DUMAS.
M. DE SARTINE TO THE COMMISSIONERS.
Translation.
Versailles, November 14th, 1778.
Gentlemen,
I have submitted to the king the reasons, which might determine his Majesty to set at liberty citizens of the United States, prisoners in France. But he has wisely decided, that this favor ought to be granted only to those, who have been taken from American vessels, and compelled to serve against their country; it will, therefore be necessary for you, Gentlemen, to cause a list to be made, certified by yourselves, which you will have the goodness to forward to me, that only the good and faithful subjects of the United States may enjoy the benefit of his Majesty"s favor.
I have the honor to be, &c.
DE SARTINE.
M. DUMAS TO THE COMMISSIONERS.
Translation.
Hague, November 20th, 1778.
Gentlemen,
I returned here last Wednesday morning, and in the afternoon was informed by our friend, that the despotic act, which I announced to you in my last of the 13th of November, was pa.s.sed in the a.s.sembly of the Province, after a session of three hours; and that the preamble with the addition, of which I gave you an account in my letter of the 10th, was adopted by a majority. The city of Amsterdam has in consequence entered a protest against this resolution, declaring it null, as having been adopted contrary to the forms required by the const.i.tution of the State, which prescribes unanimity in such cases.
The injurious consequences which may result to the city are also exposed.
Sir J. Yorke despatched a messenger with all haste to England, with the news of the triumph of his party. His Court will not fail to boast of this success in Parliament and in the journals; it appears to have been desired for this purpose. No mention will be made of the protest, which in reality converts this success into smoke, which will soon be dissipated; for the members from the great city declare, that if the protest is not printed with the resolution, they will have it printed in the city, so that at least this nation shall not be deceived. It is easy to foresee two important consequences resulting from this measure; one, the blow predicted in my letter of the 10th; the other, the close of a famous banking establishment, without which the others cannot stand.
I might enter more into details; but besides that I have not time, I am afraid to trust them to paper. I will only add, that tomorrow morning, the members from the great city will depart, and with them all the glory of Belgium. The others are ashamed of their own work, dare not boast of it, and hang down their heads. It has even been attempted to circulate the report, that the famous resolution was adopted unanimously, and in conformity with the wishes of the great city.
You cannot imagine, Gentlemen, how eager are your enemies in the present situation of affairs, to propagate reports of dissensions and divisions between the Americans and French, and among the Americans themselves; their object is to animate their own party, and discourage their opponents. We may despise them and laugh at them; but your best friends are afflicted, that we receive no news from America by the way of France. I pray G.o.d that we may soon have some, and of the most favorable character.
I am, Gentlemen, &c.
DUMAS.
TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.
Pa.s.sy, January 1st, 1779.
Sir,
Some late proceedings of the enemy have induced us to submit a few observations to your Excellency"s superior light and judgment.
His Britannic Majesty"s Commissioners, in their manifesto of the 3d of October, have denounced "a change in the whole nature and future conduct of the war," they have declared, "that the policy as well as the benevolence of Great Britain has thus far checked the extremes of war," when they tended "to distress the people and desolate the country;" that the whole contest is changed; that the laws of self-preservation must now direct the conduct of Great Britain; that these laws will direct her to render the United States of as little avail as possible to France, if they are to become an accession to her, and by every means in her power to destroy the new connexion contrived for her ruin. Motions have been made and supported by the wisest men in both Houses of Parliament, to address the king to disavow these clauses, but these motions have been rejected by majorities in both Houses, so that the manifesto stands avowed by the three branches of the Legislature.
Ministers of State made in Parliament a question concerning the meaning of this manifesto; but no man who reads it, and knows the history of their past conduct in this war, can doubt its import. There is to be a "change in the nature and conduct of the war." A change for the worse must be horrible indeed! They have already burned the beautiful towns of Charlestown, Falmouth, Norfolk, Kingston, Bedford, Egg Harbour, and German Flatts, besides innumerable single buildings and smaller cl.u.s.ters of houses, wherever their armies have marched. It is true, they left Boston and Philadelphia unhurt, but in all probability it was merely the dread of a superior army, that in these cases restrained their hands, not to mention that burning these towns would have been the ruin of the few secret friends they have still left, of whom there are more in those towns than in all America besides. They have not indeed murdered upon the spot _every_ woman and child that fell in their way, nor have they in _all_ cases refused quarters to the soldiers, that at _all_ times have fallen into their power, though they have in many. They have also done their utmost in seducing negroes and Indians to commit inhuman barbarities upon the inhabitants, sparing neither age, s.e.x, nor character. Although they have not in all cases refused quarter to soldiers and sailors, they have done what is worse than refusing quarters, they have thrust their prisoners into such dungeons, loaded them with such irons, and exposed them to such lingering torments of cold, hunger, and disease, as have destroyed greater numbers than they could have had an opportunity of murdering, if they had made it a rule to give no quarter. Many others they have compelled by force to serve and fight on board their ships, against fathers, brothers, friends and countrymen; a destiny to every sensible mind more terrible than death itself.
It is therefore difficult to comprehend what they mean by a change in the conduct of the war, yet there seems to be no room to doubt, that they mean to threaten something more cruel, greater extremes of war, measures that shall distress the people and lay waste the country more than any thing they have yet done. "The object of the war is now entirely changed." Heretofore their ma.s.sacres and conflagrations were to divide us and reclaim us to Great Britain. Now, despairing of that end, and perceiving that we shall be faithful to our treaties, their principle is by destroying us to make us useless to France. This principle ought to be held in abhorrence, not only by all christians, but by all civilized nations. If it is once admitted, that powers at war have a right to do whatever will weaken or terrify an enemy, it is not possible to foresee where it will end. It would be possible to burn the great cities of Europe. The savages, who torture their prisoners, do it to make themselves terrible; in fine, all the horrors of the barbarous ages may be introduced and justified.
The cruelties of our enemies have heretofore more than once exasperated the minds of the people so much as to excite apprehensions, that they would proceed to retaliation, which, if once commenced, might be carried to extremities; to prevent which, the Congress issued an address exhorting to forbearance and a further trial by examples of generosity and lenity, to recall their enemies to the practice of humanity amidst the calamities of war. In consequence of which, neither the Congress, nor any of the States apart, have ever exercised or authorised the exercise of the right of retaliation. But now, that Commissioners vested with the authority of the nation have avowed such principles, and published such threats, the Congress have, by a resolution of the 30th of October, solemnly and unanimously declared that they will retaliate. Whatever may be the pretences of the enemy, it is the manifest drift of their policy to disgust the people of America with their new alliance, by attempting to convince them that instead of shielding them from distress, it has acc.u.mulated additional calamities upon them.
Nothing, certainly, can more become a great and amiable character than to disappoint their purpose, stop the progress of their cruelties, and vindicate the rights of humanity which are so much injured by this manifesto. We therefore beg leave to suggest to your Excellency"s consideration, whether it would not be advisable for his Majesty to interfere, by some declaration to the Court of London and to the world, bearing the royal testimony against this barbarous mode of war, and giving a.s.surances, that he will join the United States in retaliation, if Great Britain by putting her threats in execution should make it necessary. There is another measure, however, more effectual to control their designs, and to bring the war to a speedy conclusion; that of sending a powerful fleet, sufficient to secure a naval superiority over them in the American seas. Such a naval force, acting in concert with the armies of the United States, would, in all human probability, take and destroy the whole British power in that part of the world. It would put their wealth and West Indian commerce into the power of France, and reduce them to the necessity of suing for peace. Upon their present naval superiority in those seas depend not only the dominion and rich commerce of their islands, but the supply of their fleets and armies with provisions and every necessary.
They have nearly four hundred transports constantly employed in the service of their fleet and army in America, pa.s.sing from New York and Rhode Island to England, Ireland, Nova Scotia, and their West India Islands, and if any one link in this chain was struck off, if their supplies from any one of these places should be interrupted, their forces could not subsist. Great numbers of these vessels would necessarily fall into the hands of the French fleet, and go as prizes to a sure market in the United States. Great numbers of seamen too would become prisoners, a loss that England cannot repair. It is conceived, that it would be impossible for Great Britain to send a very great fleet after the French into those seas. Their men of war, now in Europe, are too old, too rotten, too ill manned, and their masts and yards are of too bad materials to endure such a navigation.
The impossibility of their obtaining provisions, artists and materials in that country, which would be easy to the French, makes it still clearer that they cannot send a great additional force, and the fear of Spain"s interfering, with her powerful navy, would restrain them.
Whereas France has nothing to fear in Europe from them, as the number and excellence of their armies are an ample security against the feeble land forces of Great Britain.
This naval superiority would open such commerce between the United States and the French West India islands, as would enable our people to supply themselves with the European and West India articles they want, to send abroad the produce of the country, and by giving fresh spirit and vigor to trade, would employ the paper currency, the want of which employ has been one cause of its depreciation. The maintenance of such a fleet in America, would circulate so many bills of exchange as would likewise, in a great measure, relieve them from that dangerous evil. And these bills would all return to France for her manufactures, thereby cementing the connexion and extending the trade between the two countries. Such a naval superiority would contribute very much to extinguish the hopes of the remaining number of persons who secretly wish, from sinister motives, to become again subjected to Great Britain, and would enable the people of the several States to give such consistency and stability to their infant governments, as would contribute greatly to their internal repose, as well as to the vigor of their future operations against the common enemy. The late speedy supply and reparation of his Majesty"s fleet at Boston will show the advantages, which this country must enjoy in carrying on a naval war, on a coast friendly to her and hostile to her enemy. And these advantages will in future be more sensible, because the appearance of the fleet before was unexpected, and the harvest in that part of the country had been unfavorable. It is obvious to all Europe, that nothing less is at stake than the dominion of the sea, at least the superiority of naval power, and we cannot expect Great Britain will ever give it up, without some decisive effort on the part of France. With such an exertion as that of sending a superior fleet to America, we see nothing in the course of human affairs, that can possibly prevent France from obtaining such a naval superiority without delay. Without it the war may languish for years, to the infinite distress of our country, to the exhausting both of France and England, and the question left to be decided by another war.
We are more earnest, in representing these things to your Excellency, as all our correspondence from England, for some time, has uniformly represented that the intention of the Cabinet is conformable to the spirit of the manifesto, that all parties grow more and more out of temper with the Americans; that it has become fashionable with the minority as well as the majority and administration, to reproach us both in and out of Parliament; that all parties join in speaking of us in the bitterest terms, and in heartily wishing our destruction; that great clamors are raised about our alliance with France, as an unnatural combination to ruin them; that the cry is for a speedy and powerful reinforcement of their army, and for the activity of their fleet in making descents on the sea coast, while murdering and desolating parties are let loose upon the frontiers of the Carolinas, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and New England, and, that very early in the year, they will carry all these projects into execution. This whole system may, as we conceive, be defeated and the power of Great Britain now in America totally subdued (and if their power is subdued there, it is reduced every where,) by the measure we have the honor to propose.
We submit the whole merely as our opinion to your Excellency"s superior wisdom, and have the honor to be, &c.
B. FRANKLIN, ARTHUR LEE, JOHN ADAMS.
TO M. DE SARTINE.
Pa.s.sy, January 2d, 1779.
Sir,
We had the honor of receiving your Excellency"s letter of the 22d, and are much obliged to you for the interest you take in what concerns the unhappy prisoners, who may escape from England. We have not been inattentive to that subject. There are persons who supply them at Bordeaux, Brest, L"Orient, Nantes, and Dunkirk. A gentleman at Calais has voluntarily done this service, for which we have directed him to draw on us for his disburs.e.m.e.nts; and we shall as readily discharge what may have been disbursed by your commissaries, when we have their accounts.
As there is very little probability of prisoners coming to other ports, we will not give your Excellency the trouble you are so good as to offer to take.
The regulation your Excellency proposes, relative to the prisoners we may take from the enemy and bring into the ports of France, is entirely agreeable to us; and we shall direct our agents accordingly, who will readily deliver such prisoners to the persons your Excellency may appoint to receive them, having already requested us to procure written orders from you, without which your commissaries were unwilling to take charge of them.
We have the honor to be, &c.
B. FRANKLIN, ARTHUR LEE, JOHN ADAMS.
M. DE SARTINE TO THE COMMISSIONERS.
Translation.
Versailles, January 13th, 1779.
Gentlemen,