Canada for the present remained content, having extended the fishery service and garrisoned with her own troops Halifax and Esquimalt. Both parties in Canada agreed in giving no attention to the question.
During the general elections which followed shortly after the Conference of 1907, neither Sir Wilfrid Laurier nor Mr Borden said one word about naval defence. Nothing but a dramatic crisis would rouse the people to give {302} the support necessary to enable either leader to take a decided stand.
The Kaiser provided the crisis. During 1908 and 1909 cries of alarm over the growth of the German navy awoke the United Kingdom and found echoes in Canada. It appeared that Britain"s margin of safety was being dangerously lessened, that the Mistress of the Seas had been challenged. The British House of Commons voted eight additional Dreadnoughts and the Admiralty continued to withdraw ships from the ends of the earth and to concentrate the fleet in the North Sea.
Since the eighties international affairs had shown increasing tension.
In Europe the struggle for national freedom, which marked the previous era, had in many cases been perverted into an endeavour to impose one nation"s will upon another. Not only did France cherish the memory of Alsace-Lorraine; not only did Italy dream of her lost provinces; not only did the Balkan states plot to complete the half-done task of driving out the Turk; but the German Austrian sought to dominate the Magyar and the Magyar the Slav, while Italy swelled with visions of the Eastern Mediterranean once more a Roman {303} lake, and Pan-German and Pan-Slav drew and re-drew the map of Europe to their liking.
But it was not in Europe alone that these nations sought expansion.
The belief that empire overseas was necessary to national greatness, and that sea-power was the means to that end, spread through Continental Europe. During the thirty years following 1880 France added three and a half million square miles to her colonial possessions, Germany a million, and Italy a quarter-million. Even the United States was carried away by the current, and Great Britain, already the greatest of colonial powers, picked up nearly four million square miles more. Europe"s aggression stirred sleeping Asia, and j.a.pan gave promise of beating her teachers at their own game. This hasty parcelling out of the non-white world brought friction and often threatened war. For years a conflict with Russia was believed inevitable in England. Then France became the inevitable foe. Next Germany took up the role. Though felt at fewer points, her rivalry was more serious. A state with the ideals of mediaeval feudalism and the might of a modern industrial nation--with all the wealth and organizing power of industry and science at the disposal {304} of a monarchy based on "divine right," and a military aristocracy which moulded and mastered the nation through control of school and press and army--was a constant danger to its neighbours. Germany"s aims were more aggressive than those of the western democracies, and its methods were more efficient than those of other European states of no higher ideals.
True, the democratic and anti-militarist forces were gaining ground in Germany itself, while elsewhere the folly and waste of militarism were rousing unprecedented efforts towards peace. But no way out was found.
It was clearly impossible for one state to disarm while its neighbours armed to the teeth. A few fitful efforts, in which Great Britain took an honourable part, to bring about a concerted halt came to nothing.
The world appeared convinced that the only statesmanlike way to avert war was for each state or group of states to make itself stronger than every other state or group. The war of armaments went on unchecked.
Europe slept on a powder-mine.
In every Dominion the new sense of peril stirred instant response. If Britain"s rivals had counted on the Dominions holding aloof in the hour of her need, or had held their {305} resources negligible, they were speedily awakened. In Australia, in New Zealand, in South Africa, and in Canada, press and parliament voiced the new realization of danger and the new determination to face it more effectively.
At first the prospect in Canada of speedy and harmonious action was of the brightest. Mr Foster gave notice in the House of Commons of a resolution in favour of Canadian naval preparations, and the leaders of both parties met in private conference and agreed upon the general course to be followed. Late in March 1909 Mr Foster moved his resolution and supported it with powerful and kindling eloquence. He dwelt on the burden which Britain bore alone and the urgent need that Canada should take a more adequate part in naval defence. He opposed strongly the policy of a fixed annual contribution. The certainty of constant friction over the amount, the smack of tribute, the radical defect that it meant hiring somebody else to do what Canadians themselves ought to do, the failure of such a plan to strike any roots, were fatal objections. A Canadian Naval Service was the only possible solution, though for himself he would agree to vote a Dreadnought as {306} a preliminary step. Mr Borden emphasized the need of action, and advocated "a Canadian naval force of our own." Sir Wilfrid Laurier declared that Canada must realize to the full both the rights and the obligations of a daughter nation by rising to any sacrifice that might be needed to maintain unimpaired the power of the British Empire, essential as it was not only for Canada"s safety but for the civilization of the world. As to the form of action, he opposed being stampeded into any spectacular policy inconsistent with the principle of self-government, and closed by moving a series of resolutions, which, with some changes suggested by Mr Borden, were unanimously accepted by the House. The resolutions recognized the duty of Canada to a.s.sume larger responsibilities with growth in strength, declared that under existing const.i.tutional relations money payments to the British Treasury would not be the most satisfactory solution, and expressed cordial approval of any expenditure necessary to promote a Canadian Naval Service to co-operate in close relation with the British Navy.
During the summer a special Conference was held in London, attended by ministers from all the Dominions. Mr M"Kenna, while {307} repeating the orthodox Admiralty view that considerations of strategy favoured a single navy, now recognized that other considerations had to be taken into account, and that "room must be found for the expression of national sentiment.... While laying the foundation of future Dominion navies to be maintained in different parts of the Empire, these forces would contribute immediately and materially to the requirements of Imperial defence." No wonder that the London _Times_ congratulated Australia and Canada "on their achievement in having at last educated the Admiralty up to their own point of view." Unfortunately the convert was soon to backslide, but for the present hearty and ready aid was given in establishing the Dominion naval policy. Australia agreed to form a distinct fleet unit, consisting of a large armoured cruiser, three unarmoured cruisers, six destroyers and three submarines, with auxiliary ships. Canada, not an island like Australia or Great Britain, had two seaboards to protect, ten thousand miles apart. The Canadian representatives, therefore, while agreeing that a second fleet unit in the Pacific would be desirable in the future, requested suggestions, which were given, for the expenditure, first, of {308} an equivalent and, second, of a lesser amount on two squadrons.
When the Canadian parliament met in January 1910 Sir Wilfrid Laurier submitted the Naval Service Bill, which provided for the establishment of fleets according to the plan finally approved by the Admiralty. The ships were to be under the control of the Dominion Government, which might, in case of emergency, place them at the disposal of the Admiralty, summoning parliament to ratify such action. The bill was pa.s.sed in March. In the autumn the cruiser _Niobe_ (11,000 tons) and the _Rainbow_ (3600 tons), purchased from the Admiralty, reached Canadian waters, where they were to serve as training-ships.
Recruiting for these ships was begun and, while not speedy, was reported by the department as satisfactory. The Halifax and Esquimalt dockyards were taken over. Early in 1911 a Naval College was opened at Halifax; and in May tenders were received, ranging from eleven to thirteen millions, from six British and Canadian firms, for the construction, in Canada, of four Bristol cruisers, one Boadicea cruiser, and six destroyers. In June (1911), at the Imperial Conference in London, agreement was reached as to the boundaries {309} of the Australian and Canadian stations. The naval services of the two Dominions were to be "exclusively under control of their respective governments"; but in time of war any fleet or ships placed at the disposal of the British Government by the Dominion authorities would "form an integral part of the British fleet and remain under the control of the Admiralty during the continuance of the war." Training and discipline were to be generally uniform. Dominion ships were to fly the white ensign at the stern as the symbol of the Crown"s authority and the distinctive flag of the Dominion at the jack-staff.
Then came the reciprocity fight, the blocking of supplies by the Conservatives, and the general elections of September, all intervening before any tender had been finally accepted.
Long before this time, however, the issue had given rise to bitter party controversy. The unanimity of parliament in 1909 had not truly reflected the diversity of public opinion. Mr Borden was not able to carry his party with him. In the English-speaking provinces many Conservatives denounced a Canadian fleet as "a tinpot navy," useless, expensive, and separatist, and called for a gift of Dreadnoughts. Mr Borden"s lieutenant from Quebec, {310} Mr F. D. Monk, came out strongly against either Canadian navy or contribution, unless approved by popular vote. So, after a loyal attempt to defend the agreement of 1909, Mr Borden found it necessary to change his position. By attacking the Laurier navy as inadequate, and at the same time declaring that no permanent policy should be adopted without an appeal to the people, he endeavoured to keep both wings of his party in line.
The opposition in Quebec was strengthened by Mr Henri Boura.s.sa and his following--"Nationalists" in some respects perhaps, but more rightly labelled Colonialists or Provincialists. They dealt a shrewd blow in defeating the Government candidate at a by-election held in November 1910 for Drummond-Arthabaska, Sir Wilfrid"s old seat. And, though in all the other provinces the general elections of 1911 were fought on the issue of reciprocity, the navy was made the chief issue in Quebec.
Conservatives formed a close working alliance with the Nationalists, who attacked the prime minister as a tool of the English imperialists, and pictured to the habitants the horrors of the _marine_, of conscription and the press-gang.
A little over a year after his accession to {311} power in 1911, Sir Robert Borden brought down his naval proposals, providing for a gift or loan to Great Britain of three Dreadnoughts to meet the current emergency, and promised to submit later on his permanent policy to the electorate. What that permanent policy would be he did not reveal. It was stated that the Government had not definitely decided against a Canadian navy, but the insistence upon the difficulty of building up a naval organization in Canada, and other remarks, made it appear that some plan of permanent contribution, with a share in the central controlling body, was under contemplation. Sir Wilfrid Laurier vigorously opposed the proposals and adhered to the policy of a Canadian navy. And, not to be outdone in bigness, he now advocated two fleet units. After a prolonged discussion and determined obstruction by the Opposition, the Government introduced the closure and forced the bill through the Commons, only to see it rejected by the Senate on the motion of Sir George Ross, "that this House is not justified in giving its a.s.sent to this bill until it is submitted to the judgment of the country."
The Government"s abrupt change of policy was in part due to the activity of the first {312} lord of the Admiralty, Mr Winston Churchill. Whether moved by his own impetuous temperament or by the advice of others, Mr Churchill threw overboard the M"Kenna memorandum, and endeavoured once more to revive the contribution policy. He was not content with laying before the Canadian prime minister the opinion of experts on the strategic questions involved, and advising on means to reach the desired end, but sought to influence public opinion in the Dominions by word and act. The memoranda sent at Sir Robert Borden"s request in January 1913, emphasizing the difficulty of building battleships in Canada--which was not proposed by the Opposition--and the difficulty of helping to man the two Canadian fleet units--though at the same time men were declared to be available for as many as five Dreadnoughts, if contributed--were preceded by pressure on the Malay States to contribute a battleship, and were followed by Mr Churchill"s announcement of his intention to establish at Gibraltar an Imperial Squadron composed of Dominion ships, under the Admiralty"s control.
When Australia suggested that a special Dominion Conference to discuss the matter should be held in Canada, New Zealand, or Australia, {313} the United Kingdom would not consent. It was made emphatically clear that Mr Churchill was in favour of contribution, not as an emergency but as a permanent policy. It was his doubtless well-meant--and invited--intervention in the dispute, ignoring the principles by which imperial harmony had been secured in the past, which more than anything else stirred up resentment in Canada.
The dispute in Canada turned partly on const.i.tutional, and partly on technical, naval considerations. A Canadian navy was opposed by some as tending to separation from the Empire, and by others as involving Canada in a share in war without any corresponding share in foreign policy. It was defended as the logical extension of the policy of self-government, which, in actual practice as opposed to pessimistic prophecy, had proved the enduring basis of imperial union. The considerations involved have been briefly reviewed in an earlier section. It need only be noted here that the const.i.tutional problem was no more acute in December 1912 than in March 1909. Whatever the difficulties, they had been faced and accepted by all the other Dominions. Australia was irretrievably and proudly committed to her {314} own navy--"His Majesty"s Royal Australian Navy"; New Zealand announced her dissatisfaction with the original contribution policy; General Botha declared that South Africa would prefer "a navy of our own." Not contribution therefore, but local navies, afforded the only basis of uniformity throughout the Empire. Given this att.i.tude on the part of all the Dominions, there was little question that forms would soon follow facts, and each of the Five Nations be given its due place and weight in settling common issues of policy.
On the more technical issues there was equally wide divergence. A Canadian navy was attacked by some as useless even in the long run.
Canada could not build up an adequate naval administration in half a century. Inefficiency and jobbery would mark the navy"s management.
The sea was one and the navy should be one; concentration at the supreme danger point, defence by attack, were the latest maxims of naval strategy. On the other hand, it was urged that what Australia had done Canada could do, and that the German navy itself had been built up in twenty years. The sea was one, but it was tens of thousands of miles in width; {315} the trade routes required protection, and the coasts must be guarded against sudden raids.
Greater stress, however, was laid on the "short-run" arguments. That there was only one possible enemy, Germany; that war with her in a few years was inevitable; that when it came Great Britain"s fleet would be overmatched, or perilously equalled, were the insistent contentions of one party. That the Pacific required watching as well as the North Sea; that relations with Germany, on Sir Edward Grey"s testimony, were improving and war unlikely; that if war came in a few years the naval power of Britain, to say nothing of that of France and Russia, would be overwhelming, was the other party"s oft-reiterated answer. It was urged, also, that the Canadian Government"s belief in the seriousness of the emergency must be judged by its acts, not its words. Had it believed war imminent and the naval situation so dangerous that its three Dreadnoughts were required, it would unquestionably have been too patriotic to think for a moment of any other course but to bring on a general election in 1913 to override the Senate.
That is now ancient history. The outbreak of the Great War threw the Canadian naval {316} question, along with so many greater questions, into the melting pot. The temporary easing of the international situation after 1912 was followed by acute tension again, and this time the restraining forces gave way. The rivalry of Teuton and Slav in the Balkans, where of late the balance had tilted against the Central Powers because of the defeat of their quasi-ally, Turkey, provided the setting. The murder of an Austrian prince by a Servian subject gave the occasion, and Germany set the fatal drama in motion. What part was played in her decision by dreams of world conquest or dread of being hemmed in by ever-stronger foes, what part by the desire of a challenged autocracy to turn the people from internal reform to external policy, will not be certain until the chancelleries of Europe have given up their secrets, if certain then; but, whatever the motive, all the world outside Germany has agreed that had she willed she could have averted the fatal ending of those tense days of July 1914.
When the intervention of the United Kingdom was made inevitable and practically unanimous by the brutal attack on Belgium, Canada never hesitated for a moment as to her att.i.tude. The rights of the immediate issue {317} were clear; the whole world"s liberty was plainly at stake; the struggle promised to task, if not to overtask, every resource of the mother country. Sir Robert Borden acted promptly and effectively, and parliament when called in special session unanimously backed his actions. In a few weeks the largest force that had ever crossed the Atlantic sailed to England, and throughout the war ten thousand upon ten thousand followed. The Dominions surprised the world, and not least themselves, by the greatness and effectiveness of the efforts made in the common cause. At first, distance or over-confidence prevented a full grasp of the crisis by the general public, and even by the leaders of opinion; but, as time went on, the sense of the greatness of the issue deepened, resolution hardened, and the only measures of effort were what the crisis called for and what Canada could give.
The country was united as on few occasions. Here and there undigested groups of immigrants from the enemy lands stood out from the common enthusiasm, but gave little overt trouble. In Quebec some, but not all, of the Nationalists opposed Canada"s partic.i.p.ation in the war, taking either the belated colonial view that it was Britain"s part to fight the {318} Empire"s wars, or the more logical but inopportune view that Canada should not fight in a war when she had had no part in shaping the policy that went before it. They claimed to stand where practically all Canadians had stood a generation before. They forgot that meanwhile the world, and Canada, had moved forward.
The ordeal of battle put to the test the facts and the theories of empire which had been shaping in the years which have been reviewed.
The splendid response of the whole Empire to the call of need proved that it was not the weak and crumbling structure that enemies had hoped and zealous friends had feared. Of their own free will the Dominions and even India poured out their treasures of men and money in measure far beyond what any central authority could have ordained. Freedom was justified of her children, and the British Empire proved its right to exist by its very difference from the Prussian Empire. When General Botha and General s.m.u.ts, after crushing with ease a rebellion which under a different imperial policy would have been triumphant, led the army of the Crown in triumph against the German dominions to which it had once been proposed to banish {319} them, they gave a most dramatic proof of the power of the unseen bonds of confidence and liberty.
Yet, as the war proved, the Empire had not yet reached its final stage.
Now that the Dominions helped to pay the piper, henceforth they would insist on a share in calling the tune. That the decision as to peace and war must no longer rest solely with the government of Great Britain, however wisely that power had been used in this instance, became the conviction of the many instead of the few. It was still matter for serious debate how that greater voice could be attained, and the conflict between the policy of consultation between existing governments and the policy of creating a new central over-government, which had marked the years before, bade fair to mark the years after the war as well.
The subsidiary question of naval defence had also its after-lights.
Those in Canada who had urged the contribution policy had the gloomy satisfaction of seeing their prophecy of speedy war with Germany fulfilled. Those who had urged the policy of a Canadian navy had the more cheerful satisfaction of seeing that the only "emergency" was that which faced the Kaiser"s fleet, bottled up by {320} the vastly superior allied forces. The battle of the Falkland Islands, redeeming the defeat at Coronel, proved the wide range of action of fast cruisers based on European waters, while on the other hand the raids of the _Emden_ proved the need of cruisers for defence on every sea; and the exploits of the _Sydney_, sister ship of Canada"s unbuilt Bristols, ended all talk of tin-pot navies. The lessons of the war as to ships and weapons and strategy were all important for the reconsideration of the question. Still more vital for the decision as to this and weightier matters were the secrets the future held as to the outcome of the war, as to the future alignment of nations, and, above all, as to the possibility of building up some barrier against the madness, the unspeakable sufferings, and the blind, chaotic wastes of war, more adequate than the secret diplomacy, the compet.i.tive armaments, and the shifting alliances of the past.
[1] Report of Annual Meeting, Canadian Manufacturers" a.s.sociation, in _Industrial Canada_, 1912, p. 334.
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CHAPTER XIV
FIFTY YEARS OF UNION
The Dominion of Canada"s first fifty years have been years of momentous change. The four provinces have grown into nine, covering the whole half-continent. The three million people have grown to eight, and the west of the wandering Indian holds cities greater than the largest of the east at Confederation. From a people overwhelmingly agricultural they have become a people almost equally divided between town and country. The straggling two thousand miles of railways have been multiplied fifteen-fold, forming great transcontinental systems unmatched in the United States. An average wheat crop yields more than ten times the total at Confederation, and the output of the mine has increased at even a more rapid rate. Great manufacturing plants have developed, employing half a million men, and with capital and annual products exceeding a thousand {322} million dollars. Foreign trade has mounted to eight times its height of fifty years ago. The whole financial and commercial structure has become complex and intricate beyond earlier imagining. The changes, even on the material side, have not been all gain. There is many a case of reckless waste of resources to lament, many an instance of half-developed opportunity and even of slipping backwards. With the millionaire came the slum, and the advantages of great corporations were often balanced by the "frenzied finance" and the unhealthy political influence of those in control.
Yet, on the whole, progress, especially in the last twenty years, has been unquestioned and rarely paralleled.
Political has kept pace with economic change. The far-flung Dominion is at last being welded into one, and a Canadian nationality is arising of a distinct character and with conscious unity. The average man thinks of himself no longer as first a citizen of Nova Scotia, Ontario, or Manitoba, an Englishman, a Scotsman, or an Irishman, but as first a Canadian. Provincial and racial jealousy, though not pa.s.sed away, are less intense and less critical than in the days of old. There is less bitterness in party {323} conflicts, less personal abuse, and more of the broader patriotism. Of jobbery and corruption and low political ideals there are unfortunately no less, but there is more conscious endeavour to grapple with and overthrow these foes. The Dominion has found its place in the family of nations, and has taken its full share in the transforming and upbuilding of the British Empire. Fifty years ago, merely colonies of Britain, looked upon by most men in the mother country as being about to break from the Empire to which they were now profitless, and to the rest of Europe scarcely a name! To-day, sending hundreds of thousands of men across the seas to fight shoulder to shoulder with Britain to maintain the unity of the Empire, the freedom of Europe and the world! History has few more striking transformations than this to show.
Even more striking, but less within the scope of this brief survey, were the changes in the life and thought, in the manners and the social texture of the nation. The growth of luxury and of restless change; the quickening pace of business and the accompanying shortening of the work-day and the work-week; the transformation effected by railway {324} and steamship, by telephone and typewriter, by electric light and skysc.r.a.per; the coming of the motor-car, of bridge, and of society columns; the pa.s.sing of cricket, the rise and fall of lacrosse, the triumph of baseball and hockey and golf and bowling, the professionalizing of nearly all sport; the increasing share of women in industry and education; the constant shift of fashion, the waxing and waning of hats and skirts; the readjustment of theological creeds and the trend towards church unity; the progress of medical science, the widening of university interests, the development of advertising and the transformation of the newspaper;--all these and many more phases of the changing times bulked larger in the daily life of the people than the const.i.tutional and political issues with which statesmen and politicians had to deal and which historians have to describe.
Even in the political and economic change no man and no party had a dominating share. The Canada of to-day is the creation of millions of hands, of the known or unknown few who toiled primarily for their country"s advancement, and of the many who sought their own private ends and made national progress as a by-product. Yet if statesmen {325} are, on the one hand, not directly responsible for good harvests or bad, on the other, they are not "flies on the wheel." The powers confided to them are great for good or ill. They may hasten or r.e.t.a.r.d material progress, and guide, if they cannot create, the current of national destiny. It is impossible to imagine what different course the Dominion would have taken had there been no Macdonald and no Laurier at the helm.
In Sir Wilfrid Laurier"s career four guiding principles, four goals of endeavour, have been steadily kept in view--individual liberty, collective prosperity, racial and religious harmony, and growth to nationhood. The end in view was not always reached. The path followed was not as ruler-straight as the philosopher or the critic would have prescribed. The leader of a party of many shades of opinion, the ruler of a country of widely different interests and prejudices and traditions, must often do not what is ideally best but what is the most practicable approach to the ideal. Yet with rare consistency and steadfast courage these ends were held in view. Ever an opportunist as to means, Wilfrid Laurier has never been an opportunist as to ends.
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The historic task of Liberalism--the promotion, by negative and positive means alike, of individual freedom with full opportunity for self-development--has been less urgent in Canada than in many other lands. Civil liberty Canadians inherited from their fathers overseas.
Political liberty was the achievement of the generation before the Dominion was formed. Social liberty, the a.s.suring for each man genuine equality of opportunity, has in great measure been ensured by the wide s.p.a.ces of a virgin continent. What legislation is required to guarantee it further falls for the most part within the scope of the provincial legislatures; though one most important factor in securing equality and keeping open the door of opportunity, the free gift of farm lands to all who will, has been a federal policy. But in one important field, liberty of thought and discussion, the battle has had to be fought in our own day, and has been fought valiantly and well.
In standing for the elementary rights of freedom of speech and political action, Sir Wilfrid Laurier braved the wrath of powerful forces in the Church he loved and honoured. He did not deny any church or any churchman the right to take a full part in political discussion.
But he {327} did deny any religious teachers the right to brandish for a political purpose the weapons of their spiritual armoury; and he urged the inexpediency, in the Church"s own interest, of endeavouring to build up a clerical party.
The promotion of the country"s economic welfare has been the chief task of every Canadian Government, and the one most in discussion. A tariff marked by stability and by moderate advances towards freedom of trade, a railway policy reflecting the new-found faith of Canada in its future, an immigration campaign that opened up the West and laid the foundation for mounting prosperity, and for a new place in the world"s regard, aid to farmer and fisherman and miner--these were the outstanding features of the Canadian administration after 1896.
Mistakes were made, errors of omission and commission, due now to lack of vision, now to over-confidence, but the accounting was not to be feared. "When I am Premier," declared Mr Laurier in the early nineties, referring to some dubious statistics used to prove that all was well with the country, "you will not have to look up figures to find out whether you are prosperous: you will know by feeling in your pockets."
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No need of Canada has been greater, none has lain nearer Sir Wilfrid Laurier"s heart, than the lessening of misunderstanding and hostility between the men of the different races and tongues and creeds that make up the Dominion. It is a task which has been the more difficult because not merely was there a difference of races, but one race was of the same blood as the people of the United Kingdom and the other of its hereditary foe. It was always easy for politicians of the baser sort, or for well-meaning but rigid and doctrinaire extremists on either side, to stir up prejudice and pa.s.sion. It was a statesman"s task to endeavour to bridge the gulf, to work for better feeling between Britain and France, to emphasize the future which all Canadians hold in common, to urge the men of each race to seek that knowledge of the other which is the first and longest step towards harmony. In training and temperament Sir Wilfrid Laurier was uniquely fitted for the task of interpreting each race to the other, and though it was a task that was never completed, he had the satisfaction of achieving a marked advance.
The share of Canadian statesmen in working out the unique political achievement which {329} we call the British Empire has not yet been fully recognized. When the history of its upbuilding comes to be written, it may well be that the names of Baldwin and LaFontaine and Howe, of Brown and Galt, of Tupper and Blake, of Macdonald and Laurier, will stand, in this regard, higher than those of Peel and Disraeli, Gladstone and Salisbury, and even Durham and Elgin. Some in England opposed the grant of self-government, believing that it led to separation. Some, reconciled to separation, urged it. Canadians, though not always seeing the path clear, both demanded self-government and trusted it would make union all the firmer. It fell to Sir Wilfrid Laurier"s lot to carry out this traditional Canadian policy through an exceptionally critical era of development. He steadfastly a.s.serted Canada"s right to full nationhood, and as steadily faced each new responsibility that came with added rights. He often incurred the hostility of ultra-imperialist and of colonialist alike, going too slow for the one and too fast for the other. Many autonomists failed to recognize how manfully and how effectively he had stood at the London Conferences for self-government, until at last practically all the Dominions {330} swung into line. Many imperialists failed to recognize how hard he had struggled to bring Quebec into harmony with the rest of the Dominion on imperial issues and particularly on the naval question.
A wise opportunism, that met each issue as it arose and dealt with it in the light of long-held principles, kept the nation advancing steadily and advancing abreast.