong indications of the j.a.panese intentions throughout May-not only from Magic-and MacA. had decided that it was the j.a.panese plan to attack Midway, as a steppingstone to Hawaii.
I asked MacA. what he thought the American reaction to the loss of Hawaii would be. He said that it might wake the American people up to the idea that basic American interests are in the Pacific, not in Europe; but that if it fell, which he couldn"t imagine, American influence in the Pacific would be lost in our lifetimes, perhaps forever. Then he added that a year ago he would have been unable to accept the thought that the American people would stand for the reinforcement of England, knowing that it would mean the loss of the Philippines.
MacA. expected that Admiral Yamamoto, for whom he has great professional admiration, would launch either a two-p.r.o.nged attack, with one element attacking Midway, or a diversionary feint coinciding with an attack on Midway. He would not have been surprised if there had been a second attack (or a feint) at Port Moresby.
MacA. reasoned that the j.a.panese loss of the carrier Shoho and the turning of the Port Moresby invasion force in early May had been the first time we"d actually been able to give the j.a.panese a b.l.o.o.d.y nose. For the first time, they had been kept from doing what they had started out to do. Their admirals had lost face. But now they"d had a month to regroup, lick their wounds, and prepare to strike again. They could regain face by taking Port Moresby, and that would have put their Isolate Australia plan back on track.
He was surprised when the Magic messages began to suggest an attack on the Aleutians. He grilled me at length about the Aleutians, whether there was something there he hadn"t heard about. He simply cannot believe the j.a.panese want to invade Alaska. What could they get out of Alaska that would be worth the logistical cost of landing there? MacA. asks. Their supply lines would not only be painfully long, but would be set up like a shooting gallery for interdiction from the United States and Canada.
He therefore concluded that the attack on the Aleutians, which came on June 3, was a feint intended to draw our Naval forces off; that the j.a.ps believe that the Americans would place a greater emotional value on the Aleutians than was the case; and that we would rise to the bait. MacA. predicted this would be a miscalculation on their part.
"Nimitz is no fool!" he said. "He doesn"t care about the Aleutians. "
Events, of course, proved him right. We learned from Magic intercepts that Admiral Nagumo (and thus the entire j.a.panese fleet) was very surprised on 4 June, when his reconnaissance aircraft reported seeing a large American Naval force to the northeast of Midway.
We later learned-from Magic!-that these were the aircraft carriers Yorktown , Enterprise, and Hornet, under Admirals Spruance and Fletcher. We were getting our information about the movements of our own fleet from j.a.panese intercepts, via Hawaii, before we were getting reports from the Navy. MacA. is convinced, in the absence of any other reason to the contrary, that the Navy believes that the war in the Pacific is a Navy war, and consequently they have no obligation to tell him what"s happening.
I have a recommendation here: I strongly recommend that you direct Nimitz (or have King direct Nimitz) to a.s.sign one commander or captain the sole duty of keeping MacA. posted on what"s going on while it"s happening-not just when the Navy finds it convenient to tell him.
We learned (again via Magic intercepts) that the j.a.panese came under attack by torpedo bombers at 0930 4 June. The aircraft carriers Hiryu, Kaga, Soryu, and Akagi all reported to Yamamoto that they were relatively unhurt, and that the American losses were severe. Then came a report from Hirvu, saying she had been severely damaged by American dive bombers . Nothing was intercepted from any of the others.
Then there were Magic intercepts of Yamamoto"s orders to the fleet to withdraw.
And then, many hours later, we heard from the Navy, and learned that the carriers Sorvu. Kacra. and Akagi had been sunk, and that we had lost the carrier Yorktown. It was a day later that we learned that the Hirvu was sunk that next morning, and about the terrible losses and incredible courage of the Navy torpedo bomber pilots who had attacked the j.a.panese carriers. And that Marine Fighter Squadron VMF-211, land-based on Midway, had lost fifteen of its twenty-five pilots; in effect it had been wiped out.
The j.a.panese seem to have suffered more than just their first beating; it was also a very bad mauling. And MacA. sent what I thought were rather touching messages to Nimitz, Spruance, and Fletcher, expressing his admiration and congratulations.
And today he sent a long cable to Marshall, asking permission to attack New Britain and New Ireland (in other words, to take out the j.a.panese base at Rabaul) with the U.S. 32nd and 41st Divisions and the Australian 7th Division. To do so would mean that the Navy would have to provide him both with vessels capable of making and supporting an amphibious invasion, and with aircraft carriers. I don" t think he really expects the Navy to give him what he asks for. But not to ask for the operation-indeed fight for it, and the necessary support for it from the Navy-would be tantamount to giving in to the notion that the Navy owns the war over here.
I won" t presume to suggest who is right, but I frankly think it is a tragedy that the Army and the Navy should be at each other"s throats like this.
I mentioned earlier on in this report that Banning has developed a good relationship with the Australian Coast.w.a.tchers. Early this morning, the RAAF parachuted two Marines, a lieutenant and a sergeant, and a replacement radio, onto Buka Island, north of Bougainville, where the Coast.w.a.tcher"s radio had gone out. Loss of reports from the observation post was so critical that great risks to get it up and running again were considered justified. The only qualified (radio operator, parachutist) Marine was eighteen years old. And that is all he can do. He can"t tell one j.a.panese aircraft from another, or a destroyer from a battleship. So one of Banning"s lieutenants, Joe Howard, a Mustang, who had taught aircraft/ship recognition, volunteered to parachute in, too, although he had never jumped before. Banning confided to me that he thought he had one chance in four or five of making a successful landing.
The Lockheed Hudson that was to drop them was never heard from. We took the worst-possible-case scenario, and decided it had been shot down by j.a.panese fighters on the way in and that everyone was lost. Banning immediately asked for volunteers to try it again. All of his men volunteered.
As I was writing this, Banning came in with the news that Buka was back on the air. The Lockheed had been shot down on the way home. With contact reestablished, the RAN people here had routinely asked for "traffic." This is what they got, verbatim: "Please pa.s.s Ensign Barbara Cotter, USNR, and Yeoman Daphne Farnsworth, RAN. We love you and hope to see you soon. Joe and Steve. "
Those boys obviously think we"re going to win the war. Maybe, Frank, if we can get the admirals and the generals to stop acting like adolescents, we can.
Respectfully, Fleming Pickering, Captain USNR TOP SECRET.
(Six) Menzies Hotel Melbourne, Victoria 16 June 1942 Lieutenant Hon Song Do, Signal Corps, Army of the United States, was sitting in one of the chairs lining the hotel corridor when Captain Fleming Pickering, USNR, stepped off the elevator. Captain Pickering had just finished dining, enfamille, with the Commander-in-Chief and Mrs. Douglas MacArthur. Over cognac afterward, General MacArthur had talked at some length about the German campaign in Russia. The dissertation had again impressed Captain Pickering with the incredible scope of MacArthur"s mind; and the four snifters of Remy Martin had left him feeling just a little bit tight.
"Well, h.e.l.lo, Lieutenant," Pickering said when he saw Lieutenant Hon. Hon sometimes made him feel slightly ill at ease. For one thing, he didn"t know what to call him. Something in his mind told him that "Hon" was, in the American sense, his last name. He could not, in other words, do what he had long ago learned how to do with other junior officers; he couldn"t put him at ease by calling him by his first name, or even better, by his nickname. He simply didn"t know what it was.
And Lieutenant Hon was not what ordinarily came to Pickering"s mind when "Asian-American" or "Korean-American" was mentioned. For one thing, he was a very large man, nearly as tall and heavy as Pickering; and for another, he had a deep voice with a thick Boston accent. And on top of this, he was what Pickering thought of as an egghead. He was a theoretical mathematician. He had been commissioned as a mathematician, and he"d originally been a.s.signed to Signal Intelligence as a mathematician. Only afterward had the Army learned that he was a j.a.panese linguist.
"Good evening, Sir," Lieutenant Hon said, rising to his feet. "I have a rather interesting decrypt for you, Sir."
"Why didn"t you bring it downstairs?"
"I didn"t think it was quite important enough for me to have to intrude on the Commander-in-Chief s dinner."
Pickering looked at him. There was a smile in Lieutenant Hon"s eyes.
"Well, come on in, and I"ll buy you a drink," Pickering said, then added, "Lieutenant, I think I know you well enough to call you by your first name."
"I wouldn"t do that, Sir," Lieutenant Hon said dryly. " "Do" doesn"t lend itself to English as a first name. Why don"t you call me Pluto?"
"Pluto?"
"Yes, Sir. That"s what I"ve been called for years. After Mickey Mouse"s friend, the dog with the sad face?"
"OK," Pickering chuckled. "Pluto it is."
He snapped the lights on.
"What will you have to drink, Pluto?"
"Is there any of that Old Grouse Scotch, Sir?"
"Should be several bottles of it. Why don"t you give me the decrypt and make us both one? I think there"s a can of peanuts in the drawer under the bar, too. Why don"t you open that?"
"Thank you, Sir," Pluto Hon said, and handed Pickering a sealed manila envelope.
Pickering tore it open. Inside was a TOP SECRET cover sheet, and below that a sheet of typewriter paper.
NOT LOGGED.
ONE COPY ONLY.
DUPLICATION FORBIDDEN.
FOLLOWING IS DECRYPTION OF MSG 234545 RECEIVED 061742.
OFFICE SECNAVY WASHDC 061642 1300 GREENWICH.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.
EYES ONLY CAPTAIN FLEMING PICKERING USNR REF YOUR 8 JUNE 1942 REPORT.
SECNAVY REPLIES QUOTE.
PART ONE YES.
PART TWO YOUR FRIEND BEING INVITED HAWAIIAN PARTY.
PART THREE BEST PERSONAL REGARDS SIGNATURE FRANK.
END QUOTE.
HAUGHTON CAPT USN ADMIN OFF TO SECNAVY.
Pickering walked to the bar. Pluto was just about finished making the drinks.
"A little cryptic, even decrypted, isn"t it?" he said to Pluto, taking the extended drink.
Pluto chuckled. "I don"t think it"s likely, but even if the j.a.ps have broken the Blue Code, their a.n.a.lysts are going to have a h.e.l.l of a time making anything out of that."
"Would you care to guess, Pluto?"
"There was a message from the JCS adding General Willoughby to the Albatross list. Am I getting warm?"
Pickering smiled and nodded.
"I have no idea what "Yes" means," Pluto Hon said..
"I asked for permission to give Major Banning access to Magic intercepts" Pickering said. "What I decide to show him. I didn"t ask that he be put on the Albatross list."
Pluto nodded. "Are you going to want that logged, Sir?"
Pickering shook his head, then took out his cigarette lighter and burned the sheet of typewriter paper, holding it over a wastebasket until it was consumed.
Lieutenant Pluto Hon refused a second drink and left. Pickering went to bed.
In the morning, at breakfast, Major General Willoughby walked over to Captain Pickering"s table in the Menzies Hotel dining room and sat down with him. A large smile was on his face.
"Have you had a chance to read the overnight Magics yet, Pickering?"
"No, Sir," Captain Pickering said.
"You should have a look. Very interesting."
General Willoughby looked very pleased with himself.
(Seven) The Elms Dandenong, Victoria, Australia 1825 Hours 1 July 1942 It was windy; and there was a cold and unpleasant rain. As Captain Fleming Pickering drove the drop-head Jaguar coupe under the arch of winter-denuded elms toward the house, he was thinking unkind thoughts about the British.
As cold as it gets in England, and as much as this car must have cost, it would seem reasonable to expect that the windshield wipers would work, and the heater, and that the G.o.dd.a.m.ned top wouldn"t leak.
As he neared the house and saw Banning"s Studebaker, his mind turned to unkind thoughts about Major Ed Banning, USMC.
He didn"t know what he was doing here, except that he would be meeting "a friend" and somebody else Banning wanted to introduce him to. Banning, on the telephone, acted as if he was sure the line was tapped by the j.a.panese, even if all he was discussing was G.o.dd.a.m.ned dinner. No details. Just cryptic euphemisms.
And I will bet ten dollars to a doughnut that both "a friend" and "somebody else" are going to be people I would rather not see.
He got out of the car and ran through the drizzle up onto the porch.
Mrs. Cavendish answered his ring with a warm smile.
"Oh, good evening, Captain," she said. "How are you tonight?"
"Wet and miserable, Mrs. Cavendish, how about you?"
She laughed. "A little nip will fix you right up," she said. "The other gentlemen are in the library."
I had no right to snap at her, and no reason to be annoyed with Banning. For all I know the G.o.dd.a.m.ned phone is tapped. Maybe by Willoughby. And it is absurd to fault an intelligence officer for having a closed mouth. You are acting like a curmudgeonly old man. Or perhaps a younger man, suffering from s.e.xual deprivation.
The latter thought, he realized, had been triggered by the perversity of his recent erotic dreams. He had had four of them over not too many more nights than that. Only one had involved the female he was joined with in holy matrimony. A second had involved a complete stranger who had, in his dream, exposed her b.r.e.a.s.t.s to him in a Menzies Hotel elevator, then made her desires known with a lewd wink. The other two had been nearly identical: Ellen Feller had stood at the side of his bed, undressed slowly, and then mounted him.
"I didn"t mean to snap at you, Mrs. Cavendish," Pickering said.
"I didn"t know that you had," she said, smiling, as she took his coat.
He walked down the corridor to the library and pushed the door open.
"I will be d.a.m.ned," he said, smiling. It really was a friend. "How are you, Jake?"
Major Jake Dillon, USMC, crossed the room to him, smiling, shook his hand, and then hugged him.
"You should be ashamed of yourself," Dillon said. "Patricia"s sitting at home knitting scarfs and gloves for you, imagining you living in some leaking tent; and here you are, living like the landed gentry-even including a Jaguar."
"If I detect a broad suggestion of jealousy, I"m glad," Pickering said. "I see you"re already into my booze."
"Banning took care of that, after I told him how dry it was all the way from the States to Wellington, New Zealand."
"That was probably good for you. I"m sure you hadn"t been sober that long in years. You came with the 1st Division?" Headquarters, 1st Marine Division, and the entire 5th Marines had debarked at Wellington, New Zealand, on June 14, 1942.