TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, November 8th, 1782.
Sir,
In one of your letters you suppose, that I have an open avowed contempt of all rank. Give me leave to say, you are much mistaken in my sentiments. There are times, and I have often seen such, when a man"s duty to his country demands of him the sacrifice of his rank, as well as his fortune and life, but this must be an epoch, and for an object worthy of the sacrifice. In ordinary times, the same duty to his country obliges him to contend for his rank, as the only means indeed, sometimes, by which he can do service, and the sacrifice would injure his country more than himself. When the world sees a man reduced to the necessity of giving up his rank, merely to serve the public, they will respect him, and his opinions will have the more weight for it; but when the same world sees a man yield his rank for the sake of holding a place, he becomes ridiculous. This, you may depend upon it, will not be my case.
Ranks, t.i.tles, and etiquettes, and every species of punctilios, even down to the visits of cards, are of infinitely more importance in Europe, than in America, and therefore Congress cannot be too tender of disgracing their Ministers abroad in any of these things, nor too determined not to disgrace themselves. Congress will, sooner or later, find it necessary to adjust the ranks of all their servants, with relation to another, as well as to the magistrates and officers of the separate governments.
For example, if, when Congress abolished my commission to the king of Great Britain, and my commission for peace, and issued a new commission for peace, in which they a.s.sociated four other gentlemen with me, they had placed any other at the head of the commission, they would have thrown a disgrace and ridicule upon me in Europe, that I could not have withstood. It would have injured me in the minds of friends and enemies, the French and Dutch, as well as the English.
It is the same thing with the States. If Mr Jay and I had yielded the punctilio of rank, and taken the advice of the Count de Vergennes and Dr Franklin, by treating with the English or Spaniards, before we were put upon the equal footing, that our rank demanded, we should have sunk in the minds of the English, French, Spaniards, Dutch, and all the neutral powers. The Count de Vergennes certainly knows this; if he does not, he is not even an European statesman; if he does know it, what inference can we draw, but that he means to keep us down if he can; to keep his hand under our chin to prevent us from drowning, but not to lift our heads out of water?
The injunctions upon us to communicate, and to follow the advice that is given us, seem to be too strong, and too universal. Understood with reasonable limitations and restrictions, they may do very well. For example, I wrote a speculation, and caused it to be printed in the _Courier du Bas Rhine_, showing the interest, policy, and humanity of the neutral confederation"s acknowledging American independence, and admitting the United States to subscribe to the principles of their Marine Treaty. This was reprinted in the Gazette of Leyden, the _Politique Hollandais_, the _Courier de l"Europe_, and all the Dutch gazettes. At the same time I caused to be transmitted to England some pieces on the same subject, and further showing the probability, that the neutral powers might adopt this measure, and the impolicy of Great Britain, in permitting all the powers of Europe to get the start of her, and having more merit with America than she, by acknowledging her independence first. These pieces were printed in the English papers, in the form of letters to the Earl of Shelburne, and can never be controverted, because they are in writing, and in print, with their dates. These fears thus excited, added to our refusal to treat on an unequal footing, probably produced his Lordship"s resolution, to advise the King to issue the commission, under the great seal, to Mr Oswald; by which Great Britain has got the start, and gone to the windward of the other European powers. No man living, but myself, knew, that all these speculations, in various parts of Europe, came from me. Would it do for me to communicate all this to the French Ministers? Is it possible for me to communicate all these things to Congress? Believe me it is not, and give me leave to say it will not do to communicate them to my friend, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, nor my friend, M. Marbois. If they should be, long letters will lay all open to the Count de Vergennes, who, I a.s.sure you, I do not believe will a.s.sist me, or anybody else, in such measures of serving our country. When the French Ministers in America, or Europe, communicate everything to us, we may venture to be equally communicative with them. But when everything is concealed from us, more cautiously than it is from England, we shall do ourselves injustice, if we are not upon our guard.
If we conduct ourselves with caution, prudence, moderation, and firmness, we shall succeed in every great point; but if Congress, or their Ministers abroad suffer themselves to be intimidated by threats, slanders, or insinuations, we shall be duped out of the fishery, the Mississippi, much of the western lands, compensation to the tories, and Pen.o.bscot at least, if not Kennebec. This is my solemn opinion, and I will never be answerable to my country, posterity, or my own mind, for the consequences, that might happen from concealing it.
It is for the determinate purpose of carrying these points, that one man, who is submission itself, is puffed up to the top of Jacob"s ladder in the clouds, and every other man depressed to the bottom of it in the dust. This is my opinion, let me be punished for it, for a.s.suredly I am guilty.
With great respect, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, November 11th, 1782.
Sir,
On my first arrival at Paris, I found my colleagues engaged in conferences with Mr Oswald. They had been before chiefly conducted by Mr Jay, Dr Franklin having been mostly confined for three months, by a long and painful illness. At this time, however, he was so much better, although still weak and lame, as to join us in most of our subsequent conferences, and we were so constantly engaged forenoon, afternoon, and evening, that I had not been out to Versailles, nor anywhere else.
On Sat.u.r.day last, the Marquis de Lafayette called upon me, and told me he had been to Versailles, and the Count de Vergennes had said to him, that he had been informed by the returns of the Police, that I was in Paris, but not officially, and he should take it well if I would come to see him.
I went out to dine with Dr Franklin the same day, who had just returned from delivering his memorial, and repeated to me the same message. I said to both, I would go the next morning, and, accordingly, on Sunday, the 9th, I went to make my court to his Excellency. He received me politely, and asked me questions about our progress. I answered him, that the English Minister appeared to me to divide with us upon ostensible points; that I still doubted his intentions to make a universal peace; that the cry of the nation was for something to be done or said with the American Ministers; and to satisfy this, the King of Great Britain had been advised to be the third power in Europe to acknowledge our independence. As this was a royal act, and under the great seal of his kingdom, it would never be denied or revoked; but still it did not render the nation unanimous, and to avoid, finally, disgusting any great party, the Minister would still pursue his usual studied obscurity of policy. Points must be conceded to the Americans, before a complete agreement could be made with them, even on terms to be inserted in the universal peace, which would open the full cry of a powerful party upon him, among which were the refugees. It could not be supposed, that the refugees and Pen.o.bscot were such points with the nation or Minister, that they would continue the war for them only, if they were ready to strike with France, Spain, and Holland.
The Count then asked me some questions respecting Sagadehock, which I answered, by showing him the records, which I had in my pocket, particularly that of Governor Pownal"s solemn act of possession in 1759; the grants and settlements of Mount Desert, Machias, and all the other townships east of Pen.o.bscot river; the original grant of James the First, to Sir William Alexander of Nova Scotia, in which it is bounded on St Croix river; (this grant I had in Latin, French, and English) the dissertations of Governor Shirley, and Governor Hutchinson, and the authority of Governor Bernard, all showing the right of Ma.s.sachusetts to this tract to be incontestable. I added, that I did not think any British Minister would ever put his hand to a written claim of that tract of land, their own national acts were so numerous, and so clear against them. The Count said, Mr Fitzherbert had told him, that it was for the masts, that a point was made of that tract. But the Count said, Canada was an immense resource for masts. I said, there were few masts there; that this could not be the motive; that the refugees were still at the bottom of this; several of them had pretensions to lands in Sagadehock, and the rest hoped for grants there.
The Count said, it was not at all surprising, that the British Ministry should insist upon compensation to the tories, for that all the precedents were in their favor; in the case of the United Provinces with Spain, all were restored to their possessions, and that there never had been an example of such an affair terminated by treaty, but all were restored. He said, it was a point well settled by precedents. I begged his Excellency"s pardon for this, and thought there was no precedent in point. A rest.i.tution of an estate not alienated, although confiscated to a Crown or State, could not be a precedent in point, because, in our case, these estates had not only been confiscated, but alienated by the State, so that it was no longer in the power of the State to restore them. And when you come to the question of compensation, there is every argument of national honor, dignity of the State, public and private justice and humanity, for us to insist upon a compensation for all the plate, negroes, rice, and tobacco stolen, and houses and substance consumed, as there is for them to demand compensation to the tories; and this was so much the stronger in our favor, as our sufferers were innocent people, and theirs guilty ones.
M. Rayneval, who was present, said something about the King and nation being bound to support their adherents. I answered, that I could not comprehend this doctrine. Here was a set of people, whose bad faith and misrepresentations had deceived the King and deluded the nation, to follow their all-devouring ambition, until they had totally failed of their object; had brought an indelible reproach on the British name, and almost irretrievable ruin on the nation, and yet that nation is bound to support their deceivers and ruiners. If the national honor was bound at all, it was bound still to follow their ambition, to conquer America, and plant the refugees there in pomp and power, and in such case, we all know whose estates would be confiscated, and what compensation would be obtained. All this M.
Rayneval said was very true.
The Count asked me to dine, which I accepted, and was treated with more attention and complaisance than ever, both by him and the Countess. As it is our duty to penetrate, if we can, the motives and views of our allies, as well as our enemies, it is worth while for Congress to consider what may be the true motives of these intimations in favor of the tories. History shows, that nations have generally had as much difficulty to arrange their affairs with their allies as with their enemies. France has had as much this war with Spain as with England. Holland and England, whenever they have been allies, have always found many difficulties, and from the nature of things, it must ever be an intricate task, to reconcile the notions, prejudices, principles, &c. of two nations in one concert of councils and operations.
We may well think, that the French would be very glad to have the Americans join with them in a future war. Suppose, for example, they should think the tories men of monarchical principles, or men of more ambition than principle, or men corrupted and of no principle, and should, therefore, think them more easily seduced to their purposes than virtuous Republicans, is it not easy to see the policy of a French Minister in wishing them amnesty and compensation? Suppose that a French Minister foresees, that the presence of the tories in America will keep up perpetually two parties, a French and an English party, and that this will compel the patriotic and independent men to join the French side, is it not natural for him to wish them restored? Is it not easy too to see, that a French Minister cannot wish to have the English and Americans perfectly agreed upon all points, before they themselves, the Spanish and the Dutch are agreed too? Can they be sorry then to see us split upon such a point as the tories? What can be their motives to become the advocates of the tories? It seems the French Minister, at Philadelphia, has made some representations to Congress, in favor of a compensation to the royalists, and that the Count de Vergennes" conversation with me was much in favor of it. The Count probably knows, that we are instructed against it, or rather, have not a const.i.tutional authority to make it; that we can only write about it to Congress, and they to the States, who may, and probably will, deliberate upon it a year or eighteen months before they all decide, and then every one of them will determine against it. In this way, there is an insuperable obstacle to any agreement between the English and Americans, even upon terms to be inserted in the general peace, before all are ready, and, indeed, after. It has been upon former occasions the constant practice of the French, to have some of their subjects in London, and the English some of theirs in Paris, during conferences for peace, in order to propagate such sentiments as they wished to prevail. I doubt not there are such there now. M.
Rayneval has certainly been there. It is reported, I know not how truly, that M. Gerard has been there, and probably others are there, who can easily prompt the tories to clamor, and to cry that the King"s dignity and nation"s honor are compromised, to support their demands.
America has been long enough involved in the wars of Europe. She has been a football between contending nations from the beginning, and it is easy to foresee, that France and England both will endeavor to involve us in their future wars. It is our interest and duty to avoid them as much as possible, and to be completely independent, and to have nothing to do with either of them, but in commerce. My poor thoughts and feeble efforts, have been from the beginning constantly employed to arrange all our European connexions to this end, and will continue to be so employed, whether they succeed or not. My hopes of success are stronger now than they ever have been, because I find Mr Jay precisely in the same sentiments, after all the observations and reflections he has made in Europe, and Dr Franklin at last, at least appears to coincide with us. We are all three perfectly united in the affair of the tories, and of the Sagadehock, the only points in which the British Minister pretends to differ from us.
The enclosed papers will show Congress the substance of the negotiation. The treaty, as first projected between Mr Oswald on one side, and Dr Franklin and Mr Jay on the other before my arrival; the treaty as projected after my arrival, between Mr Oswald and the three American Ministers, my Lord Shelburne having disagreed to the first; Mr Oswald"s letter and our answer; Mr Strachey"s letter and our answer.[14] Mr Strachey has gone to London with the whole, and we are waiting his return, or the arrival of some other, with further instructions.
If Congress should wish to know my conjecture, it is, that the Ministry will still insist upon compensation to the tories, and thus involve the nation every month of the war in an expense sufficient to make a full compensation to all the tories in question. They would not do this, however, if they were ready with France and Spain.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN ADAMS.
Philadelphia, November 18th, 1782.
Sir,
Since my letter of the 6th, Congress have been pleased to appoint Mr Jefferson one of their Ministers Plenipotentiary for negotiating peace. I have not yet received an answer to my letter informing him of this event, though I have some reason to believe he will accept the appointment.
I believe I mentioned to you, that Congress had refused to accept Mr Laurens" resignation. Many members have since seen with great pain, the pet.i.tion published in the Parliamentary debates as his. I sincerely wish, that it may prove to be a forgery, since the language it speaks does not consist with the dignified character he holds. He has since informed Congress, that he purposes to return to England, and come out to this country by the way of New York. I hope the determination of Congress will reach him before he leaves France, as it will have an awkward appearance to send to England for an American Minister.
All the contracts we have received from you, have been sent back with the ratification endorsed. Some of them have, I hope, reached you before this. So that the last hand may be put to the important business of the loan.
So much has been said of Captain Asgill, upon whom, as you have been informed, the lot fell, when it was determined to avenge the death of Captain Huddy, that I should let you know the issue of this business, which you may in part collect, from the enclosed resolve, though you may be ignorant of the reasons which induced Congress to pa.s.s it, and again render abortive their determination to punish the unexampled cruelty of the enemy. Mrs Asgill, the mother of this unfortunate young man, had sufficient influence at the Court of France to obtain its interposition in his favor; a letter was written on the subject by Count de Vergennes to General Washington, enclosing one from Mrs Asgill to the Count, which was extremely pathetic. The Minister of France had orders from his master to support this application. It was thought advisable, that this should not be formally done, but that the discharge of Asgill, should be grounded upon the reasons expressed in the preamble of the resolution. Congress the more readily acquiesced in this measure, as there is ground to hope, from the late conduct of the enemy, that they have determined to adopt a more civilized mode of carrying on the war in future. They have called off the savages, and a large number of prisoners have returned on parole from Canada.
We have yet no certain account of the evacuation of Charleston, though we know that the first division of the troops, and a considerable number of the inhabitants sailed on the 19th ultimo, as is said, for Augustine; it is probably evacuated by this time.
It would give me pleasure to receive from you an accurate account of the differences, which have arisen between the Court of Denmark and the United Provinces, and the effects they may probably produce. We are imperfectly acquainted with facts here, and still less with the politics of the Northern Courts; you will sometimes extend your observations to them.
I confide too much in the wisdom of the States-General to believe, that they will omit any honorable means to prevent an accession of strength to Great Britain, at this critical moment.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
FOOTNOTE:
[14] These papers will be found in the Correspondence of the Ministers for negotiating a peace.
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, November 18th, 1782.
Sir,