It is not from the vain wish of seeing my poor name upon a treaty, that I write this. If the business is well done, it is not of much importance in itself who does it.
But my duty to my country obliges me to say, that I seriously believe this clandestine manner of smuggling treaties is contrived by European politicians on purpose, that Mr Jay and I may not have an opportunity of suggesting ideas for the preservation of American navigation, transport-trade, and nurseries of seamen. But in another point of view it is of equal importance. This method reflects contempt and ridicule on your other Ministers. When all Europe sees, that a number of your Ministers are kept here as a kind of satellites to Dr Franklin in the affair of peace, but that they are not to be consulted or asked a question, or even permitted to know the important negotiations which are here going on with all Europe, they fall into contempt. It cannot be supposed that Congress mean to cast this contempt upon us, because it cannot be supposed they mean to destroy the reputation, character, influence, and usefulness of those to whom in other respects they intrust powers of so much consequence; and therefore I am persuaded, that Congress is as much imposed on by it as the Courts of Europe are.
I asked the Baron, what was the substance of the treaty. He said his Court had taken for a model, my treaty with Holland. I said nothing to him in answer to this, but I beg leave to say to Congress, that the negotiation with Holland was in very different circ.u.mstances. We were then in the fiercest rage of the war. A treaty with that Republic was at that time of as much weight in the war, as the captivity of Burgoyne or Cornwallis. A treaty with any power was worth a battle or a siege, and no moments of time were to be lost, especially in a country so divided, that unanimity being necessary, every proposition was dangerous. At present the case is altered, and we may take time to weigh and inquire. The Baron tells me, that St Thomas and St John, two of their Islands, are free ports, but that St Croix, which is of more importance than both, is not. That foreign vessels, our vessels, are permitted to bring our produce, and carry away half the value in sugar, &c. The Island produces, _communibus annis_, twenty thousand hogsheads of sugar, and their mola.s.ses is better than that of the French, because they make only "_sucres crutes_." He says, they have some sugar-houses at Copenhagen. But notwithstanding this, I think it is worth while for Congress to try if they cannot, by the treaty, obtain a right to take away cargoes, to the full value of those they bring. It is worth while to try too, if we cannot obtain a tariff, to ascertain the duties to be paid in exportation and importation. It is worth while too, to endeavor to get the duties ascertained in the Danish ports in Europe, at least that we may not pay in their ports more than they pay in ours; or that our vessels may not be obliged to pay more than theirs, especially when we import our own produce. I pretend not to be a master of these commercial subjects, but I think that Dr Franklin has not studied the subject more than myself, that both of us need the advice of Mr Laurens and Mr Jay, and that all of us want that of American merchants, and especially of Congress. I am therefore against this secret and hasty method of concluding treaties, at this time, when they may be more maturely reflected on.
I know very well to what ill-natured remarks these reflections are liable, but they shall not hinder me from doing my duty. I do sincerely believe, there are clandestine insinuations going about to every commercial nation in the world, to excite them to increase their own navigation and seamen at the expense of ours, and that this smuggling of treaties is one means of accomplishing the design, although Dr Franklin may not be let into the secret of it. For, from long experience and observation, I am persuaded that one Minister at least and his dependants would prefer, that the navigation of any nation in the world, even that of the English, should grow, rather than ours. In the last _Courier de l"Europe_, it is said, that all the commercial powers are concerting measures to clip the wings of the eagle, and to prevent us from having a navy. I believe it. That is to say, I believe measures are taken with them all to bring them into this system, although they are not let into the secret design, and do not know from whom the measures come, nor with what views promoted.
With great regard, I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[11] Franklin did not a.s.sume this authority, but reported to Congress, that propositions for treaties had been made, and desired that authority to conclude them might be sent to him, or _some other person_. See on this subject, _Franklin"s Correspondence_, Vol. IV.
pp. 74, 97, 99, 110, 114, 141. For the treaty with Sweden he had a special authority. _Secret Journals_, Vol. III. p 240.
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, August 15th, 1783.
Sir,
France, England, Spain, and America are all agreed; but Mr Hartley is sanguine, that the treaty will not be signed, because, he says, the Count de Vergennes does not mean to sign it. His reasons for this opinion I know not, and I think he is mistaken. It is very certain, however, that the French Minister is embarra.s.sed, and would not, perhaps, be sorry to find good reasons for postponing the signature for some time.
Congress may judge in some degree of the situation of things, by the following conversation, which I had this morning with M. Brantzen, the Amba.s.sador Extraordinary from the States-General, to whom I returned the visit he made me yesterday, when I was abroad.
He told me, "that he was as far, and indeed farther than ever, from an agreement with the Duke of Manchester. He had given up, he said, all pretensions to a compensation for the unjust damages of the war, and he had in a manner waived his claim of the rest.i.tution of Negapatnam.
But the Duke of Manchester now insisted peremptorily upon, not only all the ancient salutations from the Dutch flag to the English, but upon an unlimited liberty of navigation in all the seas of the East Indies. He had despatched an express to the Hague the day before yesterday, who would arrive today; but the Grand Pensionary was sick, and the States of Holland not sitting; so that there must be some time before he could have an answer. Concerning the salutes to the flag, there would be different opinions, but they would be all of a mind against the liberty of navigation in the Indies. He could not, therefore, expect from their High Mightinesses permission to sign, and the Count de Vergennes would be embarra.s.sed. All the other powers were ready, and to make them wait would raise a cry.
"To sign without Holland would raise a terrible storm in Holland against the Count, and no small one in France. And even, if the States should authorise him to sign a shameful peace, this would raise no less clamor in Holland and France against the Count. He will, therefore, not know what to do, and will seek to postpone; for the parties of the Marquis de Castries and of M. de Breteuil will take advantage of every clamor against the Count, as these parties wish M.
de Breteuil in his place. I am persuaded, therefore, that the Count himself looks upon his own situation as very hazardous. It has been so a long time. It was his instability in his place that made him sign the preliminaries, for money to carry on the war could not be obtained without M. Necker, and M. Necker would not come in with the Count, as they were and are sworn enemies to each other. He was, therefore, reduced to the dilemma to make peace or go out. I have good reasons to believe, that the Mareschal de Castries disapproves of the Count"s conduct towards our Republic. He certainly deceived me. The States-General did very wrong to bind me to leave so much to the French Minister; but I thought him an honest man, and that I could trust him; so I left things to him, according to my instructions, depending on his word, and, at last, I found myself the dupe. No, not a dupe, for I am always upon my guard not to be a dupe. But he deceived me; and when one, whom I have reason to believe an honest man, deceives me, I cannot call myself a dupe, for I can do no other than believe an honest man, when he gives me his word."
In several of your letters, Sir, you have insisted on my reciting to you my conversations with foreign Ministers. You must not esteem them infallible oracles. They are often mistaken in their facts, and sometimes wrong in their reasonings. But these sentiments of M.
Brantzen are of so much importance, that I thought proper to recite them. It will, indeed, be necessary for your foreign Ministers to be more inquisitive than we have been, and to transmit to Congress more information concerning the intrigues of Courts, than we have done. If the Mareschal de Castries and M. de Breteuil, who is now in the Council, and M. Necker are not friends to the Count de Vergennes, and all the world here agree they are not, Congress ought to know it.
Although I would have so much respect to the Queen, as not to name her Majesty upon unnecessary occasions, yet, upon this, when she is sister to the Emperor, and the question at Court is, whether there shall be a war with her brother, it is obviously a matter of so much importance, as to make it a duty to communicate to Congress her sentiments, which all men here agree are favorable to de Castries and Breteuil, but not partial to the present Minister of foreign Affairs. I said in a former letter, if this Minister continues, there will be war; but I am told by some, if there is war, he cannot continue; for neither he, nor his friends, can raise the money. M. de Rayneval, however, affirmed positively to Mr Hartley, that nothing but death could remove the Count.[12]
All these things show the critical and uncertain const.i.tution of this Court, and the uncertainty when the definitive treaty will be signed, notwithstanding that four powers are agreed, and, therefore, I can give Congress no clear information upon that head. This is a great chagrin to me, both on account of the public and myself, because I am as uncertain about my own destiny as that of the public.
With great respect, I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[12] This affirmation was verified. The Count de Vergennes continued in the Ministry till his death, which happened, February 13th, 1787.
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Paris, September 5th 1783.
Sir,
On Wednesday, the 3d day of this month, the American Ministers met the British Minister at his lodgings at the _Hotel de York_, and signed, sealed, and delivered the Definitive Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the King of Great Britain. Although it is but a confirmation or repet.i.tion of the provisional articles, I have the honor to congratulate Congress upon it, as it is a completion of the work of peace, and the best that we could obtain. Nothing remains now to be done but a treaty of commerce; but this in my opinion cannot be negotiated without a new commission from Congress to some one or more persons. Time, it is easy to foresee, will not be likely to render the British nation more disposed to a regulation of commerce favorable to us, and therefore my advice is to issue a commission as soon as may be.
There is another subject on which I beg leave to represent to Congress my sentiments, because they seem to me of importance, and because they differ from many sanguine opinions, which will be communicated to the members of that a.s.sembly from partisans both of England and France.
In the late deliberations concerning an acceptance of the mediation of the Imperial Courts, the British Minister refused it, and in the conferences we had with the Count de Vergennes upon this subject, it was manifest enough to me that he was not fond of our accepting it; for although he maintained a perfect impartiality of language, neither advising us for, nor against the measure, yet at last, when it was observed that Mr Hartley was averse to it, he turned to Dr Franklin and said, that we must agree with Mr Hartley about it, with such a countenance, air, and tone of voice (for from these you must often collect the sentiments of Ministers) as convinced me he did not wish the mediation should take place.
It was not a subject which would bear insisting on either way. I therefore made no difficulty. But I am, upon recollection, fully of opinion that we should have done wisely to have sent our letter to the Imperial Ministers, accepting the mediation on our part. The signature of these Ministers would have given reputation in Europe and among our own citizens. I mention these, because I humbly conceive that Congress ought, in all their proceedings, to consider the opinion that the United States or the people of America will entertain of themselves.
We may call this national vanity or national pride, but it is the main principle of the national sense of its own dignity, and a pa.s.sion in human nature, without which nations cannot preserve the character of man. Let the people lose this sentiment, as in Poland, and a part.i.tion of their country will soon take place. Our country has but lately been a dependent one, and our people although enlightened and virtuous, have had their minds and hearts habitually filled with all the pa.s.sions of a dependent and subordinate people; that is to say, with fear, with diffidence, and distrust of themselves, with admiration of foreigners, &c. Now I say, that it is one of the most necessary and one of the most difficult branches of the policy of Congress to eradicate from the American mind, every remaining fibre of this fear and self-diffidence on one hand, and of this excessive admiration of foreigners on the other.
It cannot be doubted one moment, that a solemn acknowledgment of us by the signature of the two Imperial Courts would have had such a tendency in the minds of our countrymen. But we should also consider, upon every occasion, how our reputation will be affected in Europe. We shall not find it easy to keep up the respect for us, that has been excited by the continual publication of the exploits of this war. In the calm of peace, little will be said about us in Europe unless we prepare for it, but by those who have designs upon us. We may depend upon it, everything will be said in Europe and in the gazettes, which anybody in Europe wants to have repeated in America, to make such impressions upon the minds of our citizens, as he desires. It will become us, therefore, to do everything in our power to make reasonable and just impressions upon the public opinion in Europe. The signature of the two Imperial Courts would have made a deep and important impression in our favor, upon full one half of Europe, as friends to those Courts, and upon all the other half as enemies.
I need not explain myself further. I may however add, that Americans can scarcely conceive the decisive influence of the governments of Europe upon their people. Every nation is a piece of clockwork, every wheel is under the absolute direction of the sovereign as its weight or spring. In consequence of this, all that moiety of mankind that are subject to the two imperial Courts and their allies, would, in consequence of their mediation have been openly and decidedly our friends at this hour, and the other half of Europe would certainly have respected us more for this. But at present, the two Imperial Courts not having signed the treaty, all their friends are left in a state of doubt and timidity concerning us. From all the conversations I have had with the Count de Mercy and M. Markoff, it is certain that the two Courts wished, as these Ministers certainly were ambitious to, sign our treaty. They and their sovereigns wished that their names might be read in America, and there respected as our friends. But this is now past. England and France will be most perfectly united in all artifices and endeavors to keep down our reputation at home and abroad, to mortify our self-conceit, and to lessen us in the opinion of the world. If we will not see, we must be the dupes; we need not, for we have in our own power, with the common blessing, the means of everything we want. There is but one course now left to retrieve the error, and that is to send a Minister to Vienna with power to make a treaty with both the Imperial Courts. Congress must send a Minister first, or it will never be done. The Emperor never sends first, nor will England ever send a Minister to America, until Congress shall have sent one to London.
To form immediate commercial connexions with that half of Europe, which ever has been, and with little variations ever will be, opposite to the House of Bourbon, is a fundamental maxim of that system of American politics, which I have pursued invariably from the beginning of this war. It is the only means of preserving the respect of the House of Bourbon itself; it is the only means in conjunction with our connexions with the House of Bourbon, already formed, to secure us the respect of England for any length of time, and to keep us out of another war with that kingdom. It is, in short, the only possible means of securing to our country that peace, neutrality, impartiality, and indifference in European wars, which, in my opinion, we shall be unwise in the last degree, if we do not maintain. It is, besides, the only way in which we can improve and extend our commercial connexions to the best advantage.
With great respect, I am,
JOHN ADAMS.
TO ELIAS BOUDINOT, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Paris, September 8th, 1783.
Sir,
Yesterday morning Mr Jay informed me, that Dr Franklin had received, and soon after the Doctor put into my hands, the resolution of Congress of the 1st of May,[13] ordering a commission and instructions to be prepared to those gentlemen and myself for making a Treaty of Commerce with Great Britain. This resolution, with your Excellency"s letter, arrived very seasonably, as Mr Hartley was setting off for London with information from us, that our powers were executed.
I am very sensible of the honor, that is done me by this resolution of Congress, and of the great importance of the business committed to our care; and shall not, therefore, hesitate to take a part in it. I can attend to this business, and at the same time have some care of your affairs in Holland; and in case the present loan should be full in the course of the next winter, I can open a new one, either by going to Amsterdam, or by having the obligation sent to me in Paris to be signed. In this way there will be no additional expense to the public, as I have informed M. Dumas, that there must be no expense made at the Hague on my account, or on account of Congress, but that all his expenses must be borne by himself, or he must at least settle them with Congress. I have so much regard for this gentleman, and such an opinion of his worth and merit, that I cannot but recommend him upon this occasion to Congress, for the commission of Secretary of that Legation, but as economy is and ought to be carefully attended to, I presume not to point out the salary, which will be proper. There are so many ways of pillaging public men in Europe, that it will be difficult for Congress to conceive the expenses, which are unavoidable in these countries.
If the principle of economy should restrain Congress from sending Ministers to Vienna, Petersburg, Copenhagen and Lisbon, they will probably send a commission to Paris to negotiate treaties there, because I think it will appear to be of great importance, both in a political and commercial light, to have treaties with these powers. If this should be the case, as three of us will be now obliged to attend at Paris the tedious negotiation with every Court, we can all at the same time and with the same expense attend to the negotiations with the other powers; which will afford to all an opportunity of throwing in any hints, which may occur for the public good, and will have a much better appearance in the eyes of Europe and America. I do not hesitate, therefore, to request, that if such a commission or commissions should be sent, that all your Ministers in Europe may be inserted in it. If the arrangement should make any difficulty in America, it will make none with me; for although I think there was good reason for the order in which the names stand in the new commission for peace, and in the resolution for a new commission for a treaty of commerce, that reason will not exist in any future commission.
Mr Hartley"s powers are sufficient to go through the negotiation with us, and I suppose it will be chiefly conducted at Paris, yet we may all think it proper to make a tour to London, for a few weeks especially, in case any material obstacle should arise. We are told, that such a visit would have a good effect at Court and with the nation; at least, it seems clear it would do no harm.
With the greatest respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant,
JOHN ADAMS.