The conversation next turned to our negotiation with Spain, and to her claims east of the Mississippi. Nothing new pa.s.sed on the first topic; as to the latter, the Count made only some very general remarks, such as that he hoped we should, on conferring further about the matter, approach nearer to each other; that those limits ought to be settled, and while they remained in contest, a treaty with Spain could not reasonably be expected; that as soon as we should agree upon those points, Count d"Aranda would have a further or more formal commission to conclude the treaty, &c.
I remarked, that these claims of Spain were of recent date, for that on my first arriving in Spain, the Count de Florida Blanca told me, that the success of my mission would probably turn upon one single point, viz. the cession of our rights to the navigation of the river Mississippi; from which, as well as from their subsequent and uniform demands on that head, it was evident, that they then considered that river as our boundary; for it would have been very strange indeed, that they should insist on our forbearing to navigate a river, whose waters washed no part of our country, and to which we could not, of consequence, have any pretence of claim.
The Count smiled, but avoided making any direct reply; he hoped we should, nevertheless, agree, and that we must endeavor to approach and meet each other. I told him I could not flatter myself with such expectations, while Spain continued her claims to those countries, for that we should be content with no boundary short of the Mississippi.
I went from the Count"s to M. Rayneval"s chamber, for I had not seen him since his return from England. He gave me the same reason for his journey, which I had just received from the Count. We then talked of his memoir and the Spanish negotiation. He said much in favor of the conciliatory line he had proposed, and of the advantages of placing the Indian nations on the _west_ side of it, under the _protection_ of Spain, and those on the _east_, under that of the United States; that the rights of those nations would be thereby secured, and future disputes between us and Spain avoided. I replied, that so far as our claims might affect those Indian nations, it was a matter solely between us and them; and that admitting them to be independent, they certainly had a right to choose their own protectors; and, therefore, that we could have no right, without their knowledge or consent, to choose for them. I also made the same remark to him respecting the recency of these Spanish claims, which I had just before done to Count de Vergennes. He said it was a subject which Count de Florida Blanca had not understood, and imputed their former ideas of our extending to the Mississippi, to their ignorance respecting those matters; hence it became evident, from whom they had borrowed their present ideas.
On the 27th of September, Mr Vaughan returned here from England with the courier that brought Mr Oswald"s new commission, and very happy were we to see it. Copies of it have already been sent to you, so that I will not lengthen this letter by inserting it here; nor will I add anything further on this head at present, than to a.s.sure you, that Mr Vaughan greatly merits our acknowledgments.
The next thing to be done, was to prepare and draw up the proposed articles. They were soon completed and settled between us and Mr Oswald, by whom they were sent to his Court, with letters declaring his opinion, that they ought to be accepted and agreed to; but they differed with him in opinion.[6]
These articles, for very obvious reasons, were not communicated to the Count de Vergennes.
Mr Oswald did not receive any opinion from his Court relating to our articles until the 23d of October, when letters from the Minister informed him, that the extent of our boundaries, and the situation of the tories, &c. caused some objections, and the Minister"s Secretary was on the way here to confer with us on those subjects.
On the 24th of October, I dined at Pa.s.sy with Dr Franklin, where I found M. Rayneval. After dinner, we were in private with him a considerable time. He desired to know the state of our negotiation with Mr Oswald. We told him, that difficulties had arisen about our boundaries, and that one of the Minister"s Secretaries was coming here with papers and doc.u.ments on that subject. He asked us what boundaries we claimed. We told him, the river St John to the east, and ancient Canada, as described in the proclamation, to the north. He contested our right to such an extent to the north, and entered into several arguments to show our claim to be ill founded. These arguments were chiefly drawn from the ancient French claims, and from a clause in the proclamation restraining governors from making grants in the Indian country, &c.
He inquired what we demanded as to the fisheries. We answered, that we insisted on enjoying a right in common to them with Great Britain. He intimated that our views should not extend further than a coast fishery, and insinuated that pains had lately been taken in the eastern States to excite their apprehensions, and increase their demands on that head. We told him that such a right was essential to us, and that our people would not be content to make peace without it; and Dr Franklin explained very fully, their great importance to the eastern States in particular. He then softened his manner and observed, that it was natural for France to wish better to us than to England; but as the fisheries were a great nursery for seamen, we might suppose that England would be disinclined to admit others to share in it, and that for his part he wished there might be as few obstacles to a peace as possible. He reminded us, also, that Mr Oswald"s new commission had been issued posterior to his arrival at London.
On the 26th of October, Mr Adams arrived here, and in him I have found a very able and agreeable coadjutor.
When I began this letter, I did not flatter myself with being able to write this much before Captain Barney would leave us; and I now find myself too much exhausted to proceed with further details, and must therefore refer you to the letters you will receive from Mr Adams and Dr Franklin.
The same reason also prevents my writing to you and Mr Morris on other subjects by Captain Barney, and I hope the length of this letter, and the disagreeable state of my health will apologise for my not writing even to my own family by this opportunity.
I am sensible of the impression which this letter will make upon you and upon Congress, and how it will affect the confidence they have in this Court. These are critical times, and great necessity there is for prudence and secrecy.
So far, and in such matters as this Court may think it their interest to support us, they certainly will, but no further, in my opinion.
They are interested in separating us from Great Britain, and, on that point we may, I believe, depend upon them; but it is not their interest that we should become a great and formidable people, and therefore they will not help us to become so.
It is not their interest that such a treaty should be formed between us and Britain, as would produce cordiality and mutual confidence.
They will, therefore, endeavor to plant such seeds of jealousy, discontent, and discord in it as may naturally and perpetually keep our eyes fixed on France for security. This consideration must induce them to wish to render Britain formidable in our neighborhood, and to leave us as few resources of wealth and power as possible.
It is their interest to keep some point or other in contest between us and Britain to the end of the war, to prevent the possibility of our sooner agreeing, and thereby keep us employed in the war, and dependent on them for supplies. Hence they have favored, and will continue to favor, the British demands as to matters of boundary and the tories.
The same views will render them desirous to continue the war in our country as long as possible, nor do I believe they will take any measures for our repossession of New York, unless the certainty of its evacuation should render such an attempt advisable. The Count de Vergennes lately said, that there could be no great use in expeditions to take places, which must be given up to us at a peace.
Such being our situation, it appears to me advisable to keep up our army to the end of the war, even if the enemy should evacuate our country; nor does it appear to me prudent to listen to any overtures for carrying a part of it to the West Indies, in case of such an event.
I think we have no rational dependence except on G.o.d and ourselves, nor can I yet be persuaded that Great Britain has either wisdom, virtue, or magnanimity enough to adopt a perfect and liberal system of conciliation. If they again thought they could conquer us, they would again attempt it.
We are, nevertheless, thank G.o.d, in a better situation than we have been. As our independence is acknowledged by Britain, every obstacle to our forming treaties with neutral powers, and receiving their merchant ships, is at an end, so that we may carry on the war with greater advantage than before, in case our negotiations for peace should be fruitless.
It is not my meaning, and therefore I hope I shall not be understood to mean, that we should deviate in the least from our treaty with France; our honor, and our interest are concerned in inviolably adhering to it. I mean only to say, that if we lean on her love of liberty, her affection for America, or her disinterested magnanimity, we shall lean on a broken reed, that will sooner or later pierce our hands, and Geneva as well as Corsica justifies this observation.
I have written many disagreeable things in this letter, but I thought it my duty. I have also deviated from my instructions, which though not to be justified, will, I hope, be excused on account of the singular and unforeseen circ.u.mstances which occasioned it.
Let me again recommend secrecy, and believe me to be, Dear Sir, &c.
JOHN JAY.
_P. S._ I have neither seen nor heard anything of Mr Laurens, nor of the cypher you mention to have sent by him.
FOOTNOTES:
[3] Afterwards Sir William Jones.
[4] See this warrant in the Correspondence of the Commissioners for making Peace, under the date here mentioned.
[5] When the Treaty was made with France, M. Gerard, who negotiated it on the part of the French Court, did not show his commission to treat till the Commissioners met him for the last time, and just before the signing of the Treaty. Mr Jay was more particular, however, on this point, and seemed disinclined to commence the negotiation in any form, till the powers had been exchanged.
[6] See these articles in the Correspondence of the Commissioners for Peace.
_Observations on the above Letter by the Editor._
Although in the present work I have carefully refrained from expressing any opinions on the contents of the letters, or views of the writers, not feeling authorised by the resolution of Congress, under which these papers are published, to a.s.sume the task of a commentator or critic, yet in regard to the preceding letter I cannot hesitate to make an exception to this rule, and for reasons which I trust will appear obvious and satisfactory.
On the main topics of the above letter, I have read in the office of Foreign Affairs in London the confidential correspondence of the British Ministers with their Commissioners for negotiating peace in Paris. I have also read in the French office of Foreign Affairs the entire correspondence of the Count de Vergennes, during the whole war, with the French Ministers in this country, developing the policy and designs of the French Court in regard to the war, and the objects to be attained by the peace. I have moreover read the instructions of the Count de Vergennes to M. de Rayneval, when he went to London, and the correspondence which pa.s.sed between them while he remained there, containing notes of conversations with Lord Shelburne on one part, and Count de Vergennes" opinions on the other. After examining the subject with all the care and accuracy, which these means of information have enabled me to give to it, I am prepared to express my belief most fully, that Mr Jay was mistaken both in regard to the aims of the French Court, and the plans pursued by them to gain their supposed ends.
1. Mr Jay conceived, that one motive of M. de Rayneval"s journey was to cause the acknowledgment of independence by Great Britain to be deferred, till France and England should have arranged their treaty.
But in reality, M. de Rayneval was instructed to insist on the independence of the United States as a _preliminary measure_. In a letter to the Count de Vergennes, dated September 28th, 1782, he writes, that Lord Shelburne said, "he had always been opposed to independence, but that he perceived the necessity of ceding it, and that this object should be granted _without condition_." And in reporting the result of his conversations with the British Minister, M. de Rayneval states the points discussed in their order, the first of which is as follows.--"_Independence, this article is agreed upon; it shall be without restriction_;" (il sera sans restriction.) So far from recommending, therefore, to defer the recognition of American independence, M. de Rayneval insisted on an agreement to it as _a preliminary step_ to further discussions.
2. Mr Jay supposed again, that another purpose of M. de Rayneval"s visit to London was to interfere with the claims of the United States respecting the fisheries and boundaries. But this supposition is contradicted by the following extract from his instructions, viz. "As it is possible, that the English Ministers may speak to M. de Rayneval concerning the affairs of America and of the United Provinces, he will declare, _that he has no authority to treat on these topics_."
Accordingly we find him writing to the Count de Vergennes in the letter quoted above, that after discussing the subject of the fisheries with reference to the interests of England and France, Lord Shelburne said to him, "without doubt the Americans will also form pretensions to the fisheries, but he trusted the king (of France) would not sustain them." To which M. de Rayneval replied,--"that he was ignorant of the views of Congress concerning the object in question, but thought he might venture to say, that the king would never support unjust demands; that he was not able to judge whether those of the Americans were such or not; and that, besides, _he was without authority in this respect_." Again, in the same letter, M. de Rayneval adds; "Lord Shelburne said he had foreseen that there would be a great deal of difficulty with the Americans, as well in regard to boundaries, as to the fishery of Newfoundland; but he hoped that the king would not sustain them in their demands. I answered, that I did not doubt the earnest desire of the king to do all in his power to restrain them within the bounds of justice and reason. As to the extent of the boundaries, I supposed the Americans would regulate it by their charts; but the discussion was not continued far, _because it did not pertain to me either to uphold or weaken the pretension of America_, with which I was unacquainted. I added only, that the English Ministry ought to find in the negotiations of 1754, relative to the Ohio, the limits which England, then the sovereign of America, believed it proper to a.s.sign."
The above extracts, it must be kept in mind, are from the confidential letters written at the time between M. de Rayneval and Count de Vergennes. The purport of them is corroborated by testimony that might be drawn from other sources. They show most clearly, that Mr Jay"s suspicions were in reality erroneous, on whatever grounds he might at the time suppose them to rest. M. de Rayneval"s visit to London had nothing to do with American affairs, except to insist on unconditional independence.
Nor is it improbable, that the change in Mr Oswald"s commission was effected in consequence of M. de Rayneval"s representations; for the agreement on the part of the British Minister to cede independence "_without restriction_" was made before Mr Vaughan"s arrival in London, as a messenger from Mr Jay.
These facts go far to rescue the French Ministry from the censure, which it has been usual to cast on them, respecting their supposed policy in the negotiations for peace. Whoever will examine all the testimony that exists on the subject will be convinced, that some grave particulars have crept into our history, which have a slender foundation in fact, and which bestow but scanty justice on the motives, conduct, and policy of the first ally of the United States.[7]
JARED SPARKS.
FOOTNOTES:
[7] For a further elucidation of this subject see the North American Review for January, 1830, No. LXVI, p. 15. Also Mr Livingston"s letter to Mr Jay, dated January 4th, 1783, in the present volume.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.
Philadelphia, November 23d, 1782.