(a). A thing which a.s.sumes different forms and states, cannot itself be one of those forms and states. A body which receives different colors should be, in its own nature, colorless. The soul, in its perception of external objects, a.s.sumes, as it were, various forms and states; it, therefore, cannot be regarded as one of those forms. Ibn Maskawaih seems to give no countenance to the contemporary Faculty-Psychology; to him different mental states are various transformations of the soul itself.
(b). The attributes are constantly changing; there must be beyond the sphere of change, some permanent substratum which is the foundation of personal ident.i.ty.
Having shown that the soul cannot be regarded as a function of matter, Ibn Maskawaih proceeds to prove that it is essentially immaterial. Some of his arguments may be noticed:--
1. The senses, after they have perceived a strong stimulus, cannot, for a certain amount of time, perceive a weaker stimulus. It is, however, quite different with the mental act of cognition.
2. When we reflect on an abstruse subject, we endeavour to completely shut our eyes to the objects around us, which we regard as so many hindrances in the way of spiritual activity. If the soul is material in its essence, it need not, in order to secure unimpeded activity, escape from the world of matter.
3. The perception of a strong stimulus weakens and sometimes injures the sense. The intellect, on the other hand, grows in strength with the knowledge of ideas and general notions.
4. Physical weakness due to old age, does not affect mental vigour.
5. The soul can conceive certain propositions which have no connection with the sense-data. The senses, for instance, cannot perceive that two contradictories cannot exist together.
6. There is a certain power in us which rules over physical organs, corrects sense-errors, and unifies all knowledge. This unifying principle which reflects over the material brought before it through the sense-channel, and, weighing the evidence of each sense, decides the character of rival statements, must itself stand above the sphere of matter.
The combined force of these considerations, says Ibn Maskawaih, conclusively establishes the truth of the proposition--that the soul is essentially immaterial. The immateriality of the soul signifies its immortality; since mortality is a characteristic of the material.
-- II.
Avicenna (d. 1037).
Among the early Persian Philosophers, Avicenna alone attempted to construct his own system of thought. His work, called "Eastern Philosophy" is still extant; and there has also come down to us a fragment[38:1] in which the Philosopher has expressed his views on the universal operation of the force of love in nature. It is something like the contour of a system, and it is quite probable that ideas expressed therein were afterwards fully worked out.
[38:1] This fragment on love is preserved in the collected works of Avicenna in the British Museum Library and has been edited by N. A. F. Mehren. (Leiden, 1894.)
Avicenna defines "Love" as the appreciation of Beauty; and from the standpoint of this definition he explains that there are three categories of being:--
1. Things that are at the highest point of perfection.
2. Things that are at the lowest point of perfection.
3. Things that stand between the two poles of perfection. But the third category has no real existence; since there are things that have already attained the acme of perfection, and there are others still progressing towards perfection. This striving for the ideal is love"s movement towards beauty which, according to Avicenna, is identical with perfection. Beneath the visible evolution of forms is the force of love which actualises all striving, movement, progress. Things are so const.i.tuted that they hate non-existence, and love the joy of individuality in various forms. The indeterminate matter, dead in itself, a.s.sumes, or more properly, is made to a.s.sume by the inner force of love, various forms, and rises higher and higher in the scale of beauty. The operation of this ultimate force, in the physical plane, can be thus indicated:--
1. Inanimate objects are combinations of form, matter and quality. Owing to the working of this mysterious power, quality sticks to its subject or substance; and form embraces indeterminate matter which, impelled by the mighty force of love, rises from form to form.
2. The tendency of the force of love is to centralise itself. In the vegetable kingdom it attains a higher degree of unity or centralisation; though the soul still lacks that unity of action which it attains afterwards. The processes of the vegetative soul are:--
(a) a.s.similation.
(b) Growth.
(c) Reproduction.
These processes, however, are nothing more than so many manifestations of love. a.s.similation indicates attraction and transformation of what is external into what is internal. Growth is love of achieving more and more harmony of parts; and reproduction means perpetuation of the kind, which is only another phase of love.
3. In the animal kingdom, the various operations of the force of love are still more unified. It does preserve the vegetable instinct of acting in different directions; but there is also the development of temperament which is a step towards more unified activity. In man this tendency towards unification manifests itself in self-consciousness. The same force of "natural or const.i.tutional love", is working in the life of beings higher than man. All things are moving towards the first Beloved--the Eternal Beauty. The worth of a thing is decided by its nearness to or distance from, this ultimate principle.
As a physician, however, Avicenna is especially interested in the nature of the Soul. In his times, moreover, the doctrine of metempsychosis was getting more and more popular. He, therefore, discusses the nature of the soul, with a view to show the falsity of this doctrine. It is difficult, he says, to define the soul; since it manifests different powers and tendencies in different planes of being. His view of the various powers of the soul can be thus represented:--
1. Manifestation as unconscious activity--
(a). Working in different directions + 1. a.s.similation.
(Vegetative soul) 2. Growth.
+ 3. Reproduction.
(b). Working in one direction and securing uniformity of action--growth of temperament.
2. Manifestation as conscious activity--
(a). As directed to more than one object--
Animal soul.
Lower Animals. Man.
A. Perceptive powers. A. Perceptive powers.
B. Motive powers (desire (a) Five external senses.
of pleasure and avoidance (b) Five internal senses-- of pain). 1. Sensorium.
2. Retention of images.
3. Conception.
4. Imagination.
5. Memory.
These const.i.tute the five internal senses of the soul which, in man, manifests itself as progressive reason, developing from human to angelic and prophetic reason.
B. Motive powers--will.
(b). As directed to one object--The soul of the spheres which continue in one uniform motion.
In his fragment on "Nafs" (soul) Avicenna endeavours to show that a material accompaniment is not necessary to the soul. It is not through the instrumentality of the body, or some power of the body, that the soul conceives or imagines; since if the soul necessarily requires a physical medium in conceiving other things, it must require a different body in order to conceive the body attached to itself. Moreover, the fact that the soul is immediately self conscious--conscious of itself through itself--conclusively shows that in its essence the soul is quite independent of any physical accompaniment. The doctrine of metempsychosis implies, also, individual pre-existence. But supposing that the soul did exist before the body, it must have existed either as one or as many. The multiplicity of bodies is due to the multiplicity of material forms, and does not indicate the multiplicity of souls. On the other hand, if it existed as one, the ignorance or knowledge of A must mean the ignorance or knowledge of B; since the soul is one in both.
These categories, therefore, cannot be applied to the soul. The truth is, says Avicenna, that body and soul are contiguous to each other, but quite opposite in their respective essences. The disintegration of the body does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul. Dissolution or decay is a property of compounds, and not of simple, indivisible, ideal substances. Avicenna, then denies pre-existence, and endeavours to show the possibility of disembodied conscious life beyond the grave.
We have run over the work of the early Persian Neo-Platonists among whom, as we have seen, Avicenna alone learned to think for himself. Of the generations of his disciples--Behmenyar, Ab u"l-Ma"mum of Isfahan, Ma"?umi, Ab u"l-"Abbas, Ibn Tahir[44:1]--who carried on their master"s Philosophy, we need not speak. So powerful was the spell of Avicenna"s personality that, even long after it had been removed, any amplification or modification of his views was considered to be an unpardonable crime.
The old Iranian idea of the dualism of Light and Darkness, does not act as a determining factor in the progress of Neo-Platonic ideas in Persia, which borrowed independent life for a time, and eventually merged their separate existence in the general current of Persian speculation. They are, therefore, connected with the course of indigenous thought only in so far as they contributed to the strength and expansion of that monistic tendency, which manifested itself early in the Church of Zoroaster; and, though for a time hindered by the Theological controversies of Islam, burst out with redoubled force in later times, to extend its t.i.tanic grasp to all the previous intellectual achievements of the land of its birth.
[44:1] Al-Baihaqi; fol. 28a et seqq.
CHAP. III.
THE RISE AND FALL OF RATIONALISM IN ISLAM.