"Aye, aye, Sir," Captain Steward said. "In late April, Sir, we learned, from Albatross intercepts, details of j.a.panese plans to take Midway Island, and from there to threaten Hawaii, with the ultimate ambition of taking Hawaii, which would both deny us that forward port and logistic facility and permit them to threaten the West Coast of the United States and the Aleutian Islands.
"Secondly, they planned to invest Port Moresby, on the tip of Eastern New Guinea. From Port Moresby they could threaten the Australian continent and extend their area of influence into the Solomon Islands. If they succeed in this intention, land-based aircraft in the Solomons could effectively interdict our supply lines to Australia and New Zealand."
I"ve heard all this before, and I"m tired. But I"m not going to jump on this hardworking kid because I"m grouchy when I"m tired.
"Via Albatross intercepts we learned that there would be two j.a.panese naval forces. Vice-Admiral Takeo Takagi sailed from the j.a.panese naval base at Truk in command of the carrier striking force, the carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku, which represented a total of 125 aircraft, and its screening force.
"The second j.a.panese force, under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye, and sailing from their base at Rabaul on New Britain, included the carrier Shoho and several cruisers, transports, and oilers.
"On 3 May, elements of this second force, which had apparently sailed from Rabaul several days earlier, landed on Tulagi, a small island here in the Solomons"-Steward pointed with what looked like an orchestra leader"s baton-"approximately equidistant between the three larger islands of Santa Isabel, Malaita, and Guadalca.n.a.l. They immediately began to construct a seaplane base.
"Based on the Albatross intercepts, Admiral Nimitz ordered Task Force 17, with Admiral Fletcher flying his flag aboard the carrier Yorktown, into the area. At the same time, Admiral Nimitz ordered Task Force 11, with Admiral Fitch flying his flag aboard the carrier Lexington, and Task Force 44, a mixed force of U.S. and Australian cruisers, under Admiral Crace, to join up with Task Force 11.
"Admiral Fletcher ordered a strike on the j.a.panese invasion force on Tulagi, which was carried out at 0630 hours 6 May. The after-action reports on the success of that attack, which are in the folder marked "Tulagi," have had to be revised."
"What the h.e.l.l does that mean?" the Commandant asked sharply.
"Sir, there are Australian Coast.w.a.tchers on Tulagi. Their radioed reports of the damage inflicted differed from that of the personnel involved in the attack. Admiral Nimitz feels that inasmuch as the Coast.w.a.tchers are on Tulagi, theirs are the more credible reports."
"In other words," the Commandant said angrily, "the flyboys let their imaginations run wild again, but the Coast.w.a.tchers produced the facts."
"Yes, Sir," Captain Steward said uncomfortably.
"Nothing personal, Doc," the Commandant said.
"I know why it happens, Sir," Mclnerney said evenly. "But that doesn"t excuse it."
"Why does it happen? I"m really curious, Doc."
"I think it has to do with movement, Sir. Perspective. Two, or three, or four pilots report, honestly, what they have seen. But because they are looking at what they all see from different places, both in terms of alt.i.tude and direction, no two descriptions match. For example, one aircraft shot down, or one seaplane destroyed in the water, becomes three airplanes shot down, or four seaplanes destroyed, because there are four different reports from people who are, in fact, reporting honestly what they saw. You need a pretty good G-2 debriefing team to separate the facts. Or consolidate them."
The Commandant grunted. "Bad intelligence is worse than no intelligence."
"I agree, Sir," Mclnerney said.
"We sent a special unit over there to work with the Coast.w.a.tchers," the Commandant said. "Did you know about that?"
"Yes, Sir."
"Is that going to help this, do you think?"
"Sir, I don"t think it"s possible to overstate the value of the Coast.w.a.tchers. They will get us, quickly, valid intelligence from the islands, particularly about j.a.panese air activity, but also of course about ship movement. If we know as soon as it happens what the j.a.panese are launching against us, what type of aircraft, and how many, we can launch our own aircraft in time to have them in the air when and where it is to our advantage. As opposed to detecting the enemy with patrolling aircraft, or worse, learning about the attack only when it begins, which catches us on the ground. Or when we"re in the air almost out of fuel."
The Commandant grunted.
"I recommended to General Forrest," Mclnerney went on, "that he-we-should do whatever it takes, whatever it costs, to get our people tied in to the Coast.w.a.tchers. And I want some of our own people as quickly as possible to get onto the islands as Coast.w.a.tchers. I think I was preaching to the convinced, but he said he intended to do just that. But if you were asking, Sir, whether it will do anything about the confusing reports we get from pilots, I don"t think so. We"re just going to have to work on that. It"s inexperience, Sir, rather than dishonesty."
"I didn"t mean to insult your people, Doc. You know that."
"Yes, Sir."
"OK, Stew. Pardon the interruption."
"After the attack on Tulagi, Sir, Task Force 17 moved south to join up with Task Forces 11 and 14. They did so at 0930 6 May, and together steamed westward to intercept the Port Moresby invasion force.
"At 1030 hours, 6 May, Army Air Force B-17 aircraft from Australia bombed the carrier Shoho and her covering force, apparently without effect.
"The next day, 7 May, at 1135 hours, aircraft from the Lexington spotted the Shoho again. They attacked and sank her. Three of Lady Lex"s aircraft were lost in the attack."
"But they got the j.a.p carrier? That wasn"t one of these perception problems General Mclnerney is talking about?"
"No, Sir. In addition to the pilot"s after-action reports, there has been confirmation of the loss via Albatross intercepts."
"OK. Go on."
"At noon, 7 May, j.a.panese bombers and torpedo bombers flying off Admiral Takagi"s carriers, the Zuikaku and Shokaku, found the fleet oiler Neosho, escorted by the destroyer Sims. The Sims was sunk and the Neosho damaged. The last word on that is that she will probably have to be scuttled.
"Just before noon the next day, j.a.panese aircraft from Admiral Tagaki"s carriers attacked the combined Task Force. Both Yorktown and Lexington were damaged. Yorktown"s damage was minimal, but Lexington was badly damaged, and she was scuttled at 1956 hours 8 May."
"d.a.m.n!" the Commandant said.
"At that point, Admiral Nimitz ordered Task Forces 11 and 17 to withdraw to the south. Task Force 44, the cruiser force, steamed westward to intercept the Port Moresby invasion force.
"By that time, Albatross intercepts indicated that Admiral Inouye had called off "Operation Mo," which was the Port Moresby invasion, but inasmuch as this information could not be made available to Admiral Crace, his Task Force patrolled the Coral Sea south of New Guinea until word from the Coast.w.a.tchers confirmed the withdrawal of the j.a.panese invasion force."
"That"s it, then, Stew?" the Commandant asked.
"Sir, the radio messages are in the folders, and I have precise maps-"
"No, thank you. That was first-cla.s.s, Stew. I know how hard you had to work to get that up in the time you had. I appreciate it."
Captain Steward beamed.
"My pleasure, Sir," he said.
"Now go get some sleep," the Commandant said. "And you too, Bob," he added to his aide. "I"m going to have a quick drink with General Mclnerney and then hit the sheets myself."
The Commandant waited until Captain Steward and his aide had gathered up all the briefing material before speaking.
"Was it worth it, Doc? One of our carriers for one of theirs?"
"Probably not," Mclnerney said, after a moment"s thought. "They have more carriers to lose than we do. But if it-and it looks like it did-if it called off, or even delayed for any appreciable time, their invasion of Port Moresby, then it was. If they had taken Moresby, I don"t think we could have held Australia."
"You don"t think they"ll be back?"
"I think they will. But we"ve bought some time. What worries me is that seaplane base on that island-what was it?-Tulagi. If they get a decent air base going in that area, we"re in deep trouble as far as our shipping lanes are concerned. We"re going to have to do something about that."
"Such as?"
"Maybe take one of the other islands and put a dirt-strip fighter base on it."
"With what? We don"t have anything over there. My G.o.d, we couldn"t even hang on to Corregidor."
Three days earlier, on May 6, Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright, USA, had surrendered the fortress of Corregidor, in Manila Bay, to the j.a.panese.
"I know."
"That"s the first time a Marine regiment ever had to surrender," the Commandant said. "Ever!"
"They were ordered to surrender, Sir, by the Army."
"That"s a lot of consolation, isn"t it?"
The Commandant walked to the whiskey tray and poured himself a drink. He held up the bottle to Mclnerney, who shook his head no and said, "No, thank you, Sir."
"What"s on your mind, Doc?" the Commandant asked.
"General, I"m really desperate for qualified fighter squadron commanders."
"I"ll bet if Al Vandergrift was here, he would say, "I"m really desperate for qualified company commanders.""
Major General Alexander Vandergrift commanded the 1st Marine Division, which consisted of the 1st and 5th Marines, plus the 11th Marines, Artillery, and which had just been brought up to war strength on May 1 at New River, North Carolina.
"Sir, I have one Naval Aviation Pilot, Technical Sergeant Galloway, who is qualified by both experience and temperament to command a fighter squadron. I would like to commission him and give him one."
The Commandant flashed him an icy stare. "Galloway? That"s the young buck who flew the Wildcat onto the carrier of Pearl and enraged the Navy? I"m still hearing about that. Whenever the Navy wants an example of irrational Marine behavior, they bring up Sergeant Galloway"s flight onto the Saratoga."
"Yes, Sir."
"You ever hear the story, Doc, of General Jubal T. Early in the Civil War? Somebody sent him a plan he turned down. So this staff officer sent it back, respectfully requesting that the commanding general reconsider his previous decision. Early sent that back, too, after he wrote on it, "G.o.ddammit, I already told you "no." I ain"t gonna tell you again.""
"Yes, Sir."
The Commandant looked at him thoughtfully, even disbelievingly.
"That"s the only reason you came here tonight? You sat out there on the porch for hours, waiting for me to come home just to ask me to do something you knew d.a.m.ned well I wouldn"t do?"
"Sergeant Galloway got a raw deal, Sir. And I need squadron commanders."
"Loyalty to your men is commendable, General," the Commandant said, "but there is a point beyond which it becomes counterproductive." "Yes, Sir."
"And G.o.ddammit, Doc," the Commandant said, warming to his subject, "I"m disappointed that you don"t know what that point is."
Well, I tried, Mclnerney thought. And really p.i.s.sed him off. I wonder what that"s going to cost Marine Aviation somewhere down the pike?
He set his gla.s.s on the table. "With your permission, Sir, I"ll take my leave." The Commandant glowered at him.
"Keep your seat, and finish your drink, you hard-headed Scotchman," he said. "I can"t afford to lose any more old friends."
(Three) Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Parachute School Lakehurst Naval Air Station Lakehurst, New Jersey 15 May 1942 First Lieutenant Richard B. Macklin, USMC, heard the knock at the jamb of his open office door, and then his peripheral vision picked up First Sergeant George J. Hammersmith standing there with a sheet of teletype paper in his hand.
Macklin did not raise his eyes from the papers on his desk. First Things First made sense. If you interrupted your work every time someone appeared at your door, you never got anything done. And he certainly didn"t want Sergeant Hammersmith to form the opinion, as so many old Marines did, that a commanding officer had nothing to do but sit behind a desk and wait for payday while the sergeants ran the Corps.
He finished what he was doing, which was to consider a request from the Navy Commander of Lakehurst that he permanently detail two enlisted men a day to work with the Base Engineer on roads and grounds. He decided against it; Para-Marines had more important things to do than pick up trash and cut weeds. Then he raised his head.
"You wish something, First Sergeant?"
"Got a TWX here, Sir, I thought you"d want to see right away."
Macklin made an impatient gesture for Hammersmith to give him the sheet of teletype paper. He judged in advance that the message would probably be of little genuine importance and could just as easily have been sent by mail. In his view, ninety-five percent of TWXs were a waste of time.
He was wrong.
HEADQUARTERS USMC.
WASHDC 0755 15MAY42.
ROUTINE.
COMMANDING OFFICER.
USMC PARACHUTE SCHOOL.
LAKEHURST NAVAL AIR STATION.
LAKEHURST NJ.
1.ON RECEIPT, ISSUE NECESSARY ORDERS DETACHING 1ST LT RICHARD B. MACKLIN, USMC, FROM HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY USMC PARASCHOOL LAKEHURST NAS NJ FOR TRANSFER TO HQ & HQ COMPANY 1ST USMC PARA BN, FLEET MARINE FORCE PACIFIC.
2.LT MACKLIN WILL REPORT TO US NAVAL BASE SAN DIEGO CAL NOT LATER THAN 2400 HOURS 30 MAY 1942 FOR FURTHER SHIPMENT TO FINAL DESTINATION. TRAVEL BY FIRST AVAILABLE MIL AND/OR CIV RAIL, AIR, OR MOTOR TRANSPORTATION TO SAN DIEGO IS AUTHORIZED. TRAVEL BEYOND SAN DIEGO WILL BE BY US GOVT SEA OR AIR TRANSPORT, PRIORITY BBBB2B.
3.TIME PERMITTING LT MACKLIN IS AUTHORIZED NO MORE THAN SEVEN (7) DAYS DELAY EN ROUTE OVERSEAS LEAVE.
4.LT MACKLIN WILL COMPLY WITH ALL APPLICABLE REGULATIONS CONCERNING OVERSEAS TRANSFER BEFORE DEPARTING LAKEHURST. STORAGE OF PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND ONE (1) PRIVATELY.
OWNED AUTOMOBILE AT GOVT EXPENSE IS AUTHORIZED.
5.HEADQUARTERS USMC (ATTN: PERS/23/A/11) WILL BE NOTIFIED BY TWX OF DATE OF LT MACKLIN"S.
DEPARTURE.