Sir,
I do myself the honor to submit to Congress a letter to the Minister of France, which covered their resolutions of the 28th of October, his answer thereto, and the draft of a letter in reply to his. As the last implies a promise on the part of Congress, I did not think myself authorised to send it without their approbation.
Congress will observe, that I endeavor to wave a question, which perhaps it might have been imprudent to answer by a direct avowal of the propriety of the resolution, or in the present circ.u.mstances to yield in express terms. By seeming to slight matters of mere ceremony, we may avoid troublesome discussions in future, and teach the old world by the example of the new to get rid of a clog, which too often fetters the most important transactions. I take the liberty to submit to Congress the propriety of directing in the next vote, which they shall have occasion to pa.s.s, in which France and America, or their Sovereigns, are mentioned, the preference to be given to the first, and so that we may seem to have established no rule on a subject of so little moment as rank or precedence.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO M. DE LA LUZERNE.
Office of Foreign Affairs, November 21st, 1781.
Sir,
Finding by frequent applications from the French Islands, that their Courts of Admiralty are not fully acquainted with the resolutions of Congress, pa.s.sed the 14th of October, 1777, which vest in the captors the property of such of the enemy"s vessels as are taken by their mariners; and being called by the letter, a copy of which I do myself the honor to enclose, to attend particularly to the case of Captain Jones and his crew, I must beg, Sir, that you will do me the favor to recommend it to the notice of the General and Commander in Chief of the French Leeward Islands, for whose use I enclose a certified copy of the above mentioned resolutions of Congress, presuming that the Court of Admiralty will pay some respect to them in their decisions, though they may not be strictly agreeable to the rules they have adopted, since it would be highly disadvantageous to both nations to have that considered as lawful prize in one port, which is not so in another. But should the Court think they are not warranted in condemning the vessel, she should at least be restored to Captain Jones or his agent, that she might, by being brought to a port of the United States, become lawful prize.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
HEADS OF A VERBAL COMMUNICATION MADE TO THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS BY THE MINISTER OF FRANCE.
In Congress, November 23d, 1781.
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs laid before Congress the following heads of a verbal communication made to him by the Minister of France.
The Minister of France informed the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that the Count de Vergennes, in a letter to him of the 7th of September, 1781, a.s.sured him that the King of France had received with great pleasure, an account of Mr Adams, Mr Franklin, and Mr Jay"s appointment to the place of Ministers for the negotiation of peace; and after expressing favorable sentiments of them and of Mr Jefferson, from his general reputation, adds, that they have little reason to hope for the a.s.sistance of Mr Laurens, since the enemy will probably continue his captivity during the war. That the King accepted with pleasure the proofs, which Congress have given him of their confidence, when they intrusted to his care the interests of the United States. That he would use his influence and credit for the advantage of his allies, whenever a negotiation should render their interests a subject of discussion. That if he did not obtain for every State all they wished, they must attribute the sacrifice he might be compelled to make of his inclinations, to the tyrannic rule of necessity. That, however, he had no reason to believe, that the events of the campaign would make an unfavorable change in the situation of affairs; and that from the present view of them, he had no cause to dread a disadvantageous peace.
The Count adds, that he presumes Mr Adams has communicated to Congress his Majesty"s refusal to accede to the terms of the mediation of the Imperial Courts, until they should agree to acknowledge the American Plenipotentiaries in the manner most conformable to the dignity of the United States; and observes thereon, that if the King was so attentive to a matter of form, though it might indeed in our present situation be considered as important, he would not be less tenacious of our more essential interests, which he will be zealous to promote, as far as circ.u.mstances will allow. But that if notwithstanding this, Congress, or even a considerable part of its members, should regret the confidence they had placed in his Majesty, or wish to free their Ministers from this restraint, his Majesty would not disapprove the measure; provided they made their Ministers answerable, as in justice they should be, in proportion to the powers, with which they invested them. He expresses his satisfaction at the extensive powers, with which the Ministers are invested as to the matter of boundary, and the truce, which he says, the interests of France as well as of us, require to be as long as possible.
With respect to the _statu quo_, he says, that though from the number of their conquests it would be beneficial both to France and Spain, yet it has not entered into their system so far as it regards America, and that his Majesty accordingly refused to accede to the plan of negotiation proposed by the mediating powers, which held up that idea.
He exhorts the Minister to recommend to Congress the most vigorous exertions, and to a.s.sure them, that the expulsion of the enemy from this continent depends in a great measure on the exertion of the United States; that France would be able to afford us very little a.s.sistance; and that Britain, so far from discovering any inclination to peace upon reasonable terms, absolutely refused the plan of negotiation proposed by the mediating powers; so that arms alone could compel her to it. He mentions, that the King being apprehensive, that the capture of the Marquis de Lafayette might reduce us to some difficulties, had ordered her cargo to be replaced immediately; and that in consequence of applications from the States of Virginia and Maryland, he had ordered a number of arms and military stores to be shipped to them, subject however to the order of Congress. That this and the cargo designed to replace that of the Marquis de Lafayette, were to be paid for out of the loan negotiated in Holland, which he had occasion to think would be completed. He expresses a desire, that the plan for the appointment of Consuls should be digested and adopted, as the Court of France wished to make it the basis of some commercial arrangements between France and the United States.
The Secretary for Foreign Affairs further informed Congress, that the Minister of France had communicated to him the following extract of a letter from the Count de Vergennes, which he had transmitted to the Superintendent of Finance.
Extract of a letter from the Count de Vergennes, September 7th, 1781.
"We think that since the arrival of Colonel Laurens, you have stopped the bills of Mr Morris on Messrs Le Couteulx. If the Superintendent has not followed your advice, he will cause us some embarra.s.sment, as we have not destinated any fund for that article. We have peremptorily declared to Dr Franklin, that we will not in future discharge any bills, that had not been drawn with your consent. As to you, Sir, we cannot but repeat our former instructions on this subject; and we direct you to authorise no draft even for a small sum."
No. 1.
_The Answer of his Most Christian Majesty to the Articles proposed by the two Mediating Courts._[2]
Translation.
The mediators are too well satisfied of the moderation of the King, and his constant wish for the re-establishment of peace, not to be previously a.s.sured, that his Majesty will receive with as much grat.i.tude as warmth the _Preliminary Articles_ they have communicated.
The King, the more fully to convince the two high mediators of his frankness and of the purity of his intentions, as well as of the unreserved confidence, that he places in the justice and impartiality of their High Imperial Majesties, believes he ought to make some confidential observations upon these Preliminary Articles. His Majesty flatters himself, that this will be more acceptable to them as its sole objects are to prevent discussions, which are equally mischievous and complicated, and to facilitate the much wished for success of their generous interposition.
"ARTICLE I. _There shall be a negotiation at Vienna, by the united care of the two Imperial Courts, embracing all the objects for the re-establishment of peace, which the belligerent parties, who intrust them with the mediation, shall judge proper to be there proposed. A negotiation shall in the meantime be entered into between Great Britain and her Colonies for the re-establishment of peace in America, but without the intervention of either of the other belligerent parties, or even of the two Imperial Courts, unless their mediation shall be formally demanded and accorded, for this object._"
According to the verbal observations, the expressions in the first part of this Article have been used merely to place the King of Spain in a situation to propose the cession of Gibraltar, and this turn has been judged necessary because the Court of London had previously declared, that it ought to be made without reference to this cession, while the Catholic King demands it as a preliminary; as this part of the Article immediately affects the Court of Madrid, the King cannot but refer himself to it for the answer that shall be made thereto. His Majesty is content to observe, that having united himself in the same cause with the King, his uncle, he neither can nor will separate his interests from those of that Prince, and that he regards the satisfaction he claims as a condition, without which he cannot personally treat of those matters.
As to the second part of the Article, the two Imperial Courts cannot flatter themselves with the hopes of bringing their mediation to a happy issue, if they do not prevent the subterfuges, the subtelties and false interpretations, which either of the belligerent powers may avail themselves of to explain according to their views the preliminary propositions, which will certainly happen if they do not previously ascertain the sense of the expressions, which relate to America.
The Court of London will elude as much and as long as she possibly can, the direct or indirect acknowledgement of the independence of the United States, and will avail herself of the terms, that are used in speaking of them, to maintain, that she is not obliged to treat with her ancient Colonies as with a free and independent nation. That she is consequently not reduced to admit a Plenipotentiary on their part, and that she is at liberty to view the American representative as a deputy from a part of her subjects who demand a favor. From whence it will follow, that when the mediation is in force, and they shall be about to enter upon the negotiation, that they will dispute the character, in which the American Plenipotentiary shall be received.
The King of England will consider him as his subject, while Congress will demand, that he shall be received as the representative of a free people, by means whereof the mediation will be stopped at the first outset.
To prevent this inconvenience it should seem, that previous to any other measure, the _character of the American agent_ ought to be determined in the most precise and positive manner, and Congress should be invited to confide its interests to the mediation. This invitation is so much the more interesting, as the negotiation relative to America should go hand in hand with that of the Courts of Madrid and Versailles, and by consequence, the negotiations although separate should commence at the same time.
But who will invite the Congress to treat with England? The King cannot, since the First Article excludes him from the negotiation.
This task then can only be executed by the mediators themselves; all that the King can do, and that he will do with zeal and fidelity, is to invite the Americans to the peace, and to facilitate it by every means that they believe compatible with their essential interests. But that the King may take this step with safety, and the hopes of success, and with the certainty of not rendering himself suspected by the Americans, it is necessary that he should first know the determination of the mediators upon the observations now made to them, and that this determination should be such as to secure to the American States their political existence.
The two high mediators and their Ministers are too enlightened not to perceive, that without this preliminary measure the Congress will send no person to Vienna, and that the King can make no attempts to engage them thereto, without incurring the danger of involving himself, by means whereof, and for the reasons already urged, the mediation will be stopped at its first outset. These reflections appear to merit the most serious attention of the two mediating Courts.
"ARTICLE II. _This separate peace cannot, however, be signed, except conjointly, and at the same time with that of the powers whose interests shall be treated by the mediating Courts. Although neither peace, notwithstanding they are treated separately, shall be concluded without the other, yet care shall be taken to inform the mediators constantly of the progress of that, which regards Great Britain and the Colonies, to the end, that the mediation may be able to regulate the measures intrusted to it according to the state of the negotiation relating to the Colonies, and both of the pacifications, which shall have been separately concluded at the same time, shall be solemnly guarantied by the mediating Courts, and by every other neutral power, whose guarantee the belligerent powers may think proper to claim._"
When the United States shall have been duly called to the Congress at Vienna, and shall have commenced their separate negotiation with England, this Article will make no difficulty with his Majesty.
"ARTICLE III. _To render the negotiations of peace independent of events of war, always uncertain, which may arrest, or at least r.e.t.a.r.d their progress, there shall be a general armistice between the two parties, during the term of one year, reckoning from ---- of the month of ---- of the present year, or reckoning from the month of ---- of the year 1782. Should it happen, that a general peace should not be re-established during the first term, or whilst the duration of either of these terms continues, everything shall remain in the same state, in which it shall be found at the signing of these preliminaries._"
This Article includes two objects equally important; an armistice and a _statu quo_. The mediators have already acknowledged, that without this preliminary basis, they cannot enter upon a serious negotiation for a peace; and, for still stronger reason, these preliminaries should be established before a truce can be spoken of.
The two mediating Courts are themselves of this opinion, since they do not propose the armistice, but in consequence of the acceptation of the first and second Preliminary Articles. The King thinks, that before they can agree to an armistice, it is necessary that the belligerent parties should have established preliminaries; and it cannot be denied, that the basis, which the high mediators have proposed, may lead to a delay of those preliminaries, which should serve as the pledge and security for the re-establishment of peace, when, in fact, they really afford none.
But when these preliminaries shall be invariably established, it may be of consequence to determine what duration should be given to the suspension of arms. The plan of the mediators proposes one year; but this term appears too short not to be illusory. In fact, it should be observed, that the fire of war being kindled in the four quarters of the world, one part of the year will have revolved before the orders can be received by the respective commanders; so that tranquillity will be established in Europe, while hostilities continue in America and in the Indies. Besides, all the powers remaining armed, the slightest circ.u.mstance may occasion a violation of the truce.
In fine, it is in vain to flatter ourselves with the hope of concluding a definitive peace in the short s.p.a.ce of one year; as, exclusive of the variety of subjects, that must necessarily be discussed, the two mediating Courts are at a great distance from each other; nor is there less between the belligerent powers; and we should deceive ourselves, if we supposed, that all the propositions, which will be made on the one part, and on the other, will not give room for much debate and altercation; or, that they will not, consequently, consume much time.
To these considerations we ought to add, that an armistice for one year would be very burdensome, because the powers at war will be obliged to remain in arms, to their manifest loss, as it will be impracticable to disarm, as well from the dispersion of the troops, as from the enormous expense, if, (which is highly probable) it should become necessary to renew hostilities. If, then, the mediators wish sincerely to establish the peace they propose, they should prefer a truce of many years to a simple armistice for one year. This expedient is better adapted to consolidate their work, than a suspension of arms for a short time. But a truce will have the same inconveniences, and be equally dangerous with an armistice, if the belligerent powers remain under arms. Thus it seems necessary to agree at the same time reciprocally to disarm.
But supposing these two points settled, there remains another equally important, that is the _statu quo_. Neither France nor Spain have any reason to reject it, so far as they are individually concerned. This is not the case with the Americans. To be satisfied of this, we need only cast our eyes upon the _points_, that the British troops actually occupy upon the continent of North America. The question, then, will be to obtain the consent of the United States, and this consent can only be demanded by the two Courts that offer their mediation, for the reasons that have already been urged.
"ARTICLE IV. _This plan of negotiation being adopted by all the parties, the belligerent powers shall request the mediators to open the conferences of the Congress, and shall without delay give their respective plenipotentiaries such full powers and instructions, as they shall judge necessary for the success of the negotiation._"
The King will conform himself, with as much pleasure as earnestness, to this Article, as soon as the preliminary basis shall be irrevocably established, agreeably to the observation above mentioned. And the King will then authorise his plenipotentiaries to treat immediately of the Preliminary Articles, which should lead to a cessation of hostilities; and, as soon as these Articles shall have been agreed to, to labor with zeal and a.s.siduity for the early conclusion of a definitive treaty. The high mediators may be a.s.sured, that his Majesty will facilitate this double task by every means, which he shall deem compatible with his dignity, with his interest, and with those of his allies; and that as far as depends upon him, they will acquire the glory of having established, upon a solid and unalterable basis, the peace and tranquillity of every part of the world.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] Austria and Russia proposed to act as mediators for a general peace about the beginning of the year 1781. Some particulars on this subject will be found in _John Adams"s Correspondence_, Vol VI. p.