The crew of the Prize remained quietly hidden at their concealed guns throughout this punishment, which continued for forty minutes as the submarine closed, coming up from right astern, a position no doubt which she considered one of safety. When close to she sheered off and pa.s.sed to the port beam at a distance of about one hundred yards. At this moment Lieutenant Sanders gave the order for "action." The guns were exposed and a devastating fire opened at point blank range, but not before the submarine had fired both her guns, obtaining two more hits, and wounding several of the crew of the Prize. The first sh.e.l.l fired from the Prize hit the foremost gun of the submarine and blew it overboard, and a later shot knocked away the conning tower. The submarine went ahead and the Prize tried to follow, but the damage to her motor prevented much movement. The firing continued as the submarine moved away, and after an interval she appeared to be on fire and to sink. This occurred shortly after 9.0 P.M., when it was nearly dark. The Prize sent her boats to pick up survivors, three being taken out of the water, including the commander and one other officer. The prisoners on coming on board expressed their willingness to a.s.sist in taking the Prize into port. It did not at this time seem likely that she would long remain afloat, but by great exertion and good seamanship the leaks were got under to a sufficient extent to allow of the ship being kept afloat by pumping. The prisoners gave considerable help, especially when the ship caught fire whilst starting the motor again. On May 2 she met a motor launch off the coast of Ireland and was towed into port. In spite of the undoubted great damage to the submarine, damage confirmed by the survivors, who were apparently blown overboard with the conning tower, and who had no thought other than that she had been sunk, later intelligence showed that she succeeded in reaching Germany in a very disabled condition. This incident accentuated still further the recurrent difficulty of making definite statements as to the fate of enemy submarines, for the evidence in this case seemed absolutely conclusive. The commander of the submarine was so impressed with the conduct of the crew of the Prize that when examined subsequently in London he stated that he did not consider it any disgrace to have been beaten by her, as he could not have believed it possible for any ship"s company belonging to any nation in the world to have been imbued with such discipline as to stand the sh.e.l.ling to which he subjected the Prize without any sign being made which would give away her true character.
Lieut.-Commander Sanders was awarded the Victoria Cross for his action and many decorations were given to the officers and ship"s company for their conduct in the action. It was sad that so fine a commander and so splendid a ship"s company should have been lost a little later in action with another submarine which she engaged unsuccessfully during daylight, and which followed her in a submerged condition until nightfall and then torpedoed her, all hands being lost.
It was my privilege during my visit to New Zealand in 1919 to unveil a memorial to the gallant Sanders which was placed in his old school at Takapuna, near Auckland.
On June 7, 1917, a decoy ship, the S.S. Pargust, armed with one 4-inch gun, four 12-pounder guns and two torpedo tubes, commanded by Captain Gordon Campbell, R.N., who had meanwhile been awarded the Victoria Cross, was in a position Lat. 51.50 N., Long. 11.50 W., when a torpedo hit the ship abreast the engine-room and in detonating made a hole through which water poured, filling both engine-room and boiler-room. The explosion of the torpedo also blew one of the boats to pieces. The usual procedure of abandoning ship was carried out, and shortly after the boats had left, the periscope of a submarine was sighted steering for the port side. The submarine pa.s.sed close under the stern, steered to the starboard side, then recrossed the stern to the port side, and when she was some fifty yards off on the port beam her conning tower appeared on the surface and she steered to pa.s.s round the stern again and towards one of the ship"s boats on the starboard beam. She then came completely to the surface within one hundred yards, and Captain Campbell disclosed his true character, opened fire with all guns, hitting the submarine at once and continuing to hit her until she sank. One officer and one man were saved. The decoy ship lost one man killed, and one officer was wounded by the explosion of the torpedo.
As in the case of the action on February 17 the distinguishing feature of this exploit was the great restraint shown by Captain Campbell in withholding his fire although his ship was so seriously damaged. The gallantry and fine discipline of the ship"s company, their good shooting and splendid drill, contributed largely to the success. The decoy ship, although seriously damaged, reached harbour.
On July 10, 1917, a decoy ship, H.M.S. Glen, a small schooner with auxiliary power and armed with one 12-pounder and one 6-pounder gun, commanded by Sub-Lieutenant K. Morris, R.N.R., was in a position about forty miles south-west of Weymouth when a submarine was sighted on the surface some three miles away. She closed to within two miles and opened fire on the Glen. The usual practice of abandoning ship was followed, the submarine closing during this operation to within half a mile and remaining at that distance examining the Glen for some time. After about half an hour she went ahead and submerged, and then pa.s.sed round the ship at about 200 yards distance, examining her through the periscope, finally coming to the surface about 50 yards off on the port quarter. Almost immediately she again started to submerge, and fire was at once opened. The submarine was. .h.i.t three or four times before she turned over on her side and disappeared. There was every reason to believe that she had sunk, although no one was on deck when she disappeared. No survivors were rescued.
The feature of this action was again the restraint shown by the commanding officer of the Glen and the excellent discipline of the crew.
On August 8, 1917, the decoy ship H.M.S. Dunraven, in Lat. 48.0 N., Long. 7.37 W., armed with one 4-inch and four 12-pounder guns and two torpedo tubes, commanded by Captain Gordon Campbell, V.C., R.N., sighted a submarine on the surface some distance off. The submarine steered towards the ship and submerged, and soon afterwards came to the surface some two miles off and opened fire. The Dunraven, in her character of a merchant ship, replied with an after gun, firing intentionally short, made a smoke screen, and reduced speed slightly to allow the submarine to close.
When the sh.e.l.ls from the submarine began to fall close to the ship the order to abandon her was given, and, as usual with the splendidly trained ship"s company working under Captain Campbell, the operation was carried out with every appearance of disorder, one of the boats being purposely left hanging vertical with only one end lowered. Meanwhile the submarine closed. Several sh.e.l.ls from her gun hit the after part of the Dunraven, causing a depth charge to explode and setting her on fire aft, blowing the officer in charge of the after gun out of his control station, and wounding severely the seaman stationed at the depth charges. The situation now was that the submarine was pa.s.sing from the port to the starboard quarter, and at any moment the 4-inch magazine and the remaining depth charges in the after part of the Dunraven might be expected to explode. The 4-inch gun"s crew aft knew the imminence of this danger, but not a man moved although the deck beneath them was rapidly becoming red hot; and Captain Campbell was so certain of the magnificent discipline and gallantry of his crew that he still held on so that the submarine might come clearly into view on the starboard side clear of the smoke of the fire aft. In a few minutes the antic.i.p.ated explosion occurred. The 4-inch gun and gun"s crew were blown into the air just too soon for the submarine to be in the best position for being engaged. The explosion itself caused the electrical apparatus to make the "open fire" signal, whereupon the White Ensign was hoisted and the only gun bearing commenced firing; but the submarine submerged at once.
Fifteen minutes later a torpedo hit the ship, and Captain Campbell again ordered "abandon ship" and sent away a second party of men to give the impression that the ship had now been finally abandoned although her true character had been revealed. Meanwhile he had made a wireless signal to other ships to keep away as he still hoped to get the submarine, which, now keeping submerged, moved round the ship for three quarters of an hour, during which period the fire gained on the Dunraven and frequent explosions of ammunition took place.
The submarine then came to the surface right astern where no guns could bear on her, and recommenced her sh.e.l.lfire on the ship, hitting her frequently. During this period the officers and men still remaining on board gave no sign of their presence, Captain Campbell, by his example, imbuing this remnant of his splendid ship"s company with his own indomitable spirit of endurance. The submarine submerged again soon afterwards, and as she pa.s.sed the ship Captain Campbell from his submerged tube fired a torpedo at her, which just missed. Probably the range was too short to allow the torpedo to gain its correct depth. She went right round the ship, and a second torpedo was fired from the other tube, which again missed. This torpedo was evidently seen from the submarine, as she submerged at once. The ship was sinking, and it was obviously of no use to continue the deception, which could only lead to a useless sacrifice of life; wireless signals for a.s.sistance were therefore made, and the arrival of some destroyers brought the action to a conclusion. The wounded were transferred to the destroyers and the ship taken in tow, but she sank whilst in tow forty-eight hours later.
This action was perhaps the finest feat amongst the very many gallant deeds performed by decoy ships during the war. It displayed to the full the qualities of grim determination, gallantry, patience and resource, the splendid training and high standard of discipline, which were necessary to success in this form of warfare. Lieutenant Charles G. Bonner, R.N.R., and Petty-Officer Ernest Pitcher, R.N., were awarded the V.C. for their services in this action, and many medals for conspicuous gallantry were also given to the splendid ship"s company.
Captain Campbell, as will be readily realized, met with great success in his work, and he was the first to acknowledge how this success was due to those who worked so magnificently under his command, and he also realized the magnitude of the work performed by other decoy ships in all areas, since he knew better than most people the difficulties of enticing a submarine to her doom.
On September 17, 1917, in position Lat. 49.42 N., Long. 13.18 W., the decoy ship Stonecrop, a small steamer commanded by Commander M. Blackwood, R.N., armed with one 4-inch, one 6-pounder gun and some stick-bomb throwers and carrying four torpedo tubes, sighted a submarine, which opened fire on her at long range, the fire being returned by the 6-pounder mounted aft. After the sh.e.l.ling had continued for some time the usual order was given to "abandon ship," and a little later the periscope of the submarine was sighted some distance away. The submarine gradually closed, keeping submerged, until within about a quarter of a mile, when she pa.s.sed slowly round the ship, and finally came to the surface at a distance of about 500 yards on the starboard quarter. She did not close nearer, so the order was given to open fire, and hitting started after the third round had been fired and continued until the submarine sank stern first. No survivors were picked up, but all the indications pointed to the certainty of the destruction of the submarine.
PATROL GUNBOATS Mention may here be made of another vessel of a special cla.s.s designed in 1917. In the early summer, in consequence of the shortage of destroyers, of the delays in the production of new ones, and the great need for more small craft suitable for escorting merchant ships through the submarine zone, arrangements were made to build a larger and faster cla.s.s of trawler which would be suitable for convoy work under favourable conditions, and which to a certain extent would take the place of destroyers. Trawlers could be built with much greater rapidity than destroyers, and trawler builders who could not build destroyers could be employed for the work, thus supplementing the activities of the yards which could turn out the bigger craft.
Accordingly a 13-knot trawler was designed, and a large number ordered. Great delays occurred, however, in their construction, as in that of all other cla.s.ses of vessel owing to the pressure of various kinds of war work and other causes, and only one was delivered during 1917 instead of the twenty or so which had been promised, whilst I believe that by July, 1918, not more than fourteen had been completed instead of the antic.i.p.ated number of forty. I was informed that they proved to be a most useful type of vessel for the slower convoys, were excellent sea boats, with a large radius of action, were a great relief to the destroyers, and even to light cruisers, for convoy work. It is understood that some fifty were completed by the end of the war.
NET PROTECTION FOR MERCHANT SHIPS This idea originated in 1915 or 1916 with Captain Edward C. Villiers, of the Actaeon Torpedo School ship. Experiments were carried out by a battleship at Rosyth, in the first instance, and later at Scapa. They were at that time unsuccessful.
At the end of 1916 I gave directions for a reconsideration of the matter, and fresh trials were made; but early in 1917 there seemed to be no prospect of success, and the trials were again abandoned. However, Captain Villiers displayed great confidence in the idea, and he introduced modifications, with the result that later in the year 1917 directions were given for fresh trials to be undertaken. At the end of the year success was first obtained, and this was confirmed early in 1918, and the device finally adopted. A curious experience during the trials was that the vessel carrying them out was actually fired at by a German submarine, with the result that the net protection saved the ship from being torpedoed. It is not often that an inventor receives such a good advertis.e.m.e.nt.
DEPTH CHARGE THROWERS The first proposal for this device came from Portsmouth, where the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville, was indefatigable in his efforts to combat the submarine; throwers manufactured by Messrs. Th.o.r.n.ycroft, of Southampton, were tried and gave good results. The arrangement was one by which depth charges could be projected to a distance of 40 yards from a vessel, and the throwers were usually fitted one on each quarter so that the charges could be thrown out on the quarter whilst others were being dropped over the stern, and the chances of damaging or sinking the submarine attacked were thus greatly increased.
As soon as the earliest machines had been tried orders were placed for large numbers and the supplies obtained were as follows:
Deliveries commenced in July, 1917.
By September 1, 30 had been delivered.
By October 1, 97 had been delivered.
By December 1, 238 had been delivered.
COASTAL MOTOR BOATS At the end of 1916 we possessed 13 fast coastal motor boats, carrying torpedoes, and having a speed of some 36 knots. They had been built to carry out certain operations in the Heligoland Bight, working from Harwich, but the preliminary air reconnaissance which it had been decided was necessary had not been effected by the end of 1916 owing to bad weather and the lack of suitable machines.
When winter set in it became impossible, with the type of aircraft then existing, to carry out the intended reconnaissance, and early in 1917 I abandoned the idea of the operations for the winter and sent the boats to the Dover Command for Sir R. Bacon to use from Dunkirk in operations against enemy vessels operating from Ostend and Zeebrugge. They quickly proved their value, and it became evident that they would also be useful for anti-submarine work. A large number were ordered, some for anti-submarine work and some for certain contemplated operations in enemy waters, including a night attack on the enemy"s light cruisers known to lie occasionally in the Ems River, an operation that it was intended to carry out in the spring of 1918. A daylight operation in this neighbourhood, which was carried out during 1918, did not, from the published reports, meet with success, the coastal motor boats being attacked by aircraft, vessels against which they were defenceless. The new boats were of an improved and larger type than the original 40-feet boats. Delays occurred in construction owing princ.i.p.ally to the difficulty in obtaining engines by reason of the great demand for engines for aircraft, and but few of the new boats were delivered during the year 1917.
MINING OPERATIONS The policy which was carried out during 1917 in this respect, so far as the supply of mines admitted, aimed at preventing the exit of submarines from enemy ports. Incidentally, the fact that we laid large numbers of mines in the Heligoland Bight rendered necessary such extensive sweeping operations before any portion of the High Sea Fleet could put to sea as to be very useful in giving us some indication of any movement that might be intended. In view of the distance of the Grand Fleet from German bases and the short time available in which to intercept the High Sea Fleet if it came out for such a purpose as a raid on our coasts, or on convoys, the information thus gathered would have proved of great value.
In planning mining operations in the Heligoland Bight, it was necessary to take into consideration certain facts. The first was the knowledge that the Germans themselves had laid minefields in some portions of the Bight, and it was necessary for our minelayers to give such suspected areas a wide berth. Secondly, it was obvious that we could not lay minefields in areas very near those which we ourselves had already mined, since we should run the risk of blowing up our own ships with our own mines.
Mining operations had necessarily to be carried out at night, and as there were no navigational aids in the way of lights, etc., in the Heligoland Bight, the position in which our mines were laid was never known with absolute accuracy. Consequently an area in which we had directed mines to be laid, and to which a minelayer had been sent, could not safely be approached within a distance of some five miles on a subsequent occasion.
The use in mining operations of the device known as "taut wire" gear, introduced by Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, was of great help in ensuring accuracy in laying minefields and consequently in reducing the danger distance surrounding our own minefields.
As our mining operations increased in number we were driven farther and farther out from the German ports for subsequent operations. This naturally increased the area to be mined as the Heligoland Bight is bell-mouthed in shape, but it had the advantage of making the operations of German minesweepers and mine-b.u.mpers more difficult and hazardous as they had to work farther out, thus giving our light forces better chances of catching them at work and engaging them. Such actions as that on November 17, 1917, between our light forces and the German light cruisers and minesweepers were the result. We did not, of course, lay mines in either the Danish or Dutch territorial waters, and these waters consequently afforded an exit for German vessels as our minefields became most distant from German bases.
Broadly speaking, the policy was to lay mines so thoroughly in the Heligoland Bight as to force enemy submarines and other vessels to make their exits along the Danish or Dutch coasts in territorial waters.
At the end of the exit we stationed submarines to signal enemy movements and to attack enemy vessels. We knew, of course, that the enemy would sweep other channels for his ships, but as soon as we discovered the position of these channels, which was not a very difficult matter, more mines were laid at the end. In order to give neutrals fair warning, certain areas which included the Heligoland Bight were proclaimed dangerous. In this respect German and British methods may be contrasted: We never laid a minefield which could possibly have been dangerous to neutrals without issuing a warning stating that a certain area (which included the minefield) was dangerous. The Germans never issued such a warning unless the proclamation stating that half the Atlantic Ocean, most of the North Sea, and nine-tenths of the Mediterranean were dangerous could be considered as such. It was also intended, as mines became available, to lay more deep minefields in positions near our own coast in which enemy submarines were known to work; these minefields would be safe for the pa.s.sage of surface vessels, but our patrol craft would force the submarines to dive into them. This system to a certain extent had already been in use during 1915 and 1916.
Schemes were also being devised by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson, who devoted much of his time to mining devices, by which mines some distance below the surface would be exploded by an enemy submarine even if navigating on the surface.
Such was the policy. Its execution was difficult.
The first difficulty lay in the fact that we did not possess a thoroughly satisfactory mine. A percentage only of our mines exploded when hit by a submarine, and they failed sometimes to take up their intended depth when laid, betraying their presence by appearing on the surface.
Energetic measures were adopted to overcome this latter defect, but it took time and but few mines were available for laying in the early months of 1917.
The result of our minelaying efforts is shown in the following table:
Mines laid Deep mines laid Year. in the Heligoland off our own coasts Bight. to catch submarines.
1915 4,498 983 1916 1,679 2,573 First quarter of 1917 4,865 ) Second quarter of 1917 6,386 ) 3,843 Third quarter of 1917 3,510 ) In the Straits of Dover, Thames Estuary and off the Belgian coast we laid 2,664 mines in 1914, 6,337 in 1915, 9,685 in 1916, and 4,669 in the first three quarters of 1917.
These last mines were laid as fast as the alterations, made with a view to increasing their efficiency, could be carried out.
During the early part of the year 1917 the new pattern of mine, known as the "H" Type, evolved in 1916, had been tried, and although not perfectly satisfactory at the first trials, the success was sufficient to warrant the placing of orders for 100,000 mines and in making arrangements for the quickest possible manufacture. This was done by the Director of Torpedoes and Mines, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Edward Fitzherbert, under the direction of the then Fourth Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Lionel Halsey.
Deliveries commenced in the summer of 1917, but by the end of September only a little over 1,500 were ready for laying. Some 500 of these were laid in September in the Heligoland Bight and were immediately successful against enemy submarines. More were laid in the Bight during October, November and December, and the remainder, as they were produced, were prepared for laying in the new minefield in the Straits of Dover. In the fourth quarter of the year a total of 10,389 mines was laid in the Heligoland Bight and in the Straits of Dover.
During this last quarter delivery of "H" pattern mines was as follows: In October 2,350, November 5,300, December 4,800; total 12,450. So that it will be seen that the mines were laid as fast as delivery was made.
The great increase in projected minelaying operations during the year 1917 made it necessary also to add considerably to the number of minelaying vessels.
In January, 1917, the only vessels equipped for this service were four merchant ships and the Flotilla Leader Abdiel, with a total minelaying capacity of some 1,200 mines per trip. It was not advisable to carry out minelaying operations in enemy waters during the period near full moon owing to the liability of the minelayers being seen by patrol craft. Under such conditions the position of the minefield would be known to the enemy. As the operation of placing the mines on board occupied several days, it was not pa.s.sible to depend on an average of more than three operations per ship per month from the larger minelayers. Consequently, with the intended policy in view, it was obvious that more minelayers must be provided.
It was inadvisable to use merchant ships, since every vessel was urgently required for trade or transport purposes, and the alternative was to fit men-of-war for minelaying. The only old vessels of this type suitable for mining in enemy waters were ships of the "Ariadne" cla.s.s, and although their machinery was not too reliable, two of these vessels that were seaworthy were converted to minelayers. In addition a number of the older light cruisers were fitted with portable rails on which mines could be carried when minelaying operations were contemplated, in place of a portion of the armament which could be removed; a flotilla of destroyers, with some further flotilla leaders, were also fitted out as minelayers, and several additional submarines were fitted for this purpose.
For a projected special scheme of minelaying in enemy waters a number of lighters were ordered, and some of the motor launches and coastal motor boats were fitted out and utilized for mining operations on the Belgian coast towards the end of 1917.
By the end of that year 12 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and flotilla leaders and 5 submarines had been fitted for minelaying. Two old cruisers had been added to the minelaying fleet and several other vessels were in hand for the same purpose. The detailed plans of the arrangements were prepared and the work of fitting out minelayers carried out under the supervision of Admiral R.N. Ommanney, C.B., whose services in this matter were of great value. The rapidity with which ships were added to the minelaying fleet was largely due to his efforts.
On the entry of the United States of America into the war a further development of mining policy became feasible. The immense manufacturing resources of the United States rendered a large production of mines an easy matter, with the result that as soon as the United States Navy produced a reliable type of mine the idea of placing a mine barrage across the northern part of the North Sea which had been previously discussed became a matter of practical politics. With this end in view a still further addition to the minelaying fleet became necessary, and since the mining would be carried out at leisure in this case and speed was no great necessity for the minelayer owing to the distance of the minefields from enemy waters, an old battleship was put in hand for conversion.
With the enormous increase in the number of mines on order the problem of storage became of importance, including as it did the storage of the very large number, some 120,000, required for the northern barrage. The Third Sea Lord, Admiral Lionel Halsey, took this matter in hand with characteristic energy, and in conjunction with United States naval officers made all the necessary arrangements.
The United States mines were stored in the vicinity of Invergordon, and the British mines intended for use in the northern barrage were located at Grangemouth, near Leith, where Rear-Admiral Clinton Baker was in charge, as well as in other places, whilst those for use in the Heligoland Bight and Channel waters were stored at Immingham and other southern depots.